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SECRET 9 We do with gruss -28- in they pay no, seeking to depart those areas to return to port. Our purpose would be to show Western determination and to apply immediate military pressure on the USSR, even before the substantial use of ground force could be mounted, in order to influence basic Soviet political decisions. If the Soviets nonetheless continued passive interference, the airlift could be hobbled. For passive measures could restrict us to visual flight; and visual flight would not be sufficient to moye the needed goods and supplies to Berlin in the long run, as the stockpiles there became depleted. If passive interference were continued, therefore, we - should then resort to substantial ground force to restore our access. C. The Use of Force to at same turn as an tropic Theiuse of force to restore access should begin with a sizable probe ao say a battalion - to establish the fact that access to Berlin is physically blocked. Then resort should bei had to an operation involving substantial non-nuclear force. Whether this operation takes place at once or not would depend on the state of preparations. The purpose of the operation would not be the military one of defeating all the Soviet forces which might oppose our forces; this would not be feasible. It would be the political purpose of moving the Soviets to negotiate a resumption of access by giving the most con vincing demonstration of which the West was capable that the Western Allies were not prepared to submit to Soviet demands and would use whatever force was necessary, up to an including general war, in resisting them. The Western force should thus be large enough so that the Soviets would appreciate the great risk that conflict involving this force would, if not terminated by early negotiations, get out of control and escalate into nuclear war. This means, among other things, that: (a) The force should not be susceptible of being stopped by the GDR. The JCS believe that 7 divisions and 4 air wings would achieve this end. Supper 2069 + 2070 (b) SECRET 1907/305

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    "ocrText": "SECRET\n9\nWe do with gruss\n-28-\nin they pay no,\nseeking to depart those areas to return to port. Our purpose\nwould be to show Western determination and to apply immediate\nmilitary pressure on the USSR, even before the substantial\nuse of ground force could be mounted, in order to influence basic\nSoviet political decisions.\nIf the Soviets nonetheless continued passive interference,\nthe airlift could be hobbled. For passive measures could restrict\nus to visual flight; and visual flight would not be sufficient\nto moye the needed goods and supplies to Berlin in the long run,\nas the stockpiles there became depleted. If passive interference\nwere continued, therefore, we - should then resort to substantial\nground force to restore our access.\nC. The Use of Force\nto at same turn as an\ntropic\nTheiuse of force to restore access should begin with a\nsizable probe ao say a battalion - to establish the fact that\naccess to Berlin is physically blocked. Then resort should bei\nhad to an operation involving substantial non-nuclear force.\nWhether this operation takes place at once or not would depend\non the state of preparations.\nThe purpose of the operation would not be the military\none of defeating all the Soviet forces which might oppose\nour forces; this would not be feasible.\nIt would be the political purpose of moving the Soviets\nto negotiate a resumption of access by giving the most con\nvincing demonstration of which the West was capable that\nthe Western Allies were not prepared to submit to Soviet\ndemands and would use whatever force was necessary, up to an\nincluding general war, in resisting them.\nThe Western force should thus be large enough so that the\nSoviets would appreciate the great risk that conflict involving\nthis force would, if not terminated by early negotiations, get\nout of control and escalate into nuclear war. This means, among\nother things, that:\n(a) The force should not be susceptible of being\nstopped by the GDR. The JCS believe that 7 divisions and\n4\nair wings would achieve this end.\nSupper 2069 + 2070\n(b)\nSECRET\n1907/305"
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