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    "ocrText": "Originally Processed With FOIA(s):\nFOIA Number:\n2025-0373-S\n2025-0373-S\nFOIA\nMARKER\nThis is not a textual record. This is used as an\nadministrative marker by the George Bush Presidential\nLibrary Staff.\nRecord Group/Collection:\nGeorge H.W. Bush Presidential Records\nCollection/Office of Origin:\nChief of Staff, White House Office of\nSeries:\nCard, Andrew, Files\nSubseries:\nOA/ID Number:\n02718\nFolder ID Number:\n02718-009\nFolder Title:\nFEMA\nStack:\nRow:\nSection:\nShelf:\nPosition:\nG\n15\n21\n6\nTHE WHITE HOUSE\nWASHINGTON\nDATE: 7/26/89\nTO: Richard Breeden\nFROM: ANDY CARD And\nM. FEMA\nH may be Late, but\nhere is a name worth\nconsidering Chips is\na great suy.\nTHE WHITE HOUSE\n7/26/89\nChips-\nThanks for your not. I'll\nplus you into the septem\nkeep in touch.\nAndy\nTHE WHITE HOUSE\nWASHINGTON\nThe Honorable James K. Stewart\n6427 Lakeview Drive\nFalls Church, Virginia 22041\nHON. JAMES K. STEWART\nDear Andy July 12, 1989\nThe PResident needs A new Director\nor FEMA.\nI have the leAdership, Experience And A\nTRACK record For integrating the Bureaucracy's\nobjectives with the PResidents needs! I\nChAnged nIJ to J Source of Support.\nCAndidory I would be delighted. with Chips. best regards\nIF you wonld \"in ternally market\" my\nJKS\n6427 Lakeview Drive, Falls Church, Virginia 22041\nAC has seend\nTHE WHITE HOUSE\nWASHINGTON\nTO:\nFROM:\nDAVID ANDY CARD Q. BATES w\nX\nFYI\n.\nAction\nComment\nTHE WHITE HOUSE\nWASHINGTON\n7/14/89\nDate:\nDavid Batess\nTO:\nFROM:\nJUANITA D. DUGGAN\nSpecial Assistant to the President\nfor Cabinet Affairs\nRoom 230, OEOB, Ext. 2800\nThis letter from the Acting Director of\nFEMA informs Gov. Sununu of FEMA's decision\nto assist the State of Colorado with\nfire suppression assistance on a Federal/\nState cost sharing basis a i a ccst of\n$1.024 million.\nEMERGENCY MANAGEMENT\nFederal Emergency Management Agency\nAGENCY\nWashington, D.C. 20472\nJUL I 2 1989\nThe Honorable John H. Sununu\nChief of Staff\nThe White House\nWashington, D.C. 20500\nDear Governor Sununu:\nIt has been our practice to advise the White House staff of our\ndecision on requests for fire suppression assistance under\nSection 420, Public Law 93-288, as amended. This letter advises\nyou of our decision on a recent request from the State of\nColorado.\nOn July 10, 1989, the State of Colorado submitted a request for\nfire suppression assistance under Section 420, PL 93-288, as\namended, for the uncontrolled Sunnyside Fire, located near the\nCity of Boulder, which started on July 9, 1989, burned over 2,500\nacres of forest and grassland, and threatened communities in\nBoulder County. Our assessment of this situation in consultation\nwith the U.S. Forest Service, Department of Agriculture,\nrevealed that the fire threatened such destruction as would\nconstitute a major disaster. Consequently, assistance was\nauthorized under Section 420, PL 93-288, as amended.\nOur Regional Director in Denver, Colorado, assisted by the U.S.\nForest Service, verified the need for immediate Federal funding\nfor this potentially critical fire situation. Based on this\nrecommendation, the Federal Emergency Management Agency has\nauthorized Federal funding under Federal/State cost sharing. The\nFederal share is 70 percent of eligible State fire suppression\ncosts in excess of the State floor cost for 1989 which is\n$36,960. On this basis, our preliminary estimate of Federal\ncosts to suppress the fire is $1,024,000.\nThe Regional Director is actively monitoring the situation and\nhas notified the Governor that Section 420 assistance is\navailable.\nSincerely,\nRobert H. Morris\nActing Director\nand\nJHS says its\ngoing to he\nSP\n& trome ??\nDocument Originally\nAttached to\nFollowing Page\nAC has seen\nTHE WHITE HOUSE\nWASHINGTON\nDate:\nJune 12, 1989\nFOR:\nGovernor Sununu\nFROM: ANDY CARD\nAction\nYour Comment\nLet's Talk\nX\nFYI\n31 Lincoln Circle\nAndover, MA 01810\n26 May, 1989\nMr. Andrew H. Card\nDeputy Chief of Staff\nThe White House\nWashington, D.C. 20500\nDear Andy:\nAs you are aware, I am seeking appointment as Region I\nAdministrator of the Federal Emergency Management Agency here in\nBoston. I have submitted all the paperwork to the White House\npersonnel office directly and also through friends such as yourself\nand other local party leaders. Ray Shamie has sent in a\nrecommendation on my behalf because he and a significant number of\nstate committee members believe I have both the technical and\npolitical qualifications for this position.\nIn recent conversations with Ron Kaufman and others, I have\nlearned that Governor Sununu is recommending Richard Strome, the\ncurrent head of New Hampshire's Civil Defense office. He appears\nto be technically qualified for this job -- more so than anyone who\nhas held that post in recent memory. However, there are unusual\npolitical considerations surrounding this position that lead me to\nbelieve that I would be a much more appropriate nominee. In this\nletter, I'd like to provide some background on this and give you\nmy view of what challenges will face the next Regional\nAdministrator:\nWith the sale of Shoreham to New York State now virtually\nassured, Seabrook becomes the only reactor that needs to win a\nfull-power operating license under the new rules promulgated by the\nNRC for situations where state and local governments refuse to\ncooperate in planning. The legal challenges to using utility-\ndrafted plans have not yet been fully litigated, so now that action\nwill shift here to Massachusetts. Attorney General Jim Shannon has\nbeen using the full resources of the state government to oppose\nSeabrook and he has been extremely effective in that role. He has\nnot faced any direct political challenge at either the state or\nfederal level to his actions, and has virtually monopolized the\nnuclear debate to his personal political advantage and to the\nDemocratic Party in general.