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4. World Opinion. Khrushchev has been trying to pre-
sent his demands regarding Berlin in such a way as to
maintain his peace posture with the neutrals and convince
them that his object is to eliminate "hotbeds of war."
It is important to frustrate this effort; the Soviets
are much more dangerous when they believe that their pro-
paganda has put world opinion upon their side: They are
apt to believe that they can take greater risks because we
will be inhibited by adverse opinion from taking effective
counter=action,
Beginning soon, therefore, a well thought-out, inten-
sive, and continuous campaign should be conducted, both
domestically and internationally, to bring out the fact
that at the present time there is no threat of any sort to
the peace in either Eastern or Western Germany; that
peace is a condition and does not depend upon formal
documents announcing or proclaiming it; and that Khrushchev
is engaged in an operation unique in its cynicism: In the
very name of peace, and through the instrumentality of
negotiating and putting into effect what he calls a peace
treaty, he is taking an action of calculated and far-
reaching aggression.
This theme should be developed over and over again
and with the most homely and understandable analogies.
Speeches by the President, the Secretary of State, other
members of the Administration, popular pamphlets (along
the lines of one recently put out by the State Department
entitled "Berlin: A City Between Two Worlds)", messages
to
Congress, and all the instrumentalities of the U.S.I.A.
should drive home this lesson - adapting it to the con
ditions and understanding of various countries, both allied
and neutral.
As suggested above, all of this should be done at
the outset in low key, stressing reason and determination,
rather than crisis and alarm. As the crisis deepens ,
a
greater note of urgency can be added. As these statements
accompany
SECRET
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"ocrText": "SECRET\n- 16 -\n4. World Opinion. Khrushchev has been trying to pre-\nsent his demands regarding Berlin in such a way as to\nmaintain his peace posture with the neutrals and convince\nthem that his object is to eliminate \"hotbeds of war.\"\nIt is important to frustrate this effort; the Soviets\nare much more dangerous when they believe that their pro-\npaganda has put world opinion upon their side: They are\napt to believe that they can take greater risks because we\nwill be inhibited by adverse opinion from taking effective\ncounter=action,\nBeginning soon, therefore, a well thought-out, inten-\nsive, and continuous campaign should be conducted, both\ndomestically and internationally, to bring out the fact\nthat at the present time there is no threat of any sort to\nthe peace in either Eastern or Western Germany; that\npeace is a condition and does not depend upon formal\ndocuments announcing or proclaiming it; and that Khrushchev\nis engaged in an operation unique in its cynicism: In the\nvery name of peace, and through the instrumentality of\nnegotiating and putting into effect what he calls a peace\ntreaty, he is taking an action of calculated and far-\nreaching aggression.\nThis theme should be developed over and over again\nand with the most homely and understandable analogies.\nSpeeches by the President, the Secretary of State, other\nmembers of the Administration, popular pamphlets (along\nthe lines of one recently put out by the State Department\nentitled \"Berlin: A City Between Two Worlds)\", messages\nto\nCongress, and all the instrumentalities of the U.S.I.A.\nshould drive home this lesson - adapting it to the con\nditions and understanding of various countries, both allied\nand neutral.\nAs suggested above, all of this should be done at\nthe outset in low key, stressing reason and determination,\nrather than crisis and alarm. As the crisis deepens ,\na\ngreater note of urgency can be added. As these statements\naccompany\nSECRET"
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