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Andrew Card's Files
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Originally Processed With FOIA(s):
FOIA Number:
2025-0373-S
2025-0373-S
FOIA
MARKER
This is not a textual record. This is used as an
administrative marker by the George Bush Presidential
Library Staff.
Record Group/Collection:
George H.W. Bush Presidential Records
Collection/Office of Origin:
Chief of Staff, White House Office of
Series:
Card, Andrew, Files
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OA/ID Number:
02718
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02718-009
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FEMA
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15
21
6
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
DATE: 7/26/89
TO: Richard Breeden
FROM: ANDY CARD And
M. FEMA
H may be Late, but
here is a name worth
considering Chips is
a great suy.
THE WHITE HOUSE
7/26/89
Chips-
Thanks for your not. I'll
plus you into the septem
keep in touch.
Andy
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
The Honorable James K. Stewart
6427 Lakeview Drive
Falls Church, Virginia 22041
HON. JAMES K. STEWART
Dear Andy July 12, 1989
The PResident needs A new Director
or FEMA.
I have the leAdership, Experience And A
TRACK record For integrating the Bureaucracy's
objectives with the PResidents needs! I
ChAnged nIJ to J Source of Support.
CAndidory I would be delighted. with Chips. best regards
IF you wonld "in ternally market" my
JKS
6427 Lakeview Drive, Falls Church, Virginia 22041
AC has seend
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
TO:
FROM:
DAVID ANDY CARD Q. BATES w
X
FYI
.
Action
Comment
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
7/14/89
Date:
David Batess
TO:
FROM:
JUANITA D. DUGGAN
Special Assistant to the President
for Cabinet Affairs
Room 230, OEOB, Ext. 2800
This letter from the Acting Director of
FEMA informs Gov. Sununu of FEMA's decision
to assist the State of Colorado with
fire suppression assistance on a Federal/
State cost sharing basis a i a ccst of
$1.024 million.
EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT
Federal Emergency Management Agency
AGENCY
Washington, D.C. 20472
JUL I 2 1989
The Honorable John H. Sununu
Chief of Staff
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500
Dear Governor Sununu:
It has been our practice to advise the White House staff of our
decision on requests for fire suppression assistance under
Section 420, Public Law 93-288, as amended. This letter advises
you of our decision on a recent request from the State of
Colorado.
On July 10, 1989, the State of Colorado submitted a request for
fire suppression assistance under Section 420, PL 93-288, as
amended, for the uncontrolled Sunnyside Fire, located near the
City of Boulder, which started on July 9, 1989, burned over 2,500
acres of forest and grassland, and threatened communities in
Boulder County. Our assessment of this situation in consultation
with the U.S. Forest Service, Department of Agriculture,
revealed that the fire threatened such destruction as would
constitute a major disaster. Consequently, assistance was
authorized under Section 420, PL 93-288, as amended.
Our Regional Director in Denver, Colorado, assisted by the U.S.
Forest Service, verified the need for immediate Federal funding
for this potentially critical fire situation. Based on this
recommendation, the Federal Emergency Management Agency has
authorized Federal funding under Federal/State cost sharing. The
Federal share is 70 percent of eligible State fire suppression
costs in excess of the State floor cost for 1989 which is
$36,960. On this basis, our preliminary estimate of Federal
costs to suppress the fire is $1,024,000.
The Regional Director is actively monitoring the situation and
has notified the Governor that Section 420 assistance is
available.
Sincerely,
Robert H. Morris
Acting Director
and
JHS says its
going to he
SP
& trome ??
Document Originally
Attached to
Following Page
AC has seen
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
Date:
June 12, 1989
FOR:
Governor Sununu
FROM: ANDY CARD
Action
Your Comment
Let's Talk
X
FYI
31 Lincoln Circle
Andover, MA 01810
26 May, 1989
Mr. Andrew H. Card
Deputy Chief of Staff
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500
Dear Andy:
As you are aware, I am seeking appointment as Region I
Administrator of the Federal Emergency Management Agency here in
Boston. I have submitted all the paperwork to the White House
personnel office directly and also through friends such as yourself
and other local party leaders. Ray Shamie has sent in a
recommendation on my behalf because he and a significant number of
state committee members believe I have both the technical and
political qualifications for this position.