\nThe FEMA Regional Office will soon have to defend the adequacy\nof these alternate plans developed by Seabrook in federal courts,\nin administrative tribunals -- and most importantly -- before the\ngeneral public through the media. The FEMA regional Administrator\nmust be able to articulate the policy of the Bush-Quayle\nAdministration and convince the public that their safety is being\n2\namply ensured by the federal regulatory process. He must also\nhighlight the purely political motives behind Shannon's activities.\nShannon and his colleagues cannot be permitted any longer to use\nthis \"public safety\" issue without challenge, especially during\nnext year's election cycle. Our Party's candidates for Governor and\nAttorney General - whoever they might be - will be greatly helped\nif this issue were either de-fused or turned against the Democratic\nincumbents.\nAs we have seen in the recent past, the anti-nuclear crowd\ncurrently ruling Beacon Hill have strongly criticized both FEMA and\nthe NRC as lacking impartiality and independence. Imagine the\nvolatile issue Democrats would have in a scenario in which the FEMA\nRegional Office issued, as it must, an evaluation of emergency\nplans for communities around Seabrook that were developed under the\ndirection of the same person heading the federal reviewing office!\nThere is no way the reputation and credibility of FEMA (or the\npublic acceptability of the Seabrook plans) could survive the furor\nthat would be certain to result.\nI know that the Commonwealth of Massachusetts is giving\nserious consideration to deliberately failing the next annual\nfederally-graded emergency exercise at the Pilgrim plant, which is\nto be evaluated by FEMA. This action will be part of their overall\nstrategy to close all nuclear plants in the state, especially the\nPilgrim reactor. Under this scenario, either Boston Edison (or\nFEMA, according to President Reagan's Executive Order of November\n1988) would then become responsible for drafting off-site plans\nunder the NRC's revised rules, thus creating yet another Seabrook\nsituation. That problem could surface just in time to also be used\nin next year's state elections unless it was handled with extreme\npolitical finesse and sensitivity by the FEMA regional office.\nAs you know from reading my published columns and letters the\nlast few years, I am the only Republican activist in Massachusetts\nwho has openly been involved in the political debate surrounding\nemergency planning. I have taken the heat willingly when most\nothers in our Party have refused to study the issue and get\ninvolved in this highly-emotional and politically-unpopular topic.\nMy training and professional experience have allowed me to combine\ntechnical competence with good political instincts to effectively\ntake this fight to the public with a degree of credibility.\nSo as you can see, Andy, we in the Massachusetts Republican\nParty have more at stake in how this position is filled this year\nthan just the usual post-election patronage considerations. The\nnational energy policies of the Bush-Quayle Administration, the\neconomic vitality of our electricity-dependent region, the anxiety\nof local citizens over their safety from nuclear accidents, and our\nchances of installing a Republican administration in the\nCommonwealth all will be greatly impacted by what happens in this\nfederal post.\n3\nYes, we need someone technically qualified by professional\nexperience to administer this office, but the political\nrequirements are of over-riding importance for the reasons outlined\nabove. That is why I urge you to discuss this appointment at\ngreater length with John Sununu and Ron Kaufman so they will come\nto recognize that I have just the right balance of technical\nexperience and political savvy to effectively exercise this federal\nresponsibility to our overall advantage. I urge you to present my\ncase as strongly as possible and ensure that I am given an\nopportunity to demonstrate in an interview the wisdom of selecting\nme.\nI'd appreciate hearing your thoughts on this proposal. Thanks\nagain, Andy, for listening.\nCordially,\nJohn John P. Harris\nPhones:\n(617) 589-7003 office\n(508) 470-3743 residence\nCC: Sen. A. Paul Cellucci\nMassachusetts\nRepublican\nParty\nHon. Ray Shamie\nState Chairman\nMassachusetts Republican State Committee\n9 Galen Street, Watertown, Massachusetts 02172. Telephone (617) 924-8683\nApril 7, 1989\nSenator Paul Cellucci\nCOPY\nRoom 520\nState House\nBoston, MA 02133\nDear Paul:\nI am very pleased to recommend John P. Harris for a position at\nthe Federal Emergency Management Agency. With his education and\nexperience, he would be a valuable addition to any staff.\nI have enclosed John's resume and his detailed experience record\nwhich I believe you will find most impressive.\nHe is a veteran of the U. S. Air Force, where he held the\nposition of Military Communications Intelligence Specialist.\nJohn is proficient in both Russian and Japanese. I know him as\na dedicated Republican and a very supportive member of the\nMassachusetts Republican State Committee.