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1252248
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3/6/75 - Opening Statement for Press Conference (Includes draft)
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1252248
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document
title
3/6/75 - Opening Statement for Press Conference (Includes draft)
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President's Speeches and Statements Reading Copies (Ford Administration)
Reading Copies of Presidential Speeches and Statements
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Cambodia
Vietnam (Republic)
Vietnam War, 1961-1975
Foreign aid
Press conferences
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1252248
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6
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1975-03-06
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3
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1975
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6
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1975-03-06
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3
year
1975
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The original documents are located in Box 6, folder "3/6/75 - Opening Statement for Press
Conference (Includes draft)" of the President's Speeches and Statements: Reading Copies
at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library.
Copyright Notice
The copyright law of the United States (Title 17, United States Code) governs the making of
photocopies or other reproductions of copyrighted material. Gerald Ford donated to the United
States of America his copyrights in all of his unpublished writings in National Archives collections.
Works prepared by U.S. Government employees as part of their official duties are in the public
domain. The copyrights to materials written by other individuals or organizations are presumed to
remain with them. If you think any of the information displayed in the PDF is subject to a valid
copyright claim, please contact the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library.
Digitized from Box 6 of President's Speeches and Statements: Reading Copies at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library
THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN
ef
OPENING STATEMENT FOR
PRESS CONFERENCE
THURSDAY - MARCH 6, 1975
-I-
THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN
df.
BEFORE WE START ON QUESTIONS TONIGHT,
I WOULD LIKE TO MAKE A STATEMENT ON THE SUBJECT OF
ASSISTANCE TO CAMBODIA AND SOUTH VIETNAM.
THERE ARE THREE ISSUES.
-2-
THE FIRST
THE FUTURE OF THE PEOPLE WHO
LIVE THERE.
IT IS A CONCERN THAT IS HUMANITARIAN --
FOOD FOR THOSE WHO HUNGER AND MEDICAL SUPPLIES FOR
THE MEN, WOMEN AND CHILDREN WHO ARE SUFFERING
THE RAVAGES OF WAR.
- 3 -
WE SEEK TO STOP THE BLOODSHED AND END THE
HORROR AND TRAGEDY THAT WE SEE ON TELEVISION AS ROCKETS
ARE FIRED WANTONLY INTO PHNOM PENH.
I WOULD LIKE
TO BE ABLE TO SAY THAT THE KILLING WOULD CEASE IF WE
WERE TO STOP OUR AID, \ BUT THAT IS NOT THE CASE.
-4--
THE RECORD SHOWS, IN BOTH VIETNAM
AND CAMBODIA, THAT COMMUNIST TAKEOVER OF AN
AREA DOES NOT BRING AN END TO VIOLENCE BUT,
ON THE CONTRARY, SUBJECTS THE INNOCENT TO NEW
HORRORS.
-5-
WE CANNOT MEET HUMANITARIAN NEEDS
UNLESS WE ALSO PROVIDE SOME MILITARY ASSISTANCE.
ONLY THROUGH A COMBINATION OF HUMANITARIAN ENDEAVORS
AND MILITARY AID DO WE HAVE A CHANCE TO STOP THE
FIGHTING IN THAT COUNTRY IN SUCH A WAY AS TO
END THE BLOODSHED.
- 6 -
THE SECOND ISSUE IS WHETHER THE PROBLEMS OF
INDOCHINA WILL BE SETTLED BY CONQUEST OR BY NEGOTIATION.
- 7 -
BOTH THE GOVERNMENTS OF CAMBODIA AND THE
UNITED STATES HAVE MADE VIGOROUS AND CONTINUED EFFORTS
OVER THE YEARS TO BRING ABOUT A CEASEFIRE AND POLITICAL
SETTLEMENT.
- 8 -
THE CAMBODIAN GOVERNMENT DECLARED A
UNILATERAL CEASEFIRE AND CALLED FOR NEGOTIATIONS IMMEDIATELY
AFTER THE PEACE ACCORDS OF JANUARY 1973.
- 9 -
IT HAS SINCE REPEATEDLY EXPRESSED ITS WILLINGNESS TO BE
FLEXIBLE IN SEEKING A NEGOTIATED END TO THE CONFLICT
ITS LEADERS HAVE MADE CLEAR THAT THEY ARE WILLING TO DO
WHATEVER THEY CAN TO BRING PEACE TO THAT COUNTRY.
- 10 -
THE UNITED STATES HAS BACKED THESE PEACE EFFORTS
YESTERDAY, WE MADE PUBLIC AN OUTLINE OF OUR OWN UNCEASING
EFFORTS OVER THE YEARS, INCLUDING SIX SEPARATE INITIATIVES
SINCE I BECAME PRESIDENT.
- 11 -
LET ME ASSURE YOU:
WE WILL SUPPORT ANY NEGOTIATIONS AND ACCEPT
ANY OUTCOME THAT THE PARTIES THEMSELVES WILL ACCEPT;
-12-
AS FAR AS THE UNITED STATES IS CONCERNED,
THE PERSONALITIES INVOLVED WILL NOT, THEMSELVES,
CONSTITUTE OBSTACLES OF ANY KIND TO A SETTLEMENT.
- 13 -
YET ALL OF OUR EFFORTS HAVE BEEN REBUFFED
PEACE IN CAMBODIA HAS NOT BEEN PREVENTED BY OUR FAILURE
TO OFFER REASONABLE SOLUTIONS.
THE AGGRESSOR BELIEVES
THAT IT CAN WIN ITS OBJECTIVES ON THE BATTLEFIELD.
