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NSC Meeting, 4/28/75
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1552385
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NSC Meeting, 4/28/75
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National Security Council Meetings Files (Ford Administration)
National Security Council Meetings Files from the Ford Administration
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President (1974-1977 : Ford). National Security Council. (1974 - 1977)
Vietnam War, 1961-1975
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The original documents are located in Box 1, folder: "NSC Meeting, 4/28/1975" of the
National Security Adviser's NSC Meeting File at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library.
Copyright Notice
The copyright law of the United States (Title 17, United States Code) governs the making of
photocopies or other reproductions of copyrighted material. Frank Zarb donated to the United States
of America his copyrights in all of his unpublished writings in National Archives collections.
Works prepared by U.S. Government employees as part of their official duties are in the public
domain. The copyrights to materials written by other individuals or organizations are presumed to
remain with them. If you think any of the information displayed in the PDF is subject to a valid
copyright claim, please contact the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library.
Digitized from Box 1 of the National Security Adviser's NSC Meeting File at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library
MEMORANDUM
2779-X
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
April 29, 1975
MEMORANDUM FOR:
SECRETARY KISSINGER
FROM:
W. R. SMYSER 8
SUBJECT:
Minutes of the National Security
Council Meeting, held April 28, 1975
Attached are the minutes of the National Security Council Meeting
held April 28, 1975, to discuss Vietnam evacuation.
Attachment
Declassified Photocopy from
Gerald R. Ford Library
RETIRED ESERVATION
cc: General Scowcroft
ORIGINAL
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE - XGDS
Determined to be Administrative Murking
Date 2/6/95 By KBH
FORD : GERALD LIBRARY
ORIGINAL RETIRED FOR PRESERVATION
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING
April 28, 1975
Roosevelt Room
7:23 - 8:08 p.m.
Participants:
President Ford
Declassified Photocopy from
Gerald R. Ford Library
RETIRE ERVATION
Vice President Rockefeller
Secretary of State Kissinger
Secretary of Defense Schlesinger
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, General George S. Brown
Director of Central Intelligence William Colby
Deputy Secretary of State Robert Ingersoll
Deputy Secretary of Defense William Clements
Lt. General Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant
to the President for National Security Affairs
W. R. Smyser, Senior Staff Member, National Security Council
ORIGINAL
FORD
&
LIBRARY
195
DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4.
MR IR 92-10,#21, # NSCltr. NSC 10/7/94
By KBH NARA, Date 2/6/95
ORIGINAL RETIRED FOR PRESERVATION
GERALD = 1970
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
2
President: Brent Scowcroft this afternoon brought me the report
that two Marines had been lost, so I felt we should convene the
National Security Council to discuss the situation in Saigon.
Who can bring us up-to-date?
Colby: I think I can.
What has happened is that the Viet Cong have rejected Minh's cease-
fire offer. They have now added a third demand, which is to dis-
mantle the South Vietnamese armed forces. Bien Hoa is in the
process of falling. The Viet Cong have cut off the road to the
Delta and are advancing on Vung Tau.
It is a very dangerous situation. The North Vietnamese are bringing
artillery within range of Tan Son Nhut airport. At 4:00 a. m. they
Declassified Photocopy from
Gerald R. Ford Library
had a salvo of rockets against Tan Son Nhut. This is what killed the
Marines. This salvo was followed by 130 millimeter artillery fire.
Some of this artillery fire hit the American side, not the Vietnamese
side like last night.
Three aircraft have been shot down. All are Vietnamese. They include
a C-119, an A-1, and an A-37 helicopter. The latter was shot down by
an SA-7 missile. The presence of these missiles increases the risk
ORIGINAL
factor greatly.
President: Has the rocket and the other fire now stopped?
Colby: No. It's continuing.
Schlesinger: The latest information is that there is still artillery
fire against the airport. A flight of C-130's is going in to take out
the DAO (Defense Attache Office). They hope to be able to land,
but they can be waved off by a controller on the ground if it is unwise.
