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e 31 6
V. THE POSSIBILITIES AND CONSEQUENCES
OF FAILURE
It is essential to consider, not only the possibility
of success and the risks and danger involved in any proposal,
but also the possibilities and consequences of failure.
Failure in the course proposed could arise from at least
three sources.
First. Even with the most careful handling, our
allies, or important ones of them, might become frightened
along the way, decide that the risks and dangers exceeded
the advantages, and indicate that they were no longer ase
sociated with our position.
This could happen, not only because their people might
be less stalwart or because their governments came to a
different appraisal of the dangers and advantages but also
because, to some extent, their interest may be different
from ours in one respect: None of them has the prestige
or world position which we do; and, therefore, none of
them can have that position and prestige at stake.
It is impracticable for the United States to under=
take unilateral action in the Berlin area, if for no other
reason than that this action would take off from the
territory of the Federal Republic and might require, to
some extent, air bases, staging areas, assembly areas, and
so forth in both France and Great Britain. If these allies,
especially the Federal Republic, were to weaken, the plan
here developed would fail: While the United States could
still launch nuclear warfare, there is very grave doubt
that our own Congress and people would support initiation
of a general war which arose over Berlin and was disapproved
by the Germans themselves.
What could be done to mitigate the danger to our
position and to the alliance which this division among
the allies would have caused?
The Soviets
SECRET
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"ocrText": "SECRET\ne 31 6\nV. THE POSSIBILITIES AND CONSEQUENCES\nOF FAILURE\nIt is essential to consider, not only the possibility\nof success and the risks and danger involved in any proposal,\nbut also the possibilities and consequences of failure.\nFailure in the course proposed could arise from at least\nthree sources.\nFirst. Even with the most careful handling, our\nallies, or important ones of them, might become frightened\nalong the way, decide that the risks and dangers exceeded\nthe advantages, and indicate that they were no longer ase\nsociated with our position.\nThis could happen, not only because their people might\nbe less stalwart or because their governments came to a\ndifferent appraisal of the dangers and advantages but also\nbecause, to some extent, their interest may be different\nfrom ours in one respect: None of them has the prestige\nor world position which we do; and, therefore, none of\nthem can have that position and prestige at stake.\nIt is impracticable for the United States to under=\ntake unilateral action in the Berlin area, if for no other\nreason than that this action would take off from the\nterritory of the Federal Republic and might require, to\nsome extent, air bases, staging areas, assembly areas, and\nso forth in both France and Great Britain. If these allies,\nespecially the Federal Republic, were to weaken, the plan\nhere developed would fail: While the United States could\nstill launch nuclear warfare, there is very grave doubt\nthat our own Congress and people would support initiation\nof a general war which arose over Berlin and was disapproved\nby the Germans themselves.\nWhat could be done to mitigate the danger to our\nposition and to the alliance which this division among\nthe allies would have caused?\nThe Soviets\nSECRET"
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