Ask the Scholar
Document scope · 1 page
Scholar
Ask about this object, its catalog metadata, its source description, or the page inventory.
For page-specific OCR and visual context, open one of the page chats.
Scholar Source Context
Document identity
localId
1553550
label
October 1, 1976 - Ford, Kissinger, USSR Foreign Minister Andrey Gromyko
core
doc
dtoType
document
citationUrl
pageCount
1
Source metadata
id
1553550
sourceUrl
contentType
document
title
October 1, 1976 - Ford, Kissinger, USSR Foreign Minister Andrey Gromyko
citationUrl
collections
Memoranda of Conversations (Nixon and Ford Administrations)
Ford Administration Memoranda of Conversations
subjects
Japan
Africa
Soviet Union
Arms control
Middle East conflicts
thumbnailUrl
largeImageUrl
imageCount
1
hasImages
yes
source
import
hasTranscription
no
Source extras
naId
1553550
coverageEndDate
day
1
logicalDate
1976-10-01
month
10
year
1976
coverageStartDate
day
1
logicalDate
1976-10-01
month
10
year
1976
levelOfDescription
fileUnit
recordType
description
ocrSource
nara-archive
Single page context
seq
1
pageIndex
0
type
document
mediaId
cea7bfd7556ec23d
ocrText
File scanned from the National Security Adviser's Memoranda of Conversation Collection at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
SECRET/SENSITIVE
MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION
PARTICIPANTS:
President Ford
Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State
William G. Hyland, Deputy Assistant to the
President for National Security Affairs
Helmut Sonnenfeldt, Counsellor, State Department
Andrey Gromyko, Foreign Minister
G. Kornienko, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
A. Dobrynin, USSR Ambassador to the US
DATE & TIME:
Friday, October 1, 1976, 4:15 p.m.
PLACE:
The Oval Office
President: It's been a year since I've seen you; there have been ups
and downs. The long range objectives established in Vladivostok and at
the Conference in Helsinki I want continued in the future, as long as
I am in office. The road is not smooth, but basically it is where it was
when I took office. SALT has slowed down because of the campaign. I
assure you that after November 2 it can again become serious. We are
trying to be constructive in South Africa, and events should proceed with
a minimum of outside involvement. We have no interest in a permanent
role there.
Over the next four years, we should move ahead on MBFR, also on the
Middle East. Let me repeat what I said to the General Secretary: our
two countries must continue to put relations on a better basis; despite
certain international problems, I believe we can carry it out.
Gromyko: Generally pleased to hear your introductory remarks, the
meaning of which is that you confirm that you follow and intend to
follow the course that has been taken in recent years, and that this is
the basic line of the US and Soviet Union. This is also the basic problem
I wanted to take up. Also SALT and the Middle East.
DECLASSIFIED
SECRET/SENSITIVE
E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5
XGDS (3,1)
NSC MEMO, 11/24/98, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES State Review 3/13/04
Per = Brent Scoweroft
BY has
, NARA DATE 7/30/04
SEGRET/SENSITIVE
2
On both sides there are repeated statements, also by you, in favor
of development of relations between Soviet Union and US on the basis
of peaceful coexistence. Also notably in behalf of party and country by
Leonid Brezhnev. Trust you are familiar with his remarks to the XXV
Congress. Thus you and we have several times confirmed that we intend
to continue on peaceful coexistence line, which is the most reasonable
position. Recall this basic underlying concept embodied in US-Soviet docu-
ments: (1) Principles, (2) the Agreement on the Prevention of Nuclear
War, and (3) Vladivostok understanding; though not yet finalized, its
importance is immence, provided both sides finalize it. All that is well and
good but I would be wrong if I didn't call attention to statements by the
US not fully or at all in accord or even running counter to the line in
these documents. I won't list who said what, where and on what occasion.
Every day people have hammered into their minds we are arming without
let up and that the US should increase its arms, as if the US were
prodded by the Soviet Union. We categorically reject this. An unbiased
observer knows that the facts are opposite. Second, the Soviet Union
allegedly is acting contrary to the line, bringing influence to bear on
countries in remote areas to further unilateral interests and trying to
give detente a one-sided interpretation. Not just officials but others.
But the state of affairs is not discussed, and no rebuff is given to these
statements. So we ask ourselves where is the essence of US policy?