\nI hope you will give him every consideration.\nSincerely,\nRays\nRay Shamie\nCC: Ronald Kaufman\n/emb\nPAID FOR BY THE MASSACHUSETTS REPUBLICAN STATE COMMITTEE\nLAWRENCE\nEAGLE-TRIBUNE\nWEDNESDAY, MAY 10, 1989\n11\nNuclear paranoia grips Bay State\nPublic needs better education on safety\nBy John P. Harris\ncurrent generation of U.S. nuclear\nGuest Columnist\nplants, including Seabrook, poses\nmuch less risk to our health and\nT\nsafety than do any of those other\nHERE HAVE BEEN a number\nsources.\nof thoughtful articles ap-\nIndeed, if the controls and re-\npearing lately in the press suggest-\ning America re-consider its posi-\nstraints that are routinely re-\ntion on nuclear power.\nquired of the nuclear industry\nIn particular, a recent column,\nwere imposed across the board to\n\"Nuclear Industry Needs Intelli-\nevery industry that has any el-\nement of risk associated with it,\ngent Spectators,\" by MIT Presi-\nour society would come to a\ndent Paul E. Gray, provided a\nsound case for building a second\nscreeching half.\ngeneration of small, inherently\nTwenty or 30 years ago, such\nsafe nuclear plants to replace the\nconcerns as we now hear from\nones now operating. He correctly\nMassachusetts state officials\nstressed that we need to better ed-\nwould have had some merit. But\nucate the public on nuclear power\nwith all the actual experience\nissues.\ngained since then, and the impres-\nDr. Gray felt this education\nsive record of safety that has been\nwould help the public recognize\nestablished, these fears have been\nthat, as he put it, \"the greater use\nproven groundless from a scientif-\nof fully tested, standardized, safe\nFile photo\nic point of view. Every major in-\nnuclear power plants as an alter-\nSeabrook nuclear power plant\ndustrialized nation in the world is\nnative to fossil fuel is the only vi-\nrapidly expanding their use of cur-\nable, long-term approach to ame-\nliorate the atmospheric pollution\nput an upper limit on the actual\nrent-generation nuclear reactors\nthat causes the greenhouse ef-\nconsequences of even the most se-\nas the most environmentally be-\nfect.\"\nvere nuclear accident. Despite all\nnign source of electric power, and\nthe initial hysteria in the media,\nthey are using our technology to do\nHowever, he skipped one crit-\nthe fact still remains that. beyond\nit!\nical factor in his appraisal.\nthe 31 plant operators and fire-\nBefore the American people\nfighters who died putting out the\nSo what we need today from our\nwill ever allow their utility compa-\nblaze, there were no serious radia-\nuniversity scientists and academic\nnies to invest in second-generation\ntion-related injuries to the general\nleaders is not more articles about\nnuclear reactors, or permit their\npublic from that accident. Scien-\nhow much better future reactors\ngovernment to license them, they\ntists have agreed that the only use-\nmight be, but some straight talk\nmust first be convinced of the safe-\nful conclusion for the United States\nabout the safety of reactors that\nty of existing nuclear plants. No\nto draw from Chernobyl is that it\ncurrently exist. What the great\none is effectively doing that job to-\nhas proven the soundness of Amer-\nuniversities of our state can do is\nday.\nican-style reactors.\nprovide factual information from\ninformed, neutral sources to edu-\nWith the 110 operating nuclear\nThe operating efficiency of\ncate the public officials who are\npower plants in the United States\nexisting nuclear power plants in\nneedlessly alarming people for\ntoday, we have accumulated over\nAmerica continues to improve\nwhat appears to be their own polit-\n1,200 reactor-years of experience.\nevery year. Thanks to better train-\nical gain.\nDuring that time, not one member\ning of operators and improved pro-\nof the general public has ever been\ncedures, there are fewer and few-\nThe stakes are too high for our\nharmed by radiation releases\ner automatic shutdowns\nnational and state energy policies\nfrom those plants. The extensive\noccurring. As our knowledge of\nto be based on emotional or irratio-\ninternal damage to the reactor at\nwhat burning fossil fuel does to our\nnal reactions to public officials\nThree Mile Island was \"con-\nfragile environment increases, our\nwho have no technical competence\ntained,\" as it was engineered to\nappreciation of nuclear power\nin this area. The very real hazards\nAbout the author\ndo, and posed no risk to the public.\nshould also be increasing.\nof global pollution and the \"green-\nThe lessons learned from that ac-\nhouse effect\" are far more omi-\nBut that is not the case, espe-\nJohn P. Harris, 46, was a re-\ncident and implemented at every\ncially here in Massachusetts. The\nnous than those posed by existing\ncent candidate for Governor's\nU.S. plant have significantly re-\nnuclear power plants. But so far,\npublic is constantly being bom-\nCouncil in Massachusetts. He is\nduced the likelihood of a serious\nthe anti-nuclear paranoia seems to\nbarded with irresponsible half-\naccident occurring to only a statis-\nhave our Bay State leaders under\na former president of the Essex\ntruths and outright deception\nClub.\ntical possibility.\nits spell, and they have lost all\nabout the \"risks\" of nuclear pow-\nsense of perspective.\nHe has worked at several nu-\ner. Critics always fail to compare\nclear power plants for a major\nExtensive research after the\nthis risk to that of the alternative\nSo how about it, Dr. Gray? Can\nMassachusetts-based engi-\nterrible accident at Chernobyl\nsources of energy, such as oil, coal\nyou and your scholars provide our\nneering firm.