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People's Republic of China (17)
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Presidential Country Files for East Asia and the Pacific (Ford Administration)
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Presidential campaign, 1976
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The original documents are located in Box 14, folder "People's Republic of China (17)" of
the Presidential Country Files for East Asia and the Pacific at the Gerald R. Ford
Presidential Library.
Copyright Notice
The copyright law of the United States (Title 17, United States Code) governs the making of
photocopies or other reproductions of copyrighted material. The Council donated to the United
States of America his copyrights in all of his unpublished writings in National Archives collections.
Works prepared by U.S. Government employees as part of their official duties are in the public
domain. The copyrights to materials written by other individuals or organizations are presumed to
remain with them. If you think any of the information displayed in the PDF is subject to a valid
copyright claim, please contact the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library.
5532
Ron
la
MEMORANDUM
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
SECRET /SENSITIVE
ACTION
Oct ober 2, 1976
MEMORANDUM FOR: BRENT SCOWCROFT
BD
FROM:
WILLIAM GLEYSTEEN of
SUBJECT:
Current State of Play in China, Foreign
Policy Implications
The President may be interested in our latest assessment of the China
picture before he leaves for California.
We might have made it more exciting by engaging in speculation about
the outcome of the present power struggle, but frankly, we think the
evidence is too thin to warrant that.
RECOMMENDATION:
That you sign the memorandum to the President at Tab A.
DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5
GERALO R. FORD LIBRARY
NSC MEMO, 11/24/98, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES
BY
HR NARA, DATE 5/11/01
Digitized from Box 14 of Presidential Country Files for East Asia and the Pacific at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library
if
MEMORANDUM
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
SEGRET/SENSITIVE
INFORMATION
MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT
FROM:
BRENT SCOWCROFT
SUBJECT:
Leadership Struggle in China, Impact on
Foreign Policy
Summary
There is no sign that the ruling Party Politburo or its elite Standing
Committee has moved away from the careful balance of political forces
or from the public themes of unity and continuity of policy which have
been the centerpieces of PRC pronouncements for the last month.
Nonetheless, a number of signs point to contention within the succession
leadership over policy and power as well as to confusion and speculation
among lower level officials and the populace at large. Most Chinese seem
to feel the "moderates" will dominate in the end with crucial assistance
from the military.
There are reports of some breakdown in social order in a number of areas
but nothing which would suggest that serious turmoil is about to erupt.
Although the strident line on forceful liberation of Taiwan has receded into
the background, increased Chinese concern about U.S. post-election
attitudes towards normalization of relations, and particularly about our
ties with Taiwan, are reflected in private conversations and some media
commentary. Overall, however, Peking is still sending out clear signals
that China is committed to continuing improvement of relations with the
United States and hostility towards the Soviet Union.
Unity and Continuity on the Surface, Struggle Underneath
As expected, the succession leadership in China has maintained a very
careful balance of "moderate" (i.e., pragmatic) and "radical" (i.e.,
ideologue) forces, with neither side yet able to overpower the other.
SECRET/SENSITIVE
DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5 State Dept Review
NSC MEMO, 11/24/98, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES
SW 9/26/02
BY
HR $ NARA, DATE 2/3/03
SECRET/SENSITIVE
2
Considerable effort has been devoted to giving a public impression that
the essentially irreconcilable factions are working in an atmosphere of
unity. At the same time, domestic and foreign audiences alike are being
reassured about continuity of policy in the post-Mao period.
Nonetheless, there is growing evidence that behind this facade, the
power struggle of the last year is continuing. This is seen both in
negative signs such as the absence of any but the blandest statements
emanating from the center and in positive ways such as continued sharply
divergent positions taken by known mouthpieces of the different factions.
Provincial leaders throughout China, lacking firm guidance from Peking,
have also emphasized ideology or practicality as suits their individual
taste. In the absence of an overwhelming authority like Mao to keep the
struggle within bounds, we expect that it will intensify over the coming
months.
Uncertainty Among the People
We have numerous reports, apparently reflecting the same scantiness of
information available to outsiders, of restiveness among the people and
speculation by peasants and officials alike about the probable shape of
the future leadership and the nature of its policies. Many people seem
to think there will be an extended period of struggle, but that in the end
the "moderates" will win out. They attribute this to the relatively small
number of "radicals" (i. e., ideologues) and to the fact that the military
will play a decisive role on the side of conservatism. As for Mao's suc-
cessor, most Chinese seem to agree there will either be some sort of
gimmickry (e. g., leave the Chairman's post vacant and work the power
relationships around it) or that the Chairmanship will go to a person who
is to be given significantly less power. This mood of uncertainty may
well explain why the authorities have felt constrained to issue warnings
about spreading rumors and have taken stern measures against those
who engage in "anti-social" activity.
Foreign Policy
We would anticipate that, as there may be adjustments in domestic policy,
there may also be some shifting in China's international priorities. But,
the indicators emerging from Peking at the moment are almost unanimous
in pointing to continuity in foreign policy in general and specifically as
regards hostility towards the Soviet Union and a desire to complete the
normalization process and improve relations with the United States.
SEGRET/SENSITIVE
TAILISNIS/S
3
The Chinese haughtily rejected Soviet Party condolences on Mao's death
and have responded to the relative stand-down in Soviet anti-Chinese
polemics with a virtual tirade of anti-Soviet articles and reiteration of
pledges to resist Soviet revisionism. Only three days after Gromyko's
UN speech holding out the prospect of normalization of Sino-Soviet rela-
tions, Peking's National Day editorial called for "struggle against modern
revisionism with the Soviet revisionist renegade clique at the core. 11
This hard-line posture may reflect some firm decision by the successors.
More likely, however, it has been adopted to set the issue aside and also
avoid any vulnerability to charges of being soft on Soviet communism.
That the hard line is not immutable has already been suggested in two
intelligence reports on views of senior Chinese diplomats, one of whom
related future PRC policy towards the USSR to the fate of the US-PRC
normalization process.
There is continuing emphasis on carrying out Chairman Mao's "revolu-
tionary line in foreign affairs" which has been a code phrase to encompass
the opening with the United States. Premier Hua Kuo-feng reiterated to
Schlesinger that the US-PRC relationship had the imprimatur of the ulti-
mate authority, emphasizing it was Mao's personal decision to improve
relations with the United States. Despite the continuation of Peking's
barely disguised vendetta against Secretary Kissinger because of his
identification with improved US-Soviet relations, the overall thrust of
Chinese policy towards the United States is reflected in the favorable
treatment accorded your condolence messages and statement. The Chinese
cited in full your references to Mao's role in initiating the normalization
process and your commitment to complete it.
While not necessarily influenced by Mao's death, the hard line on forceful
liberation of Taiwan which surfaced around the time of Senator Scott's
trip to China in July has not been repeated recently. But the basic posi-
tion that liberation of Taiwan is an internal matter of no concern to us is
unchanged, and distress over a perceived American drift towards a two-
Chinas or one China-two governments position continues to be expressed
with some frequency. A senior PRC diplomat in New York spoke of this
recently, citing your use of the term "Mainland China" as evidence.
Others, as you know, have referred to the Republican platform and to
Governor Carter's statements as signs that no matter who wins in November
normalization is in trouble. Peking's concern even has gone to the point
that the Chinese Ambassador in Tokyo, apparently acting under instructions,
asked Japanese Foreign Minister Kosaka to sound out the U.S. on our inten-
tions towards normalization, particularly about the timing.
4
While there has thus been some softening of the tone of Peking's com-
ments about Taiwan in the last month, there is every indication that
the Chinese see the post-election period as a critical juncture in U.S. -
PRC relations and are more than a little concerned about the prospects.
SEGRET/SENSITIVE
IC
NATIONAL SECI TY COUNCIL
Saturday, Oct 2
No log number assigned -- Secretariat
closed (pm).