In recent conversations with Ron Kaufman and others, I have
learned that Governor Sununu is recommending Richard Strome, the
current head of New Hampshire's Civil Defense office. He appears
to be technically qualified for this job -- more so than anyone who
has held that post in recent memory. However, there are unusual
political considerations surrounding this position that lead me to
believe that I would be a much more appropriate nominee. In this
letter, I'd like to provide some background on this and give you
my view of what challenges will face the next Regional
Administrator:
With the sale of Shoreham to New York State now virtually
assured, Seabrook becomes the only reactor that needs to win a
full-power operating license under the new rules promulgated by the
NRC for situations where state and local governments refuse to
cooperate in planning. The legal challenges to using utility-
drafted plans have not yet been fully litigated, so now that action
will shift here to Massachusetts. Attorney General Jim Shannon has
been using the full resources of the state government to oppose
Seabrook and he has been extremely effective in that role. He has
not faced any direct political challenge at either the state or
federal level to his actions, and has virtually monopolized the
nuclear debate to his personal political advantage and to the
Democratic Party in general.
The FEMA Regional Office will soon have to defend the adequacy
of these alternate plans developed by Seabrook in federal courts,
in administrative tribunals -- and most importantly -- before the
general public through the media. The FEMA regional Administrator
must be able to articulate the policy of the Bush-Quayle
Administration and convince the public that their safety is being
2
amply ensured by the federal regulatory process. He must also
highlight the purely political motives behind Shannon's activities.
Shannon and his colleagues cannot be permitted any longer to use
this "public safety" issue without challenge, especially during
next year's election cycle. Our Party's candidates for Governor and
Attorney General - whoever they might be - will be greatly helped
if this issue were either de-fused or turned against the Democratic
incumbents.
As we have seen in the recent past, the anti-nuclear crowd
currently ruling Beacon Hill have strongly criticized both FEMA and
the NRC as lacking impartiality and independence. Imagine the
volatile issue Democrats would have in a scenario in which the FEMA
Regional Office issued, as it must, an evaluation of emergency
plans for communities around Seabrook that were developed under the
direction of the same person heading the federal reviewing office!
There is no way the reputation and credibility of FEMA (or the
public acceptability of the Seabrook plans) could survive the furor
that would be certain to result.
I know that the Commonwealth of Massachusetts is giving
serious consideration to deliberately failing the next annual
federally-graded emergency exercise at the Pilgrim plant, which is
to be evaluated by FEMA. This action will be part of their overall
strategy to close all nuclear plants in the state, especially the
Pilgrim reactor. Under this scenario, either Boston Edison (or
FEMA, according to President Reagan's Executive Order of November
1988) would then become responsible for drafting off-site plans
under the NRC's revised rules, thus creating yet another Seabrook
situation. That problem could surface just in time to also be used
in next year's state elections unless it was handled with extreme
political finesse and sensitivity by the FEMA regional office.
As you know from reading my published columns and letters the
last few years, I am the only Republican activist in Massachusetts
who has openly been involved in the political debate surrounding
emergency planning. I have taken the heat willingly when most
others in our Party have refused to study the issue and get
involved in this highly-emotional and politically-unpopular topic.
My training and professional experience have allowed me to combine
technical competence with good political instincts to effectively
take this fight to the public with a degree of credibility.
So as you can see, Andy, we in the Massachusetts Republican
Party have more at stake in how this position is filled this year
than just the usual post-election patronage considerations. The
national energy policies of the Bush-Quayle Administration, the
economic vitality of our electricity-dependent region, the anxiety
of local citizens over their safety from nuclear accidents, and our
chances of installing a Republican administration in the
Commonwealth all will be greatly impacted by what happens in this
federal post.
3
Yes, we need someone technically qualified by professional
experience to administer this office, but the political
requirements are of over-riding importance for the reasons outlined
above. That is why I urge you to discuss this appointment at
greater length with John Sununu and Ron Kaufman so they will come
to recognize that I have just the right balance of technical
experience and political savvy to effectively exercise this federal
responsibility to our overall advantage. I urge you to present my
case as strongly as possible and ensure that I am given an
opportunity to demonstrate in an interview the wisdom of selecting
me.
I'd appreciate hearing your thoughts on this proposal. Thanks
again, Andy, for listening.
Cordially,
John John P. Harris
Phones:
(617) 589-7003 office
(508) 470-3743 residence
CC: Sen. A. Paul Cellucci
Massachusetts
Republican
Party
Hon. Ray Shamie
State Chairman
Massachusetts Republican State Committee
9 Galen Street, Watertown, Massachusetts 02172. Telephone (617) 924-8683
April 7, 1989
Senator Paul Cellucci
COPY
Room 520
State House
Boston, MA 02133
Dear Paul:
I am very pleased to recommend John P. Harris for a position at
the Federal Emergency Management Agency. With his education and
experience, he would be a valuable addition to any staff.
I have enclosed John's resume and his detailed experience record
which I believe you will find most impressive.
