NSDD 234 Libya Policy

UNCLASSIFIED iup SECREI TOP SECRITT 2 We cannot rule out the possibility that a successor regime would conduct itself responsibly while aligning itself more closely to Moscow. Moreover, the perception of direct U.S. involvement in certain actions could forestall internal plotting, rally domestic support for Qadhafi, and complicate our ability to work with a successor. These risks to our strategy should be considered as specific actions are undertaken. (TS/V) The strategy will be overseen by the CPPG. Specific activities aimed at countering terrorism shall continue to be coordinated by the OSG/TWIG. The components of our strategy should include the following: -- Diplomacy. The Department of State should dispatch a special emissary to engage in high-profile diplomacy in Europe aimed at increasing allied political and economic pressure on Libya. 25x(1) 25x(6) (TS/V) Economic Sanctions. The Department of the Treasury shall report by September 1 on U.S. subsidiaries doing business with Libya and shall work with the Department of State to bring diplomatic pressure to bear, where appropriate, to cease such operations. Such pressure should also be applied to parent companies in the U.S. Efforts to reduce Libya to the status of a residual supplier of. crude oil to Western Europe should be intensified. (TS/V) Military. The Department of Defense shall maintain a level of force in the Mediterranean sufficient to respond promptly with a range of options to Libyan-supported terrorist attacks. Additional measures which convey our readiness, capability, and intention to act with force shall be conducted in coordination with the Department of State. 25x(1).26x(6) (TS/V) Intelligence. 25x(1)25x(6) (TS/V) Ronald Riagan TOP SECRETT IB OF. 7 COPIE: