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NSC Meeting, 12/15/76
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NSC Meeting, 12/15/76
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This file contains comments by President Gerald Ford on the national security.
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National Security Council Meetings Files (Ford Administration)
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President (1974-1977 : Ford). National Security Council. (1974 - 1977)
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The original documents are located in Box 2, folder: "NSC Meeting, 12/15/1976" of the
National Security Adviser's NSC Meeting File at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library.
Copyright Notice
The copyright law of the United States (Title 17, United States Code) governs the making of
photocopies or other reproductions of copyrighted material. Frank Zarb donated to the United States
of America his copyrights in all of his unpublished writings in National Archives collections.
Works prepared by U.S. Government employees as part of their official duties are in the public
domain. The copyrights to materials written by other individuals or organizations are presumed to
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copyright claim, please contact the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library.
Digitized from Box 2 of the National Security Adviser's NSC Meeting File at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library
MEMORANDUM
Jen law &
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
6640X
INFORMATION
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
January 3, 1977
MEMORANDUM FOR:
BRENT SCOWCROFT
FROM:
Jeanne W. Davis
amo
SUBJECT:
Minutes of NSC, Meeting
Held December 15, 1976
Attached are the minutes of the National Security Council meeting
Declassified Photocopy from
RETIRED E MOMBERSHIP
held December 15, 1976 to discuss NSSM 246--U. S. Defense Policy
and Military Posture.
Gerald R. Ford Library
cc: Mr. Hyland
Gen. Boverie
ORIGINAL
Attachment
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE (XGDS (B) (3)
lit 2/28/98
GERALD
&
FORD
TORIGINAL RETIRED FOR PRESERVATION
GERALD
LIBRARY
6640X
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506
TORSECREY/SENSVTIVE XGDS
MINUTES
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING
DATE:
Wednesday, December 15, 1976
TIME:
3:00 p.m. to 4:45 p.m.
PLACE:
Cabinet Room, The White House
SUBJECT:
NSSM 246 -- U.S. Defense Policy and Military Posture
Principals
Declassified Photocopy from
Gerald R. Ford Library
ORIGINAL RETIRED FOX PRESERVATION
The President
The Vice President
Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger
Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld
Director, Office of Management and Budget, James T. Lynn
Acting Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, John Lehman
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, General George S. Brown
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence Enno Knoche
Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs Brent Scowcroft
Other Attendees
White House:
Mr. Richard Cheney, Assistant to the President
Mr. William G. Hyland, Deputy Assistant to the
President for National Security Affairs
Defense:
Deputy Secretary William Clements
Dr. James P. Wade (Deputy Assistant Secretary for
Policy Plans and NSC Affairs)
NSC Staff:
Brig Gen Richard T. Boverie
GERALD
FORD LIBRARY LIBRARY
DECLASSIFIED
TOP SECRET SENSITIVE XGDS (B) (3)
E.O. 12958 Sec. 3.6
Classified by Brent Scowcroft
MR 98- 39, 65; NSCletes 2/10/99
ORIGINAL RETIRED FOR PRESERVATION
By let NARA, Date 5/25/99
TOR.SECRET/SENSITIVE XGDS
2
President Ford: I've looked at the NSSM 246 study. It is obviously a
very well done effort, particularly in view of the time pressures. It
has been helpful to me, and should be helpful to the next Administration.
I've looked at the various alternatives. Don, should we start with the
six overall strategies, or perhaps go first with strategic forces and
then general purpose forces?
Secretary Rumsfeld: We have the strategies on the boards here today.
We could start with the strategic forces and then discuss them; then turn
to the general purpose forces. Or we could take them together at one
time and then have our discussions.
President Ford: Let's start with strategic forces, then see if we can
RESERVATION
turn to the general purpose forces.
Mr. Hyland: The boards that are up there now show the overall strategies.
Secretary Rumsfeld: That presumes that we have worked our way through
Declassified Photocopy from
Gerald R. Ford Library
the strategic forces and general purpose forces issues and strategies.
Dr. Wade: (Briefing from the boards on overall strategies.) These
overall strategies are notional in character. They are examples only,
and they are not the only variations which are possible. (Typed copies
of the charts are at Tab A of these minutes.)
ORIGINAL
Option A assumes that the major buildup of strategic forces by the Soviets
compels the U.S. to improve its strategic force posture substantially
and rapidly. With respect to general purpose forces, this strategy accepts
greater risks, and frees resources for strengthening U.S. strategic forces.
President Ford: Do the figures there mean that we would save from
$3 billion to $10 billion?
Dr. Wade: Yes.
Director Lynn: Over what period of time?
Secretary Rumsfeld: These are average annual costs over a period of
five to ten years, but they are inaccurate and soft, and they work off a
higher base than that recently approved by the President.
Director Lynn: The only things we should really pay attention to are the
plus and minus signs.
is
FORD
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE XGDS
&
LIBRARY
GERALD
TOP/SECRET/SENSITIVE XGDS
3
Secretary Kissinger: Is the base the same for all alternatives?
Director Lynn: Yes.
President Ford: But all are related dollar-wise to one another.
Secretary Rumsfeld: Right.
Dr. Wade: Alternative B assumes that the priority near-term problem
confronting U.S. security interests is the buildup of Soviet forces for
possible attack in Europe. It also assumes that the growth of Soviet
strategic capabilities can be met with acceptable risk by a slower rate
of modernization in our strategic forces.
ESERVATION
Alternative C is basically the current DOD program as expressed in
the latest FYDP (Five Year Defense Plan).
Secretary Kissinger: What is the theory behind each of these alternatives?
Declassified Photocopy from
Gerald R. Ford Library
Dr. Wade: Alternative A assumes that priority must be given to countering
the Soviet strategic buildup. It also assumes a short war in Europe.
Secretary Kissinger: What does it do that we are not doing now?
Secretary Rumsfeld: In this alternative, we would have to stop doing
ORIGINAL
some things we are doing now.
Secretary Kissinger: What about in the strategic forces areã?
Dr. Wade: It would accelerate the modernization program. It would
bring M-X in in 1984. We would move faster on TRIDENT II. There would
be a significant improvement in our counter-silo capability. And we
would have improved civil defense and air defense.
General Scowcroft: And basically it would give us a full counter-silo
capability.
Dr. Wade: You have some hand-outs in front of you which will help as
we go through the strategies. (A copy of the hand-out is at Tab B of
these minutes.)
Alternative D assumes that our conventional strategy is adequate, but
that we have to do something about the Soviet strategic forces buildup.
FORDS is 07VU39 LIBRARY
TOP/SECRET/SENSITIVE XGDS
BERALD FORD LIBRARI
-
TOP/SECRETYSENSITIVE XGDS
4
President Ford: What about our supply of stocks in Europe for 90 days?
Dr. Wade: Our plan is for 90 days but we are not there yet. The allies
are around 30 days.
Secretary Kissinger: Under strategic strategy S-4, you talk about military
advantage. What is this?
Dr. Wade: That at any level of determination, if war breaks out, we
would insure that there would not be a Soviet military advantage.
Secretary Rumsfeld: Henry, each term is explained in the NSSM 246
report. This one is on page 24.
RESERVATION
Secretary Kissinger: I still don't know what it means.
General Scowcroft: It is hard to say in realistic terms.
