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NSC Meeting, 1/13/77
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NSC Meeting, 1/13/77
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National Security Council Meetings Files (Ford Administration)
National Security Council Meetings Files from the Ford Administration
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President (1974-1977 : Ford). Commission on Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) Activities within the United States. 1/4/1975-6/6/1975
Department of Defense. National Security Agency/Central Security Service. 12/23/1971-
President (1974-1977 : Ford). National Security Council. (1974 - 1977)
Executive orders
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1977
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1977-01-18
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1977
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The original documents are located in Box 2, folder: "NSC Meeting, 1/13/1977" of the
National Security Adviser's NSC Meeting File at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library.
Copyright Notice
The copyright law of the United States (Title 17, United States Code) governs the making of
photocopies or other reproductions of copyrighted material. Frank Zarb donated to the United States
of America his copyrights in all of his unpublished writings in National Archives collections.
Works prepared by U.S. Government employees as part of their official duties are in the public
domain. The copyrights to materials written by other individuals or organizations are presumed to
remain with them. If you think any of the information displayed in the PDF is subject to a valid
copyright claim, please contact the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library.
Digitized from Box 2 of the National Security Adviser's NSC Meeting File at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library
MEMORANDUM
INFORMATION
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
6849X
January 18, 1977
MEMORANDUM FOR:
BRENT SCOWCROFT
FR OM:
Jeanne W. Davi
SUBJECT:
Minutes of NSC Meeting,
January 13
Herewith, for your approval, Sam Hoskinson's minutes of the
NSC Meeting on January 13.
ORIGINAL RETIRED FOR PRESERVATION
GERALD LISA FORD $
NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet
WITHDRAWAL ID 09239
REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL
National security restriction
TYPE OF MATERIAL
Minute
CREATOR'S NAME
Samuel Hoskinson
RECEIVER'S NAME
Brent Scowcroft
TITLE
Minutes, NSC Meeting, 1/13/77
CREATION DATE
01/13/1977
VOLUME
8 pages
COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID
031200039
COLLECTION TITLE
National Security Adviser. National
Security Council Meetings File
BOX NUMBER
2
FOLDER TITLE
NSC Meeting, 1/13/77
DATE WITHDRAWN
02/26/1998
WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST
LET
opened with excisms 6/99 let
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506
6849X
not SECPET/SENSITIVE
MINUTES
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING
DATE:
Thursday, January 13, 1977
TIME:
10: 30 a.m. - 11: 30 a.m.
PLACE:
Cabinet Room, The White House
SUBJECT:
Semiannual Review of the Intelligence Community
Principals
The President
The Vice President
Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger
Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld
Director of Central Intelligence George Bush
Chief of Naval Operations James L. Holloway
(Acting for Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff)
Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs Brent Scowcroft
Other Attendees
White House:
Richard Cheney, Assistant to the President
William G. Hyland, Deputy Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
NSC Staff:
Samuel M. Hoskinson, Director for Intelligence Coordination
DOD:
William Clements, Deputy Secretary of Defense
Robert Ellsworth, Deputy Secretary of Defense
Intelligence
Community Staff:
Fritz Ermarth, Office of Performance, Evaluation &
Improvement
is LIBRARY
ORIGINAL RETIRED FOR PRESERVATION
XGDS of E. O. 11652 by authority
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE (XGDS)
of Brent Scowcroft; Exemption
Category Section 5 (B)(2)
DECLASSIFIED E.O. 12958 Sec. 3.64
With PORTIONS EXEMPTED
E.O. 12958 Sec. X (b) (ie)
3.4
MR 98-39, #66; NSC letter 2/10/99
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By let NARA, Date 5/25/99
POP SECRET/SENSITIVE
President Ford:
This is the last meeting of the National Security Council
in this administration unless a crisis develops in the next week. I would, therefore,
like to thank each of you individually and as a group for the assistance and
quality of materials and views you have provided. You have collectively and
individually made the system work the way it should. We are meeting today to
fulfill the requirements of the Executive Order (11905) which provides for semi-
annual reviews of foreign intelligence activities by the NSC. First, I would like
for George (Bush) to give us his views on how the Executive Order has worked
out in practice. Secondly, I would like to discuss the quality of intelligence
production.
Director Bush:
Mr. President, the Executive Order has proved to be a
major contribution to reform by putting the Intelligence Community within the
proper constitutional framework. It has not received the proper credit on the
Hill, but there is some realization of its value and the basic concept will probably
not be thrown out.
On the whole, your intentions have been fulfilled. The Committee on Foreign
Intelligence has not been without its difficulties but generally it has worked well.
First we established our procedures and then we systematized resource planning
and looked for resource trade-offs. As a result the National Foreign Intelligence
Plan budget came out well. We didn't get everything
President Ford:
Including your airplane
Director Bush:
I ride commercial alot! Seriously, the machinery has
worked fairly well. We do, of course, still have some problems like counter-
intelligence and manpower levels.