North Vietnamese ground forces are one kilometer from Tan Son
Nhut and advancing.
Colby: Those forces are of platoon strength, perhaps one or two
platoons.
President: We should not predicate our judgments on two platoons.
How many people is that?
TOP SEGRET/SENSITIVE - XGDS
FORD & LIBRARY BERALD
F3R0 is LIBRARY
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
3
Schlesinger: About 100.
President: When did you get a report that the firing was last going
on?
Schlesinger: About 30 minutes ago.
President: What is the status of the runway?
Schlesinger: Landable.
President: Do you have air controllers?
RVATION
Schlesinger: There are some on the ground.
President: Are there any C-130's on the ground?
Declassified Photocopy from
Gerald R. Ford Library
Schlesinger: Only one, which had been hit. We are loading weapons
and bombs on aircraft in Thailand. Our aircraft are in the air for
potential cover, but they are over the water.
President: What kinds of bombs are these? Are they the "smart"
bombs?
Brown: They are regular iron bombs. The aircraft do not carry
ORIGINAL
"smart" bombs unless they have special equipment.
President: How many DAO people do you have at the airport?
Schlesinger: About 400, including contractors.
President: If the C-130's can land, they should. How many are
there?
Brown: The plan is for 70 sorties, with each of 35 aircraft coming
in twice.
President: Who will decide whether they come in?
Brown: The controller on the ground at Tan Son Nhut.
President: If these attacks continue, would he bring the aircraft in?
COND
TOP SEGRET/SENSITIVE - XGDS
GERALD
LIBRARY
FORD is LIBRARY 93
&
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
4
Brown: If it is artillery fire, he would wave them off. If it is rocket
fire, he would bring them in.
He had a message yesterday that one artillery unit was to fire on
two targets. They have now hit those two targets, an apron and a
gymnasium used for processing.
President: For the processing of Vietnamese?
Brown: Yes.
Kissinger: Was that artillery or rocket fire?
Schlesinger: It is not certain.
Brown: What worries me more than the artillery fire is the report
Declassified Photocopy from
Gerald R. Ford Library
of an aircraftibeing shot down by an SA-7. Choppers or aircraft are
defenseless against the SA-7. The only way to deflect the missiles
is to use flares, but I am not sure whether the aircraft we are using
are equipped for that. Of course, we have to do our mission, but if
the risk becomes too great, we may need to turn off the lift.
President: If the risk is too great, the man on the ground has to
ORIGINAL
judge. We cannot. That means we have to move to get the DAO
people out as well as the Embassy. That is one possibility.
If they can land, they should carry out the operation as before. But
when they find that it is getting toohazardous the last two C-130's
have to take the DAO out.
I think we have to continue operations if the people on the ground say
that conditions are alright, but if it is a question of two remaining
aircraft they should be filled by the DAO personnel and not by
Vietnamese.
Kissinger: I have talked to Graham Martin. I think the DAO should
come out anyway. I also think the Embassy should be thinned down.
If we have to go to suppressive fire, then we must remove the
Americans. Otherwise, it is too risky.
Schlesinger: There is no authority now for suppressive fire, only
for the chopper lift.
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE - XGDS
FORD & LIBRARY GERALD
FORD is LIBRARE CENALD
TORSECRET/SENSITIVE
5
President: If we do not fire until they do, we are bound to lose some
choppers to the SA-7's.
Schlesinger: It is a hard weapon to counter.
Brown: We cannot do much about them.
President: Will there be air cover above?
Brown: Whenever you say. Also, tankers.
President: Should we not have that cover even for the C-130's?
Brown: We can do that, as Jim Schlesinger says. The aircraft and
the tankers are ready.
President: How much time will be lost before the aircraft come in?
Declassified Photocopy from
Gerald R. Ford Library
Schlesinger: There are two issues. First, once we get to the point
where we have to have air cover, we should pull out,anyway.
Kissinger: I think if they see air cover, it helps.
President: If we have air cover but do not use it, they would still
have enough radar to pick up our presence.