Declassified Photocopy from
Secretary Kissinger: What about in terms of the SIOP?
Gerald R. Ford Library
General Brown: This was a hurried study, and there are no hard numbers.
President Ford: It assumes that if we have more, we are better off.
Secretary Kissinger: If we choose Alternative A, but this is certainly not
the DOD preference, nor mine. Unless we can establish overwhelming
ORIGINAL
military advantages in strategic forces, we are asking for it in Alternative A.
Option A would magnify every problem we have.
Dr. Wade: In Option E, we would have a moderately increased strategic
emphasis, today's strategy for Europe, and increased worldwide capabilities.
For Option F, we have increased emphasis on strategic deterrence,
increased capability in Europe, and today's capabilities worldwide.
Secretary Rumsfeld: Just to refresh your memory, we first analyzed the
strategic forces. We came up with about eight key issues, each of which
could be addressed in two or three different ways. Then we combined these
issues in various ways to give us alternative strategies for our strategic
forces. Then we did the same thing with general purpose forces. The
important thing is not whether we are talking about Option "S" or Option "G,"
but the issues.
is
FORD
FORD & LIBRARY GERALD
BERALD
LIBRARIO
TOP SEGRET/SENSINIVE XGDS
TOR SECRET SENSITIVE XGDS
5
President Ford: On the chart for Option C, you refer to "current defense
policy. 11 Please relate that to Option E, for example. What is the
corresponding line for Option C? Is it consistent with the Navy shipbuilding
study?
Secretary Rumsfeld: We looked at various alternatives for sustaining
capability in Europe such as 30 days, 90 days, and so forth and we con-
sidered other such factors.
Secretary Kissinger: How was it computed? By German standards? When
we say we have 90 days capability, they say we have 50 days. Conversely,
using our standards for computation, their 30 days is really 60 days.
General Brown: We are a long way from solving that problem. It is a national
problem.
Secretary Kissinger: But what way is it computed? Does Haig know what
he has got?
Declassified Photocopy from
Gerald R. Ford Library
General Brown: Yes.
Deputy Secretary Clements: Henry, I don't care how we compute it. We
simply don't have it over there.
Secretary Rumsfeld: No. Plus the Middle East has changed our estimates
for attrition rates.
OR'G'NAL
Secretary Kissinger: This leaves us with other problems. We will be
driven by the lowest days of the critical item.
Deputy Secretary Clements: There are several of those critical items, not
just one.
General Brown: This is no secret. It is well known. We took it into
account in the FY 78 budget for the first time.
Secretary Rumsfeld: Never before did we have a program to get well. This
time we have such a program.
Deputy Secretary Clements: At least now we are talking about it.
Secretary Rumsfeld: If we don't get well, it lowers the nuclear threshold.
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE XGDS
BERALD FORD FIBKAR,
TOPSECRET SENSITIVE XGDS
6
Dr. Lehman: The Soviet figures don't look that good either. Their
situation is not better.
General Brown: Our knowledge of their situation is limited. It relates
to how we estimate they fill up their buildings. The estimates are pretty
soft in many areas.
Secretary Rumsfeld: This forces the Services to continue to reassess
the situation.
Secretary Kissinger: I am strongly in favor of that.
Vice President Rockefeller: Mr. President, let me ask two questions, please.
SERVATION
Were these plans developed with a budgetary ceiling in mind?
President Ford: No.
Vice President Rockefeller: Then why don't we have an Option G where
Declassified Photocopy from
Gerald R. Ford Library
all three areas (strategic, Europe, worldwide) are improved.
General Scowcroft: You are right. It stops at Option F.
Vice President Rockefeller: That means Japan has got to go. That is bad.
Secretary Rumsfeld: Not if you take Option E.
ORIGINAL
General Scowcroft: You have no option that improves strategic forces,
Europe, and worldwide.
Vice President Rockefeller: That is why we need an Option G.
Secretary Rumsfeld: What we should do is look at the issues. Why
don't we take a look at the issues?
Vice President Rockefeller: I didn't make up the charts.
Secretary Rumsfeld: An interagency group prepared the charts.
Vice President Rockefeller: Why don't we have an option for improvements
in all three areas?
Secretary Rumsfeld: Maybe there should be one. We don't have to take
any of these options that are shown on the chart. We can take a look at the
issues, and then come up with the strategy we think is best.
FORD
FORD i LIBRARY GERALD
GERALD
LIBRARY
TOPSECRET/SENSITIVE XGDS
TOPSECRET/SENSITIVE XGDS
7
Vice President Rockefeller: Then why are we doing it this way?
Secretary Rumsfeld: There are an infinite number of combinations possible.
These are only llustrative.
Vice President Rockefeller: But none of them includes all three areas
for improvements.
Director Lynn: With respect to today's policy, I think we are moving
from S-2 to S-3 for strategic forces. For general purpose forces, this
assumes that we are trying to do better in Europe with our stockpile and
the like.
SERVATION
Secretary Rumsfeld: The current general purpose forces strategy is G-2.
Director Lynn: That has the United States at 90 days sustainability and
the allies at 30 days.
Declassified Photocopy from
Gerald R. Ford Library
Secretary Kissinger: What is the rationale for that?
Director Lynn: The allies don't get it up there.
Vice President Rockefeller: The plan today is inadequate, based on the
analysis in the report.
ORIGINAL
President Ford: Nelson, we had a drawdown in Vietnam. We had a
drawdown for the Yom Kippur War. We have had Congressional cuts in
the budget over 10 years. It is very easy to say "let's turn the switch
on and get it right, " but where are we going to get the money? We have
problems with inflation and taxes. It's great to go for all of it, but
goddamn it, we can't do everything. We should show these charts to
Mr. Carter, with all his talk.
Secretary Rumsfeld: The strategies are for illustration only. The
way it ought to be done is as follows. Let's take one of each of the
strategic and general purpose options and modify them. Let's keep the
differences in mind. We have to think about what we have now, what
policy we have in mind, and what budget plan is necessary for that guidance.
Vice President Rockefeller: But somebody thinks that each of these
options is right.
General Scowcroft: But we didn't put up the minimal option either.
FORD
TOP SECRETV/SENSTTVE XGDS
FORD i GERALD LIBRARY
TOPSECRET/SENSITIVE XGDS
8
Vice President Rockefeller: The poor President of the United States is
responsible for the defense of the country.
Secretary Kissinger: The question isn't what the human mind can conceive.
First, the problem is with the Soviet strategic buildup. The second point
is that it is unlikely for us to be able to develop a decisive military
superiority in strategic forces, of the kind we had in the 1950s. Third,
we should not permit perceptual discrepancies; we have to consider what
drives the political and perceptual problems. These considerations could
lead us to an unspecified increase in strategic forces.
Next, the overwhelming strategic problem we will face over the next 10
years is the Soviet capability for regional attack -- in Europe and elsewhere.
And we have to consider what the U.S. position would be with respect to
peripheral attack.
Therefore, we should have a strategy to augment our strategic forces,
plus what is needed for worldwide capability, plus we have the special
Declassified Photocopy from
Gerald R. Ford Library
problem of Europe since it has a more explicit nuclear threshold.
For example, what if the Soviets put four divisions in Damascus in a
Middle East war, or in Iran, or real forces in Africa. That is the real
problem.
