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TELCON
S. Alsop/Kissinger
11:11 am
5/22/70
A: I have written a piece on the basis of my work. Let me read you the
theme. "The decision the President reached on the basis of ? ? ? ? not
decide if he is right. The first myth is that ? ? ? ? ?. He cabled
Abrams on the eve of the decision. ? ? ? ? ? ? the President would have
been mad not to consult his chief advisors. The second myth is that he is so re-
moved from ? ? ? ?. And aide warned him ???? that some
universities might burn. ? ? other advantages were outweighed."
K: If you could delete that sentence that some universities would burn. That
tags it too closely to me.
A: OK. ?????? bit at list the President's scribbles suggest that
it was not the decision of a faol but that ? ? ? ? ? ? His chief motive was
to ? ? ? ? ? withdrawals. It will soon become clear if it's objective
will succeed. I have other scribbles "time is running out, " "only
symbolic.
K: Military aid would be only symbolic.
A: Strength ? ? ? to hold out against an assault? ???? You are
particularly sensitive about Penom Penh so here is "? ? ? ? ? ? " That's
all Alsop. Two more scribbles "if we don't move now and they don't either"
--
this could make it impossible for ? ? ? ? ? ? attacking a neutral government.
K: What he meant by the Cambodian situation was that Cambodia would become
a base and we could not react. A de facto communist base. The if you added
that sentend in explanation. It wounds now that he couldn;t
to go after
these sanctuaries one way or another. ? ? ? ? and we couldn't prevent
it's use.
IA: I have another one which may be too sensitive "it may divert the communists
from an attack on Penom Penh and it may ? ? ? ? ? to negotiation
. "
K: If you could leave out Moscow for other reasons. There's an enourmous
sensitivity.
A: You don't want to say that they can attack Penom Penh and we won't do
anything.
K: You could say it may keep the communists from taking over the whole
country and drop Moscow.
also
A: I have a paraphrase. The risk XIXXX in the President's mind was a
communist attack on Penom Penh. Meaning that they would take over the
whole country.
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"ocrText": "TELCON\nS. Alsop/Kissinger\n11:11 am\n5/22/70\nA: I have written a piece on the basis of my work. Let me read you the\ntheme. \"The decision the President reached on the basis of ? ? ? ? not\ndecide if he is right. The first myth is that ? ? ? ? ?. He cabled\nAbrams on the eve of the decision. ? ? ? ? ? ? the President would have\nbeen mad not to consult his chief advisors. The second myth is that he is so re-\nmoved from ? ? ? ?. And aide warned him ???? that some\nuniversities might burn. ? ? other advantages were outweighed.\"\nK: If you could delete that sentence that some universities would burn. That\ntags it too closely to me.\nA: OK. ?????? bit at list the President's scribbles suggest that\nit was not the decision of a faol but that ? ? ? ? ? ? His chief motive was\nto ? ? ? ? ? withdrawals. It will soon become clear if it's objective\nwill succeed. I have other scribbles \"time is running out, \" \"only\nsymbolic.\nK: Military aid would be only symbolic.\nA: Strength ? ? ? to hold out against an assault? ???? You are\nparticularly sensitive about Penom Penh so here is \"? ? ? ? ? ? \" That's\nall Alsop. Two more scribbles \"if we don't move now and they don't either\"\n--\nthis could make it impossible for ? ? ? ? ? ? attacking a neutral government.\nK: What he meant by the Cambodian situation was that Cambodia would become\na base and we could not react. A de facto communist base. The if you added\nthat sentend in explanation. It wounds now that he couldn;t\nto go after\nthese sanctuaries one way or another. ? ? ? ? and we couldn't prevent\nit's use.\nIA: I have another one which may be too sensitive \"it may divert the communists\nfrom an attack on Penom Penh and it may ? ? ? ? ? to negotiation\n. \"\nK: If you could leave out Moscow for other reasons. There's an enourmous\nsensitivity.\nA: You don't want to say that they can attack Penom Penh and we won't do\nanything.\nK: You could say it may keep the communists from taking over the whole\ncountry and drop Moscow.\nalso\nA: I have a paraphrase. The risk XIXXX in the President's mind was a\ncommunist attack on Penom Penh. Meaning that they would take over the\nwhole country."
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