The President, when he speaks in public on various occasions, or to
us at high-level meetings, or at a different place. We make no statements
running counter to our agreed line. Just a few days ago I made a statement
at the UN.
The other specific example relates to the MIG 25 which accidentally came
down on Japanese territory. We were taken aback by the US line (so
also by the Japanese line). As soon as that happened, a statement on
Belenko by the White House: "If he wants asylum we'll grant it. A very
hostile act. The plane is still not given back. US and Japan took the
plane apart as if they owned it, like spoils of war. We can't qualify this
as anything but hostile. In 1970, during the Vietnam war, a US transport
carrying large group came down on Soviet territory. We at once let
them go. So there was another plane with two US generals in South
Caucasus and we let them go. That is the practice of civilized countries.
But that line didn't suit the US and Japan. We are entitled to believe that
the US would give Japanese friendly advice how to act, but no press
stories, Belenko acted voluntarily. We don't believe a word of it. Force
was used. Confirmed by doctors. Don't know what your military will do,
but incident has injected great doubt into relations, especially as far as
confidence is concerned. We now understand situation better than before:
there is great difference in word and deed of US. General Secretary
Brezhnev told us to tell you he is very bitter and indignant. How could
you do it. How could you meet and look each other in the eye, and raise
glasses and drink to friendship. Brezhnev says he just can't conceive of
the whole thing. Has caused great indignation in the whole country.
SECRET/SENSITIVE
3
President: Some preliminary comments: 1) What I said at the outset
is policy. What I have said publicly is that the relationship has ups and
downs. Basic relationships must continue for peace.
But the President has a responsibility to maintain our security, as you do.
Our efforts will fall within limits of Vladivostok agreement. We will
maintain forces sufficient for security. Not incompatible with SALT
agreement.
3) We have important differences over actions in far-off lands. We told
you your actions in Angola were not helpful and hope it won't happen again.
4) On Belenko: We have traditional asylum policy. All the information
we have shows he did it voluntarily. You were granted an interview with
your officials. Your remarks about the transport and the two generals
are quite different cases. They wanted to come back; Belenko wanted
asylum. So, they are not comparable. General Secretary has to
recognize there is a difference. If Lt. Belenko wants to go back, we'll
accommodate his wishes. But he doesn't. But that sort of incident is
no reason to cut relations. We did not precipitate the incident. This
incident should not interfere with our broad relationship.
Gromyko: Time will pass and you will realize you've been misled,
and you'll see the true circumstances concerning the plane and the
desires of the pilot. Other occasions other people found themselves
abroad and were asked to go back to tell the story of how they were
treated. If we had used other means on American planes, some of them
would have stayed in the Soviet Union.
Now on South Africa, there are no lack of statements that the Soviets
are trying to interfere. Not a single soldier has ever been there. But
US persons traveling there to advance US interests. We can't approve.
Our attitude on racialism well-known since 1917. That's one view of what
justice is all about, should be in the hands of majority people. Racism is
not in anyone's interest. I took part in UN Charter drafting. Many
clauses due to the collapse of the colonial system due to US-Soviet
cooperation after war, and that went into the UN Charter. Now you
assert we are taking bad position. We have no desire to interfere. No
one should say we are white and you are black, therefore we know better
what's good for you. My own speech in UN consistent with this.
We are endeavoring to display tact and delicacy in your election campaign.
We favor development of relations and line that has taken shape.
SECRET/SENSITIVE
4
President: I appreciate that. US has never believed in colonialism.
We gave freedom to the Philippines. And that is the best evidence we
don't believe in it. We have no racism in the US and don't believe in it
on a world-wide basis. So what we are doing in Africa is not in behalf
of colonial ambitions. We want Africans to solve African problems and
areglad to discuss it.
Gromyko: Can we take up SALT.
President: Sure.
Gromyko: We believe as before that this problem is of exceptional
importance. We will finally abide by Vladivostok understanding. Both
sides should make all effort to translate understanding into a new
agreement. Should be in strict conformity with Vladivostok principles.