ORIGINAL
Brown: The artillery people do not. Nor do the SA-7 people.
I think we should not commit the air cover until we are ready to use
it. The risk is such that they should only be used for a job, rather
than to be picked up on radar.
Schlesinger: They may only be doing this shooting to bloody us. If
they see fighters, they may hit us hard.
Kissinger: It may, of course, have the opposite effect. Even if
some of their local units do not see our aircraft on radar, the high
command in Hanoi will know it very quickly. I do not think that
they will intensify their attacks.
Schlesinger: They may have pre-positioned orders to attack us.
Brown: I think they have pulled out the stops. The platoons that we
have spoken of are being followed by more. They came in through
that same area during the Tet offensive. They are ready for the
battle of Tan Son Nhut.
TOP SEGRET/SENSITIVE - XGDS
DEBALD
FORD is LIBRARY DERALD
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
6
President: If we decide on air cover, we have to go for the evacua-
tion of Saigon and not just Tan Son Nhut. How soon will we know if
the C-130's can land?
Brown: Within an hour. We have an open line to Graham Martin.
Kissinger: I think we have three decisions:
-- First, how long to continue to operate, and whether the C-130's
should just pull out Americans or Vietnamese as well. In either event,
today is clearly the last day for fixed-wing operations.
-- Second, whether you want to have air cover flown over Tan Son
Nhut or wherever the evacuees can be picked up.
-- Third, when we order suppressive fire. In this connection,
I agree with Jim that it should only be used when pulling out Americans.
Declassified Photocopy from
Gerald R. Ford Library
My concern is between balancing the risk to pull out all the stops if
they have not yet decided to do so. I think if they see American air
cover it would have a good effect.
Schlesinger: I think we can go in over the area with less equipment.
Clements: If you decided that this is the last day for civilian evacua-
ORIGINAL
tion, we can proceed on that basis.
President: I think SO. This is the last day for the evacuation of the
Vietnamese.
Kissinger: Then the DAO will go out with them.
Brown: Regarding whether our air cover will be seen: We are putting
in a Navy CAP above the air cover and Gayler has told them to jam the
radar of the SA-2's.
President: Can the SA-7 not be jammied?
Brown: No. It is heat-seeking.
Scowcroft: We have just received a report that the airport is still
taking fire. The two North Vietnamese platoons are still in the
cemetery near Tan Son Nhut. The C-119 was shot down over the air-
port, and the other aircraft elsewhere. We also understand the
C-130's are still on the way but are not landing.
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE - XGDS
GERALD
LIBRARY
LIBRUST CERALD FUE!
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
7
Schlesinger: The North Vietnamese have 4, 000 sappers in Saigon.
They will hit the Embassy if we attack by fire.
Kissinger: I think that, if we fire, we have to pull out the entire
Embassy. Maybe we should consider leaving in a nucleus of
volunteers, but I would pull everybody out. The North Vietnamese
have the intention of humiliating us and it seems unwise to leave
people there.
President: I agree. All should leave.
We now have made two decisions:
NOTEVAN
-- First, today is the last day of Vietnamese evacuation.
-- Second, if we fire, our people will go.
Declassified Photocopy from
Gerald R. Ford Library
Are we ready to go to a helicopter lift?
Brown: Yes, if you or Ambassador Martin say so, we can have them
there within an hour.
Kissinger: I understand your orders are that the Vietnamese should
go today, and that the DAO and most of the Embassy should go with
the rest of the fixed-wing aircraft.
ORIGINAL
President: I think they should be phased in.
Kissinger: A reduced staff should be left at the Embassy. If there
is suppressive fire, we go to the plan to evacuate all Americans.
If we have to go out, priority will go to the Americans.
Schlesinger: We should get Embassy people out today also.
Kissinger: Yes.
We should not let it out that this is the last day of civilian evacuation.
Vice President: Does the press know of the two Marines being killed?
Schlesinger: Yes. We will see how the four Chairmen react.
