NSDD 104 United States Approach to Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Negotiations II
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OCR Page 1 of 6THE WHITE HOUSE
NCLASSIFIED
WASHINGTON
NATIONAL SECURITY DECISION
September 21, 1983
DIRECTIVE NUMBER 104
U.S. APPROACH TO INF NEGOTIATIONS - II
The basic US position taken at the INF negotiations in Geneva is
and remains a sound one. Its essence is captured in the US
proposal to eliminate the entire class of land-based LRINF
missiles. This proposal remains the optimal outcome for the US,
for NATO, for Europe, and, I believe, for the Soviet Union. It
is a principled position which involves the most significant
degree of reductions possible in the class of LRINF weapons
which cause most concern to both sides. It fully meets our own,
and NATO's, criteria for a genuine arms reduction agreement and
it remains my hope that the Soviet Union will eventually see the
wisdom of our proposal.
In the interest of exploring all possibilities, and on the basis
of close consultations with our allies, I decided last March to
an interim step towards the ultimate elimination of all
propose LRINF land-based missiles. While actively keeping our proposal
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to eliminate all land-based LRINF missiles on the table, the the United
United States formally notified the Soviet Union that
States is prepared to enter into an interim agreement under
which the United States would accept a limit at some finite,
agreed number of warheads on LRINF land-based missile launchers
if the Soviet Union reduces the number of warheads on its LRINF
land-based missile force to an equal level on a global basis.
This and is in the US, NATO's and, I believe, the Soviet Union's
proposal also meets the basic criteria we have established
interest.
Both of these proposals have been translated into draft treaty
texts and provided to the Soviet Union. Regrettably, the Soviet
Union has not, as yet, provided a serious response to our
interim proposal. They have not demonstrated, through their
actions at the negotiating table, that additional initiatives Nor on
our part are the appropriate next step in the negotiations. the US
have they demonstrated any flaw in the fundamentals of
therefore, will not offer any new initiative altering
position and in the criteria upon which it rests. The the US,
fundamental US position that the US seeks an agreement which
si number, and could lead to the ultimate total elimination of,
meets agreed NATO criteria and which significantly reduces the
nuclear warheads on LRINF land-based missiles.
should be no doubt that without an agreement which
There satisfies the criteria we have identified, the US will, with the
cooperation of our NATO allies, deploy LRINF land-based missiles
as planned.
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