Extracted text

OCR Page 1 of 23
SECRET -WE CANNOT ACCEPT THE SOVIET SIDE! PG JITION N L NKING ITS INTERIM OPTION ITS P OPOSALS REI .TED TO THE BM TREATY. MOREOVER; R NTI UE TO E JJEC THE Il EA 0 LINKING PROGRESS IN ONE NEG TIATING GRO IP TO PI IN ANOTHER. --WE WELCOME SOVIET RET RN O THE El "LUS U.S NON- STRATEGIC SYSTEMS FROM HE IMITS ON NDVS AND WF IPONS PROPOSED BY THE SOVIET IDE IN START. OWEVER NE ARE DISAPPOINTED THAT THE SOVIET SIDE CONTINUED TO PROPOSE THAT THOSE SYSTEMS BE LIMITED IN A START AGREEMENT (E.G. IN THE FORM OF A U.S. COMMITMENT NOT TO INCREASE THE NUMBER OF SUCH SYSTEMS WITHIN RANGE OF SOVIET TERRITORY). THE SOVIET PROPOSAL WOULD CONSTRAIN U.S. SYSTEMS DEPLOYED IN SUPPORT OF U.S. ALLIES WITHOUT CONSTRAINING SOVIET SYSTEMS OF COMPARABLE CAPABILITY THAT THREATEN THOSE ALLIES. THIS IS NOT ACCEPTABLE. -WE WELCOME SOVIET WILLING ESS TO CERTA: LONG- RANGE CRUISE MISSILES. M VER, WHLL ACKNOWLEDG VG THIS STEP ON LONG-RANGE ALC S, WE C1 NOT ICCL on ECT LIMITS ON OTHER BOMBE WEAP NS. ON SLC 6, THE SOV1 ST SIDE HAS PUT FORWARD A PROP SAL WHI H W ULD COM LIC TE THE CENTRAL NEGOTI ION AN WHICH OES NOT LEN IT ELF TO EFFECTIVE VERIFIC SPECIAL Y I VIEW a TH DIFFICULTIES OF VERIFYI G TF E ABSEN a SLCMS N SURFACE SHIPS AND ON SUI MAR NES NOT AUT! ORIZED to CRRY THEM, AND PROBLEMS OF VI RIFIING RANG 0. --WE QUESTION THE SOVIE RA TONALE FOR RAISING WEAPONS TOTAL TO 8000, JALLY THE ARC THAT THIS IS JUSTIFIED BY THE EXCLUSION OF U.S. NON-STRATEGIC SYSTEMS. ALTHOUGH WE WOULD STRONGLY PREFER TO WORK NOW TOWARD AN AGREEMENT TO CODIFY 50 PERCENT REDUCTIONS IN STRATEGIC NUCLEAR FORCES, WE ARE PREPARED TO WORK ON AN INTERIM FIRST STEP TOWARD THAT OBJECTIVE. WE DO NOT BELIEVE IT IS NECESSARY TO RAISE THE NUMBERS AS MUCH AS THE SOVIET SIDE HAS PROPOSED IN ORDER TO TAKE A FIRST STEP. --THE SOVIET PROPOSAL COM It ES TO D1 PERENTITATE INADEQUATELY AMONG VARLESS N CLEAR W APO) SECRET