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE - XGDS
FORD & LIBRARY GERALD
Faxas is LIBRARY CENALD
FOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
8
Brown: The Secretary said that Americans should have priority if
we have to terminate the lift, but we will not know this. We will
not know in advance which is the last aircraft.
Schlesinger: We should give them subtle priority.
President: We have to leave it to General Smith to phase them into
the evacuation.
Kissinger: If the Americans get on the first aircraft, the situation
will be out of control. We have to space them out. The people
who should stay to the end are the team to handle the evacuation
of the Vietnamese. The others should go.
Gerald R. Ford Library
RETIRED PRESERVATION
President: We have to mix them. We do not want too many at the
end.
Declassified Photocopy from
Brown: I do not want to see Americans standing there waiting for
the last plane.
Schlesinger: There is one question, Henry, that we need to think
about. When it is known at the end of the day that this was the last
day, will it not provoke panic against our Embassy?
Kissinger: I believe that, as the new Government comes in, our
ORIGINAL
obligations are terminated.
Even without shelling, we might have a transformation of the Minh
Government from a pro-American to a neutralist to an anti-American
Government. This could have happened this week.
To answer the question, it could produce panic. It could also make
the Government turn on us. With 150 people, this would be more
manageable.
President: They are one hour away. Even later today, if the situa-
tion deteriorates more rapidly than we think, we can go.
Brown: We are 25 minutes away from a ship to the Embassy. We
can go on your orders or Graham Martin's.
Schlesinger: There is a chance of a night attack.
Kissinger: I think the Embassy is safer from a disciplined attack
than the DAO.
FORD is LIBRARY GENALD
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE - XGDS
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
9
I think during the day tomorrow you will probably need to decide
whether you want to take out the Embassy tomorrow night. You
minimize the panic if you do not take the Embassy to Tan Son Nhut.
So you may need the Embassy compound for evacuation.
I think we should take everybody we can out today, and then decide
on the Embassy tomorrow.
President: What if the C-130 cannot land; then we cannot get people
out by fixed-wing aircraft.
Kissinger: You can then go to an emergency airlift at the DAO and
the Embassy, and you have no choice but to evacuate everybody.
Then you might also have to go to suppressive fire.
Schlesinger: I think we should still try to get the C-130's in.
Declassified Photocopy from
Brown: We are more ready to get people out at Tan Son Nhut than
Gerald R. Ford Library
at the Embassy, since at the latter we need to blow up trees and to
clear the parking lot.
President: We first need to see what happens at Tan Son Nhut. Then
we have to use the DAO and Embassy lift.
ORIGINAL
Kissinger: If they keep up their attacks, it is because they have
decided to bottle us up. We should then get everybody. out.
President: Who executes?
Kissinger: I suggest we draft a message here, clear it with Jim and
George, and show it to you. We will then send it to Graham Martin.
Jim can send the same message to Gayler through his channels.
Then everybody should know what we are doing.
Clements: If we cannot get the C-130's in, we will need to make a
critical decision at midnight or 1: 00 a.m.
President: That decision would be whether to get out.
Schlesinger: Should we soften up the artillery first?
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE - XGDS
FORD & LIBRARY GERALD
FORD it LIBRARY
TOP SEGRET/SENSITIVE
10
Brown: I would ignore the artillery for the chopper flight if the
artillery is on the air field. But if it is on the DAO or on the
Embassy, we cannot go in. In the first case, we would hope that
they cannot shift too rapidly. In the second case, we may need
to suppress.
Kissinger: But you would have air cover any way to protect the
lift.
President: Where is the air cover now?
Brown: I recommend that it come in when we go to a helicopter
lift.
President: We can await that until we see whether the C-130's can
get in. If they cannot, then we go to Option 3. The decision will
be forced by whether the C-130's can or cannot operate.
Declassified Photocopy from
Gerald R. Ford Library
Is that agreed? (All nod. )
ORIGINAL
TOP SEGRET/SENSITIVE - XGDS
LIBRARY GERALD R. FORD
FORD is LIBRARY CENNLE