Secretary Rumsfeld: That is what the Pentagon has concluded and what
the Vice President is saying. I think we should go with strategy S-3
ORIGINAL
with some elements of S-4, and strategy G-3 with elements of G-4 or
G-5. This includes worldwide capabilities. We would not add troops to
Europe, but we would put stocks in, and there would be increases in the
strategic area.
Now the debate is about what pieces to add in. We have discussed most
of the issues except for civil defense. For civil defense, I think we should
go from something which is practically non-existent to some better planning.
We have no base for civil defense plans, and I am not talking about going
back to bomb shelters.
Vice President Rockefeller: There is nothing wrong with bomb shelters.
Secretary Rumsfeld: You're for bomb shelters? (Laughter)
Vice President Rockefeller: I just built one at my home.
General Brown: We can pick and choose through the charts. As for the JCS,
we come out somewhere between three and five in each case.
TOPSEGRET/SENSTTTVE XGDS
FORD & LIBRARY GERALD
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE XGDS
9
Secretary Rumsfeld: Then we have to determine what pace to do it.
Secretary Kissinger: Then we have the Vice President's question. We
have no budgetary figures for the Defense preference. If it's from three
to five, then the budget would go up.
Secretary Rumsfeld: This is not a budget exercise.
Vice President Rockefeller: I still don't understand why we have no option
which improves all three areas.
Secretary Rumsfeld: DOD was acting as the Chairman of an NSC subgroup.
It tried to do the work in a reasonably orderly way.
Deputy Secretary Clements: Mr. Vice President, you are right. Ultimately,
we must manage all of this, and figure out what it costs.
Declassified Photocopy from
Secretary Rumsfeld: You can forget some strategies like G-1 and G-2.
Gerald R. Ford Library
We ought to think about improving our worldwide capabilities. We can do
the studies identified at the end of the study. And we can cost out those
strategies which look particularly interesting to us.
Vice President Rockefeller: And explain what the reasons are.
Secretary Rumsfeld: We have another question, Mr. President. Mechani-
ORIGINAL
cally, given the electoral situation, we must determine physically how
to handle the study. Would you want to speak to it? Hand it off? Pursue
it further?
President Ford: I'm reminded of the first debate in the House I attended
in 1950. The Administration was cutting back on defense following the
post-war period. Carl Vincent took up the cudgel for DOD. But George
Mahon gave a speech in which he used the following analogy. He said he
was for defense. His record for 1950 was good on this. But then he took
his son to the Smithsonian. He came to a man in armor surrounded by a
coat of iron. His son bumped into it, and it toppled over. His son asked
him why it toppled over. And George replied, "Because it had no bone and
muscle inside."
My point is this. The country can put a coat of iron around it, but if it
has no economy and will, it is no good. Sometimes I think we want to put
a coat of iron and steel around us, and let the economy go to hell. The
country would not be worth a damn internally.
FORD
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE XGDS
FORD & LIBRARY GERALD
CERALD
LIDRARY
TOPASECRET/SENSITIVE XGDS
10
We must take a rational view to meet the challenge militarily. This has
been a damn good exercise, but we must be realistic. I'm a little fed
up when I see what we try to do but see what the next generation will
be doing. We cannot go through an unrealistic exercise. Let's see what
is reasonable and go from there.
Vice President Rockefeller: Mr. Carter wants to spend $10 billion on
public works; if we want to spend it on the military, I think it would be
just as good.
President Ford: That is why I vetoed the public works program. I see
none of his solutions aimed at military strength. Jobs, cities, public
works -- but not one penny for defense of the United States.
Secretary Rumsfeld: As Mr. Carter was leaving the Pentagon after his
briefing, someone asked him whether he still intended to cut the Defense
budget. He said yes.
Declassified Photocopy from
Gerald R. Ford Library
General Brown: That's not exactly what he said. He said: "I've seen
something about the Soviet forces but I've not yet seen the U.S. forces. 11
President Ford: He is as inaccurate as I know, but we must be realistic.
If we do not have a healthy economy, we can't do anything.
Secretary Rumsfeld: The Mahon analogy would fit if the case were that
ORIGINAL
the present burden of defense on society is dangerous. But this is not
the case. Defense is the lowest percentage of the federal budget and the
gross national product in many years. This goes to macroeconomics.
Does an incremental increase of defense spending of X percent do damage
to the economy? No! I believe that. Of course, Mr. President, you
could find some economist somewhere who takes the other side. But I
say there is no danger of damaging the economy.
President Ford: In keeping programs the way they are.
Secretary Rumsfeld: Yes, sir. You must begin with the fact that the
United States is not an economic enterprise. The first function of govern-
ment is freedom and security of our people. Therefore, it is not a question
of what spending level we should have, but what is the right policy or
strategy.
I got in this debate in Europe with some of the people after the meeting.
They say they can't afford increased defense. But that is false. Look
at Israel; look at the United States in World War II. It is a matter of priorities.
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE XGDS
FORD is LIBRAR GERALD
TOP'SECRER/SENSITIVE XGDS
11
General Scowcroft: But we have to ask what is politically sustainable
year after year after year. We either do that or we have to get into a
frenzy with the threat.
Secretary Rumsfeld: Where are we in a frenzy with the threat?
General Scowcroft: Look at Vietnam.
General Brown: And in the late 50s when we talked about the missile threat.
Director Lynn: I don't really see a lot of changes from the overall strategies
vice what we determined in the study in 1969. We are looking at how many
days we should provide for sustainability in Europe and issues such as this.
These should be identified and we are doing this. We have to look closely
at the idea of fighting for 90 days in light of attrition rates, prepositioning,
and the like.
Secretary Kissinger: Particularly when we put our prepositioned stocks
Declassified Photocopy from
Gerald R. Ford Library
all in one depot to save money.
Secretary Rumsfeld: General Haig is working his can off to fix this.
Director Lynn: There are very few things we want to change. We must
consider non-exclusive reliance on sea lanes, given the vulnerabilities of
sea lanes. We are moving that way. If I can convince Congress to slow
ORIGINAL
down domestic programs, we ought to also be able to make our case for
defense.
The strategy should be, Mr. President: (1) Address the problem hard in
the State of the Union Address. Put out a very strong signal. (2) We
should address it in the Defense Posture Statement, that we are moving
to strategy S-3. I wouldn't go to S-4, though, if someone paid me.
President Ford: We can't even build three TRIDENTs a year.
Director Lynn: Third, we could prepare a draft NSDM. You would not
have to sign it; just give it to Mr. Carter. He can then compare his ideas
against that sheet. The turnaround you have made over the past two years
has been remarkable. To keep it going, discipline on domestic programs
must be imposed.
And then we can do some other things. For example, with Japan, there
is some room for ASW and air defense improvements on their part.
FORD
CERALD
LIBERTY
XGDS
FORD & GERALD LIBRANT
TOPSECRET/SENSITIVE XGDS
12
Secretary Rumsfeld: And even economic aid in the region.
Director Lynn: This is confusing. Current defense policy has words such
as "increased, 11 "improved. 11 We are now moving to S-3, now moving to
counter-silo capability.
General Scowcroft: A partial counter-silo capability.
Secretary Rumsfeld: Right. A limited counter-silo capability.
Director Lynn: I am not that sure that Henry would want to signal this.
I hope the M-X program we have is good enough for the signals we want
this year.