\n(where a complete loss of emer-\nand gas, as well as the risk from\nleaders with MIT's scientific con-\nHe and his wife and three\ngency core cooling, no con-\nthe pervasive use of volatile and\nclusions on the safety of the 110\nchildren live on Lincoln Circle\ntainment structure, and a raging\ntoxic chemicals in every aspect of\nplants operating right now, some\nin Andover.\nfire forced radioactive materials\nmodern life. If they would do so,\nof which we've lived with for a\ninto a globe-girdling plume) has\nthey would have to admit that the\nwhole generation?\nENERGY ISSUES NEED YOUR ATTENTION\nThe Democratic leadership of the Dukakis Administration is pursuing a reckless and expensive course\non energy issues in the Commonwealth and elsewhere. Most of their activities are based on an anti-nuclear\npolitical bias, but all of them are having a direct negative impact on the cost of electricity to consumers and has\nbegun to affect supplies of electricity to meet residential and business demands\nThe following items are just a sample of the actions which all Republican activists should be watching:\nAttorney-General Shannon is spending over $1 million per year in his efforts to block a license\nfor Seabrook, even though the State Budget is seriously out-of-balance and the Commonwealth\nis experiencing power shortages.\nBoston Edison has spent over $15 million to support the Massachusetts Civil Defense Agency\nin developing emergency plans for local communities around Pilgrim Station but that state\nagency has failed to complete them adequately enough to meet the federal standards enforced\nat 108 other plants nationwide.\nNine municipal electric companies in the state have filed suit against Governor Dukakis and\nAttorney General Shannon for their illegal actions in blocking Seabrook, which has cost\nthousands of local taxpayers millions of dollars they invested in that plant. If these towns win\ntheir suit, the court will order the taxpayers of the Commonwealth to re-imburse those municipal\ninvestors for their losses. No matter which way the suit goes, the taxpayers will have to pay the\ncost of defending Shannon and Dukakis.\nThe Massachusetts Department of Public Health has repeatedly provided brief reports to the\nnews media which indicate that the MDPH is investigating \"new evidence of cancer deaths near\nthe Pilgrim Station.\" MDPH has for two years failed to issue a final report which would disprove\nthose claims. Even though its own monitoring system has shown radiation levels around Pilgrim\nare at or below levels measured elsewhere in the state, this state agency is creating unnecessary\nanxiety to resident near the plant, apparently to support the Governor and the Attorney\nGeneral's anti-nuclear campaign.\nThe Mass Civil Defense Agency has hired - at taxpayers' expense - a full-time nuclear inspector\nto monitor the Pilgrim and Yankee Rowe plants, even though the federal Nuclear Regulatory\nCommission has Resident Inspectors assigned to both plants.\nSen. Nick Costello of Amesbury has filed a bill that would prohibit Massachusetts electric\ncompanies from buying power from out-of-state nuclear power plants, even though over one-\nthird of all New England's electric power is nuclear generated!\nSen. Costello, Rep. Hildt and others have filed a bill requiring voters to approve of emergency\nresponse plans for nuclear power plants at biennial elections, even though those highly technical\nplans are reviewed and tested by federal authorities regularly.\nRep. Larry Alexander and others have filed a bill to double the size of emergency planning\nzones around nuclear plants, even though the state can't handle the current 10-mile federal\nrequirement. The cost for the extra Civil Defense Agency staff and outside consultants would\nbe billed to the electric companies and, in turn, to the rate-payers.\nAll of these activities are contrary to good energy planning and will cost both taxpayers and rate-payers\nof the Commonwealth enormously. If they are success in further weakening the ability of local electric utilities\nto provide adequate power supplies, our state's economy will be irreparably damaged and the health and welfare\nof our citizens will suffer.\nYou are encouraged to write \"Letters to the Editor\" and contact your state representative and senator\nto bring some common sense to bear on these vital issues. For more information, contact John Harris, 31 Lincoln\nCircle, Andover MA 01810 or Republican State Committee headquarters.\nFEMA\nok\nFEMA shall provide for initial federal response activities,\nincluding command and control of the off-site response, as\nmay be needed.\nlove\nTHE WHITE HOUSE\nWASHINGTON\nDATE:\nTO:\nFROM:\nANDY CARD\nTurn ASLB\nCong Support\n18th sides 5/th isl\nFEMA\nFEMA shall provide\nFEMA Shall provider\ninitial Fedual response activi\nUersun\n16\n352.27 Federal Role in the Emergency Response\nIn addition to the Federal component of the licensee offsite\nemergency response plan described in Subpart B (352.26), and\nafter complying with E.O. 12657, Section 2 (b) (2), which states\nthat FEMA:\n\"(2) shall take care not to supplant State and local\nresources. FEMA shall substitute its own resources for\nthose of State and local governments only to the extent\nnecessary to compensate for the nonparticipation or\ninadequate participation of those governments, and only as\na last resort after appropriate consultation with the\nGovernors and responsible local officials in the affected\narea regarding State and local participation;\",\nUntil such time as there is the orderly activation of State and\nlocal government response activities, FEMA shall provide for\ninitial Federal response activities, including command and\ncontrol. Any Federal response role undertaken pursuant to this\nSection shall be transferred to State and local governments as\nsoon as feasible after the onset of an actual emergency.