Two basic differences stand in the way of a new agreement: (1) Cruise
missiles. We set out our position in detail to Dr. Kissinger when he
was last in Moscow. On that occasion the US side set one position. At
that time we thought there was a basis for agreement. Dr. Kissinger
said it would take more time to think it over; still no reply has been
received. (2) Backfire: the position of the US side on this bomber is
still being talked about, but we have on more than one occasion set
forth that the Backfire is not a strategic bomber; doesn't have
attributes and we gave you arguments and reasons. Those were
given to Dr. Kissinger by the General-Secretary. We can't take any
other positions. It cannot be a strategic bomber and can't be so regarded.
General Secretary said not only is it not a strategic bomber, not will
we make it one. This has been said at a responsible level, so you can see
how embarrassing it would be if it were discovered to do SO. It can't be
hidden.
Our cruise missile position is the same as when Dr. Kissinger was in
Moscow.
Don 't think we should prohibit only ballistic missiles above certain level
but not prohibit cruise missiles. At one point US told us all to resolve
the MIRV question for confidence: what missiles shall be counted as
MIRV. We agreed if missile tested once with MIRV, all missiles of that
type would be counted. Not easy for us, a major concession. But
stressed it was only valid if cruise missile and Backfire also settled
as organic whole. In February we got your proposal to leave suspended
cruise missile/Backfire while talks go on.
President: In February.
SEGRET/SENSITIVE
5
Gromyko: This was tantamount to saying what is acceptable to the US
should be solved but what is not acceptable should be only talked about.
This is not good. We don't want an agreement to be unclear and things
left unclear. We want a new SALT agreement and assume so does the
US. We urge you to take another look; perhaps the advice some of
your agencies give you is not in the broader interest of the US. Don't
know if it can be done before or after the election. But we are prepared
to go ahead. If not, we will regret it deeply; if it is bogged down and
fails it would damage the interests of both countries and peace.
President: I wanted it a year ago. Dr. Kissinger went in January and
thought there was a narrowing of differences. In February I wrote General
Secretary Brezhnev to suggest a settlement of cruise missile and Backfire
by 1979. You rejected it in March. Hoped if you disagreed you'd make
a new proposal, but you didn't. After November it will be possible to
sit down; if you have a proposal, we'll listen. If the interim idea is no
good, then we should talk. Henry?
Kissinger: Thought maybe we should reflect on what has been said.
In a letter we could let them know about a reasonable timetable in a
week or SO. As I had understood, the General Secretary is prepared
to reduce 2400 to 2300 or below.
Gromyko: This is not excluded.
Kissinger: As I understand it, the Soviets reject deferral. So you,
Mr. President, have not yet considered with your advisers how to proceed.
Dobrynin: You gave us a reply.
President: But yours was a rejection.
Gromyko: Think it over. If there is any possibility alone the lines
spoken of by Kissinger, it would be attractive. Something in that area
might get us out of dilemma. The Middle East?
Gromyko: Points of settlement are: 1) Return of occupied territory.
2) Solution of Palestine problem. But from the outset, to place matter
on realistic basis, those two should be supplemented by two others
(in terms of principles). First, recognition by Arabs and all states of
rights of Israel and others to independent existence. Second, end to
state of war in Middle East.
SECRET/SENSITIVE
SECRET/SENSITIVE
6
President: UN resolutions 338 and 242 offer a basis. Problem is to
get over hump on PLO. If some mechanism can be found maybe all
four points can be settled at same time.
Gromyko: We feel these four major items for Geneva agenda have been
recognized by all parties. True not each party gives some importance
to each time. But they all recognize items. So why not reconvene
Geneva and place them on the agenda. We gave Dr. Kissinger our
proposal and also to other parties. Want them to think it over. We
don't think accept some other separate conference and start into a new
jungle.
Re Palestinians -- it is interwoven with all other questions in the Middle
East. On adopting agenda without Palestinians, they'd have to be
consulted. Then commissions. But can't have full conference without
Palestinians. Question of war and peace is more important than
procedure. But the agenda can be adopted in one meeting. One single
Geneva conference. No preliminary separate conference. No one can
believe these four points solely in Soviet interest. Involve all the
parties. So why not try. Find common language and cooperate or have
contact. If Palestinians agree, there could be opening meeting to
approve agenda, without Palestinians. Only one meeting. But there
would be understanding that as soon as agenda is approved, the
Palestinians come in. If that takes time, then it is OK, but no separate
conference.
President: Suggestion merits careful consideration. I'll sit down with
Henry and we'll be in touch.
President: We'll contact Palestinians and let you know.
SECRET/SENSITIVE