Secretary Rumsfeld: I presume Henry's views are in the study since
the State Department has been involved throughout the entire process.
Secretary Kissinger: I have no quarrel with the study.
Declassified Photocopy from
Gerald R. Ford Library
Secretary Rumsfeld: A draft NSDM is being prepared. Lcan give it to
Brent.
ORIGINAL RETIRED
General Scowcroft: I am not sure I wouldn't sign it.
Vice President Rockefeller: When the General says sign, that is good.
Also, you can give a strong signal and sign the NSDM. You can say
these are the details. These are the essential things to say to the
American people. If you, Mr. President, pull back, he'll pull back from
that. We should plant the flag on a field where it is sound and right.
Secretary Kissinger: The most important thing is to explain this to the
American people. You can do this, Mr. President, in a valedictory
occasion, such as the State of the Union Address. You can say that we
have been focusing on the long-term problems over 15 years, so it doesn't
look like you've neglected anything.
Basically, in the 1960s we stopped all strategic programs, so we gave
the Soviets an opportunity to get ahead. It wasn't until SALT ONE that
we did something about it. And about four years ago we got our force
programs moving again. These programs are just now coming into the
force.
Also, we can talk about Vietnam, how we had to draw down the stockpiles
to support the war in Vietnam.
FORD
GERALD LIBRARY
GERALD
LIBRARY
TOR SECRET/SENSITIVE XGDS
TOP'SECRET/SENSHTAVE XGDS
13
However, this has not been the result of a sudden Soviet buildup. They
have been building up at a steady pace year after year.
Also, we should worry about the way we allocate our money. We spend
a disportionately large amount for personnel.
However, it has not been a sudden Soviet buildup, but a steady buildup.
You were the first President who has had a chance to meet this. We
would not just want to be sticking the new Administration, but making
sure that there is not a chance that they could say that you failed.
In 15 or 20 minutes of your speech, you could say this, and how you would
conduct our defense policy. There should be both some theory and some
numbers in the speech.
President Ford: I think that is a good approach. My comments were aimed
at trying to get well yesterday, and feeling we haven't done the job. We
have done the job! What worries me is that they say they will do a better
Declassified Photocopy from
Gerald R. Ford Library
job with less money. That simply is not possible.
Secretary Kissinger: We would want to put the necessity in terms of forces,
not dollars. We could talk about the need for forces for intervention. Then,
ORIGINAL RETI-
if stated conceptually, it would be much harder for him to cut.
Secretary Rumsfeld: There is an advantage in stating it that way. Then
we could add the next comment: They can cut, but we will slip. This is
exactly what happened in Vietnam, and with the Congressional budget cuts.
The President is left with the tools from his predecessors. If Carter
makes the cuts of the kind he is talking about, he will compound the problem
and we will not get well from the Vietnam and Congressional cuts.
Secretary Kissinger: You can put this before the American people. You
can talk about the problems you see over the next 10 years. You have had
a tremendous record over the past two years.
Secretary Rumsfeld: Right. And only if his record is sustained in the
future will things be right.
President Ford: Let's take a look at Strategy E. It talks about a moderately
increased strategic emphasis. Haven't we done that?
General Brown: Yes!
FORD i LIBRARY GERALD
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE XGDS
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Secretary Rumsfeld: Except for civil defense.
President Ford: I don't like the idea of bomb shelters in backyards. It
reminds me of the time I was in Michigan and some shyster salesman
tried to sell me one. It was a bunch of crap.
Vice President Rockefeller: The salesman must have been from New
York. (Laughter)
President Ford: I am down on civil defense -- not one penny for it. Forget
it!
Secretary Rumsfeld: Then you are for S-3 minus civil defense, if I
understand you correctly.
President Ford: Amen. Cross civil defense out. We are going ahead
strongly with F-15s, F-16s, and A-10s. We are improving our capabilities.
Declassified Photocopy from
Gerald R. Ford Library
Secretary Kissinger: If General Brown would like to give me a going away
present, he can give the F-15 a nuclear capability.
ORIGINAL RETIRED
President Ford: We are doing everything we can in Europe. We are going
to fix up our stockpiles over a six year period. We are increasing our
worldwide capability. Look what we are doing with the shipbuilding
program.
General Scowcroft: And we need some airlift.
Secretary Rumsfeld: Right. We need some airlift.
President Ford: On the other issues: We are going to stay in Korea. We
are augmenting our Navy shipbuilding. If Carter cuts Korea, he is cutting
off from what I would do. We are going for a responsible worldwide
capability that we have endorsed.
Secretary Kissinger: You can say that in your valedictory, plus you can
look four to five years ahead. You can say you see the need for building
up regional forces against an increasing danger; but this is a 10-year steady
program. We can't go through peaks and valleys. You can say that this
is your best judgment.
Deputy Secretary Clements: We can emphasize the steadiness of the program.
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Secretary Kissinger: You have supported many levels.
Vice President Rockefeller: Where do we go from here now?
Secretary Rumsfeld: We can come up with a paper. You can identify
areas for further study and direct that these studies be taken. You can
draft up the essence of what you have said. We can draft a NSDM. And
you can take a draft of your statement from that NSDM. We can erect
this in the defense report, and the State of the Union Address or some
other valedictory. You can plant the flag down the road, so if they deviate
from it, they must admit it.
President Ford: Or they can accept it, and the peril that goes with it.
SERVATION
Secretary Rumsfeld: Yes.
President Ford: Let's do this.
Declassified Photocopy from
Gerald R. Ford Library
Obviously, I favor S-3. I favor today's strategy for Europe. I favor the
Navy shipbuilding program. I favor keeping forces in Korea. And I favor
a regional capability.
ORIGINAL RETURNS
Secretary Kissinger: That includes increased worldwide capability.
Secretary Rumsfeld: Are there any other issues we haven't looked at?
Director Lynn: NATO.
General Scowcroft: G-3 is too general for NATO.
Secretary Rumsfeld: Mr. President, as I understand it, you favor no
increase in manpower for Europe but you do want to increase our stocks,
keep our modernization program going, and have a war-fighting capability.
President Ford: Yes.
Secretary Rumsfeld: You favor, as I understand it, a more flexible
response concerning warning time. That is, an ability to defend against
an unreinforced attack with little warning, or reinforced attack with more
warning.
President Ford: What about the 90 days sustainability?
FORD
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General Scowcroft: We can increase our prepositioned supplies.
Deputy Secretary Clements: Definitely.
Secretary Rumsfeld: We would not give U.S. money to the allies for
sustainability, but rather prod them to do more. Also, we should look
at the NATO flanks.
President Ford: I'm not clear on the flanks. What are we talking about?
Troops? Materials?
General Brown: Basically, we're doing better. You gave us sealift
and airlift mobility.
President Ford: If we have the Navy shipbuilding and airlift, we should
be able to handle that.
General Scowcroft: To increase our worldwide capability, we need
Declassified Photocopy from
Gerald R. Ford Library
strategic mobility.
Secretary Rumsfeld: Yes, we need strategic mobility.
General Brown: Are we talking about G-3?
Director Lynn: We ought to put this in writing.
ORIGINAL
Secretary Rumsfeld: Mr. President, where do you stand on civil defense?
(Laughter)
President Ford: Mr. Carter can put his moleholes around here. (Laughter)
Vice President Rockefeller: Does the study address adequate training?
