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D:
That is why it shouldn't be adopted this paragraph.
K:
But it is important for any future attempt by the Egyptian side to try to
grab some territory that we did not insist that the fait accompli is still.
D:
That is why we accept the idea of observers. Because only when you
have observers in the
mouth can you effectively tell whether
movements have taken place SO I think if I made the argument for the
Russians in the discussions should be that now that there are observers
a fixed position can be attained.
K:
You know what will happen?
There will be a majority for that position.
D:
For the position of their attempt.
K:
We have two choices. If we say withdraw to the position where they were
at the moment of adoption of the decision on the ceasefire that's
ridiculous. That's inconsistent with the resolution.
D:
That shows that.
K:
I know, let's not argue about it. The second point is supposing they
amend it to say at the time of the ceasefire.
D:
That is what we were discussing because the first one I dismissed
right away and on this the Prime Minister and the Minister of Defense
have a very documented development.
K:
My problem is what do we do at the .N.
D:
That's what I said.
K:
We can veto the fourth Russian draft. That we can do. We can abstain
fron
when it says at the time of the decision of the caeasefire but we can't veto
that.
D:
I think the thing is very--if I may, I don't see what difficulty there is to
say that before the Security Council can determine who was at fault they
cannot demand of any side that we acted through the XiXiX fighting.
K:
Yes, but they could take the position, it doesn't make any difference who
was at fault. The easy way to settle it is to go back to the line.
D:
But who will determine this?
K:
I think it is indeterminable.
- 2 -
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"ocrText": "D:\nThat is why it shouldn't be adopted this paragraph.\nK:\nBut it is important for any future attempt by the Egyptian side to try to\ngrab some territory that we did not insist that the fait accompli is still.\nD:\nThat is why we accept the idea of observers. Because only when you\nhave observers in the\nmouth can you effectively tell whether\nmovements have taken place SO I think if I made the argument for the\nRussians in the discussions should be that now that there are observers\na fixed position can be attained.\nK:\nYou know what will happen?\nThere will be a majority for that position.\nD:\nFor the position of their attempt.\nK:\nWe have two choices. If we say withdraw to the position where they were\nat the moment of adoption of the decision on the ceasefire that's\nridiculous. That's inconsistent with the resolution.\nD:\nThat shows that.\nK:\nI know, let's not argue about it. The second point is supposing they\namend it to say at the time of the ceasefire.\nD:\nThat is what we were discussing because the first one I dismissed\nright away and on this the Prime Minister and the Minister of Defense\nhave a very documented development.\nK:\nMy problem is what do we do at the .N.\nD:\nThat's what I said.\nK:\nWe can veto the fourth Russian draft. That we can do. We can abstain\nfron\nwhen it says at the time of the decision of the caeasefire but we can't veto\nthat.\nD:\nI think the thing is very--if I may, I don't see what difficulty there is to\nsay that before the Security Council can determine who was at fault they\ncannot demand of any side that we acted through the XiXiX fighting.\nK:\nYes, but they could take the position, it doesn't make any difference who\nwas at fault. The easy way to settle it is to go back to the line.\nD:\nBut who will determine this?\nK:\nI think it is indeterminable.\n- 2 -"
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