\n352.28\nReimbursement\nIn accordance with Executive Order 12657, Section 6 (d), FEMA is\ndirected to coordinate full reimbursement to the agencies\nfurnishing capabilities, either jointly or severally, from any\naffected licensee and from any affected nonparticipating or\ninadequately participating State or local government, for\nservices performed by FEMA or other Federal agencies, pursuant to\nthe terms of Executive Order 12657.\nDated\nBilling Code 6718-20\nJulius W. Becton, Jr.\nDirector, FEMA\n16\n352.27 Federal Role in the Emergency Response\nIn addition to the Federal component of the licensee offsite\nemergency response plan described in Subpart B (352.26), and after\ncomplying with E.O. 12657, Section 2 (b) (2), which states that\nFEMA:\n\"(2) shall take care not to supplant State and local\nresources. FEMA shall substitute its own resources for those\nof State and local governments only to the extent necessary\nto compensate for the nonparticipation or inadequate\nparticipation of those governments, and only as a last resort\nafter appropriate consultation with the Governors and\nresponsible local officials in the affected area regarding\nState and local participation;\",\nFEMA shall provide for initial Federal response activities,\nincluding command and control to assist the orderly activation of\nState and local government response activities, including command\nand control. Any new Federal response role, undertaken pursuant\nto this Section, shall be transferred to State and local\ngovernments as soon as feasible after the onset of an actual\nemergency.\n352.28 Reimbursement\nIn accordance with Executive Order 12657, Section 6(d), FEMA is\ndirected to coordinate full reimbursement to the agencies\nfurnishing capabilities, either jointly or severally, from any\naffected licensee and from any affected nonparticipating or\ninadequately participating State or local government, for services\nperformed by FEMA or other Federal agencies, pursuant to the terms\nof Executive Order 12657.\nDated\nBilling Code 6718-20\nJulius W. Becton, Jr.\nDirector, FEMA\n8 February, 1989\nTO: Andrew H. Card\nRE: NEEDED CHANGE TO FEB. 8 OMB-APPROVED LANGUAGE ON E.O.\nToday, a meeting of OMB, DOE, NRC, FEMA and DOJ agreed\non the following implementation language for the part of the\nExecutive Order dealing with FEMA command and control at the\nonset of an actual emergency. The problem is in bold face.\n\"FEMA shall provide for initial Federal response\nactivities, including command and control, to\nassist the orderly activation of State and local\ngovernment response, including command and\ncontrol.\"\nNeeded Change: strike \"to\" and insert \"and shall\"\nExplanation: The unintended consequence of today's\ncompromise is to imply that FEMA can operate only in an\nassistance role to anti-licensing State and local officials\nwho claim that their best efforts response to an actual\nemergency will be undertaken alone, and without requests for,\nor acceptance of, any assistance.\nThe burden would be on the license applicant to prove, for\nthe record, that the relevant officials don't really mean it.\nThis destroys the intent of the Executive Order, which is to\nshow that people with legal authority will be there to\nexercise command and control - regardless of the stated\nposition taken by State and local officials prior to\nlicensing.\nUsing \"and shall\" makes clear that two things are happening.\nOne, Federal command and control will take place as a stand-\nalone activity while, two, FEMA will assist in getting the\nState and locals up on their feet so they can do it\nthemselves.\n7 February, 1989\nTO: Andrew H. Card\nRE:\nEXECUTIVE ORDER IMPLEMENTATION REGULATIONS\nThe lawyers have come up with several ways to handle the\npart of the regulations dealing with FEMA command and control\nat the onset of an actual emergency. Two possible approaches\nare listed below.\nThe trick in any case is to assure the NRC licensing\nboards that FEMA can fill the public safety gap by providing\ncommand and control from the onset of an emergency until\nState and local officials are up to speed on what to do.\nAgain, these officials seek to block licensing with sworn\ntestimony to the board that their best efforts response to an\nactual emergency will be ad hoc, without resorting to any\nplan or calling for help from anybody.\nAlso, Justice's federalism concerns are addressed by\nmaking sure that FEMA helps get the State and locals up to\nspeed, and then leaves the scene as soon as they are.\n\"If necessary, FEMA shall provide for initial\nFederal response activities, including command and\ncontrol. Federal command and control activities\nshall\nshall continue no longer than is necessary for FEMA\nand\nto assist in the orderly activation of adequate\nState and local government response, including\ncommand and control.\"\nor,\n\"If necessary, FEMA shall provide for initial\nFederal response activities, including command and\ncontrol to protect public health and safety, and\nshall assist in the orderly activation of adequate\nState and local government response, including\ncommand and control.