He is a veteran of the U. S. Air Force, where he held the
position of Military Communications Intelligence Specialist.
John is proficient in both Russian and Japanese. I know him as
a dedicated Republican and a very supportive member of the
Massachusetts Republican State Committee.
I hope you will give him every consideration.
Sincerely,
Rays
Ray Shamie
CC: Ronald Kaufman
/emb
PAID FOR BY THE MASSACHUSETTS REPUBLICAN STATE COMMITTEE
LAWRENCE
EAGLE-TRIBUNE
WEDNESDAY, MAY 10, 1989
11
Nuclear paranoia grips Bay State
Public needs better education on safety
By John P. Harris
current generation of U.S. nuclear
Guest Columnist
plants, including Seabrook, poses
much less risk to our health and
T
safety than do any of those other
HERE HAVE BEEN a number
sources.
of thoughtful articles ap-
Indeed, if the controls and re-
pearing lately in the press suggest-
ing America re-consider its posi-
straints that are routinely re-
tion on nuclear power.
quired of the nuclear industry
In particular, a recent column,
were imposed across the board to
"Nuclear Industry Needs Intelli-
every industry that has any el-
ement of risk associated with it,
gent Spectators," by MIT Presi-
our society would come to a
dent Paul E. Gray, provided a
sound case for building a second
screeching half.
generation of small, inherently
Twenty or 30 years ago, such
safe nuclear plants to replace the
concerns as we now hear from
ones now operating. He correctly
Massachusetts state officials
stressed that we need to better ed-
would have had some merit. But
ucate the public on nuclear power
with all the actual experience
issues.
gained since then, and the impres-
Dr. Gray felt this education
sive record of safety that has been
would help the public recognize
established, these fears have been
that, as he put it, "the greater use
proven groundless from a scientif-
of fully tested, standardized, safe
File photo
ic point of view. Every major in-
nuclear power plants as an alter-
Seabrook nuclear power plant
dustrialized nation in the world is
native to fossil fuel is the only vi-
rapidly expanding their use of cur-
able, long-term approach to ame-
liorate the atmospheric pollution
put an upper limit on the actual
rent-generation nuclear reactors
that causes the greenhouse ef-
consequences of even the most se-
as the most environmentally be-
fect."
vere nuclear accident. Despite all
nign source of electric power, and
the initial hysteria in the media,
they are using our technology to do
However, he skipped one crit-
the fact still remains that. beyond
it!
ical factor in his appraisal.
the 31 plant operators and fire-
Before the American people
fighters who died putting out the
So what we need today from our
will ever allow their utility compa-
blaze, there were no serious radia-
university scientists and academic
nies to invest in second-generation
tion-related injuries to the general
leaders is not more articles about
nuclear reactors, or permit their
public from that accident. Scien-
how much better future reactors
government to license them, they
tists have agreed that the only use-
might be, but some straight talk
must first be convinced of the safe-
ful conclusion for the United States
about the safety of reactors that
ty of existing nuclear plants. No
to draw from Chernobyl is that it
currently exist. What the great
one is effectively doing that job to-
has proven the soundness of Amer-
universities of our state can do is
day.
ican-style reactors.
provide factual information from
informed, neutral sources to edu-
With the 110 operating nuclear
The operating efficiency of
cate the public officials who are
power plants in the United States
existing nuclear power plants in
needlessly alarming people for
today, we have accumulated over
America continues to improve
what appears to be their own polit-
1,200 reactor-years of experience.
every year. Thanks to better train-
ical gain.
During that time, not one member
ing of operators and improved pro-
of the general public has ever been
cedures, there are fewer and few-
The stakes are too high for our
harmed by radiation releases
er automatic shutdowns
national and state energy policies
from those plants. The extensive
occurring. As our knowledge of
to be based on emotional or irratio-
internal damage to the reactor at
what burning fossil fuel does to our
nal reactions to public officials
Three Mile Island was "con-
fragile environment increases, our
who have no technical competence
tained," as it was engineered to
appreciation of nuclear power
in this area. The very real hazards
About the author
do, and posed no risk to the public.
should also be increasing.
of global pollution and the "green-
The lessons learned from that ac-
house effect" are far more omi-
But that is not the case, espe-
John P. Harris, 46, was a re-
cident and implemented at every
cially here in Massachusetts. The
nous than those posed by existing
cent candidate for Governor's
U.S. plant have significantly re-
nuclear power plants. But so far,
public is constantly being bom-
Council in Massachusetts. He is
duced the likelihood of a serious
the anti-nuclear paranoia seems to
barded with irresponsible half-
accident occurring to only a statis-
have our Bay State leaders under
a former president of the Essex
truths and outright deception
Club.
tical possibility.
its spell, and they have lost all
about the "risks" of nuclear pow-
sense of perspective.