Mary Ann
Bypassed Sat pm Orig
1
al cy. Log # obtained
Monday am.
wt
FORD & LIBRARY GERALD
Id
DOC
RECD
LOG NUMBER
MO
DA
MO
DA
HR
INITIAL ACTION o
NSC CORRESPONDENCE PROFILE
10
2
10
4
10
7605532
TO: PRES
FROM: SECSTATE
S/S
UNCLAS LOG OUT
X
SCOWCROFT
SECDEF
LOU
NO FORN
NODIS
HYLAND
DCI
X REF
EYES ONLY
SOURCE/CLASS/DESCRIPTION
Gueystan
C
EXDIS
DAVIS
STATE EXSEC
$
CODEWORD
OTHER
TS
SENSITIVE
SUBJECT
Current STate of Play in Clina STatus Report u
form Policy implication
INTERNAL ROUTING AND DISTRIBUTION
REC
ACTION REQUIRED
ACTION
CONCUR-
COOR-
INFO
CY
RENCE
DINATE
ADV CYS S'CROFT / WGH
FOR
MEMO FOR SCOWCROFT
STAFF SECRETARY
MEMO FOR PRES
CONGRESSIONAL
REPLY FOR
ECONOMIC
DISTRIBUTION/INITIAL ACTION ASGMT
APPROPRIATE ACTION
EUR/ CANADA/ OCEANS
$
MEMO
TO
FAR EAST/ PRC
RECOMMENDATIONS
INTELLIGENCE
JOINT MEMO
LATIN AMERICA
REFER TO
FOR:
MID EAST/ NO. AFRICA
ANY ACTION NECESSARY?
NSC PLANNING
CONCURRENCE
PROGRAM ANALYSIS
DUE DATE:
SCIENTIFIC
COMMENTS: (INCLUDING SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS
SUB-SAH/ AFRICA/ UN
DATE
FROM
TO
STATUS
SUBSEQUENT ACTION REQUIRED (OR TAKENI:
DUE
CY TO
10/2
Scowert
X
Pas for info
10/5
10/10
NSCS
C
SUBSEQUENT ROUTING/ACTIONS
Discound w/Pres per Script
FORD R. GERALD LIBRARY
DISPATCH
NOTIFY
MICROFILM & FILE ROMTS
NSC/S DISP INSTR
M/ F'D
BY
SPECIAL DISPOSITION:
OCT1
1976
CRT
NS
DY
SPECIAL INDEXING:
OPEN
WH SA PP
X
CLOSE
cr
MA
SUSPENSE CY ATTACHED
NSC 76-21
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE - 599-022 - 1976
599-022
)
2a
7605351
-BPA
THE WHITE HOUSE
St
WASHINGTON
to
October 9, 1976
Strib
MEMORANDUM FOR:
BRENT SCOWCROFT
FROM:
MAX FRIEDERSDORF
M.
6.
SUBJECT:
China Trip
All of the Curtis group have been contacted and accepted the
President's invitation to visit the People's Republic of
China starting November 8, 1976.
The delegation in Protocol order, which the Chinese have
requested, include the following:
1. Senator and Mrs. Carl Curtis (R-Neb)
(delegation chairman)
2. Senator and Mrs. Birch Bayh (D-Ind)
(delegation deputy chairman)
3. Senator and Mrs. Howard Baker (R-Tenn)
4. Senator and Mrs. Ernest Hollings (D-South Car)
5. Senator and Mrs. Ted Stevens (R-Alaska)
6. Senator and Mrs. Bennett Johnston (D-La)
STAFF
Mr. and Mrs. Robert Wolthuis (White House)
State Dept. or NSC Escort Officer
CC: Jack Marsh
Bob Wolthuis
FORD & GERALD LIBRARY
2b
MEMORANDUM
5351
we
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
SECRET
ACTION
September 24, 1976
MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT
FROM:
WILLIAM H. GLEYSTEEN
SUBJECT:
Congressional Travel to the PRC
We have received word from the PRC Liaison Office (PRCLO) that the
CODEL Curtis trip is on for November, with specific dates to be deter-
mined by mutual agreement. We have proposed that the delegation plan
to arrive in Shanghai November 8 for a two-week stay, exiting from
Canton by rail to Hong Kong. PRCLO will be in touch when Peking has
responded to these suggestions.
Given the likelihood of a busy Congressional travel schedule after the
election, I suggest that Bud McFarlane make tentative arrangements for
a plane. He could be in touch with either my office (Romberg) or Cathie
DeSibour regarding further details.
You will recall that we deferred decision on Max Friedersdorf's desire
to arrange a House delegation to the PRC until after we had firmed up
the CODEL Curtis trip. I remain opposed to asking the Chinese to accept
another delegation for a number of reasons.
First, the Chinese will presumably turn it down. But even if they did
not, the approach would reinforce the impression that we are always
beseeching the PRC for favors (leaving them with the feeling that we owe
them debts for fulfilling our requests) and it would add to the growing
asymmetry in the relationship. All of this increasingly complicates our
efforts to negotiate with them on issues across the board.
Moreover, I believe at the present stage in our relationship it would be
inappropriate to make this kind of approach.
Cathie DeSibour concurs in recommending against approaching the Chinese
at this time on a House delegation but cautions that there will be continuing
Congressional pressures for such a trip. State also concurs in recom-
mending against an approach.
SECRET
DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5
FORD is LIBRARY GERALD
NSC MEMO, 11/24/98, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES
BY HR NAMA, 5/11/01
SECRET
2
RECOMMENDATION:
That you inform Friedersdorf it would be inappropriate for foreign policy
reasons to raise another Congressional trip with the Chinese at this time.
APPROVE
DISAPPROVE
B
SECRET
GENALD
2c
DOC
RECD'
LOG NUMBER
MO
DA
MO
DA
HR
INITIAL ACTION o
NSC CORRESPONDENCE PROFILE
9
24
9
25
09
7605351
TO: PRES
FROM: SECSTATE
S/S
UNCLAS LOG IN/OUT
SCOWCROFT x
SECDEF
LOU
NO FORN
NODIS
HYLAND
DCI
GLaySTeeN
K REF
c
EYES ONLY
EXDIS
$
SOURCE/CLASS/DESCRIPTION
DAVIS
STATE EXSEC
CODEWORD
OTHER
TS
SENSITIVE
SUBJECT
Congressoral Travel to PRC in Nov 1976
INTERNAL ROUTING AND DISTRIBUTION
REC
ACTION REQUIRED
ACTION
CONCUR-
COOR-
INFO
CY
RENCE
DINATE
FOR
ADV CYS S'CROFT/ WGH
MEMO FOR SCOWCROFT
STAFF SECRETARY
MEMO FOR PRES
CONGRESSIONAL
)
REPLY FOR
ECONOMIC
DISTRIBUTION/INITIAL ACTION ASGMT
APPROPRIATE ACTION
EUR/ CANADA/ OCEANS
MEMO
TO
FAR EAST PRC
RECOMMENDATIONS
INTELLIGENCE
JOINT MEMO
LATIN AMERICA
REFER TO
FOR:
MID EAST/ NO. AFRICA
ANY ACTION NECESSARY?
NSC PLANNING
CONCURRENCE
PROGRAM ANALYSIS
DUE DATE:
SCIENTIFIC
COMMENTS: (INCLUDING SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS)
SUB-SAH/ AFRICA/ UN
DATE
FROM
TO
STATUS
SUBSEQUENT ACTION REQUIRED (OR TAKENI:
DUE
CY TO
9/24
Sowargt
X
Decision
9/25
IONS
10/11
NSSK
X
Scrott aced
DATE
FROM
TO
STATUS
SUBSEQUENT ACTION REQUIRED (OR TAKEN):
DUE
10/12
Ril Fuidersda/Mem
DeSibours CY TO
dlt 100 9
SUBSEQUENT ROUTING/ACTIONS
10/12
Magreen
S
Apriguate Ation
10/19
10/13/76
AR
NSC/Sec
C
Close out
Approval of Typ Juliper
MICROFILM & FILE ROMTS
DISPATCH
NOTIFY
NSC/S DISP INSTR
FORD LIBRARY 07V839
00715 1976 BY
SPECIAL DISPOSITION:
&
CRT OPEN CLOSE ID: KT
NS
DY
SPECIAL INDESING:
WH SA PP
PA
SUSPENSE CY ATTACHED
NSC 76-21
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE - 599-022 1976
599-022
3a
NATIONAL SECURIT COUNCIL
Bul
-
Dole wants This
today.
