Ask the Scholar
Page 27 of 38
I can add historical knowledge about this page.
Page image
OCR
SECRET
9
We do with gruss
-28-
in they pay no,
seeking to depart those areas to return to port. Our purpose
would be to show Western determination and to apply immediate
military pressure on the USSR, even before the substantial
use of ground force could be mounted, in order to influence basic
Soviet political decisions.
If the Soviets nonetheless continued passive interference,
the airlift could be hobbled. For passive measures could restrict
us to visual flight; and visual flight would not be sufficient
to moye the needed goods and supplies to Berlin in the long run,
as the stockpiles there became depleted. If passive interference
were continued, therefore, we - should then resort to substantial
ground force to restore our access.
C. The Use of Force
to at same turn as an
tropic
Theiuse of force to restore access should begin with a
sizable probe ao say a battalion - to establish the fact that
access to Berlin is physically blocked. Then resort should bei
had to an operation involving substantial non-nuclear force.
Whether this operation takes place at once or not would depend
on the state of preparations.
The purpose of the operation would not be the military
one of defeating all the Soviet forces which might oppose
our forces; this would not be feasible.
It would be the political purpose of moving the Soviets
to negotiate a resumption of access by giving the most con
vincing demonstration of which the West was capable that
the Western Allies were not prepared to submit to Soviet
demands and would use whatever force was necessary, up to an
including general war, in resisting them.
The Western force should thus be large enough so that the
Soviets would appreciate the great risk that conflict involving
this force would, if not terminated by early negotiations, get
out of control and escalate into nuclear war. This means, among
other things, that:
(a) The force should not be susceptible of being
stopped by the GDR. The JCS believe that 7 divisions and
4
air wings would achieve this end.
Supper 2069 + 2070
(b)
SECRET
1907/305
Page data
- Page
- 27
- Source index
- 0
- Type
- photo
- Media ID
- 0a83b8a76f0630fa
- Size
- unknown
Document data
- ID
- 6037283
- Core
- doc
- Type
- document
DTO data
{
"id": "6037283",
"sourceUrl": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/6037283",
"contentType": "document",
"title": "Memorandum for the President - Preliminary Draft - The Berlin Crisis",
"citationUrl": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/6037283",
"collections": [
"Robert S. McNamara Papers",
"Records Relating to the Defense Program and Operations"
],
"subjects": [
"Berlin Wall, Berlin, Germany, 1961-1989"
],
"iiifBase": "https://s3.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/opastorage/live/83/372/6037283/content/arcmedia/research/1961-berlin-crisis/932006-3-4-15/Memorandum-For-The-President-June-28-1961-003.jpg",
"thumbnailUrl": "https://s3.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/opastorage/live/83/372/6037283/content/arcmedia/research/1961-berlin-crisis/932006-3-4-15/Memorandum-For-The-President-June-28-1961-003.jpg",
"largeImageUrl": "https://s3.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/opastorage/live/83/372/6037283/content/arcmedia/research/1961-berlin-crisis/932006-3-4-15/Memorandum-For-The-President-June-28-1961-003.jpg",
"imageCount": 38,
"hasImages": true,
"source": "import",
"hasTranscription": false
}
Context sent to Scholar
Document identity
{
"localId": "6037283",
"label": "Memorandum for the President - Preliminary Draft - The Berlin Crisis",
"core": "doc",
"dtoType": "document",
"citationUrl": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/6037283"
}
Document source metadata
{
"id": "6037283",
"sourceUrl": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/6037283",
"contentType": "document",
"title": "Memorandum for the President - Preliminary Draft - The Berlin Crisis",
"citationUrl": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/6037283",
"collections": [
"Robert S. McNamara Papers",
"Records Relating to the Defense Program and Operations"
],
"subjects": [
"Berlin Wall, Berlin, Germany, 1961-1989"
],
"iiifBase": "https://s3.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/opastorage/live/83/372/6037283/content/arcmedia/research/1961-berlin-crisis/932006-3-4-15/Memorandum-For-The-President-June-28-1961-003.jpg",
"thumbnailUrl": "https://s3.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/opastorage/live/83/372/6037283/content/arcmedia/research/1961-berlin-crisis/932006-3-4-15/Memorandum-For-The-President-June-28-1961-003.jpg",
"largeImageUrl": "https://s3.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/opastorage/live/83/372/6037283/content/arcmedia/research/1961-berlin-crisis/932006-3-4-15/Memorandum-For-The-President-June-28-1961-003.jpg",
"imageCount": 38,
"hasImages": true,
"source": "import",
"hasTranscription": false
}
Document source extras
{
"url": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/6037283",
"naId": 6037283,
"levelOfDescription": "item",
"productionDates": [
{
"day": 28,
"logicalDate": "1961-06-28",
"month": 6,
"year": 1961
}
],
"recordType": "description",
"ocrSource": "nara-archive"
}
Page context
{
"seq": 27,
"pageIndex": 0,
"type": "photo",
"url": "https://s3.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/opastorage/live/83/372/6037283/content/arcmedia/research/1961-berlin-crisis/932006-3-4-15/Memorandum-For-The-President-June-28-1961-030.jpg",
"mediaId": "0a83b8a76f0630fa",
"ocrText": "SECRET\n9\nWe do with gruss\n-28-\nin they pay no,\nseeking to depart those areas to return to port. Our purpose\nwould be to show Western determination and to apply immediate\nmilitary pressure on the USSR, even before the substantial\nuse of ground force could be mounted, in order to influence basic\nSoviet political decisions.\nIf the Soviets nonetheless continued passive interference,\nthe airlift could be hobbled. For passive measures could restrict\nus to visual flight; and visual flight would not be sufficient\nto moye the needed goods and supplies to Berlin in the long run,\nas the stockpiles there became depleted. If passive interference\nwere continued, therefore, we - should then resort to substantial\nground force to restore our access.\nC. The Use of Force\nto at same turn as an\ntropic\nTheiuse of force to restore access should begin with a\nsizable probe ao say a battalion - to establish the fact that\naccess to Berlin is physically blocked. Then resort should bei\nhad to an operation involving substantial non-nuclear force.\nWhether this operation takes place at once or not would depend\non the state of preparations.\nThe purpose of the operation would not be the military\none of defeating all the Soviet forces which might oppose\nour forces; this would not be feasible.\nIt would be the political purpose of moving the Soviets\nto negotiate a resumption of access by giving the most con\nvincing demonstration of which the West was capable that\nthe Western Allies were not prepared to submit to Soviet\ndemands and would use whatever force was necessary, up to an\nincluding general war, in resisting them.\nThe Western force should thus be large enough so that the\nSoviets would appreciate the great risk that conflict involving\nthis force would, if not terminated by early negotiations, get\nout of control and escalate into nuclear war. This means, among\nother things, that:\n(a) The force should not be susceptible of being\nstopped by the GDR. The JCS believe that 7 divisions and\n4\nair wings would achieve this end.\nSupper 2069 + 2070\n(b)\nSECRET\n1907/305"
}