He has worked at several nu-
er. Critics always fail to compare
clear power plants for a major
Extensive research after the
this risk to that of the alternative
So how about it, Dr. Gray? Can
Massachusetts-based engi-
terrible accident at Chernobyl
sources of energy, such as oil, coal
you and your scholars provide our
neering firm.
(where a complete loss of emer-
and gas, as well as the risk from
leaders with MIT's scientific con-
He and his wife and three
gency core cooling, no con-
the pervasive use of volatile and
clusions on the safety of the 110
children live on Lincoln Circle
tainment structure, and a raging
toxic chemicals in every aspect of
plants operating right now, some
in Andover.
fire forced radioactive materials
modern life. If they would do so,
of which we've lived with for a
into a globe-girdling plume) has
they would have to admit that the
whole generation?
ENERGY ISSUES NEED YOUR ATTENTION
The Democratic leadership of the Dukakis Administration is pursuing a reckless and expensive course
on energy issues in the Commonwealth and elsewhere. Most of their activities are based on an anti-nuclear
political bias, but all of them are having a direct negative impact on the cost of electricity to consumers and has
begun to affect supplies of electricity to meet residential and business demands
The following items are just a sample of the actions which all Republican activists should be watching:
Attorney-General Shannon is spending over $1 million per year in his efforts to block a license
for Seabrook, even though the State Budget is seriously out-of-balance and the Commonwealth
is experiencing power shortages.
Boston Edison has spent over $15 million to support the Massachusetts Civil Defense Agency
in developing emergency plans for local communities around Pilgrim Station but that state
agency has failed to complete them adequately enough to meet the federal standards enforced
at 108 other plants nationwide.
Nine municipal electric companies in the state have filed suit against Governor Dukakis and
Attorney General Shannon for their illegal actions in blocking Seabrook, which has cost
thousands of local taxpayers millions of dollars they invested in that plant. If these towns win
their suit, the court will order the taxpayers of the Commonwealth to re-imburse those municipal
investors for their losses. No matter which way the suit goes, the taxpayers will have to pay the
cost of defending Shannon and Dukakis.
The Massachusetts Department of Public Health has repeatedly provided brief reports to the
news media which indicate that the MDPH is investigating "new evidence of cancer deaths near
the Pilgrim Station." MDPH has for two years failed to issue a final report which would disprove
those claims. Even though its own monitoring system has shown radiation levels around Pilgrim
are at or below levels measured elsewhere in the state, this state agency is creating unnecessary
anxiety to resident near the plant, apparently to support the Governor and the Attorney
General's anti-nuclear campaign.
The Mass Civil Defense Agency has hired - at taxpayers' expense - a full-time nuclear inspector
to monitor the Pilgrim and Yankee Rowe plants, even though the federal Nuclear Regulatory
Commission has Resident Inspectors assigned to both plants.
Sen. Nick Costello of Amesbury has filed a bill that would prohibit Massachusetts electric
companies from buying power from out-of-state nuclear power plants, even though over one-
third of all New England's electric power is nuclear generated!
Sen. Costello, Rep. Hildt and others have filed a bill requiring voters to approve of emergency
response plans for nuclear power plants at biennial elections, even though those highly technical
plans are reviewed and tested by federal authorities regularly.
Rep. Larry Alexander and others have filed a bill to double the size of emergency planning
zones around nuclear plants, even though the state can't handle the current 10-mile federal
requirement. The cost for the extra Civil Defense Agency staff and outside consultants would
be billed to the electric companies and, in turn, to the rate-payers.
All of these activities are contrary to good energy planning and will cost both taxpayers and rate-payers
of the Commonwealth enormously. If they are success in further weakening the ability of local electric utilities
to provide adequate power supplies, our state's economy will be irreparably damaged and the health and welfare
of our citizens will suffer.
You are encouraged to write "Letters to the Editor" and contact your state representative and senator
to bring some common sense to bear on these vital issues. For more information, contact John Harris, 31 Lincoln
Circle, Andover MA 01810 or Republican State Committee headquarters.
