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TELCON S. Alsop/Kissinger 11:11 am 5/22/70 A: I have written a piece on the basis of my work. Let me read you the theme. "The decision the President reached on the basis of ? ? ? ? not decide if he is right. The first myth is that ? ? ? ? ?. He cabled Abrams on the eve of the decision. ? ? ? ? ? ? the President would have been mad not to consult his chief advisors. The second myth is that he is so re- moved from ? ? ? ?. And aide warned him ???? that some universities might burn. ? ? other advantages were outweighed." K: If you could delete that sentence that some universities would burn. That tags it too closely to me. A: OK. ?????? bit at list the President's scribbles suggest that it was not the decision of a faol but that ? ? ? ? ? ? His chief motive was to ? ? ? ? ? withdrawals. It will soon become clear if it's objective will succeed. I have other scribbles "time is running out, " "only symbolic. K: Military aid would be only symbolic. A: Strength ? ? ? to hold out against an assault? ???? You are particularly sensitive about Penom Penh so here is "? ? ? ? ? ? " That's all Alsop. Two more scribbles "if we don't move now and they don't either" -- this could make it impossible for ? ? ? ? ? ? attacking a neutral government. K: What he meant by the Cambodian situation was that Cambodia would become a base and we could not react. A de facto communist base. The if you added that sentend in explanation. It wounds now that he couldn;t to go after these sanctuaries one way or another. ? ? ? ? and we couldn't prevent it's use. IA: I have another one which may be too sensitive "it may divert the communists from an attack on Penom Penh and it may ? ? ? ? ? to negotiation . " K: If you could leave out Moscow for other reasons. There's an enourmous sensitivity. A: You don't want to say that they can attack Penom Penh and we won't do anything. K: You could say it may keep the communists from taking over the whole country and drop Moscow. also A: I have a paraphrase. The risk XIXXX in the President's mind was a communist attack on Penom Penh. Meaning that they would take over the whole country.

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    "ocrText": "TELCON\nS. Alsop/Kissinger\n11:11 am\n5/22/70\nA: I have written a piece on the basis of my work. Let me read you the\ntheme. \"The decision the President reached on the basis of ? ? ? ? not\ndecide if he is right. The first myth is that ? ? ? ? ?. He cabled\nAbrams on the eve of the decision. ? ? ? ? ? ? the President would have\nbeen mad not to consult his chief advisors. The second myth is that he is so re-\nmoved from ? ? ? ?. And aide warned him ???? that some\nuniversities might burn. ? ? other advantages were outweighed.\"\nK: If you could delete that sentence that some universities would burn. That\ntags it too closely to me.\nA: OK. ?????? bit at list the President's scribbles suggest that\nit was not the decision of a faol but that ? ? ? ? ? ? His chief motive was\nto ? ? ? ? ? withdrawals. It will soon become clear if it's objective\nwill succeed. I have other scribbles \"time is running out, \" \"only\nsymbolic.\nK: Military aid would be only symbolic.\nA: Strength ? ? ? to hold out against an assault? ???? You are\nparticularly sensitive about Penom Penh so here is \"? ? ? ? ? ? \" That's\nall Alsop. Two more scribbles \"if we don't move now and they don't either\"\n--\nthis could make it impossible for ? ? ? ? ? ? attacking a neutral government.\nK: What he meant by the Cambodian situation was that Cambodia would become\na base and we could not react. A de facto communist base. The if you added\nthat sentend in explanation. It wounds now that he couldn;t\nto go after\nthese sanctuaries one way or another. ? ? ? ? and we couldn't prevent\nit's use.\nIA: I have another one which may be too sensitive \"it may divert the communists\nfrom an attack on Penom Penh and it may ? ? ? ? ? to negotiation\n. \"\nK: If you could leave out Moscow for other reasons. There's an enourmous\nsensitivity.\nA: You don't want to say that they can attack Penom Penh and we won't do\nanything.\nK: You could say it may keep the communists from taking over the whole\ncountry and drop Moscow.\nalso\nA: I have a paraphrase. The risk XIXXX in the President's mind was a\ncommunist attack on Penom Penh. Meaning that they would take over the\nwhole country."
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