Memorandum of Conference with the President Authored by Andrew J. Goodpaster
This memorandum records President Dwight D. Eisenhower's decision not to proceed with aerial surveillance overflights at that time.
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OCR Page 1 of 3TOD pronet
101 OLUNL
April 11, 1959
MEMORANDUM OF CONFERENCE WITH THE PRESIDENT
April 7, 1959
Others present:
Secretary McElroy
Mr. Bissell
General Goodpaster
The President said he had asked Mr. McElroy and Mr. Bissell
to come in to tell them that he had decided not to go ahead with
certain reconnaissance flights for which he had given tentative
approval the preceding day. He said he wanted to give them
his thinking.
First, we now have the power to destroy the
Soviets without need for detailed targeting. Second,
as
the
world is going now, there seems no hope for the future unless
we can make some progress in negotiation (it is already four
years since the Geneva meeting) Third, we cannot
in
the
present circumstances afford the revulsion of world opinion
against the United States that might occur the U. S. being
the only nation that could conduct this activity. Fourth, we
are putting several hundred million dollars into programs for
more advanced capabilities.
In summary, the President said he did not agree th at this project
would be worth the political costs.
He added that he had called Secretary Dulles who had taken the
view that if the planned action were in the East he would see no
objection but in the North and South of their sector he would not
do it. Mr. Dulles had added that if the current negotiations fail,
we must at once get the most accurate information possible.
The President said he agreed on the need for information. This
need is highlighted by the distortions several senators are making
of our military position relative to that of the Soviets, and they are
helped in their "demagoguery " by our uncertainties as to Soviet
programs. He was concerned over the terrible propaganda impact
that would be occasioned if a reconnaissance plane were to fail.
He added that there is some evidence that the Soviets really want
a Summit Meeting. The President himself feels that there is need
DECLASSIFIED
TOP OLUNLT
TOO aronrt
E.O. 12958. SEC. 3.6(b)
MR 93 - 17301
BY His DATE 9/11/26