LJ
This than abamb is he most can R.
BERALD FORD LIGRARY
5Km
Cather
36 JP
Devibour
MEMORANDUM
5742
THE
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
CONFIDENTIAL
ACTION
October 14, 1976
MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT
FROM:
WILLIAM H. GLEYSTEEN of
SUBJECT:
Senator Dole's Request for Update on China
Senator Robert Dole requested that the State Department prepare a
brief update of developments in China and their relevance to U.S. -
PRC relations. Because of concern both over Hatch Act provisions
and charges which have been levelled recently that the President has
improperly used the resources of the Executive Branch to bolster his
campaign, State referred the request to the White House.
We have prepared the attached briefing paper (Tab A) which gives the
current state of play in Peking, comments on possible implications
for foreign policy - including towards the United States, and mentions
the problem which public statements on U.S. China-policy have created
over the last several months.
The paper is written so you could volunteer it to both Senators Dole
and Mondale. In the case of Dole, I also recommend providing a copy
of the Qd A we prepared for the President on this subject this
morning (Tab B).
RECOMMENDATION:
!
That you pass the paper at Tab A to Senators Dole and Mondale, and
the Q & A at Tab B to Senator Dole.
GERALD R. FORD LIBRA
CONFIDENTIAL
DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5
NSC MEMO, 11/24/08, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES
BY
HR NADA DATE 5/11/01
3c
CONFIDENTIAL
Recent Developments in China and Their Impact on U.S. - PRC Relations
Introduction and Summary
Premier (and First Vice Chairman of the Party) Hua Kuo-feng has
been selected to replace Mao Tse-tung as Chairman of the ruling
Chinese Communist Party Central Committee. There is also strong
evidence that the four leading "leftists" in the Chinese hierarcy, in-
cluding Mao's widow, have been removed from power and are probably
under arrest.
Premier Hua and other Chinese leaders have stressed continuity of
foreign policy including the opening with the U.S. and hostility towards
the Soviet Union.
The harder line on Taiwan which emerged this summer, i.e. stress on
forceful "liberation" and some impatience with the pace of U.S. dis-
engagement from Taiwan, has receded. But the emergence of that line,
which was largely a reaction to media and other public statements in
the United States, was a forceful reminder of Peking's hypersensitivity
to U.S. public statements on Taiwan.
Developments in China
Current developments in Peking reflect a leadership struggle in the
wake of Mao's death. Although critically important events have already
occurred, the struggle may be far from over. The Party Central
Committee is currently meeting to formalize the appointment of
Premier (and Party First Vice Chairman) Hua Kuo-feng as Chairman,
replacing Mao Tse-tung. The Chinese people are being told that Hua's
selection to that post, and also to the Chairmanship of the Party's
Military Affairs Commission, is in accordance with Mao's expressed
wish.
Evidence suggests that prior to his nomination, unexplained events led
Hua and other centrist and "moderate" forces, with backing of the
Chinese military establishment, to move against the four leading
"leftists" in the Chinese hierarcy, including Mao's widow.
FORD
CONFIDENTIAL
DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12058, SEC.3.5
N80 MEMO, 11/24/08, STATE DEPT. QUIDELINES
HR
5/11/01
CONFIDENTIAL
2
Foreign Policy Implications
Ever since Mao's death, Premier Hua and other PRC officials have
stressed the continuity of PRC foreign policy. In various ways they
have indicated that this means a continuing desire to move towards
normalization of relations with the United States and unabating hostility
towards the Soviet Union.
Looking beyond the immediate future and despite the harshness of
Chinese polemics against Moscow, it would only be logical to expect
some reduction of tension and improvement in state-to~state relations
over time.
As far as the U.S. is concerned, the basic strategic interests which led
to the opening in 1971/72 remain valid, and it is therefore not sur-
prising that improved U.S. - -PRC relations have been endorsed. So
far as completion of the normalization process is concerned, the
implications of recent developmentsiin Peking are less clear.
The current leadership seems to have backed away from the mid-
summer stress on forceful "liberation" of Taiwan and impatience with
the pace of U.S. disengagement from the island. Indications are they
may revert to the 1971-73 line of "patience" with U.S. efforts to dis-
engage and of the preferability of peaceful "liberation" of the island,
even though Peking thinks force will eventually be necessary. But there
is no reason to believe that the basic Chinese position on Taiwan has
changed, i.e. that it is an internal matter to be dealt with when and
how they please, without interference from outsiders.
The stronger Taiwan line of last summer seems clearly to have been
designed at least in part to counter growing expressions of sentiment
in the United States that we should only move ahead with Peking if
it is not at the expense of the security and de facto autonomy of the
people on Taiwan -- e.g. as reflected in both Party platforms.
R.
FORD
GERALD
CONFIDENTIAL
10-14-76
Q'stA's
3d
TAB
Q: Apparently the Chinese have selected Hua Kuo-feng as new Chairman
of the Communist Party and have arrested all of the leading leftists.
How do you see these developments affecting U.S. - .PRC relations?
A:
As you know, there have been no official announcements on any
of these matters. But indications are that Premier Hua has been
elevated to the Chairmanship of the Party and that the other events
to which you refer may have taken place.
Premier Hua and other Chinese officials have stressed continuity
of their foreign policy, and I have seen nothing to indicate otherwise.
That does not mean that any problems which existed between us formerly
have been eliminated. But I believe it means that, just as we are
committed to continue toward normalization, the Chinese, too, intend
to follow the course of improved relations set out in the Shanghai
Communique.
FORD & LIBRARY WERALD
3e
CONFIDENTIAL
Recent Developments in China and Their Impact on U.S.-PRC Relations
Introduction and Summary
Premier (and First Vice Chairman of the Party) Hua Kuo-feng has
been selected to replace Mao Tse-tung as Chairman of the ruling
Chinese Communist Party Central Committee. There is also strong
evidence that the four leading "leftists" in the Chinese hierarcy, in@
cluding Mao's widow, have been removed from power and are probably
under arrest.
Premier Hua and other Chinese leaders have stressed continuity of
foreign policy including the opening with the U.S. and hostility towards
the Soviet Union.
The harder line on Taiwan which emerged this summer, i.e. stress on
forceful "liberation" and some impatience with the pace of U.S. dis-
engagement from Taiwan, has receded. But the emergence of that line,
which was largely a reaction to media and other public statements in
the United States, was a forceful reminder of Peking's hypersensitivity
to U.S. public statements on Taiwan.
Developments in China
Current developments in Peking reflect a leadership struggle in the
wake of Mao's death. Although critically important events have already
occurred, the struggle may be far from over. The Party Central
Committee is currently meeting to formalize the appointment of
Premier (and Party First Vice Chairman) Hua Kuo-feng as Chairman,
replacing Mao Tse-tung. The Chinese people are being told that Nua's
selection to that post, and also to the Chairmanship of the Party's
Military Affairs Commission, is in accordance with Mao's expressed
wish.
Evidence suggests that prior to his nomination, unexplained events led
Hua and other centrist and "moderate" forces, with backing of the
Chinese military establishment, to move against the four leading
"leftists" in the Chinese hierarcy, including Mao's widow.
CONFIDENTIAL
DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12950, SEC.3.5
FORD & LIBRARY
92-51-01/18
NSC MEMO, 11/24/98, STATE GUIDELINES
Retyped per Gen. Scowcroft
HR NAHA, DATE 5/11/01
CONFIDENTIAL
2
Foreign Policy Implications
Ever since Mao's death, Premier Hua and other PRC officials have
stressed the continuity of PRC foreign policy. In various ways they
have indicated that this means a continuing desire to move towards
normalisation of relations with the United States and unabating hostility
towards the Soviet Union.
Looking beyond the immediate future and despite the harshness of
Chinese polemics against Moscow, it would only be logical to expect
some reduction of tension and improvement in state-to-state relations
over time.