THIS
BELIEF WILL BE ENCOURAGED IF WE CUT OFF ASSISTANCE TO OUR
FRIENDS.
- 14 -
WE WANT AN END TO THE KILLING AND A NEGOTIATED
SETTLEMENT.
BUT THERE IS NO HOPE OF SUCCESS UNLESS
THE CONGRESS QUICKLY PROVIDES THE NECESSARY MEANS FOR
CAMBODIA TO SURVIVE.
- 15 -
IF WE ABANDON OUR ALLIES, WE WILL BE SAYING
TO ALL THE WORLD THAT WAR PAYS.
AGGRESSION WILL NOT
STOP;
RATHER IT WILL INCREASE.
IN CAMBODIA, THE
AGGRESSORS WILL HAVE SHOWN THAT IF NEGOTIATIONS ARE
RESISTED, THE UNITED STATES WILL WEARY, ABANDON ITS
FRIENDS, AND FORCE WILL PREVAIL.
- 16 -
THE THIRD ISSUE IS THE RELIABILITY OF THE
UNITED STATES.
IF WE CEASE TO HELP OUR FRIENDS IN
INDOCHINA, WE WILL HAVE VIOLATED THEIR TRUST THAT WE WOULD
HELP THEM WITH ARMS, FOOD AND SUPPLIES so LONG AS THEY
REMAIN DETERMINED TO FIGHT FOR THEIR OWN FREEDOM.
- 17 -
WE WILL HAVE BEEN FALSE TO OURSELVES, TO OUR WORD, AND
TO OUR FRIENDS.
NO ONE SHOULD THINK FOR A MOMENT
THAT WE CAN WALK AWAY FROM THAT WITHOUT A DEEP SENSE OF
SHAME.
- 18 -
THIS IS NOT A QUESTION OF INVOLVEMENT OR
REINVOLVEMENT IN INDOCHINA.
WE HAVE ENDED OUR
INVOLVEMENT.
ALL AMERICAN FORCES HAVE COME HOME.
THEY WILL NOT GO BACK.
- 19 -
TIME IS SHORT.
THERE ARE TWO THINGS THE
UNITED STATES CAN DO TO AFFECT THE OUTCOME.
FOR MY PART,
I WILL CONTINUE TO SEEK A NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT.
I ASK
THE CONGRESS TO DO ITS PART BY PROVIDING THE ASSISTANCE
REQUIRED TO MAKE SUCH A SETTLEMENT POSSIBLE.
TIME IS
RUNNING OUT.
END
OF
TEXT
Dich,
7:30 release
Sta Cement S Prr.
Before we start on questions tonight, I would like to make a
statement on the subject of assistance to Cambodia and South Vietnam.
There are three issues The first is the future of the
people who live there. It is a concern that is humanitarian
food for those who hunger and medical supplies for the men, women and
children who are have suffering the ravages of war. We seek to stop the
bloodshed and end the horror and tragedy that we see on television as
rockets are fired wantonly into Phnom Penh. I would like to be able to
say that the killing would cease if we were to stop our aid, but that is
not the case. The record shows, in both Vietnam and Cambodia,
That Cor Communist takeover Janaria does not bring an end to violence, but on the con-
subjects the innocent to new hourned
trary, me the beginning of a-bloodletting.
We cannot meet humanitarian needs unless we also provide some
military assistance. Only through a combination of humanitarian endeavors
and military aid do we have a chance to stop the fighting in that country
end the
in such a way as to no more bloodshed.
- 2 -
The second issue I is whether the problems of Indochina
will be settled by conquest or by negotiation.
Both the government of Cambodia and the have made vigorous
and continual efforts over the years to bring about a ceasefire and political
settlement.
The Cambodian Government declared a unilateral ceasefire and
Place
called for negotiations immediately after the Paris Accords of January
1973. It has since repeatedly expressed its willingness to be flexible in
leaders have
seeking a negotiated end to the conflict. Its leudership-hose made clear
that willing to do whatever They Mcan to bring peace to that country.
they and
peace
The United States has backed these efforts. Yesterday, we made
M
public an outline of our own unceasing efforts over the years, including
since 2 become President
six separate initiatives over the past
Let me assure you:
We will support any negotiations and accept any outcome that
- 3 -
the parties themselves will accept;
As far as the United States is concerned, the personalities
involved will not, themselves, constitute obstacles of any
kind to a settlement.
Pence in Cambrolen
Yet all of our efforts have been rebuffed. to offer
has not been prevented by onr farture to offer measonable solutions
The aggressor
believes thatit can win its objectives on the battlefield. This belief will be
encouraged if we cut off assistance to our friends.
We want an end to the killing and seek a negotiated settlement.
But there is no hope of success unless the Congress quickly provides the
necessary means for Cambodia to survive.
If we abandon our allies, we will be saying to all the world that
war pays. Aggression will not stop; rather it will increase. In Cambodia,
the aggressors will have shown that if negotiations are resisted
conding
for
United State
time,
the
I
will weary, abandon its friends, and force will prevail.
- 4 -
The third issue is the reliability of the United States and yar own
If we cease to help our friends in Indochina, we will
have violated their trust that we would help them with arms, food and
supplies so long as they remain determined to fight for their own freedom.
We will have been false to ourselves, to our word, and to our friends.
No one should think for a moment that we can walk away from that without,
a deep sense of shame.
This is not a question of involvement or reinvolvement in Indochina.
We have ended our involvement. All American forces have come home.
They will not go back.
Time is short. There are two things the U.S. can do to affect
will
the outcome. For my part, I continue to seek a negotiated
settlement. I ask the Congress to do its part by providing the assistance
required to make such a settlement possible. Time is running out,