FEMA
ok
FEMA shall provide for initial federal response activities,
including command and control of the off-site response, as
may be needed.
love
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
DATE:
TO:
FROM:
ANDY CARD
Turn ASLB
Cong Support
18th sides 5/th isl
FEMA
FEMA shall provide
FEMA Shall provider
initial Fedual response activi
Uersun
16
352.27 Federal Role in the Emergency Response
In addition to the Federal component of the licensee offsite
emergency response plan described in Subpart B (352.26), and
after complying with E.O. 12657, Section 2 (b) (2), which states
that FEMA:
"(2) shall take care not to supplant State and local
resources. FEMA shall substitute its own resources for
those of State and local governments only to the extent
necessary to compensate for the nonparticipation or
inadequate participation of those governments, and only as
a last resort after appropriate consultation with the
Governors and responsible local officials in the affected
area regarding State and local participation;",
Until such time as there is the orderly activation of State and
local government response activities, FEMA shall provide for
initial Federal response activities, including command and
control. Any Federal response role undertaken pursuant to this
Section shall be transferred to State and local governments as
soon as feasible after the onset of an actual emergency.
352.28
Reimbursement
In accordance with Executive Order 12657, Section 6 (d), FEMA is
directed to coordinate full reimbursement to the agencies
furnishing capabilities, either jointly or severally, from any
affected licensee and from any affected nonparticipating or
inadequately participating State or local government, for
services performed by FEMA or other Federal agencies, pursuant to
the terms of Executive Order 12657.
Dated
Billing Code 6718-20
Julius W. Becton, Jr.
Director, FEMA
16
352.27 Federal Role in the Emergency Response
In addition to the Federal component of the licensee offsite
emergency response plan described in Subpart B (352.26), and after
complying with E.O. 12657, Section 2 (b) (2), which states that
FEMA:
"(2) shall take care not to supplant State and local
resources. FEMA shall substitute its own resources for those
of State and local governments only to the extent necessary
to compensate for the nonparticipation or inadequate
participation of those governments, and only as a last resort
after appropriate consultation with the Governors and
responsible local officials in the affected area regarding
State and local participation;",
FEMA shall provide for initial Federal response activities,
including command and control to assist the orderly activation of
State and local government response activities, including command
and control. Any new Federal response role, undertaken pursuant
to this Section, shall be transferred to State and local
governments as soon as feasible after the onset of an actual
emergency.
352.28 Reimbursement
In accordance with Executive Order 12657, Section 6(d), FEMA is
directed to coordinate full reimbursement to the agencies
furnishing capabilities, either jointly or severally, from any
affected licensee and from any affected nonparticipating or
inadequately participating State or local government, for services
performed by FEMA or other Federal agencies, pursuant to the terms
of Executive Order 12657.
Dated
Billing Code 6718-20
Julius W. Becton, Jr.
Director, FEMA
8 February, 1989
TO: Andrew H. Card
RE: NEEDED CHANGE TO FEB. 8 OMB-APPROVED LANGUAGE ON E.O.
Today, a meeting of OMB, DOE, NRC, FEMA and DOJ agreed
on the following implementation language for the part of the
Executive Order dealing with FEMA command and control at the
onset of an actual emergency. The problem is in bold face.
"FEMA shall provide for initial Federal response
activities, including command and control, to
assist the orderly activation of State and local
government response, including command and
control."
Needed Change: strike "to" and insert "and shall"
Explanation: The unintended consequence of today's
compromise is to imply that FEMA can operate only in an
assistance role to anti-licensing State and local officials
who claim that their best efforts response to an actual
emergency will be undertaken alone, and without requests for,
or acceptance of, any assistance.
The burden would be on the license applicant to prove, for
the record, that the relevant officials don't really mean it.
This destroys the intent of the Executive Order, which is to
show that people with legal authority will be there to
exercise command and control - regardless of the stated
position taken by State and local officials prior to
licensing.
Using "and shall" makes clear that two things are happening.
One, Federal command and control will take place as a stand-
alone activity while, two, FEMA will assist in getting the
State and locals up on their feet so they can do it
themselves.
7 February, 1989
TO: Andrew H. Card
RE:
EXECUTIVE ORDER IMPLEMENTATION REGULATIONS
The lawyers have come up with several ways to handle the
part of the regulations dealing with FEMA command and control
at the onset of an actual emergency. Two possible approaches
are listed below.
The trick in any case is to assure the NRC licensing
boards that FEMA can fill the public safety gap by providing
command and control from the onset of an emergency until
State and local officials are up to speed on what to do.
Again, these officials seek to block licensing with sworn
testimony to the board that their best efforts response to an
actual emergency will be ad hoc, without resorting to any
plan or calling for help from anybody.
Also, Justice's federalism concerns are addressed by
making sure that FEMA helps get the State and locals up to
speed, and then leaves the scene as soon as they are.