General Brown: We're getting better in this, although the O&M dollars
are still a little thin.
Vice President Rockefeller: Isn't this the guts of the matter? It ought to
be here. This is another illustration of the man-in-armor analogy.
President Ford: We are doing what we can to recover from Vietnam and
the Yom Kippur War.
Vice President Rockefeller: How much money is involved?
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General Brown: I don't know.
President Ford: Approximately $2 billion in O&M. We are up to 18 percent
growth in O&M, which is what you wanted. We are up to 14 percent on
other accounts.
Vice President Rockefeller: This will fit into Henry's projection for the
future.
President Ford: These things are in the budget, not for five years, but
over a six-year period.
Director Lynn: The reason it is hard to be that final, is that we disagree
NOLLVAMENT
on attrition rates, strategies the East might use in an attack, and so forth.
We can do our best at this time and when further facts are available, then
we can always adjust.
Vice President Rockefeller: All the Services are way behind on training.
Declassified Photocopy from
Gerald R. Ford Library
But this is not my business.
General Brown: You are going in the right direction, but the problem is
a little overstated.
Dr. Lehman: Israeli statistics show a direct relationship between flying
hours and kills. If a pilot had ten times the flying hours, he had ten times
ORIGINAL
the kills.
Secretary Rumsfeld: Henry said to me, jokingly, before the meeting that
I was going to scare everybody about the Russians ahead.
Secretary Kissinger: I said that?
Secretary Rumsfeld: Jokingly. But this does affect the pace.
Vice President Rockefeller: I am concerned. I read the intelligence reports
every day.
Secretary Kissinger: I am concerned by statements that the Soviets will
engage in a Hitler-like attack. What they have done is the same thing
they have done all along; that is, increase their budget about 8-10 percent
a year for defense. As their economy increases, their military grows.
We have to live with this.
Secretary Rumsfeld: What I don't like is the impression that this is not
that serious. The President's paper must say that it is serious. Had
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the President not demonstrated his concern, we would be in an
unstable situation.
President Ford: But I don't think you can realistically say that they
have all of a sudden done this. The problem is not what they have done,
but what we haven't done over a period of years.
General Scowcroft: We must do this on a sustaining basis.
Secretary Rumsfeld: We can't run a war and drain off our supplies to
somewhere else.
Deputy Secretary Clements: We need to be realistic in a simple way.
We have to be steady with this. In the past some have talked about
Cloud 7 plans that we can't meet. We must project this in a simple,
honest way. We must say that we can't do it in NATO because of our
stocks.
Declassified Photocopy from
Gerald R. Ford Library
General Brown: We have talked about two things: our muscle and our will.
But there is a third thing. This is our relationships with 'others. How can
we talk about a contingency in the Middle East and have no base agreements
in Turkey? This is true around the world.
General Scowcroft: One thing that we have overlooked is the depth of
the study. It has been a very fine study, but we must consider its depth.
ORIGINAL
Jim Lynn mentioned the coincidence with the 1969 study. There was
nothing on 90 days versus 120 days. Also, we really haven't addressed
theater nuclear war. With regard to strategic forces, we have to consider
what we mean by such things as parity. Don says casualties are important.
We talk about people, but our last document said that we should not kill
people. Maybe we need a people-targeting doctrine, to show the Soviets that
they could not get away with anything if they attacked.
President Ford: How does this compare with the 1969 study in depth?
Secretary Rumsfeld: This one was done in 60 days. Henry, you ran
the last study. How long did you have, six months?
Secretary Kissinger: Yes. But the strategic problem today is not all that
different. In 1969, with Congress cutting the budget, we could only turn
our doctrine around. However, we eventually went with MIRV, TRIDENT,
B-1, and other programs but not until 1971 or 72. It is not that amazing
that the doctrine is about the same. What is different is the Soviet forces'
buildup, as some predicted in the 1950s.
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FORD TRANS
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In 1961, I was a consultant on the Kennedy plan to send a battalion down
the autobahn. It was a crazy plan, but we could think about it because we
had a clear strategic superiority. We could take out whatever missiles
they had very easily. But if the same situation faced us tomorrow, what
would we do? Go to nuclear war? Execute the SIOP? Kill 120 million
people? What will we send down the autobahn? This is no reflection on
anybody.
What would we do in the next Middle East War if the Israelis decide to go
to Damascus, and the Russians drop paratroops in Damascus?
Secretary Rumsfeld: They have improved their airlift and their tactical
air.
Secretary Kissinger: With regard to the future, we are ahead in strategic
forces and this may last from four to five years. But there is no way to
deal with strategic superiority. This is why I want SALT. We could never
have enough for an overwhelming capability in strategic forces. This is
Declassified Photocopy from
Gerald R. Ford Library
why we should build up our conventional capability.
General Brown: This is why the JCS are 100 percent for SALT.
Secretary Rumsfeld: But we are forgetting that strategic forces are not
a big percentage of the budget.
ORIGINAL
Deputy Secretary Clements: People are the high cost item.
President Ford: Let's prepare to go along these lines.
Vice President Rockefeller: I would hate to leave these options on the
chart that cut the budget. Carter could say that President Ford gave serious
consideration to cutting the budget.
President Ford: Thanks very much.
i
FORD
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SERALD
ORIGINAL RETIRED PRESERVATION
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OVERALL STRATEGIES
OVERALL STRATEGY A ( - $3-10B)
Increased Emphasis on Strategic Deterrence
Short War (30 Days) in Europe
Reduced Capabilities Worldwide
OVERALL STRATEGY B
( - $0 - 5 B)
Today's Level of Emphasis on Strategic Deterrence
Increased Capability in Europe
Reduced Capabilities Worldwide
OVERALL STRATEGY C (Base)
Current Defense Policy
OVERALL STRATEGY D (+$2-3B)
Increased Emphasis on Strategic Deterrence
Today's Strategy for Europe
DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13023(
STORE
Today's Worldwide Capabilities
NSC Memb 3/33/03, :
By dal NARA Low 4/25/12
09236
TOP SECRET /SENSITIVE - XGDS
TOP SECRET /SENSITIVE - XGDS
OVERALL STRATEGIES
(continued)
OVERALL STRATEGY E (+ $1 - 3 B)
Moderately Increased Strategic Emphasis
Today's Strategy for Europe
Increased Worldwide Capabilities
OVERALL STRATEGY F
( + $4 - 5 B)
Increased Emphasis on Strategic Deterrence
Increased Capability in Europe
Today's Capabilities Worldwide
Note: Korea is a separable issue.