As far as the U.S. is concerned, the basic strategic interests which led
to the opening in 1971/72 remain valid, and it is therefore not sur-
prising that improved U.S. -PRC relations have been endorsed. So
far as completion of the normalization process is concerned, the
implications of recent developmentsism Peking are less clear.
The current leadership seems to have backed away from the mid-
summer stress on forceful "liberation" of Taiwan and impatience with
the pace of U.S. disengagement from the island. Indications are they
may revert to the 1971-73 line of "patience" with U.S. efforts to dis-
engage and of the preferability of peaceful "liberation" of the island,
even though Peking thinks force will eventually be necessary. But there
is no reason to believe that the basic Chinese position on Thiwan has
changed, i.e. that it is an internal matter to be dealt with when and
how they please, without interference from outsiders.
The stronger Taiwan line of last summer seems clearly to have been
designed at least in part to counter growing expressions of sentiment
in the United States that we should only move ahead with Peking if
it is not at the expense of the security and de facto autonomy of the
people on Taiwan -- e.g. as reflected in both Party platforms.
FORD & LIBRARY
CONFIDENTIAL
3f
CONFIDENTIAL
Recent Developments in China and Their Impact on U.S. PRC Relations
Introduction and Summary
Although no formal announcements have yet been made, it is clear that
Premier (and First Vice Chairman of the Party) Hua Kuo-feng has been
selected to replace Mao Tse-tung as Chairman of the ruling Chinese
Communist Party Central Committee. There is also strong evidence
that the four leading "leftists" in the Chinese hierarchy, including Mao's
widow, have been removed from power and are probably under arrest.
Premier Hua and other Chinese leaders have stressed continuity of
foreign policy including the opening with the U.S. and hostility towards
the Soviet Union.
The harder line on Taiwan which emerged this summer, i.e. stress on
forceful "liberation" and some impatience with the pace of U.S. dis-
engagement from Taiwan, has receded. But the emergence of that line,
which was largely a reaction to media and other public statements in the
United States, was a forceful reminder of Peking's hypersensitivity to
U.S. public statements on Taiwan.
Developments in China
Current developments in Peking reflect a leadership struggle in the
wake of Mao's death. Although critically important events have already
occurred, the struggle may be far from over. The Party Central Com-
mittee is currently meeting to formalize the appointment of Premier
(and Party First Vice Chairman) Hua Kuo-feng as Chairman, replacing
Mao Tse-tung. The Chinese people are being told that Hua's selection
to that post, and also to the Chairmanship of the Party's Military Affairs
Commission, is in accordance with Mao's expressed wish.
Evidence suggests that prior to his nomination, unexplained events led
Hua and other centrist and "moderate" forces, with backing of the Chinese
military establishment, to move against the four leading "leftists" in the
Chinese hierarchy, including Mao's widow.
No announcements.have been made about these developments, and it is
possible that none will be made, but they are the subject of widespread
R.
FORD
CONFIDENTIAL
DECLARATED
GERALD
E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5
LIBRARY
NSC MEMO, 11/24/98, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES
BY
HR NARA, DATE: 5/11/01
CONFIDENTIAL
2
discussion in China and their ralidity is suggested by a number of
developments including the removal of pictures of the four from Peking
bookstares.
Foreign Rolicy Implications
Ever since Mao's death, Premier Hua and other PRC officials have
stressed the continuity of PRC foreign policy. In various ways they
have indicated that this means a continuing desire to move towards
normalization of relations with the United States and unabating hostility
towards the Soviet Union.
Looking beyond the immediate future and despite the harshness of
Chinese polemics against Moscow, it would only be logical to expect
some reduction of tension and improvement in state-to-state relations
over time.
As far as the U.S. is concerned, the basic strategic interests which led
to the opening in 1971/72 remain valid, and it is therefore not surprising
that improved U.S. -PRC relations have been endorsed. So far as comple-
tion of the normalization process is concerned, the implications of recent
developments in Peking are less clear.
The current leadership seems to have backed away from the mid-
summer stress on forceful "liberation" of Taiwan and impatience with
the pace of U.S. disengagement from the island. Indications are they
may revert to the 1971-73 line of "patience" with U.S. efforts to dis-
engage and of the preferability of peaceful "liberation" of the island,
even though Peking thinks force will eventually be necessary. But there
is no reason to believe that the basic Chinese position on Taiwan has
changed, i.e. that it is an internal matter to be dealt with when and how
they please, without interference from outsiders.
Public Discussion of the Issues
The more strident PRC line on Taiwan in mid summer may in part have
been a reflection of new personalities inserted into the picture. But
there is strong evidence, including direct statements by the Chinese,
that it was primarily to counter growing expressions of sentiment in the
United States that we should only move ahead with Peking if it is not at
the expense of the security and de facto autonomy of the people on Taiwan --
&
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e.g. as reflected in both Party platforms.
GERALD
LIBRARY
CONFIDENTIAL
The stronger Tonnion line floot
seemer seerna elearly to been
disigned at buttin sight
CONFIDENTIAL
3
It is necessary that the Chinese understand that the statements to which
they object reflect genuine American concerns But the events of the
summer point up the fact that public statements sometimes do force the
Chinese to react in ways which are helpful neither to Taiwan S security
interests nor to our own basic strategic interests in continuing to improve
relations with the PRC.
GERALD R. FORD
CONFIDENTIAL
DOC
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599-022
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SHANGHAI: JOINT CO MUNIQUE
4
1. Text of Joint Communique - February 27, 1972
2. Text of News Conference held by Dr. Kissinger and
Assistant Secretary of State Green - February 27, 1972
3. Text of Statement by Press Secretary Ziegler - February 27, 1972
1. Text of the Joint Statement Issued at the Conclusion of the President's
Visit. February 27, 1972
President Richard Nixon of the United States of America visited the
People's Republic of China at the invitation of Premier Chou En-lai of
the People's Republic of China from February 21 to February 28, 1972.
Accompanying the President were Mrs. Nixon, U.S. Secretary of State
William Rogers, Assistant to the President Dr. Henry Kissinger, and other
American officials.
President Nixon met with Chairman Mao Tse-tung of the Com-
munist Party of China on February 21. The two leaders had a serious and
frank exchange of views on Sino-U.S. relations and orld affairs.
During the visit. extensive. earnest and frank discussions were held
between President Nixon and Premier Chou En-iai on the normalization
of relations between the United States of America and the People's
Republic of China, as well as on other matters of interest to both sides. In
addition, Secretary of State William Rogers and Foreign Minister Chi
Peng-fei held talks in the same spirit.
President Nixon and his party visited Peking and viewed cultural,
industrial and agricultural sitcs, and they also toured Hangchow and
Shanghai where, continuing discussions with Chinese leaders, they viewed
similar places of interest.
The leaders of the People's Republic of China and the United States
of America found it beneficial to have this opportunity, after SO many
years without contact, to present candidly to one another their views on a
variety of issues. They reviewed the international situation in which
important changes and great upheavals are taking place and expounded
their respective positions and attitudes.
The U.S. side stated: Peace in Asia and peace in the world requires
efforts both to reduce immediate tensions and to climinate the basic causes
of conflict. The United States will work for a just and secure peace: just,
because it fulfills the aspirations of peoples and nations for freedom and
FORD i LIBRARY GERALD
progress; secure, because it removes the danger of foreign aggression. The
United States supports individual freedom and social progress for all the
peoples of the world, free of outside pressure or intervention. The United
States believes that the effort to reduce tensions is served by improving
communication between countries that have different ideologies so as to
Jessen the risks of confrontation through accident, miscalculation or mis-
understanding. Countries should treat each other with mutual respect and
be willing to compete peacefully, letting performance be the ultimate
judge. No country should claim infallibility and each country should be
prepared to TC-G nine its own attitudes for the COI on good. The
United States stressed that the peoples of Indochina should be allowed to
determine their destiny without outside intervention; its constant primary
objective has been a negotiated solution; the cight-point proposal put
forward by the Republic of Victnam and the United States on January 27,
1972 represents a basis for the attainment of that objective; in the absence
of a negotiated settlement the United States envisages the ultimate with-
drawal of all U.S. forces from the region consistent with the aim of
self-determination for each country of Indochina. The United States will
maintain its close ties with and support for the Republic of Korea; the
United States will support efforts of the Republic of Korea to seck a
relaxation of tension and increased communication in the Korean
peninsula. The United States places the highest value on its friendly
relations with Japan; it will continue to develop the existing close bonds.