"If necessary, FEMA shall provide for initial
Federal response activities, including command and
control. Federal command and control activities
shall
shall continue no longer than is necessary for FEMA
and
to assist in the orderly activation of adequate
State and local government response, including
command and control."
or,
"If necessary, FEMA shall provide for initial
Federal response activities, including command and
control to protect public health and safety, and
shall assist in the orderly activation of adequate
State and local government response, including
command and control."
7 February, 1989
TO: Andrew H. Card
RE:
EXECUTIVE ORDER IMPLEMENTATION REGULATIONS
The lawyers have come up with several ways to handle the
part of the regulations dealing with FEMA command and control
at the onset of an actual emergency. Two possible approaches
are listed below.
The trick in any case is to assure the NRC licensing
boards that FEMA can fill the public safety gap by providing
command and control from the onset of an emergency until
State and local officials are up to speed on what to do.
Again, these officials seek to block licensing with sworn
testimony to the board that their best efforts response to an
actual emergency will be ad hoc, without resorting to any
plan or calling for help from anybody.
Also, Justice's federalism concerns are addressed by
making sure that FEMA helps get the State and locals up to
speed, and then leaves the scene as soon as they are.
"If necessary, FEMA shall provide for initial
Federal response activities, including command and
control. Federal command and control activities
shall continue no longer than is necessary for FEMA
to assist in the orderly activation of adequate
State and local government response, including
command and control."
or,
"If necessary, FEMA shall provide for initial
Federal response activities, including command and
control to protect public health and safety, and
shall assist in the orderly activation of adequate
State and local government response, including
command and control."
16 pages of ref.
Fed Rob
"FEMA shall provid for initial
fed Resp actives endidy comed
and control at the by cealt
of Gov. S other comp atting.
Okey new fed deep. role,
underlaker pursuit to then
section shall be teamsfered
positice after flu onset of
to S&L govts as soon as
an actual un,
United States
GAO
General Accounting Office
Washington, D.C. 20548
Resources, Community, and
A.
Economic Development Division
February 28, 1989
RECEIVED
The Honorable John Conyers, Jr.
Chairman, Committee on
FEB 2 8 1989
Government Operations
House of Representatives
Legislation and National
Security Subcommittee
Dear Mr. Chairman:
On June 1, 1988, the former Chairman, Legislation and
National Security Subcommittee, House Committee on
Government Operations, asked us to determine the basis for
the Federal Emergency Management Agency's (FEMA) changing
its position concerning the adequacy of New Hampshire's
emergency response plan for the beach population near the
Seabrook nuclear power plant. The former Chairman was also
concerned about allegations that the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission (NRC), Governor of New Hampshire, or White House
pressured FEMA to change its position. This letter provides
you information on these issues and concludes our work
related to this request.
In summary, in June 1987 FEMA concluded that the New
Hampshire plan did not provide a range of measures to
shelter the beach population if an accident occurred at the
Seabrook plant. On the basis of various programmatic,
technical, and legal factors received during the subsequent
year, FEMA concluded that immediate evacuation, rather than
sheltering, would be the primary protective measure for the
beach population because evacuation would result in greater
radiation dose savings from an accident. Therefore, in June
1988, FEMA determined that the New Hampshire plan adequately
addressed the beach population issue. In addition, the
record shows that FEMA reached this determination on the
basis of its own deliberations and information provided by
an outside consultant and others, such as NRC.
FEMA'S ROLE IN THE
LICENSING PROCESS
FEMA, which serves as an advisor to NRC in the licensing
process for nuclear power plants, reviews and makes findings
and determinations on the adequacy of off-site state and
local radiological emergency plans and preparedness. This
process begins when a governor or designee submits state and
local plans to FEMA for its review. The review process
includes (1) an evaluation of the plans by the regional
assistance committee (RAC) 1 for compliance with joint NRC
and FEMA emergency planning criteria (NUREG-0654), (2) at
least one RAC-observed exercise that tests state and local
governments' ability to implement major portions of the
plans, and (3) a meeting with state and local government
officials and the public to discuss, and receive comments
on, the plan and the exercise.
At the completion of the review process, or earlier if
requested by NRC, FEMA determines whether the off-site plans
meet its regulatory criteria. The criteria, found in 44 CFR
350. (a) and (b), states in part that FEMA must determine
that the plans provide reasonable assurance that appropriate
protective measures can be taken to protect the public in
the event of a radiological emergency. FEMA provides its
determination to NRC.
However, the final decision on the adequacy of overall
emergency response planning, as well as other radiological
health and safety issues, rests with NRC. NRC regulations
require that--except for loading fuel and operating a plant
at low power for testing purposes--no operating license for
a nuclear power reactor will be issued unless NRC can be
reasonably assured that adequate protective measures can and
will be taken in the event of a radiological accident (10
CFR 50.47). The Atomic Safety and Licensing Board (ASLB) 2
makes this determination for NRC. ASLB decisions may be
appealed to an Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal Board and,
where NRC does not choose to review its decision, the appeal
board decision becomes the final agency position, subject
only to review in a federal court of appeals.