TOP SEGRET/SENSITIVE - XGDS
ORIGINAL RETIRED FOR PRESERVATION
B
NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet
WITHDRAWAL ID 09237
REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL
National security restriction
TYPE OF MATERIAL
Chart
ORIGINAL RETIRED FOR PRESERVATION
RECEIVER'S NAME
DOD
TITLE
Alternative Strategies for Strategic
Nuclear Forces
CREATION DATE
12/1976
VOLUME
1 page
COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID
031200038
COLLECTION TITLE
National Security Adviser. National
Security Council Meetings File
BOX NUMBER
2
FOLDER TITLE
NSC Meeting, 12/15/76
DATE WITHDRAWN
02/26/1998
WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST
LET
NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet
WITHDRAWAL ID 09238
REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL
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TYPE OF MATERIAL
Chart
TITLE
Alternative Strategies for General
Purpose Forces
CREATION DATE
12/1976
VOLUME
1 page
COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID
031200038
COLLECTION TITLE
National Security Adviser. National
Security Council Meetings File
BOX NUMBER
2
FOLDER TITLE
NSC Meeting, 12/15/76
DATE WITHDRAWN
02/26/1998
WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST
LET
DOC
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INITIAL ACTION o
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INTERNAL ROUTING AND DISTRIBUTION
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FOR
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MEMO FOR SCOWCROFT
STAFF SECRETARY
MEMO FOR PRES
CONGRESSIONAL
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APPROPRIATE ACTION
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RECOMMENDATIONS
INTELLIGENCE
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LATIN AMERICA
REFER TO
FOR:
MID EAST/ NO. AFRICA
ANY ACTION NECESSARY?
NSC PLANNING
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SCIENTIFIC
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U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1976-220-930
599-022
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MEMORANDUM
09234
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
TOP-SECRI ET /SENSITIVE - XGDS
December 14, 1976
MEMORANDUM FOR:
BRENT SCOWCROFT
FROM:
RICHARD T. BOVERIE RTB
SUBJECT:
NSC Meeting on NSSM 246, 3:00 p. m.,
Wednesday, December 15, 1976
The attached materials are provided for your use at Wednesday's
NSC meeting on the NSSM 246 study on defense policy and military
posture. Your meeting memo to the President (TabIII) summarizes
the relevant issues and strategies. In addition to the issues and
strategies, another major item for discussion will probably be
alternative ways in which the President might make use of the
NSSM 246 study.
Agency Views
DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958 (as amended) SEC 3.3
MR # 09-135 # 30
6/16/10
Our informal discussions indicate the following potential agency
By dal NARA, Date 7/8/10
views:
-- OSD. Secretary Rumsfeld has apparently decided to suggest
selecting strategies S-3 and G-3 for our strategic forces and general
purpose forces, respectively. Strategy S-3 (offset USSR strengths/
ORIGINAL RETIRED FOR PRESERVATION
military gain denial) basically reflects the current FYDP thrust.
Strategy G-3 continues our current strategy in Europe and improves
our capability worldwide through greater capability for Unilateral
Military Action (which could involve improved strategic mobility,
among other things). These strategies do not appear inconsistent
with the President's budget decisions for FY 78 and could be cast as
responding to an increased global challenge in the future.
-- The JCS. For strategic forces, the Chiefs reportedly prefer
S-3, plus some elements of S-4. The idea is to adopt an offsetting/
military gain denial strategy, while working toward a matching/
intrawar military advantage concept. For general purpose forces,
the Chiefs like G-3 (some improved capability worldwide) plus elements
of G-5. (increased sustainability on the part of NATO allies, and some
FORD
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE - XGDS (B) (3)
Classified by Brent Scowcroft
GERALD
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improvement in NATO response capability). -- It is interesting that
the Chiefs are opting for relatively realistic goals rather than JSOP-
type programs. Their preferred strategies would push the budget up
somewhat in the out-years, but apparently are not inconsistent with
the President's near-term (FY 78) budget decisions.
- State. The State staff has recommended that Secretary Kissinger
continue Deputy Secretary Robinson's theme, i. e., that the study has
been useful as a basis for identifying issues needing further analysis,
but that no action should be taken at this time to change policies. State's
position would not preclude utilizing the study in the State of the Union or
other public statements, so long as the strategy advocated is basically
consistent with present policy.
ACDA. The ACDA staff has suggested to John Lehman (Fred Ikle
will not be in town) that the President should use the report to select
or ratify a strategy (with S-3 and G-3 being likely specific choices) and
should reflect this action in the State of the Union address and the
budget submission.
OMB. The OMB staff is recommending to Jim Lynn that he support
strategic forces alternative S-2 (Triad/strategic reserve/retaliation
against postwar recovery targets), which is basically our current policy
(although DOD is moving toward S-3 in its FYDP). For general purpose
forces, the OMB staff reportedly likes G-4, which improves our NATO
posture but reduces capabilities worldwide for an average annual
savings of $0-4 billion. -- Jim Lynn will likely continue to urge the
President to use the study to state publicly his choices for the direction
which future strategy should take.
Our Views
Our views on the use of the study and on strategy alternatives are as
follows:
-- Use of the Study
The President can use the NSSM 246 report to do two things --
indicate the basic direction he would like to see US defense policy
P
FORD
take, and highlight any of the specific issues treated in the study
which he may wish to emphasize. He could give visibility to his view
GERALD
in various documents or speeches over the next month. For example,
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3
he could indicate the extent to which his views should be conveyed in
the DOD Posture Statement and his State of the Union address. Also,
if he would like to state his preferences in a much more formal way,
he could ask that a draft NSDM be prepared reflecting his dicisions.
With respect to documents and speeches, the President could:
-- State his views as to the appropriate defense strategy for the
United States.
Describe the NSSM 246 study and the way in which it examined
the central issues underlying the strategy determinations.
Stress the Ford Administration's legacy of increased emphasis
on critical defense issues and programs, noting the close relationship
between our efforts in the past two years to improve US capability and
the central issues (sustainability, warning time, deterrence criteria,
etc. ) analyzed in the NSSM 246 report.
Highlight certain of those central issues of particular importance
or concern, where increased future attention and analysis are deemed
necessary; and
Emphasize in broad terms the utility of our defense strategy
in supporting the foreign policy objectives of the United States.
We believe that a disposition of the NSSM 246 report along these lines
could be useful, would allow the President to leave an important
and lasting personal mark in the major policy area, and would be accept-
able to most if not all of the other NSC principals. The only exception
might be that some agencies, particularly State, would likely be dis-
pleased if the President indicated an interest in issuing a NSDM.
Strategic Forces. There are some things we can write off
immediately. We do not want to initiate a major defensive damage
limiting policy. We think it would be counterproductive to develop
a full counter-silo capability, because of the crisis instabilities such
a capability could introduce. We should not move downward from a
Triad to a Dyad, because of the loss of assurance in our ability to
retaliate effectively, loss of time-urgent capabilities, and perceptions
problems. With these assumptions, we are left with two strategies for
consideration: S-2 and S-3.
FORD
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE - XGDS
GERALD
LIBRARY
S-2 represents our actual policy today, while S-3 would move us toward
using our technology to offset Soviet strengths, insuring military gain
denial in a conflict, an ability to attack withheld Soviet ICBMs, and
enhanced civil defense planning (principally for crisis relocation).
From a purely military standpoint, S-3 is sound, but it has some draw-
backs in terms of perceptions, stability, and arms race implications,
Our preferred approach would be to use S-2 as a basic strategy but add
selected elements of S-3 which make sense for at least the near-term future,
such as enhanced civil defense planning for crisis relocation, and
possibly modest improvement in our peripheral attack capabilities
(which really means cruise missiles). However, we would stay away
from a heavy commitment to large, very rapid M-X deployments because
of the potential impact on Soviet perceptions and possible contributions
to crisis instability. (S-2 would deploy about 150 M-X starting in the
mid 80's; S-3 would accelerate deployments and increase the quantity to
about 200. S-4 and S-5 would deploy 300-350 M-X.)