\"\n7 February, 1989\nTO: Andrew H. Card\nRE:\nEXECUTIVE ORDER IMPLEMENTATION REGULATIONS\nThe lawyers have come up with several ways to handle the\npart of the regulations dealing with FEMA command and control\nat the onset of an actual emergency. Two possible approaches\nare listed below.\nThe trick in any case is to assure the NRC licensing\nboards that FEMA can fill the public safety gap by providing\ncommand and control from the onset of an emergency until\nState and local officials are up to speed on what to do.\nAgain, these officials seek to block licensing with sworn\ntestimony to the board that their best efforts response to an\nactual emergency will be ad hoc, without resorting to any\nplan or calling for help from anybody.\nAlso, Justice's federalism concerns are addressed by\nmaking sure that FEMA helps get the State and locals up to\nspeed, and then leaves the scene as soon as they are.\n\"If necessary, FEMA shall provide for initial\nFederal response activities, including command and\ncontrol. Federal command and control activities\nshall continue no longer than is necessary for FEMA\nto assist in the orderly activation of adequate\nState and local government response, including\ncommand and control.\"\nor,\n\"If necessary, FEMA shall provide for initial\nFederal response activities, including command and\ncontrol to protect public health and safety, and\nshall assist in the orderly activation of adequate\nState and local government response, including\ncommand and control.\"\n16 pages of ref.\nFed Rob\n\"FEMA shall provid for initial\nfed Resp actives endidy comed\nand control at the by cealt\nof Gov. S other comp atting.\nOkey new fed deep. role,\nunderlaker pursuit to then\nsection shall be teamsfered\npositice after flu onset of\nto S&L govts as soon as\nan actual un,\nUnited States\nGAO\nGeneral Accounting Office\nWashington, D.C. 20548\nResources, Community, and\nA.\nEconomic Development Division\nFebruary 28, 1989\nRECEIVED\nThe Honorable John Conyers, Jr.\nChairman, Committee on\nFEB 2 8 1989\nGovernment Operations\nHouse of Representatives\nLegislation and National\nSecurity Subcommittee\nDear Mr. Chairman:\nOn June 1, 1988, the former Chairman, Legislation and\nNational Security Subcommittee, House Committee on\nGovernment Operations, asked us to determine the basis for\nthe Federal Emergency Management Agency's (FEMA) changing\nits position concerning the adequacy of New Hampshire's\nemergency response plan for the beach population near the\nSeabrook nuclear power plant. The former Chairman was also\nconcerned about allegations that the Nuclear Regulatory\nCommission (NRC), Governor of New Hampshire, or White House\npressured FEMA to change its position. This letter provides\nyou information on these issues and concludes our work\nrelated to this request.\nIn summary, in June 1987 FEMA concluded that the New\nHampshire plan did not provide a range of measures to\nshelter the beach population if an accident occurred at the\nSeabrook plant. On the basis of various programmatic,\ntechnical, and legal factors received during the subsequent\nyear, FEMA concluded that immediate evacuation, rather than\nsheltering, would be the primary protective measure for the\nbeach population because evacuation would result in greater\nradiation dose savings from an accident. Therefore, in June\n1988, FEMA determined that the New Hampshire plan adequately\naddressed the beach population issue. In addition, the\nrecord shows that FEMA reached this determination on the\nbasis of its own deliberations and information provided by\nan outside consultant and others, such as NRC.\nFEMA'S ROLE IN THE\nLICENSING PROCESS\nFEMA, which serves as an advisor to NRC in the licensing\nprocess for nuclear power plants, reviews and makes findings\nand determinations on the adequacy of off-site state and\nlocal radiological emergency plans and preparedness. This\nprocess begins when a governor or designee submits state and\nlocal plans to FEMA for its review. The review process\nincludes (1) an evaluation of the plans by the regional\nassistance committee (RAC) 1 for compliance with joint NRC\nand FEMA emergency planning criteria (NUREG-0654), (2) at\nleast one RAC-observed exercise that tests state and local\ngovernments' ability to implement major portions of the\nplans, and (3) a meeting with state and local government\nofficials and the public to discuss, and receive comments\non, the plan and the exercise.\nAt the completion of the review process, or earlier if\nrequested by NRC, FEMA determines whether the off-site plans\nmeet its regulatory criteria. The criteria, found in 44 CFR\n350. (a) and (b), states in part that FEMA must determine\nthat the plans provide reasonable assurance that appropriate\nprotective measures can be taken to protect the public in\nthe event of a radiological emergency. FEMA provides its\ndetermination to NRC.\nHowever, the final decision on the adequacy of overall\nemergency response planning, as well as other radiological\nhealth and safety issues, rests with NRC. NRC regulations\nrequire that--except for loading fuel and operating a plant\nat low power for testing purposes--no operating license for\na nuclear power reactor will be issued unless NRC can be\nreasonably assured that adequate protective measures can and\nwill be taken in the event of a radiological accident (10\nCFR 50.47). The Atomic Safety and Licensing Board (ASLB) 2\nmakes this determination for NRC. ASLB decisions may be\nappealed to an Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal Board and,\nwhere NRC does not choose to review its decision, the appeal\nboard decision becomes the final agency position, subject\nonly to review in a federal court of appeals.