Consistent with the United Nations Security Council Resolution of
December 21, 1971, the United States favors the continuation of the
ceasefire between India and Pakistan and the withdrawal of all military
forces to within their own territories and to their own sides of the ceasefire
line in Jammu and Kashmir; the United States supports the right of the
peoples of South Asia to shape their own future in peace, free of military
threat, and without having the area become the subject of great power
rivalry.
The Chinese side stated: Wherever there is oppression, there is
resistance. Countries want independence, nations want liberation and the
people want revolution-this has become the irresistible trend of history.
All nations, big or small, should be equal; big nations should not bully the
small and strong nations should not bully the weak. China will never be
a superpower and it opposes hegemony and power politics of any kind.
The Chinese side stated that it firmly supports the struggles of all the
oppressed people and nations for freedom and liberation and that the
people of all countries have the right to choose their social systems
according to their own wishes and the right to safeguard the independence,
sovereignty and territorial integrity of their own countries and oppose
forcign aggression, interference, control and subversion. All forcign troops
should be withdrawn to their own countries.
The Chinese side expressed its firm support to the peoples of Victnam,
Laos and Cambodia in their efforts for the attainment of their goal and
its firm support to the seven-point proposal of the Provisional Revolu-
tionary Government of the Republic of South Victnam and the clabora-
tion of February this year on the two key problems in the proposal, and
to the Joint Declaration of the Summit Conference of the Indochinese
Peoples. It firmly supports the cight-point program for the peaceful
unification of Korea put forward by the Government of the Democratic
People's Republic of Korca on April 12, 1971, and the stand for the
abolition of the "U.N. Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation
-of Korea." It firmly opposes the revival and outward expansion of
Japanese militarism and firmly supports the Japanese people's desire to
build an independent. democratic, peaceful and neutral Japan. It firmly
maintains that India and Pakistan should, in accordance with the United
&
FORD
Nations resolutions on the India-Pakistan question, immediately withdraw
all their forces to their respective territories and to their own sides of the
GERALD
ceasefire line in Jammu and Kashmir and firmly supports the Pakistan
LISRARY
Government and people in their struggle to preserve their independence
WIEKLY CC LATION OF PRESIDENTIAL DÖČUMENTS, PEDRUARY 75, 1972
4/5
and sovereignty and the people of Jammu and Kashmir in their struggle
for the right of self-determination.
There are essential differences between China and the United States
in their social systems and foreign policies. However, the two sides agreed
that countries, regardless of their social systems, should conduct their
relations on the principles of respect for the sovercignty and territorial
integrity of all states, non-aggression against other states, non-interference
in the internal affairs of other states, equality and mutual benefit, and
peaceful coexistence. International disputes should bc settled on this basis,
without resorting to the use or threat of force. The United States and the
People's Republic of China are prepared to apply these principles to their
mutual relations.
With these principles of international relations in mind the two sides
stated that:
-progress toward the normalization of relations between China and
the United States is in the interests of all countries;
-both wish to reduce the danger of international military conflict;
-neither should seck hegemony in the Asia-Pacific region and each
is opposed to efforts by any other country or group of countries to
establish such hegemony; and
-neither is prepared to negotiate on behalf of any third party or to
enter into agreements or understandings with the other directed at
other states.
Both sides are of the view that it would be against the interests of the
peoples of the world for any major country to collude with another against
other countries, or for major countries to divide up the world into spheres
of interest.
The two sides reviewed the long-standing serious disputes between
China and the United States. The Chinese side reaffirmed its position:
The Taiwan question is the crucial question obstructing the normalization
of relations between China and the United States; the Government of
the People's Republic of China is the solc legal government of China;
Taiwan is a province of China which has long been returned to the
motherland; the liberation of Taiwan is China's internal affair in which
no other country has the right to interfere; and all U.S. forces and
military installations must be withdrawn from Taiwan. The Chinese Gov-
emment firmly opposes any activities which aim at the creation of "onc
China, one Taiwan," "one China, two governments," "two Chinas," and
"independent Taiwan" or advocate that "the status of Taiwan remains
to be determined."
The U.S. side declared: The United States acknowledges that all
Chinese on either side of the Taiwan Strait maintain there is but one
China and that Taiwan is a part of China. The United States Government
does not challenge that position. It reaffirms its interest in a peaceful
settlement of the Taiwan question by the Chinese themselves. With this
prospect in mind, it affirms the ultimate objective of the withdrawal of
all U.S. forces and military installations from Taiwan. In the meantime,
it will progressively reduce its forces and military installations on Taiwan
FORD i LIBRARY
as the tension in the area diminishes.
The 1110 sides agreed that it is desirable to broaden the understanding
between the two peoples. To this end, they discussed specific areas in such
ficks as science, technology, culture, sports and journalism, in which
people-to-people contacts and exchanges would be mutually beneficial.
Each side un rtakes to facilitate the further develop ent of such contacts
and exchanges.
Both sides view bilateral trade as another area from which mutual
benefit can be derived, and agreed that economic relations based on
equality and mutual benefit are in the interest of the peoples of the two
countries. They agree to facilitate the progressive development of trade
between their two countries.
The two sides agreed that they will stay in contact through various
channels, including the sending of a senior U.S. representative to Pcking
from time to time for concrete consultations to further the normalization
of relations between the two countries and continue to exchange views.on
issues of common interest.
The two sides expressed the hope that the gains achieved during this
visit would open up new prospects for the relations between the two
countries. They believe that the normalization of relations between the
two countries is not only in the interest of the Chinese and American
peoples but also contributes to the relaxation of tension in Asia and the
world.
President Nixon, Mrs. Nixon and the American party expressed their
appreciation for the gracious hospitality shown them by the Government
and people of the People's Republic of China.
i
FORD
NOTE: The joint statement was released at Shanghai, People's Republic of China.
For a news conference of Dr. Henry Kissinger and Assistant Secretary of State
Marshall Green and a statement by the White House Press Secretary on the com-
GERALD
LIBRARY
muniqué, see the following two items.
2. Shanghai: Joint Communique
what the outcome of a meeting between the President RS
the leaders of the People's Republic might be.
News Conference of Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant
During the interim visit there was some explorate:
to the President for National Security thairs, and
conversation of an outcome in the conventional SCHEC
Marshall Green, Assistant Secretary of State for East
which both sides tend to state general positions whi-
they afterwards choose to interpret, each in their own W:
Asian and Pacific Affairs. - February 27, 1972
It was, therefore, decided early in the meetings
this occasion between the President and Prime Mini
MR. ZINGLER. You have had a chance to read over the
that such an approach would make no sense. It word
communiqué. Dr. Kis-inger is here to discuss it with you
and take your questions. What Dr. Kissinger says is on the
not be worthy of the purposes that were attempted to
served.
record. Together with Dr. Kissinger is Assistant Secre-
It was therefore decided that each side would state i'
tary of State Marshall Green who, as you know, partici-
pated in all the meetings with Secretary of State Rogers
position on issues in a section which it would produ:
when he met with the Foreign Minister, and he is here
more or less independent of the other. It would not Pir
also to discuss the communiqué with you and to take
tend to an agreement which did not exist and whic.
your questions, together with Dr. Kissinger.
would have to be interpreted away in subsequent imp:-
mentations. Therefore, the beginning part of the CO!.
We will begin with Dr. Kissinger.
muniqué represents, in effect, a statement by each sid
DR. KISSINGER. Let me make a few preliminary ob-
of some of its general principles.
servations before we go to your questions. Let me do it
On our side, they were deliberately not phrased in
in two parts: the-proces. and there is obviously the com-
contentious way. While in discussions some of the any
muniqué produced, and secondly, what does it incan in
ments made by the Chinese side were, of course, rebutter
general terms. Then I believe that I will be prepared to
IVC did not feel that this was the appropriate vehicle
answer questions.
do so, but rather to state what our positive view was.