As for the quality of intelligence production my first observation is that there
are an increasing number of users. An example is the economic intelligence
area and I met recently with the Economic Intelligence Board. Generally, we
do things fairly well on such diverse areas as political, military and economic
developments throughout the world, although there are some exceptions like
China. Sometimes intelligence users find that our production priorities don't
suit their specific needs. Others think we should be more alert to short-run
problems and do more multidisciplinary analysis. NIE's are frequently
criticized for lack of relevancy. Unnecessary security compartmentation is
another major criticism. For example downgrading satellite-derived materials.
The semiannual review causes us to examine ourselves and results in a major
internal audit. We are no longer under fire for violating human rights. There
is
FORD
has not been one allegation of wrongdoing proved under the Executive Order.
CIA is today extremely sensitive to possible misdeeds, but at the same time not
GERALD
defensive. Rights are being safeguarded.
Lovern
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President Ford:
Who will be your successors?
Mr. Hyland:
They are going to do away with our committee structure.
President Ford:
Director Bush:
Secretary Kissinger: George Bush deserves a special commendation. The
Justice Department's role today is a threat to national security. Why it is better
for a foreign government to have its spies in the U.S. caught than free to
operate since if they are prosecuted everything must be made public. Because
of the Attorney General's rules, NSA reports where U.S. citizens conversa-
tions are involved are meaningless to the point of being absurd. You must know
who the U.S. official is by name to get the intercept in the right context. We should
make it a point for the record that the Attorney General's guidelines in this area
be looked at again.
I find no degradation in the quality of intelligence analysis. The opposite is true,
however, in the covert action area. We are unable to do it anymore.
Director Bush:
Henry, you are right. We are both ineffective and scared
in the covert action area.
Secretary Kissinger: Many things are not even proposed these days because
we are afraid to even discuss them much less implement them.
Director Bush:
Secretary Kissinger: We should have done something but I was afraid to even
make a recommendation. It's not the Agency's fault. Our presence is rapidly
eroding in the Caribbean. It's just not risky enough to be an enemy of the
FORD
U.S. these days.
FORD is GERALD LIBRARY
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Secretary Rumsfeld: I agree entirely with all that has been said. The
backside of this problem is that we now have a request from the Justice
Department for information from NSA to use in prosecuting one of their cases.
President Ford:
How have things changed so much today? How did we
prosecute and convict in the past?
Director Bush:
Things have changed a lot at Justice and with the Court
system. For example in the Rosenberg case years ago intelligence information
was not regarded as admissable evidence.
we are being forced to give up sensitive information in order to prosecute.
Secretary Kissinger:
It's
absurd!
Brent Scowcroft:
Judges no longer are willing to do things in camera.
Director Bush:
There are other problems as well. We have gone too
far at this business. My greatest frustration--and I didn't intend to say
this today--has been the Justice Department's prevention of my responsibility
to protect sources and methods.
Secretary Kissinger: We should leave a memorandum for the record on
this problem for guidance in the future.
President Ford:
George, would you summarize the problem in writing
and send it to the NSC? I will pass it on to the new administration.
Director Bush:
Yes I will. I am especially worried about things like
disclosure of the SIGINT relationship
Secretary Rumsfeld: There is poor policy guidance in this area. The problem
is that Justice takes the initiative against you in all these cases, rather than
helping, and you are put on the defensive. You need them to help you but
they work against you. The tension works both ways, butit'sa question of
who has the initiative.
Secretary Kissinger: The Justice Department does not understand that
intelligence problems must be treated in a special category. Why it's an
outrage what they are doing to Helms--now I got that off my chest! It has
always been the case in history where vital interests are involved. Lincoln
suspended certain rights, we have had emergency laws. There are many
examples.
TOND
President Ford:
Nelson what do you think? You had experience with
the Commission.
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Vice President Rockefeller: I had no idea that the situation had become this
serious. Doesn't the NSC have the right and power to order a change?
President Ford:
There is really no experience in the past with this kind
of problem. What accounts for the change in the situation at this time? Is is
the law, the mood in the country?
Vice President Rockefeller: It's the Attorney General himself, basically.
Secretary Clements: The Justice Department treats us like an adversary
rather than a client.
Director Bush:
Yes - we are dealing with an adversary in Justice.
Secretary Kissinger: There are two basic causes. First, there is the Attorney
General himself, his personality. Secondly, the Justice Department bureaucracy
is setting itself up like a Supreme Court to be the ultimate judge of what people do.
They act like a supreme legal body. It won't end when Levi leaves.
Vice President Rockefeller: Can the NSC supersede Justice?
Director Bush:
My problem is more with the institution than with the
Attorney General, although he is a problem also. Their view of the role of
intelligence is different. The Attorney General's departure won't make the
problem go away.