\nOn December 9, 1985, New Hampshire submitted a radiological\nemergency response plan for the communities near the\nSeabrook plant. FEMA conducted a full field exercise of the\nplan in February 1986 and issued its report in June 1986.\nSubsequently, the state submitted a revised plan, and FEMA\nand the RAC completed their review of the revision in June\nThe RAC consists of 10 federal agencies (FEMA, the\nEnvironmental Protection Agency, NRC, and the Departments of\nAgriculture, Commerce, Defense, Energy, Health and Human\nServices, the Interior, and Transportation). The cognizant\nFEMA regional representative chairs the RAC.\nThe ASLB, established by the Atomic Energy Act, has three\nmembers including attorneys and others with expertise in\nvarious technical fields.\n2\n1986. The state submitted a second revision on September 8,\n1986, and the results of the FEMA/RAC review were provided\nto the state on December 12, 1986. FEMA conducted a second\nexercise of the plan in June 1988 and issued its report on\nSeptember 2, 1988.\nFEMA'S INITIAL POSITION\nIn December 1985, after reviewing New Hampshire's plan, the\nRAC Chairman raised concerns about the state's ability to\nprotect the large population that visits the beaches around\nSeabrook each summer. As a result of this concern, the RAC\nChairman asked the members to provide their views on the\nstate's treatment of the beach population in the emergency\nplan. By February 1987, a majority of the RAC had responded\nand concluded that the state adequately addressed options to\nprotect the beach population. In its response supporting\nthis position, NRC pointed out that Seabrook's double\ncontainment system would allow more than the 30 minute\nplanning time described in NUREG-0654 and concluded that the\nplan generally met the joint NRC/FEMA emergency planning\ncriteria. At its April 1987 meeting, the RAC--including\nFEMA--adopted NRC's position.\nFollowing the meeting, NRC informed FEMA that NRC was\nwithdrawing its response and expected to provide another\nthat would omit the discussion of Seabrook's containment\nfeatures. NRC reached this decision after its Office of\nGeneral Counsel concluded that FEMA was not required to\nconsider plant-specific features when considering an\nemergency plan. NRC submitted its revised position to the\nRAC Chairman on June 4, 1987, the day FEMA submitted a\nstatement of position to the ASLB on the adequacy of the New\nHampshire plan. FEMA concluded that, until the issue of\nprotecting the beach population was resolved, it could not\nfind the plan adequate. FEMA reiterated this position in\ntestimony filed with the ASLB in September 1987.\nFACTORS LEADING TO THE\nCHANGE IN FEMA'S POSITION\nFEMA's final position with regard to the beach population\nwas presented in testimony before the ASLB on June 10, 1988.\nIn that testimony, FEMA stated that the requirement for a\nrange of protective measures for the beach population had\nbeen met through recent information provided by the state.\nAccording to FEMA officials, a number of programmatic,\ntechnical, and legal factors influenced them to change their\nposition on the adequacy of the New Hampshire emergency\nplan. Each of these are discussed below.\n3\nProgrammatic Factors\nAt four RAC meetings in 1987 and 1988, a majority of the\nmembers believed that the New Hampshire plan provided a\nrange of options to protect the beach population. The FEMA\nRAC Chairman disagreed with the other members. As a result,\nFEMA headquarters officials, who had supported the position\nthat the plan did not adequately address a range of\nprotective measures, began to reexamine this position and\nrequested additional information from the state on the\npossible use of sheltering as a protective action.\nIn September 1987, the state provided FEMA with a survey of\nshelters near the New Hampshire beaches and asked FEMA for\nassistance to evaluate the results. The state, however, had\nnot had time to incorporate the information into its plan\nbefore FEMA filed testimony with the ASLB in September 1987.\nAs a result, FEMA did not incorporate this information in\nits testimony. FEMA subsequently pointed out this omission\nin supplemental testimony filed with the ASLB on January 25,\n1988. Shortly thereafter, the state provided FEMA\ninformation showing that the buildings at the beach would\nprovide little protection to the public in the event of an\naccident. As a result, the state concluded that immediate\nevacuation, rather than sheltering, would be the primary\nprotective measure because it would provide greater\nradiation dose savings.\nTechnical Factors\nShortly after receiving the results of the survey of beach\nshelters from the state, FEMA requested the Department of\nEnergy's Idaho National Engineering Laboratory (INEL) to\nperform a technical analysis of FEMA's position on the\nadequacy of the plan to protect the beach population. INEL\nprovided FEMA information showing that under most accident\nscenarios a greater dose savings resulted from immediate\nevacuation rather than sheltering the population.