First, how was the communiqué produced? From the
For that matter, the Chinese side did not relant al"!
beginning of our contacts with the People's Republic of
ments which we made in our section that they did
China, there were some obvious general considerations of
particularly agree with.
In order to present these two n an cqual masis,
now, this IS all 1 want to say by way of introduc-
it had been decided that in the text cd by the Amer-
tion. I wonder wh Marshall Green would like to add
ican Government, the U.S. position would be stated first,
a few words, and then nc will he glad to answer questions.
and in the text to be issued by the Chinese Government,
MR. GREEN. I have just a few words. First of all with
the Chinese version would be stated first.
regard to the P.R.C. authority with whom Dr. Kissinger
I mention this only so that you will not be surprised
was maintaining the discussions, it was Chiao Kuan-
if the Chinese version follows a different sequence from
hua-just to clarify that point.
the American version. This is by agreement. Both versions
I don't think I really have much to add. Our talks under
are official and are being put out on the basis of this
Secretary Rogers on our side, and Foreign Minister Chi
agreement.
Peng-fei for the People's Republic of China, extended
The procedure that was followed here was that issues
over, I believe, 10 hours all together
of general principle were first discussed in the incetings
But it was not just the talks themselves. We had fre-
between the President and the Prime Minister. They were
quent occasion, as you could imagine with all the fine
then, after they had been explored for some time, trans-
food you have eaten-occasionally waiting to have that
ferred to the meetings chaired by the Secretary of State
fine food to have extensive talks also, and a number of
and the Foreign Minister of the People's Republic of
matters could be discussed in that context.
China. Then, if any additional issues arose, they might be
Also, it was not just that, but the Secretary did have
referred back to the meeting of the President and the
a chance to meet on a number of occasions with the
Prime Minister.
Prime Minister. Most recently, coming down on the plane,
In drafting the communiqué, various sections were pro-
he had an hour and a half from Peking to Hangchow. And
duced by various elements of the American side. I played
then today the Prime Minister called on him in his hotel
the role of go-between on our side and the Vice Foreign
room for about 10 minutes.
Minister, whose name I despair of ever learning to pro-
I would say that the talks and the counterpart meetings
nounce, on the Chinese side.
were characterized by candor, friendliness, and courtesy
In this manner, as we put together the various para-
and hospitality, as I am sure you have all SCCI:, on the part
graphs that were supplied 10 us on our side by various
of our Chinese hosts. There was no pulling of punches, not
individuals, if nc reached a point at which agreement
physically, of course. They were outspoken, no effort to
seemed near or possible, we would then go back to our
cover up or paper over differences, but to have it out. It is
principals and to the Secretary of State. Through this
good for the system. I think in so doing one has a much
process, the communqué was finally achieved.
better appreciation of the other person's point of view.
For example, some of the sessions were quite prolonged.
As far as the specifies are concerned, in the talks, T
The last few nights the sessions went on until the carly
really can't say much more than what already appears
hours of the morning with the President. In Peking, the
in the communiqué itself, although some of the points
Chinese delegation had a house in the guest complex,
there may raise questions.
and most of the sessions took place in that house. As a
Q. On page -1, in stating that the United States will
paragraph was fini-hed, it would typically go back then
progressively reduce its forces in military installations on
to the President who was in the next house, and this went
Taiwan, was that decision a result of the discussions here in
on Friday night until about 5 in the morning.
China?
So much for the process. Lct me say something about
DR. KISSINGER. No, this is a general statement of our
the content. Obviously neither side would have written
policy which we have enunciated on innumerable occa-
this communiqué this way if it had been able to draft it
sions in innumerable forums. It says that we maintain the
entirely by itself. Therefore, it represented an attempt by
amount of forces that is required by the general situation
two countries that had been out of contact for a long
and not by any abstract determination. It is a state-
time to find a basis to convey first some immediate under-
ment of our general policy, but not a mutual decision.
standings, but beyond that, to start a process by which
Q. Is there any sign now that the conditions would lead
they could bring about a closer relationship over a period
to a reduction of the American military force in Taiwan
of time and by which they could, where interests con-
shortly?
verged, act in a more nearly parallel fashion and where
DR. KISSINGER. I don't want to speculate on what
interests differed, 10 mitigate the consequences of those
will be done over a period of time, but if you speak about
disagreements.
"shortly," I would not expect that.
Q. Why did not the United States Government re-
So the communiqué sought to be seen in two aspects:
affirm its treaty commitment to Taiwan, as the President
first, in terms of the specific principles and conclusions it
and you have done on numerous occasions?
states, and secondly, in terms of the direction to which
NR. KISSINGER. Lct me take this occasion to deal with
it seeks to point. It is on that basis that we are presenting
11:00 particular aspect, and let me deal with it onc, and
it to the American people and on which the People FRe-
notalnswer it in inmunerable elliptical forms in which,
public is presenting it as well.
noedoubt, it will be presented.
The particular issue which Mr.
slow
raised
is,
of
seeing who scorca w many points on which issue. At
course, an extraordinarily difficult one to discuss on the
the time of the first ping pong exchange, if I understand
territory of a country with which nc do not maintain
the position of the People's Republic of China, it 11:15 that
formal diplomatic relations and for which this particular
some very low-level pcople-to-pcople exchanges would
issue is a matter of profound principle.
occur.
Let me, therefore, state in response to this and any
The formalization of exchanges encouraged by the two
related question-and let me do it once and not repeat
governments, the opening of trade encouraged by the two
it. We stated our basic position with respect to this issue
governments, the establishment of diplomatic mecha-
in the President's world report in which we say that this
nisms for continued contact, the joint statement of some
treaty will be maintained. Nothing has changed in that
general principles of international relations, the joint state-
position.
ment of some basic approaches to the view of the world
But I would appreciate it if that would be all that I
with respect to, for example, the section which includes the
would be asked to say about it in these circumstances.
reference to hegemony-these, I believe, are matters that
But the position of the world report stands and has been
most of us would have considered unthinkable at the time
unaltered.
of the invitation to the ping pong team.
Q. Dr. Kissinger, the possibility is mentioned of the
But I would put them on the basis of mutuality rather
United States sending a representative to Peking from time
than of any unilateral movement on the part of the
to time. Is there any likelihood that this process might be
People's Republic of China.
reversed and Peking might send a representative to
Q. Henry, is this the first time that a President of the
Washington?
United States has formally picked up the language of the
Dr. KISSINGER. The situation of the two sides is not
Five Principles of Peaceful Cocxistence?
exactly equal in this respect because in Washington there
DR. KISSINGER. I have to say I am simply not sure. All
is a Chinese representation different from that that would
I would reply, again, would be an answer in the same
be sent under the hypothesis which you mention. How-
terms as I did to Mr. Frankel. The question is not who
ever, what we envisage is the establishment of a contact
put forward the proposals. The question is: Docs it con-
point, to begin with, in which the discussions about the
tain principles that WC can live by and since we have said
exchanges and trade that are mentioned in the preceding
we are prepared to apply these principles during the next
paragraphs will be formally conducted and as soon as this
one on the non-use of force, and since both sides have
contact point has been established, it will be announced
stated this, it docs not really make a crucial difference
and the visit of a U.S. representative to Peking would take
who put it forward first.
place as the need arises, and as particular issues of great
Q. How much progress was there made in advancing
importance need to be discussed. This, however, is not
the ball, in response to the question asked by George
to the exclusion of any other possibility.
Ball on the trips, "js this necessary?" How much further
Q. What do you mean by "a contact point"?
did we go than in your original discussions with Premier
DR. KISSINGER. For example, there existed for a while,
Chou?
and formally still exists, a forum in Warsaw where U.S.