On December 9, 1985, New Hampshire submitted a radiological
emergency response plan for the communities near the
Seabrook plant. FEMA conducted a full field exercise of the
plan in February 1986 and issued its report in June 1986.
Subsequently, the state submitted a revised plan, and FEMA
and the RAC completed their review of the revision in June
The RAC consists of 10 federal agencies (FEMA, the
Environmental Protection Agency, NRC, and the Departments of
Agriculture, Commerce, Defense, Energy, Health and Human
Services, the Interior, and Transportation). The cognizant
FEMA regional representative chairs the RAC.
The ASLB, established by the Atomic Energy Act, has three
members including attorneys and others with expertise in
various technical fields.
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1986. The state submitted a second revision on September 8,
1986, and the results of the FEMA/RAC review were provided
to the state on December 12, 1986. FEMA conducted a second
exercise of the plan in June 1988 and issued its report on
September 2, 1988.
FEMA'S INITIAL POSITION
In December 1985, after reviewing New Hampshire's plan, the
RAC Chairman raised concerns about the state's ability to
protect the large population that visits the beaches around
Seabrook each summer. As a result of this concern, the RAC
Chairman asked the members to provide their views on the
state's treatment of the beach population in the emergency
plan. By February 1987, a majority of the RAC had responded
and concluded that the state adequately addressed options to
protect the beach population. In its response supporting
this position, NRC pointed out that Seabrook's double
containment system would allow more than the 30 minute
planning time described in NUREG-0654 and concluded that the
plan generally met the joint NRC/FEMA emergency planning
criteria. At its April 1987 meeting, the RAC--including
FEMA--adopted NRC's position.
Following the meeting, NRC informed FEMA that NRC was
withdrawing its response and expected to provide another
that would omit the discussion of Seabrook's containment
features. NRC reached this decision after its Office of
General Counsel concluded that FEMA was not required to
consider plant-specific features when considering an
emergency plan. NRC submitted its revised position to the
RAC Chairman on June 4, 1987, the day FEMA submitted a
statement of position to the ASLB on the adequacy of the New
Hampshire plan. FEMA concluded that, until the issue of
protecting the beach population was resolved, it could not
find the plan adequate. FEMA reiterated this position in
testimony filed with the ASLB in September 1987.
FACTORS LEADING TO THE
CHANGE IN FEMA'S POSITION
FEMA's final position with regard to the beach population
was presented in testimony before the ASLB on June 10, 1988.
In that testimony, FEMA stated that the requirement for a
range of protective measures for the beach population had
been met through recent information provided by the state.
According to FEMA officials, a number of programmatic,
technical, and legal factors influenced them to change their
position on the adequacy of the New Hampshire emergency
plan. Each of these are discussed below.
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Programmatic Factors
At four RAC meetings in 1987 and 1988, a majority of the
members believed that the New Hampshire plan provided a
range of options to protect the beach population. The FEMA
RAC Chairman disagreed with the other members. As a result,
FEMA headquarters officials, who had supported the position
that the plan did not adequately address a range of
protective measures, began to reexamine this position and
requested additional information from the state on the
possible use of sheltering as a protective action.
In September 1987, the state provided FEMA with a survey of
shelters near the New Hampshire beaches and asked FEMA for
assistance to evaluate the results. The state, however, had
not had time to incorporate the information into its plan
before FEMA filed testimony with the ASLB in September 1987.
As a result, FEMA did not incorporate this information in
its testimony. FEMA subsequently pointed out this omission
in supplemental testimony filed with the ASLB on January 25,
1988. Shortly thereafter, the state provided FEMA
information showing that the buildings at the beach would
provide little protection to the public in the event of an
accident. As a result, the state concluded that immediate
evacuation, rather than sheltering, would be the primary
protective measure because it would provide greater
radiation dose savings.
Technical Factors
Shortly after receiving the results of the survey of beach
shelters from the state, FEMA requested the Department of
Energy's Idaho National Engineering Laboratory (INEL) to
perform a technical analysis of FEMA's position on the
adequacy of the plan to protect the beach population. INEL
provided FEMA information showing that under most accident
scenarios a greater dose savings resulted from immediate
evacuation rather than sheltering the population.