General Purpose Forces. Again, we can start with those things
which we would write off immediately. We could not reasonably expect
to obtain the funds that would be required to support a massive increase
in our NATO and worldwide capabilities as called for by G-6. At the
same time, we would not want to reduce our capabilities in Europe or elsewher
worldwide, which therefore eliminates G-1 and G-4.
Looking at the individual elements of the remaining strategies, we
think we should maintain our current basic strategy in Europe but improve
our ability for rapid response through improved strategic mobility. By
improving our strategic mobility for a better response posture for
Europe, we would simultaneously be increasing our ability to respond
worldwide against unforeseen contingencies and a possibly increasing
global challenge. Also, in Europe we would encourage greater sustainability
on the part of the allies, either through their own efforts or, if necessary,
through US assistance to the allies.
With respect to Korea, we do not think we should undertake any force
reductions at this time. For the future, we could think about reducing
(but not phasing out) ground forces from a division to one forward deployed
brigade and selected artillery units. A modest force in Korea would
continue to show US interest and add greater flexibility should additional
forces ever be needed.
Overall Strategies. The notional overall strategies (identified
in the report and the President's briefing paper) represent some of
FORD
TOP SECR FT SENSITIVE - XGDS
GERALD
LIBRARY
the possible combinations of strategic and general purpose forces
alternatives. The overall strategies are illustrative only; other
combinations are clearly possible.
Our views on the strategic and general purpose forces issues tend
to lead to a modified version of Overall Strategy E. That is, we
would moderately strengthen our strategic forces strategy and our
strategic mobility capability (which improvesrapid response for
Europe and worldwide).
Conduct of the Meeting
DOD will start by referring to the earlier NSC meeting and its
discussion on strategic and general purpose forces alternatives,
and then make a brief presentation on the notional overall strategies.
This format will keep the lead in briefing to a minimum, and permit
the principals to start their discussions early in the meeting. During
the meeting, DOD may hand out copies of the charts in the report which
summarize the strategic and general purpose forces alternatives, in
order to facilitate the discussions. These charts are at Tab B and Tab C
of the President's briefing paper (Tab II).
Also, there is some speculation that Secretary Rumsfeld may try to
initiate discussions on binary weapons. We will keep you informed on
potential developments.
Your Book Contains:
Tab I
-
Talking Points
Tab II
-
Draft Charts on Overall Strategies
Tab III
-
The President's Briefing Paper
Tab A
-
List of Participants
Tab B
-
Alternative Strategies for Strategic Forces
Tab C
-
Alternative Strategies for General Purpose Forces
Tab D
⑉
U.S. Defense Policy and Military Posture,
Response to NSSM 246, November 30, 1976
TOP SEGRET/SENSITIVE - XGDS
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LIBRARY
MEETING POINTS
Use of Study
1.
The President's views could be conveyed through the DOD
Posture Statement and in his State of the Union address.
2. [If the President prefers a more specific and formal
approach] -- We could have the working group draft a
NSDM for the President's review.
Strategic Forces
1.
There are some things we can probably write off now. We
would not want to adopt a major defensive damage-limiting
policy at this time. We should not go for a full counter-silo
capability, because of the crisis instabilities it could
introduce. We don't want a Dyad. Therefore, we are left
with two strategies: S-2 and S-3.
2. S-2 looks our actual policy today. We can stick with it as a
basic strategy, but pick up some elements of S-3 that look
worthwhile, such as enhanced civil defense planning for crisis
relocation and some modest improvement in peripheral attack
forces to offset the SS-X-20 and Backfire.
3. I like the idea of moving out on a survivable M-X, but I think
we should stay away from a heavy commitment to very large,
very rapid M-X deployments because of their potential impact
on Soviet perceptions and possible contributions to crisis
instability.
General Purpose Forces
1.
Our basic strategy for Europe is sound, but we could improve
our ability for rapid response through improved strategic
mobility.
2.
By improving our strategic mobility for a better response
posture for Europe, we would simultaneously be increasing our
ability to respond worldwide against unforeseen contingencies
and an increasing global challenge.
TOP SECRET /SENSITIVE - XGDS
OFFANO FORD CIBRAAT
3.
In Europe, we could also encourage greater sustainability on
the part of the allies, either through their own efforts or, if
necessary, through US assistance to allies.
4.
With respect to Korea, we should not undertake any reductions
at this time. For the future, we could -- at the right time --
think about reducing (but not phasing out) ground forces from
a division to one forward deployed brigade and selected
artillery units. A modest force in Korea would continue to
show US interest and add greater flexibility should additional
forces be needed.
Overall Strategies
1.
The notional overall strategies identified in the study are only
examples of how strategic and general purpose strategies can
be combined. Other combinations are obviously possible.
2. I think we could point toward an overall strategy which
moderately strengthens our strategic forces posture (crisis
relocation planning, some cruise missiles), and improves
our NATO and worldwide capabilities through improved
strategic mobility.
GERALO FORD LIBRARY
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE - XGDS
NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet
WITHDRAWAL ID 09232
REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL
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TYPE OF MATERIAL
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CREATOR'S NAME
Richard Boverie
RECEIVER'S NAME
President Ford
TITLE
NSC Meeting on NSSM 246 and the Navy
Study, 12/2/76
CREATION DATE
12/01/1976
VOLUME
1 page
COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID
031200038
COLLECTION TITLE
National Security Adviser. National
Security Council Meetings File
BOX NUMBER
2
FOLDER TITLE
NSC Meeting, 12/15/76
DATE WITHDRAWN
02/26/1998
WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST
LET
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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING
ON THE NSSM 246 REPORT ON
U.S. DEFENSE POLICY AND MILITARY POSTURE
AND THE NSC STUDY ON
NAVAL FORCE REQUIREMENTS
Thursday, December 2, 1976
9:00 A.M. (3 hours)
The Cabinet Room
B
From: Brent Scowcroft
I. PURPOSE
To be briefed on and discuss NSC studies on U.S. Defense Policy and
Military Posture (NSSM 246) and Naval Force Requirements.
II. BACKGROUND, PARTICIPANTS, AND PRESS ARRANGEMENTS
A.
Background
1. NSSM 246. In September, you directed through NSSM 246
that the NSC conduct a broad review of U.S. defense policy
and military posture. The study, which was conducted by
the NSC Defense Review Panel, has been completed. It
provides a range of illustrative strategies for both our
strategic and general purpose forces, taking into account
3.3
their military, arms control, and budgetary implications.
07-98.45
3/20/09, NSC 10/21/09
4/25/12
In the area of strategic forces, the study highlights the
following issues as central to U.S. strategy:
-- Deterrence Criteria: What criteria for selecting and
sizing U.S. strategic offensive and defensive forces
will assure achievement of our fundamental objective
of deterring nuclear attack?
E.O.
-- Force Diversity: How much force diversity and redundancy
By
is necessary to provide adequate confidence in performance,
to hedge against unexpected technological breakthroughs
or catastrophic failures, and to complicate any Soviet
first strike designs? The study examines the triad of
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of bombers, ICBMs, and SLBMs and possible
alternatives such as a dyad of bombers and SLBMs only.
Force modernization programs such as the M-X are
related to this analysis.
Countersilo Capability: Do we need to increase our
capability to attack the hardened Soviet ICBM force?
This issue deals with weapons effectiveness and crisis
stability. It relates directly to the future of the M-X
and Trident II programs.