DR. KISSINGER. The character of the discussions in-
and Chinese officials met-something of this kind. As soon
evitably is entirely different when the President of the
as that is established, which we expect will be in the rea-
United States talks than when an assistant talks who can-
sonably near future, we will announce it.
not make any definitive statement. The basic objective of
Q. Will that be established in the United States or
this trip was to sct in motion a train of events and an
Canada or some other country?
evolution in the policy of our two countries which both
DR. KISSINGER. I don't expect it to be in the United
sides recognized would be slow at first and present many
States, but 1 don't want 10 speculate beyond that.
difficulties and in which a great deal depended on the
Q. Can we assume that the President and Prime Minis-
assessment by each side of the understanding by the other
ter discussed all these differences face-to-face, specifically
of what was involved in this process and of the assessment
their differences over Victnam and the reduction of troops
by each side of the reliability of the other in being able
on Taiwan? Were these positions stated openly?
to pursue this for the amount of time necessary to see it
DR. KISSINGER. All differences were discussed by the
prevail.
President and the Prime Minister face to face, candidly
In this sense it alinost had to be conducted by the heads
and seriously, including those which you mentioned.
of the 1110 governments and in this sense I would say that
Q. Can you point to. anything in this document in
in the depth and seriousness of the discussions it wont, ob-
which the People's Repablic of China goes any significant
viously, beyond what had been discussed in my and
step beyond its position at the time of the first ping pong
beyond our expectations.
exchanges?
Ω. Did Chairman Mao participate? DR his partices
DR. KISSINGER. Let me say two things: IVc are not ap-
pation go to the detailed substance of this matter or 1125
proaching this from the point of view of a scoreboard of
it largely philosophical and general?
WEEKLY COMPILATION OF PRESIDENTIAL DOCUMENTS, FECRUAR 28, 1972
479
Dr. KISSINGER. I don't believe that it would be appro-
from a dialogue with the most powerful nation in the
priate for me to go into detail about the content of the
world and WC are conducting our discussions with the
conversation with Chairman Mao. I may say, however,
People's Republic entirely on the merits of that
that Chairman Man and the President discussed each of
relationship.
the essential categories in a general way and we have
The paragraph on hegemony will arise only if any coun-
every reason to believe that the Prime Minister checked
try should seck it, but WC had no particular country in
with the Chairman at every step along the way. But it
mind when it was being drafted.
was not just 2 vague philosophical discussion.
Q. In the paragraph referring to the reduction of forces
Q. The assertion of respect for sovereignty and terri-
and military installations on Taiwan as the tension in the
torial integrity, combined with the statement of respect
area diminishes, is this an exclusive reference to Indo-
for one China, could that be construed as meaning that the
china is the area?
United States notes the claim of the Government of the
DR. KISSINGER. No. It is a reference to the general
People's Republic of China, its claim to sovercignty over
area. It is not a reference to any particular part of Asia.
Taiwan?
Q. What conditions in that arca would keep American
DR. KISSINGER. Our view with respect to Taiwan has
troops on Taiwan? What tensions in the area of Taiwan
been exhaustively stated in that paragraph you refer to
now require the presence of American troops there?
and we add nothing to it.
DR. KISSINGER. Wc are talking about the general state
Q. Dr. Kissinger, can you tell us whether there is any
of relationships in Asia and in the world. It is in reference
timetable under which you are going to undertake to fa-
to that that our general decisions on deployments will be
cilitate the contacts and exchanges in the cultural, sports,
made.
and journalistic arcas?
Q. Dr. Kissinger, the President said in a television
DR. KISSINGER. There is no precise timetable, Walter,
interview the beginning of January that he would bring
but I think it is correct to say that both sides understand
up the question of American prisoners of war in Victnam
that this will be pursued with some dispatch.
when he came to China. Can you tell us if it came up
Q. Dr. Kissinger, in the light of the statement by the
and what the reaction was?
Government of China that the Chinese side said that the
Taiwan question is the crucial question obstructing the
DR. KISSINGER. Obviously, as the communiqué makes
clear the issue of Victnam was discussed and it is
normalization of relations, does this timetable depend on
further progress in the solution of the Taiwan question?
clear that We would not discuss it without mentionim,
DR. KISSINGER. No. That is independent of the other,
our concern with respect to the prisoners. The position of
though at what point the two would become interdepend-
the People's Republic is as stated in the communiqué that
cnt again, ] cannot judge. But as this is written now, my
it supports the seven-point proposal made by the Provi-
answer to Walter Cronkite stands on its own feet.
sional Government--by the PRG, and I think it is a fair
Q. Dr. Kissinger, where the communiqué states, "Both
characterization of the basic positions.
sides are of the view that it would be against the interests
Q. Dr. Kissinger, there is a paragraph that says "In-
of the peoples of the world for any major country to col-
ternational disputes should be scitled on this basis, with-
lude with another against other countries, or for major
out resorting to the use or threat of force." Since the
countries to divide "P the world into spheres of interest,":
People's Republic says the difficulty with us on Taiwan is
was that a result of your talks about Sino-Soviet tensions
all international issue, does this incan that they have
or was the Soviet Union involved in the talks? Does this
agreed not to USC force or the threat of force in settling
refer to how the United States views the relationship be-
or solving that?
tween China and the U.S. and the Soviet Union?
DR. KISSINGER. The formal position of the People's
DR. KISSINGER. We have said on many occasions, and
Republic of China with respect to Taiwan is a matter, of
I will say it again here, that as far as the United States is
course, of extreme delicacy for us to discuss here at all.
concerned, our relationship with the People's Republic
Clearly, they do not, as they have stated in their part
of China is not directed against the Soviet Union, and
of the section on Taiwan, consider it an international
while the People's Republic is well able to speak for it-
problem in any normal sense. Clearly, the formal state-
self, and my megalomania has not reached the point where
ments with respect to this issue have to be drafted with
I believe that ] can speak for it, I believe that it is clear
the various perspectives in mind.
to us that neither is the policy of the People's Republic
REPORTER. Thank you, gentlemen.
of China in its relations with us directed against the
Soviet Union.
NOTE: White House Press Secretary Ronald 1.. Gegler opened
news conference at 5:50 p.m., local time, at the Industrial
We are pursuing our policy with the People's Republic
tion Center Banquet Hall, Shanghai, People's Upoblic of
of China on the ground that a stable peace in the world
For the text of the joint communique, see the preciding item
is difficult to covisage if COD million people are excluded
For a statement on the communiqué by the White Home Pren
Securary, see the following item.
WITKLY COMPITATION OF PRESIDENTIAL DOCUMENTS, FEBRUARY 28, 1972
Shanghai: Joint Communique
to improve communications between the United States
and the People's Republic of China will significantly con-
3. Statement by Ronald L. Ziegler, Press Secretary to the
tribute to a more stable structure of peace in the world.
President. February 27, 1972
The communiqué honestly reflects the differences that
both sides recognize exist and states those areas where
President Nixon and Premier Chou En-lai have
both sides found common views and have agreed to
reached agreement on a joint communiqué. This com-
take specific steps to further improve their relationship.
muniqué reflects the position of the United States and
The communiqué, in stating its general attitude, says,
the People's Republic of China on various bilateral and
"The leaders of the People's Republic of China and the
international issues which were discussed during Presi-
United States of America found it beneficial to have
dent Nixon's visit to the People's Republic of China.
this opportunity, after so many years without contact, to
The day President Nixon arrived in Peking he met
present candidly to one another their views on a variety
with Chairman Mao Tse-tung. The two leaders had a
of issues."
serious and frank exchange of views on Sino-U.S. rela-
The communiqué goes on to say: "There are csen-
tions and world affairs. During the President's 7-day visit
tial differences between China and the United States
to the People's Republic of China extensive, frank, and
in their social systems and foreign policies. However, the
honest discussions were held between President Nixon
two sides agreed that countries, regardless of their social
and Premier Chou En-lai. The discussions were held on
systems, should conduct their relations on the principles
the normalization of relations between the United States
of respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all
and the People's Republic of China, as well as on other
states, non-aggression against other states, non-interfer-
matters of interest to both sides.
ence in the internal affairs of other states, equality and
The two leaders participated in over 15 hours of formal
mutual benefit, and peaceful cocxistence. International
talks. In addition, Secretary of State Rogers and Foreign
disputes should be settled on this basis, without resort-
Minister Che Pang-fci held discussions in the same spirit
ing to the use or threat of force. The United States and
and participated in about 15 hours of formal discussions.
the People's Republic of China are prepared to apply
So the communiqué reflects over 30 hours of formal
these principles to their mutual relations."
discussions between the United States and the People's
Republic of China. The very fact of the joint com-
NOTE: Press Secretary Zingler read the statement to reporters at
6:40 p.m., local time, in the Industrial Exhibition Center Danguet
muniqué between the two governments is symbolic of
Hall, Shanghai, People's Repablic of China. As printed above,
the greater understanding produced through the facc-to-
this item follows the text of the White House press release.
face discussions that have been held.
