Ask the Scholar
Page 6 of 38
I can add historical knowledge about this page.
Page image
OCR
SECRET
- -11-
increasing the over-all readiness of the Navy to engage in
the combat operations which might ensue.
3. The third category would include measures to pre-
pare for general nuclear war. This would mean placing SAC
in a suitable state of readiness, which could be maintained
over the period of a prolonged crisis without degrading
SAC capabilities or generating pressures for a pre-emptive
strike. It would also mean taking civil defense measures,
including possibly construction of fall-out shelters.
The world-wide readiness of US armed forces would need
to be increased in a variety of ways.
In carrying out these preparations, we should try to
avoid actions which are not needed for sound military purposes
and which would be considered provocative. Such actions
would have a contra-productive effect on the Soviets in
two respects - first, in suggesting that the whole
operation was for "muscle flexing" and thus degrading the
deterrent effect of our other preparations, and second in
creating an atmosphere of challenge and counter-challenge
which might make it harder for the Soviets to back down,
if they should wish to. Such actions would tend to split
the alliance, furthermore, by antagonizing our allies.
Allied attitudes also suggest that preparations for
a Berlin crisis should not include steps, which would run
contrary to Presidentially-approved US policy toward
Europe, looking to sharing nuclear weapons capabilities
with France or to deployment of land-based MRBM's in
Europe. Nuclear sharing with France would trigger German
interest in developing a national nuclear capability;
preparations for deployment of land-based MRBM's to
European (including German) forces would be taken in some
quarters to foreshadow de facto creation of such a
capability. The British have opposed deployment of land-
based MRBM's to Europe, in part, because of their reluctance
to see strategic missiles containing powerful warheads
placed in German hands. A Berlin crisis would not be
the
SECRET
Page data
- Page
- 6
- Source index
- 0
- Type
- photo
- Media ID
- 387623e1d9756690
- Size
- unknown
Document data
- ID
- 6037283
- Core
- doc
- Type
- document
DTO data
{
"id": "6037283",
"sourceUrl": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/6037283",
"contentType": "document",
"title": "Memorandum for the President - Preliminary Draft - The Berlin Crisis",
"citationUrl": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/6037283",
"collections": [
"Robert S. McNamara Papers",
"Records Relating to the Defense Program and Operations"
],
"subjects": [
"Berlin Wall, Berlin, Germany, 1961-1989"
],
"iiifBase": "https://s3.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/opastorage/live/83/372/6037283/content/arcmedia/research/1961-berlin-crisis/932006-3-4-15/Memorandum-For-The-President-June-28-1961-003.jpg",
"thumbnailUrl": "https://s3.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/opastorage/live/83/372/6037283/content/arcmedia/research/1961-berlin-crisis/932006-3-4-15/Memorandum-For-The-President-June-28-1961-003.jpg",
"largeImageUrl": "https://s3.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/opastorage/live/83/372/6037283/content/arcmedia/research/1961-berlin-crisis/932006-3-4-15/Memorandum-For-The-President-June-28-1961-003.jpg",
"imageCount": 38,
"hasImages": true,
"source": "import",
"hasTranscription": false
}
Context sent to Scholar
Document identity
{
"localId": "6037283",
"label": "Memorandum for the President - Preliminary Draft - The Berlin Crisis",
"core": "doc",
"dtoType": "document",
"citationUrl": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/6037283"
}
Document source metadata
{
"id": "6037283",
"sourceUrl": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/6037283",
"contentType": "document",
"title": "Memorandum for the President - Preliminary Draft - The Berlin Crisis",
"citationUrl": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/6037283",
"collections": [
"Robert S. McNamara Papers",
"Records Relating to the Defense Program and Operations"
],
"subjects": [
"Berlin Wall, Berlin, Germany, 1961-1989"
],
"iiifBase": "https://s3.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/opastorage/live/83/372/6037283/content/arcmedia/research/1961-berlin-crisis/932006-3-4-15/Memorandum-For-The-President-June-28-1961-003.jpg",
"thumbnailUrl": "https://s3.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/opastorage/live/83/372/6037283/content/arcmedia/research/1961-berlin-crisis/932006-3-4-15/Memorandum-For-The-President-June-28-1961-003.jpg",
"largeImageUrl": "https://s3.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/opastorage/live/83/372/6037283/content/arcmedia/research/1961-berlin-crisis/932006-3-4-15/Memorandum-For-The-President-June-28-1961-003.jpg",
"imageCount": 38,
"hasImages": true,
"source": "import",
"hasTranscription": false
}
Document source extras
{
"url": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/6037283",
"naId": 6037283,
"levelOfDescription": "item",
"productionDates": [
{
"day": 28,
"logicalDate": "1961-06-28",
"month": 6,
"year": 1961
}
],
"recordType": "description",
"ocrSource": "nara-archive"
}
Page context
{
"seq": 6,
"pageIndex": 0,
"type": "photo",
"url": "https://s3.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/opastorage/live/83/372/6037283/content/arcmedia/research/1961-berlin-crisis/932006-3-4-15/Memorandum-For-The-President-June-28-1961-013.jpg",
"mediaId": "387623e1d9756690",
"ocrText": "SECRET\n- -11-\nincreasing the over-all readiness of the Navy to engage in\nthe combat operations which might ensue.\n3. The third category would include measures to pre-\npare for general nuclear war. This would mean placing SAC\nin a suitable state of readiness, which could be maintained\nover the period of a prolonged crisis without degrading\nSAC capabilities or generating pressures for a pre-emptive\nstrike. It would also mean taking civil defense measures,\nincluding possibly construction of fall-out shelters.\nThe world-wide readiness of US armed forces would need\nto be increased in a variety of ways.\nIn carrying out these preparations, we should try to\navoid actions which are not needed for sound military purposes\nand which would be considered provocative. Such actions\nwould have a contra-productive effect on the Soviets in\ntwo respects - first, in suggesting that the whole\noperation was for \"muscle flexing\" and thus degrading the\ndeterrent effect of our other preparations, and second in\ncreating an atmosphere of challenge and counter-challenge\nwhich might make it harder for the Soviets to back down,\nif they should wish to. Such actions would tend to split\nthe alliance, furthermore, by antagonizing our allies.\nAllied attitudes also suggest that preparations for\na Berlin crisis should not include steps, which would run\ncontrary to Presidentially-approved US policy toward\nEurope, looking to sharing nuclear weapons capabilities\nwith France or to deployment of land-based MRBM's in\nEurope. Nuclear sharing with France would trigger German\ninterest in developing a national nuclear capability;\npreparations for deployment of land-based MRBM's to\nEuropean (including German) forces would be taken in some\nquarters to foreshadow de facto creation of such a\ncapability. The British have opposed deployment of land-\nbased MRBM's to Europe, in part, because of their reluctance\nto see strategic missiles containing powerful warheads\nplaced in German hands. A Berlin crisis would not be\nthe\nSECRET"
}