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TOD pronet 101 OLUNL April 11, 1959 MEMORANDUM OF CONFERENCE WITH THE PRESIDENT April 7, 1959 Others present: Secretary McElroy Mr. Bissell General Goodpaster The President said he had asked Mr. McElroy and Mr. Bissell to come in to tell them that he had decided not to go ahead with certain reconnaissance flights for which he had given tentative approval the preceding day. He said he wanted to give them his thinking. First, we now have the power to destroy the Soviets without need for detailed targeting. Second, as the world is going now, there seems no hope for the future unless we can make some progress in negotiation (it is already four years since the Geneva meeting) Third, we cannot in the present circumstances afford the revulsion of world opinion against the United States that might occur the U. S. being the only nation that could conduct this activity. Fourth, we are putting several hundred million dollars into programs for more advanced capabilities. In summary, the President said he did not agree th at this project would be worth the political costs. He added that he had called Secretary Dulles who had taken the view that if the planned action were in the East he would see no objection but in the North and South of their sector he would not do it. Mr. Dulles had added that if the current negotiations fail, we must at once get the most accurate information possible. The President said he agreed on the need for information. This need is highlighted by the distortions several senators are making of our military position relative to that of the Soviets, and they are helped in their "demagoguery " by our uncertainties as to Soviet programs. He was concerned over the terrible propaganda impact that would be occasioned if a reconnaissance plane were to fail. He added that there is some evidence that the Soviets really want a Summit Meeting. The President himself feels that there is need DECLASSIFIED TOP OLUNLT TOO aronrt E.O. 12958. SEC. 3.6(b) MR 93 - 17301 BY His DATE 9/11/26

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This memorandum records President Dwight D. Eisenhower's decision not to proceed with aerial surveillance overflights at that time.

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    "ocrText": "TOD pronet\n101 OLUNL\nApril 11, 1959\nMEMORANDUM OF CONFERENCE WITH THE PRESIDENT\nApril 7, 1959\nOthers present:\nSecretary McElroy\nMr. Bissell\nGeneral Goodpaster\nThe President said he had asked Mr. McElroy and Mr. Bissell\nto come in to tell them that he had decided not to go ahead with\ncertain reconnaissance flights for which he had given tentative\napproval the preceding day. He said he wanted to give them\nhis thinking.\nFirst, we now have the power to destroy the\nSoviets without need for detailed targeting. Second,\nas\nthe\nworld is going now, there seems no hope for the future unless\nwe can make some progress in negotiation (it is already four\nyears since the Geneva meeting) Third, we cannot\nin\nthe\npresent circumstances afford the revulsion of world opinion\nagainst the United States that might occur the U. S. being\nthe only nation that could conduct this activity. Fourth, we\nare putting several hundred million dollars into programs for\nmore advanced capabilities.\nIn summary, the President said he did not agree th at this project\nwould be worth the political costs.\nHe added that he had called Secretary Dulles who had taken the\nview that if the planned action were in the East he would see no\nobjection but in the North and South of their sector he would not\ndo it. Mr. Dulles had added that if the current negotiations fail,\nwe must at once get the most accurate information possible.\nThe President said he agreed on the need for information. This\nneed is highlighted by the distortions several senators are making\nof our military position relative to that of the Soviets, and they are\nhelped in their \"demagoguery \" by our uncertainties as to Soviet\nprograms. He was concerned over the terrible propaganda impact\nthat would be occasioned if a reconnaissance plane were to fail.\nHe added that there is some evidence that the Soviets really want\na Summit Meeting. The President himself feels that there is need\nDECLASSIFIED\nTOP OLUNLT\nTOO aronrt\nE.O. 12958. SEC. 3.6(b)\nMR 93 - 17301\nBY His DATE 9/11/26"
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