NSDD 104 United States Approach to Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Negotiations II

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THE WHITE HOUSE NCLASSIFIED WASHINGTON NATIONAL SECURITY DECISION September 21, 1983 DIRECTIVE NUMBER 104 U.S. APPROACH TO INF NEGOTIATIONS - II The basic US position taken at the INF negotiations in Geneva is and remains a sound one. Its essence is captured in the US proposal to eliminate the entire class of land-based LRINF missiles. This proposal remains the optimal outcome for the US, for NATO, for Europe, and, I believe, for the Soviet Union. It is a principled position which involves the most significant degree of reductions possible in the class of LRINF weapons which cause most concern to both sides. It fully meets our own, and NATO's, criteria for a genuine arms reduction agreement and it remains my hope that the Soviet Union will eventually see the wisdom of our proposal. In the interest of exploring all possibilities, and on the basis of close consultations with our allies, I decided last March to an interim step towards the ultimate elimination of all propose LRINF land-based missiles. While actively keeping our proposal 3 to eliminate all land-based LRINF missiles on the table, the the United United States formally notified the Soviet Union that States is prepared to enter into an interim agreement under which the United States would accept a limit at some finite, agreed number of warheads on LRINF land-based missile launchers if the Soviet Union reduces the number of warheads on its LRINF land-based missile force to an equal level on a global basis. This and is in the US, NATO's and, I believe, the Soviet Union's proposal also meets the basic criteria we have established interest. Both of these proposals have been translated into draft treaty texts and provided to the Soviet Union. Regrettably, the Soviet Union has not, as yet, provided a serious response to our interim proposal. They have not demonstrated, through their actions at the negotiating table, that additional initiatives Nor on our part are the appropriate next step in the negotiations. the US have they demonstrated any flaw in the fundamentals of therefore, will not offer any new initiative altering position and in the criteria upon which it rests. The the US, fundamental US position that the US seeks an agreement which si number, and could lead to the ultimate total elimination of, meets agreed NATO criteria and which significantly reduces the nuclear warheads on LRINF land-based missiles. should be no doubt that without an agreement which There satisfies the criteria we have identified, the US will, with the cooperation of our NATO allies, deploy LRINF land-based missiles as planned. incream