Secretary Kissinger: They believe they have the right to demand total
fulfillment on things like
Classification no longer means
anything or is accepted in law. First you must be able to prove that informa-
tion is really vital to national security and that is frequently not very easy to
do. In the end it means we will not be able to prosecute espionage cases.
Director Bush:
On both this aspect and the leak problem I will send
a recommendation.
President Ford:
What language in the Executive Order creates problems?
Vice President Rockefeller: The NSA name use problem could be changed by
us. Ed Williams got the Solicitor General to admit that he personally didn't agree
to this procedure but had been ordered to impose it.
Secretary Rumsfeld: Bob Ellsworth has had a lot of experience in this area.
Bob, how do you view the problem?
is
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FORDO i SERALD LIBRARY
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Secretary Ellsworth:
When the guidelines were negotiated the Attorney General
attitude was that he was the President's legal advisor and had to protect him
against any charges of tampering with the rights of U.S. citizens. But now the
climate is changing and we must pass on our recommendations to the new team.
Vice President Rockefeller: I think the President has a responsibility to act now.
We already know the orientation of the new administration. Do you think Carter
will do it? We should deal with the problem now.
Secretary Kissinger:
Right!
Secretary Clements:
In the Navy claims problem the Attorney General told me
he was representing the American people and taxpayers. In effect arrogating
the public prosecutor role to himself when he was supposed to be defending the
U.S. Navy's interests.
President Ford:
Bill, you were trying to say something earlier.
Mr. Hyland:
We do have a good damage assessment on the impact of
the Attorney General's guidelines in the electronic surveillance field and that
will be left behind with a good recommendation. Secondly, my observation
is that the Justice Department usually says that it can't win in court without
revealing all the sensitive intelligence involved but in those cases where we
insisted--like the Glomar Explorer and the Moss subpoena--we won.
President Ford:
I would very much like to see the report you mentioned
as soon as possible this afternoon.
Mr. Hyland:
The guidelines of course flow from the Executive Order.
President Ford:
What would the Attorney General say about Henry's examp
General Scowcroft:
He has also prevented us from learning most of what the
Soviets are intercepting of U.S. communications in this country.
President Ford:
I want to read the report right away.
Vice President Rockefeller: If I can I would like to propose an NSC
resolution. It would say that the Attorney General's guidelines issued
under the Executive Order are seriously impinging on national security
and should be modified accordingly.
President Ford:
In deference to the Attorney General, I should look
at the report first. The specific steps can follow.
TOR SECRET/SENSITIVE/XODSE
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President Ford:
I have read the NIE and Team B assessment. George
would you comment for us.
Director Bush:
The competitive analysis idea seemed good at the time
and I certainly did not think it would go public. But now I feel I have been
had. A former general officer has gone public, even before the experiment is
finished. I have to recommend that the approach not be institutionalized.
The Estimate itself presents certain dissents of the Air Force and others whose
views parallel those of Team B.
Basically this was an experiment to see if one viewpoint could stand up factually
and it worked well in some areas like ICBM accuracy. There was no question of
intelligence analysts knuckling under to Team B. The estimators stood their ground.
In short the original concept was valid but failed in practice.
President Ford:
I understand that Allen Dulles made a similar process
work. But now the climate has changed and you get credit for leaks. This
is damned discouraging to me. I endorsed the PFIAB experiment. The leaks
are a disparagement of the quality of those people involved and are unforgivable.
Vice President Rockefeller: The good side is that the American people have
been educated.
Secretary Kissinger: I have no real problems with the estimate. However, I
think an across the board alternatives approach is very risky. I could find
a board of Nobel Prize winners to construct any alternative analysis conceivable.
Unless you construct both the hard and soft lines it can be used by someone for
their own self-benefit. The real problem in the future is not the hardliners.
it'sthe others.
Director Bush:
I am against institutionalizing the alternative analysis
approach. The issue has been caught up in a lot of polemics--some of which
I don't understand--but I recommend that the NSC not institutionalize.
President Ford:
The most discouraging aspect is the character of the
people who leaked. Unforgivable.
Secretary Rumsfeld: Bush's idea of presenting differing views was good
but like Henry says the scope must be more narrow. On some subjects
it is useful to have differing views. The leaks must stop. They inhibit the
whole intelligence process.
President Ford:
In the present atmosphere leakers become martyrs.
There isn't much you can do.
B.
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Secretary Rumsfeld:
The NIE is a good one. The only question I have is
how we tie it to policy judgments or make it a basis for policy rather than
using it as policy. There are some net assessment judgments involved
and they should drive decisions. There should be a very serious live
review of these matters in the future.
General Scowcroft:
We have done a quick comparison with the 1972
estimate and it has turned out to be very accurate.
President Ford:
Are there any other comments?
Vice President Rockefeller: Only to say again that you did a suberb job
last night
Secretary Kissinger:
The average person doesn't understand the turmoil
you faced in the world when you took over. Now we have total tranquillity
in the world and peace!
B.
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