-- Defensive Damage Limitation: What level of emphasis
should be placed on U.S. civil defense programs, air
defense, and ABM R&D?
The study points up the growth in the capability of Soviet
general purpose forces and examines alternate U.S. responses.
Among the key general purpose force issues raised in the
report are:
-- Adequacy of Forward Deployment: What arethe
appropriate levels of forward deployed forces in Europe
and elsewhere?
-- Assumptions on Warning Time: Should U.S. planning
for initial NATO defense, mobilization, and short-term
reinforcement continue to assume approximately three
weeks of warning time?
Sustainability: How long should U.S. NATO forces be
capable of sustaining conflict, and what is the relative
likelihood of a very short (days or weeks) versus a
longer (months or years) war? Central to the sustainability
factor are the issues of Soviet capabilities, U.S. equipment
stocks, and mobilization and preparedness programs.
-- Conflict Outside the NATO Central Region: How much
combat capability should the U.S. maintain for conflict on
the NATO flanks and outside the European theater? We
currently maintain land, air, and naval forces for a range
of possible contingencies outside Central Europe. Decisions
on the future nature and size of these forces have major
implications for the Navy and Marines, and are tied to
special considerations such as Mid-East oil supply
continuity and Korean defense.
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Alternative approaches derived from different responses
to these fundamental issues have been combined to form a
number of illustrative notional strategies -- five for strategic
forces and six for general purpose forces. These in turn
are combined into a number of overall strategy alternatives.
These combinations provide a useful framework for examining
each issue in the context of overall defense policy. Two of
the notional strategies approximate current policy, with
alternatives ranging on either side of these base points.
Tentative and extremely rough cost estimates have been
provides for each strategy.
The study lends itself to a number of possible uses. Each
of the Defense Review Panel principals has an independent
view on the utility of the study and on the individual issues
and alternative strategies presented in the report. There
are differing opinions as to the extent to which the study in
its present form provides an appropriate basis for decisions
affecting our national strategies. As Secretary Rumsfeld
points out in his transmittal memorandum to you, there is a
need for additional analysis to reduce uncertainties associated
with the strategy alternatives, the force requirements and the
cost implications of each.
2. NSC Study on Naval Force Requirements. The NSC study
on U.S. Strategy and Naval Force Requirements was initiated
early in 1976 and conducted by the NSC Defense Review Panel.
Its early development provided the basis for the May supple-
mental budget request to the Congress for additional shipbuilding
funds. Your FY 1977 budget requested $6.3B for 16 ships.
The supplemental added $1.2B for five more ships and long-
lead funding for an additional carrier (CVN-71). Congress
approved $6.2B for 15 ships and the long-lead funds for the
carrier.
As a basis for U.S. force projections, the study has examined
trends in the growth of the Soviet Navy, its capabilities for
conducting naval warfare in areas more distant from the
Soviet Union, and the increasing willingness of the Soviet
leadership to employ naval forces in support of foreign
policy objectives. The basic questions governing U.S. naval
force requirements as set forth in the Navy study are:
FORD
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GERALD
LIBRARY
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Should we accelerate current shipbuilding plans? The
numerical size of the Soviet Navy has stabilized but
newly constructed ships possess increased capabilities.
Should the force mix of ship types stress expensive,
highly capable ships, or should we concentrate on
numbers, building less expensive ships of lower unit
capability? Within this broad question, the study
addresses such issues as carrier vulnerability and
force levels; a program to modernize the existing
carrier force; the nuclear/conventional power mix;
the qualitative mix of other surface combatants;
alternative methods of providing air power to the
fleet; and the impact of future systems such as V/STOL
aircraft and cruise missiles.
-- Should the program stress new construction or should
it emphasize the readiness of existing units while adding
more slowly to the size and strength of the fleet?
Based on the projected threat and alternative responses
to these basic questions, the study outlines major naval force
alternatives. The current FY 78 Defense Plan builds an
average of 22 ships per year for a force of 535 ships by 1990
at an average annual cost of $6. 9B in FY 1977 dollars.
Three other major program options are offered:
-- Option 1 would build no more large-deck carrier
and would use the funds formerly devoted to carrier
construction to build more surface combatants (an
average of 28 ships per year for a force of 586 ships
by 1990 at an average annual cost of $6. 9B in FY 1977
dollars).
-- Option 2 would build one more large-deck carrier,
develop V/STOL aircraft and deploy them aboard a few
smaller aviation ships, and build additional surface
combatants -- stressing numbers over unit capability
(an average of 32 ships per year for a force of 608
ships by 1990 at an average annual cost of $8.0B in
FY 1977 dollars).
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Option 3 would build one more large-deck carrier,
develop V/STOL aircraft and deploy them aboard
more aviation ships, and build a mix of surface
combatants -- stressing unit capability and numbers
of ships (an average of 32 ships per year for a
force of 609 ships by 1990 at an average annual cost
of $8.4B in FY 1977 dollars).
Subsequent to the completion of the study, Defense added
a Low-Mix Option. This option falls between Options 1
and 2 in overall Navy size and costs. It does not build
one more large-deck carrier or any strike cruisers. It
develops V/STOL aircraft and deploys them aboard one
aviation ship, and includes additional surface combatants
of lower unit capability and additional support ships. It
emphasizes numbers of ships (an average of 32 ships
per year for a force of 604 ships by 1990 at an average
cost of $7.5B in FY 1977 dollars).
The study concludes that there is a need to improve our
naval capability and that the current Defense Plan
already includes an ambitious program to raise both the
quality of our ships and overall force levels. The
options presented provide a means to accelerate and
expand the current plan. A choice among the options
centers on the question of whether we should build one
more large-deck carrier and the qualitative mix of
surface combatants necessary to improve the fleet's
anti-air and anti-missile capability.
3.
Relationship between NSSM 246 Strategies and Navy
Study Options.
The NSSM 246 study outlines
alternative defense strategies, and provides notional
force structures, including naval forces, for each. The
Navy study postulates three alternative force structures
designed to implement current U.S. strategy. The
options in the two studies therefore are not strictly
FORD
comparable. However, some general correlation is
possible, and a chart illustrating the general
relationship is at Tab D.
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LIDRARY
B.
Participants:
(List at Tab A)
C.
Press Arrangements:
The meeting, but not the subject,
will be announced. White House photographer only.
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III. TALKING POINTS
(At the opening of the meeting)
1.
The basic purpose of this meeting is to become acquainted
with the results of two major NSC studies, both of which
could provide important contributions to future U.S. defense
policy and military posture. Don, would you brief us first
on the response to NSSM 246?
(Following briefing and discussion of NSSM 246)
2.
We also now have the final version of the Navy study which
we discussed in a preliminary version last spring. Don,
could we have the briefing on that study?
(Upon conclusion of discussion of the Navy study)
3.
These studies clearly represent a major effort to grapple
with the future direction of our military strategy and force
posture. I want to consider them both in greater detail and
will probably want further NSC discussion of NSSM 246.
Attachments
Tab A
-
List of Participants
Tab B
-
U.S. Defense Policy and Military Posture,
Response to NSSM 246, November 30, 1976
Tab C
-
NSC Study on U.S. Strategy and Naval Force
Requirements, November 16, 1976
Tab D
-
Implications of Navy Study Alternatives and
Options for NSSM 246 Strategies
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