For the text of the joint communiqué and a prus conference of
Dr. Henry Kissinger and Assistant Secretary of State Marshall
It is President Nixon's hope that this historic beginning
Green, see the preceding two items.
R.
FORD
GERALD
LIBRATE
5
MEMORANDUM
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
PRC
October 20, 1976
MEMORANDUM FOR:
BUD McFARLANE
FROM:
WILLIAM H. GLEYSTEEN
by
SUBJECT:
Materials on Post-1949 PRC Foreign
Policy
In response to your note concerning Susan Ford's interest in a paper on
"Relations between the United States and other regional and world powers
and China in the Post Revolutionary Period, " I have checked with a
number of sources and determined that no such paper exists. The best
I can do, I am afraid, is to provide a recommended bibliography on
aspects of that very broad subject. This would include:
John Gittings, The World and China, 1922-1972, Harper & Row,
1974
Jay Taylor, China and Southeast Asia, Praeger, 1976
Allen S. Whiting, The Chinese Calculus of Deterrence, Univ. of
Michigan Press, 1975
Peter Van Ness, Revolution and Chinese Foreign Policy: Peking's
Support for Wars of National Liberation, Univ. of
California Press, 1970
I am also assembling some public materials from State on US-PRC
relations (background notes, testimony, etc.). I will send them to you
when they arrive. As a supplement, I would suggest Ms. Ford may wish
to look at the annual Foreign Policy messages issued during the Nixon
years. Each volume contains a section on US-PRC relations. She could
also refer to a volume of hearings recently issued by Congressman
Lester Wolff's House International Relations Subcommittee on Future
Foreign Policy Research and Development on the subject United States-
Soviet Union-China: The Great Power Triangle.
FORD
6a
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MEMORANDUM
5927
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was
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
SECRET
INFORMATION
October 27, 1976
MEMORANDUM FOR:
BRENT SCOWCROFT
B
FROM:
WILLIAM H. GLEYSTEEN by
SUBJECT:
Leadership Changes in China; Implications
for the U.S.
Although we would caution against assuming the permanence of new
arrangements in Peking, we may have enough of a pause in the turning
of the kaleidoscope to try to sort out the pattern.
Hua Kuo-feng may well face further contention and struggle, but he has
at least greatly improved his leadership position and purged his "radical"
challengers. He has done so more rapidly and decisively than expected,
and we seem to be witnessing a catharsis of pent-up animosities which
suggests it may be some time before another "leftist" challenge develops.
Obviously the military have played a major role and will not forget that
they did so. Coping with this military power and the problem of Teng
Hsiao-ping are probably Hua's most delicate problems. If the new pattern
develops logically, we would expect China's domestic and foreign policies
to continue, without abrupt change, toward relatively practical goals,
characterized by the slogan of developing China into a modern socialist
society by the end of this century. This could bring a more constructive
atmosphere into our relations with Peking reminiscent of the 1971-73
period. But the PRC's terms for normalization will not alter significantly,
and it is quite possible that dealings with Peking will continue to be difficult
because of internal distractions. The most important move for us after the
election will be a quiet signal to Hua that we welcome China's affirmation
of policy continuity and that we will be preparing ourselves seriously for
the next move on normalization.
DECLASCIMED
E.O.
NSC MEMO, 11/24/98, ANGELIZES
BY HR 5/11/01
The following paragraphs speculate at greater length about the impact of
Peking's changes.
Domestic Policies
080
While we may see an effort to assure that China continues along the
"socialist path according to the thought of Mao", we expect less
SECRET
2
controversy over adherence to essentially pragmatic economic policies
such as greater reliance on material incentives (rather than political
exhortation) to boost worker output and greater emphasis on trade.
Various elements will seek greater access to Western technology to
hasten economic growth and bolster China's strategic position, even
though there will be a continuing wariness, even among the military,
about overdependence on the outside world.
Political strains within China and competition for economic resources
will continue. Provincial or regional requirements will compete with
national requirements, and there will be competing priorities of the
military and civilian sectors. And finally, there are still large numbers
of people in China who are fairly "leftist" in outlook, or whose careers
have depended upon beating the "capitalist" or "revisionist" dog and who
may wage a limited "rear-guard" struggle.
But overall, these strains may assume the more normal proportions
associated with their counterparts in other countries rather than the
grotesque political campaign style which has characterized disputes in
China for the past quarter century. Indeed, one of the striking features
of the elevation of Hua and the purging of the "left" has been not only the
smoothness with which it has proceeded thus far, but also the apparent
confidence the successful leaders had ahead of time in the popularity of
their removal of Chiang Ching and the others. Despite the scheming
and planning which must have taken place in the center, the popularity of
the turn of events has been evident in the relaxed and genuinely jubilant
mood of the people, both in small informal gatherings -- including with
Westerners - - and in the organized mass rallies throughout China.
Foreign Policies
The Chinese have been at some pains to assure domestic and foreign
audiences alike that Chairman Mao's foreign policy line will be adhered
to. In various ways this has been shown to mean continued hostility
towards the Soviet Union and commitment to improved relations with
the United States. While this has generally evoked a sense of visceral
satisfaction in the West, where "moderate" has been equated with "rational"
and "good", and while in fact we should find Chinese actions more predict-
able than if the "leftists" had won out, it is far from clear that our own
bilateral problems with China will be more easily resolved or that there
will not be some eventual improvement in Sino-Soviet state-to-state
relations.
SECRET
SECRET
3
Sino-Soviet Relations - Despite the initial hostility being displayed
toward the Soviets, some shift in Sino-Soviet relations may emerge over
the next few months. The degree of tension prevailing between China
and the Soviet Union over the last seven or eight years has been danger-
ously high with unpredictable consequences for our own interests. On
that basis alone, we should not be perturbed by a lowering of the level
of tension and hostility. We should also accept the reality that each of
the parties in a triangular relationship, such as ours with Moscow and
Peking, will try to gain whatever leverage it can with each of the other
two parties and there will often be little the third party can do to influence
ties between the other two. In any event, recognizing the depth of
hostility between the Chinese and the Soviets, we should not become SO
fearful of improvement in Sino-Soviet ties that we are panicked into
making unnecessary or unwise concessions to either of them in hopes
of forestalling a new "alliance". Indeed, we should get the message
across to the Chinese -- and Soviets that we are relaxed about it.
Sino-US Relations - We may find the Chinese tending to revert to the
tone which prevailed between mid-1971 and 1973. That is, there may be
a willingness on Peking's part to make soothing noises about trying all
peaceful means to liberate Taiwan before resorting to force and about
patience over the length of time such "liberation" might take. But the
basic line on Taiwan and about the conditions for full normalization of
US-PRC relations has never changed, and there is no reason to think it
will now. Peking will still insist that we break all official ties with
Taiwan, abrogate the Mutual Defense Treaty, and withdraw all military
forces and installations from Taiwan. The issue of military sales to
Taiwan after normalization will remain one of great delicacy and fraught
with potential hazards.
We have a number of ideas as to how we might proceed to test Peking's
limited flexibility, and we will present these to you after the election.
For the moment, I believe that we should try to avoid making statements
or taking actions which could unnecessarily complicate the process.
We should be prepared fairly promptly to give Hua a positive signal but
we should avoid steps which could be characterized as unseemly in their
haste to woo the new Chinese leadership.
SECRET
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U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE - 599-022 - 1976
599-022