\nThe INEL consultant explained that the dose savings would\noccur because the plume resulting from a radiological\nrelease consists of two parts: the cloud shine and ground\nshine. The cloud shine has a short half-life and consists\nof small, light, airborne radioactive particles. The cloud\nshine moves away from the accident and is dispersed with the\nwind. Conversely, the ground shine consists of heavier\nradioactive particles with a longer half-life that tend to\nsettle to the ground near the point of release. The\nconsultant found that the ground shine would be the greatest\ncontributor to the radioactive dose that would result from\nexposure to the plume. He reasoned that, if the population\nis sheltered at the beach, they will be in buildings that\n4\nthe shelter survey showed would provide little protection.\nIn addition, the sheltered population would eventually have\nto be evacuated and would be exposed to the ground shine\nthat had accumulated. The consultant concluded that the\nadvantage of evacuation is that the beach population would\nbe moving away from the plume's path and would generally\nreceive a lesser radiation dose than if they took shelter\nnear the beach.\nLegal Factors\nBetween June 1987 and June 1988, several legal questions\nthat affected FEMA's review of, and position on, the New\nHampshire plan were resolved. These questions pertained to\nFEMA's emergency planning regulations, an interpretation of\nNRC's emergency planning regulations, and the roles of the\ntwo agencies in emergency planning for nuclear power plants.\nEach of these are discussed below.\nFEMA's Emergency Planning Regulations\nFEMA's RAC Chairman asked FEMA headquarters officials to\nclarify the agency's position on the meaning of the term\n\"reasonable assurance\" as used in FEMA's emergency planning\nregulations (44 CFR 350.5(b)). The RAC Chairman believed\nthat FEMA had some discretion to find a plan inadequate even\nif it meets all emergency planning standards and criteria\ncontained in NUREG-0654 and 44 CFR 350.5(a). After some\ninternal debate, FEMA determined that if a plan meets the\nstandards and criteria, FEMA must make a positive finding;\nthat is, reasonable assurance exists that appropriate\nprotective measures can be taken to protect the public in\nthe event of a radiological emergency.\nAnother closely related issue that the RAC Chairman asked\nFEMA headquarters to clarify was whether a plan must achieve\nsome preset dose savings or evacuation time in order to be\nfound adequate. The Chairman believed that this question\nwas particularly relevant because the estimated evacuation\ntimes in the New Hampshire plan were high. FEMA ultimately\nconcluded that no minimum dose savings, and consequently no\nminimum evacuation time estimates, must be achieved by an\nemergency plan for the plan to be found adequate.\nA series of events led FEMA to reach this conclusion.\nAccording to FFMA officials, the events included (1) a July\n1986 NRC ruling for the Shoreham nuclear power plant, which\nstated that an emergency plan need not achieve a minimum\ndose savings, (2) the ASLB's rejection of testimony proposed\nby the Massachusetts Attorney General that focused on\nevacuation time estimates, and (3) new rules published by\nNRC on November 3, 1987, which state that a plan need not\n5\nachieve a predetermined dose savings or evacuation time\nestimate.\nClarification of NRC Regulations\nIn addition, FEMA sought clarification from NRC on the\nproper interpretation of its emergency planning regulations.\nSpecifically, FEMA wanted to know if NRC's emergency\nplanning regulations required that a plan contain\nprovisions for sheltering the population in the event of an\naccident. This issue became increasingly important to FEMA\nheadquarters officials as the limited usefulness of\nsheltering as a protective measure for the beach population\nbecame apparent. In a February 1988 letter, NRC's Office of\nGeneral Counsel informed FEMA that the lack of provisions\nfor sheltering all parts of the population within the\nemergency planning zone did not conflict with NRC's\nemergency planning regulations.\nRole of the Two Agencies\nThe final legal factor concerned the responsibilities of\nFEMA and NRC to determine an acceptable risk to the public\nfrom the operation of a nuclear power plant. Specifically,\nthe FEMA RAC Chairman, after the other issues associated\nwith the FEMA review of the New Hampshire plan had been\nresolved, personally believed that the risk to the beach\npopulation was too great. The general consensus among FEMA\nheadquarters officials was that the risk was not too great,\nthe determination of risk is NRC's responsibility, and\nFEMA's findings on the adequacy of a plan is but one factor\nconsidered by NRC to determine risk.\n- - -\nIn summary, the record in this matter demonstrates that\nvarious programmatic, technical, and legal factors caused\nFEMA to determine that the New Hampshire plan met FEMA's\nemergency planning regulations for the beach population.\nInitially, FEMA determined that the plan did not provide a\nrange of measures to shelter the beach population in the\nevent of an accident. Subsequently, FEMA concluded that\nimmediate evacuation, rather than sheltering, would be the\nprimary protective measure for the beach population because\nevacuation would result in greater radiation dose savings\nfrom an accident. The record also shows that FEMA reached\nthis determination on the basis of its own deliberations and\ninformation provided by an outside consultant, the state,\nand NRC.\n6\nIf you have any questions or would like to discuss this\nAnn Kruslicky, Assistant Director, on 353-5711.\nmatter further, please contact me on 275-1441, or Ms. Mary\nSincerely yours,\nKend O. out\nKeith O. Fultz\nDirector, Energy Issues\n7"
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