The INEL consultant explained that the dose savings would
occur because the plume resulting from a radiological
release consists of two parts: the cloud shine and ground
shine. The cloud shine has a short half-life and consists
of small, light, airborne radioactive particles. The cloud
shine moves away from the accident and is dispersed with the
wind. Conversely, the ground shine consists of heavier
radioactive particles with a longer half-life that tend to
settle to the ground near the point of release. The
consultant found that the ground shine would be the greatest
contributor to the radioactive dose that would result from
exposure to the plume. He reasoned that, if the population
is sheltered at the beach, they will be in buildings that
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the shelter survey showed would provide little protection.
In addition, the sheltered population would eventually have
to be evacuated and would be exposed to the ground shine
that had accumulated. The consultant concluded that the
advantage of evacuation is that the beach population would
be moving away from the plume's path and would generally
receive a lesser radiation dose than if they took shelter
near the beach.
Legal Factors
Between June 1987 and June 1988, several legal questions
that affected FEMA's review of, and position on, the New
Hampshire plan were resolved. These questions pertained to
FEMA's emergency planning regulations, an interpretation of
NRC's emergency planning regulations, and the roles of the
two agencies in emergency planning for nuclear power plants.
Each of these are discussed below.
FEMA's Emergency Planning Regulations
FEMA's RAC Chairman asked FEMA headquarters officials to
clarify the agency's position on the meaning of the term
"reasonable assurance" as used in FEMA's emergency planning
regulations (44 CFR 350.5(b)). The RAC Chairman believed
that FEMA had some discretion to find a plan inadequate even
if it meets all emergency planning standards and criteria
contained in NUREG-0654 and 44 CFR 350.5(a). After some
internal debate, FEMA determined that if a plan meets the
standards and criteria, FEMA must make a positive finding;
that is, reasonable assurance exists that appropriate
protective measures can be taken to protect the public in
the event of a radiological emergency.
Another closely related issue that the RAC Chairman asked
FEMA headquarters to clarify was whether a plan must achieve
some preset dose savings or evacuation time in order to be
found adequate. The Chairman believed that this question
was particularly relevant because the estimated evacuation
times in the New Hampshire plan were high. FEMA ultimately
concluded that no minimum dose savings, and consequently no
minimum evacuation time estimates, must be achieved by an
emergency plan for the plan to be found adequate.
A series of events led FEMA to reach this conclusion.
According to FFMA officials, the events included (1) a July
1986 NRC ruling for the Shoreham nuclear power plant, which
stated that an emergency plan need not achieve a minimum
dose savings, (2) the ASLB's rejection of testimony proposed
by the Massachusetts Attorney General that focused on
evacuation time estimates, and (3) new rules published by
NRC on November 3, 1987, which state that a plan need not
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achieve a predetermined dose savings or evacuation time
estimate.
Clarification of NRC Regulations
In addition, FEMA sought clarification from NRC on the
proper interpretation of its emergency planning regulations.
Specifically, FEMA wanted to know if NRC's emergency
planning regulations required that a plan contain
provisions for sheltering the population in the event of an
accident. This issue became increasingly important to FEMA
headquarters officials as the limited usefulness of
sheltering as a protective measure for the beach population
became apparent. In a February 1988 letter, NRC's Office of
General Counsel informed FEMA that the lack of provisions
for sheltering all parts of the population within the
emergency planning zone did not conflict with NRC's
emergency planning regulations.
Role of the Two Agencies
The final legal factor concerned the responsibilities of
FEMA and NRC to determine an acceptable risk to the public
from the operation of a nuclear power plant. Specifically,
the FEMA RAC Chairman, after the other issues associated
with the FEMA review of the New Hampshire plan had been
resolved, personally believed that the risk to the beach
population was too great. The general consensus among FEMA
headquarters officials was that the risk was not too great,
the determination of risk is NRC's responsibility, and
FEMA's findings on the adequacy of a plan is but one factor
considered by NRC to determine risk.
- - -
In summary, the record in this matter demonstrates that
various programmatic, technical, and legal factors caused
FEMA to determine that the New Hampshire plan met FEMA's
emergency planning regulations for the beach population.
Initially, FEMA determined that the plan did not provide a
range of measures to shelter the beach population in the
event of an accident. Subsequently, FEMA concluded that
immediate evacuation, rather than sheltering, would be the
primary protective measure for the beach population because
evacuation would result in greater radiation dose savings
from an accident. The record also shows that FEMA reached
this determination on the basis of its own deliberations and
information provided by an outside consultant, the state,
and NRC.
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If you have any questions or would like to discuss this
Ann Kruslicky, Assistant Director, on 353-5711.
matter further, please contact me on 275-1441, or Ms. Mary
Sincerely yours,
Kend O. out
Keith O. Fultz
Director, Energy Issues
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