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Korea (7)
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24465891
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Korea (7)
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National Security Council East Asian and Pacific Affairs Staff Files (Ford Administration)
Country Files
subjects
Korea (South)
Korea
Korea (North)
Thailand
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1974-11-30
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1974
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1974-10-01
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1974
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The original documents are located in Box 5, folder "Korea (7)" of the NSC East Asian
and Pacific Affairs Staff: Files, 1969-1977 at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library.
Copyright Notice
The copyright law of the United States (Title 17, United States Code) governs the making of
photocopies or other reproductions of copyrighted material. Gerald R. Ford donated to the United
States of America his copyrights in all of his unpublished writings in National Archives collections.
Works prepared by U.S. Government employees as part of their official duties are in the public
domain. The copyrights to materials written by other individuals or organizations are presumed to
remain with them. If you think any of the information displayed in the PDF is subject to a valid
copyright claim, please contact the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library.
Digitized from Box 5 of NSC East Asian and Pacific Affairs Staff: Files, 1969-1977 at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library
1A
NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet
WITHDRAWAL ID 032799
REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL
ÇNational security restriction
TYPE OF MATERIAL
ÇMemorandum
CREATOR'S NAME
W.R. Smyser, Richard T. Kennedy
RECEIVER'S NAME
Secretary Kissinger
TITLE
Proposed NSSM on U.S. Military
Assistance to South Korea
CREATION DATE
10/04/1974
VOLUME
2 pages
COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID
033700248
COLLECTION TITLE
NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER. NSC EAST
ASIAN AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS STAFF FILES
BOX NUMBER
5
FOLDER TITLE
Korea (7)
DATE WITHDRAWN
03/03/2011
WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST
TMH
if
MEMORANDUM
4599
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
TOP SECRET
GDS
ACTION
MEMORANDUM FOR:
THE PRESIDENT
FROM:
HENRY A. KISSINGER
SUBJECT:
Proposed NSSM On U.S. Military
Assistance to South Korea
Attached at Tab A is a draft NSSM requesting, in your name, a quick
study of future U.S. military assistance to South Korea. The South
Koreans have been pressing us in recent months for clearer indications
as to the future of our military assistance program in light of tightening
Congressional constraints. Foreign Minister Kim raised this question
with me here on September 27, and President Park can be expected to
broach the matter with you when you visit Seoul next month.
RECOMMENDATION:
That you approve my signing the draft NSSM request at Tab A.
APPROVE
DISAPPROVE
R.FORD
DECLASSIFIED
TOP SECRET
GDS
E.O. 12050 SEC 3.3
NSC Memo, 3/30/00, State Dept. Guidelines
By
NARA, Date 12/7/10
1c
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
TOP SECRET
GDS
National Security Study Memorandum
MEMORANDUM FOR
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of State
The Director of Central Intelligence
SUBJECT:
U.S. Security Assistance to the
Republic of Korea
The President has requested a study of our Security Assistance Program
to the Republic of Korea. The study should define basic U.S. objectives
as regards our security assistance to South Korea, and should then lay
out the policy options that will give effect to these objectives.
The study should assume no significant changes in the level or missions
of U.S. forces in the Republic of Korea during the period of transition
to new security arrangements following the termination of the UNC.
The study should include, but not necessarily be limited to, consideration
of the following issues:
- Should we fix a termination date for grant military assistance,
and if so what should that date be?
- Should we accelerate the rate of shift from grant military
assistance to FMS credits defined in NSDM 227, and if so what should
the new rate be?
What types and numbers of high performance aircraft should
be included in the Korean Force Modernization Program?
What modifications, if any, should be made in the five year
Modernization Program for the Republic of Korea prescribed in
NSDM 129?
DECLASSIFIED
E.O.
12058
(as
TOP SECRET
GDS
SEC 3.3
By NSC Memo, 3/30/06, State Dept. Guidelines
M
NARA, Date 12/7/10
TOP SECRET
GDS
2
The study should be prepared by the NSC Interdepartmental Group for
East Asia. The study should be submitted no later than October 15,
1974, for review by the NSC Senior Review Group prior to its consideration
by the President.
Henry A. Kissinger
cc: Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
TOP SECRET
GDS
1D
NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet
WITHDRAWAL ID 032800
REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL
ÇNational security restriction
TYPE OF MATERIAL
ÇTelegram
CREATOR'S TITLE
CINCPACREP GUAM
RECEIVER'S TITLE
Secretary of Defense, Chairman of the
Joint Chief of Staff
DESCRIPTION
Re US-Republic of Korea Relations
CREATION DATE
09/27/1974
VOLUME
5 pages
COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID
033700248
COLLECTION TITLE
NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER. NSC EAST
ASIAN AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS STAFF FILES
BOX NUMBER
5
FOLDER TITLE
Korea (7)
DATE WITHDRAWN
03/03/2011
WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST
TMH
ROR
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506
Calos in JAF filed Jedy fed
TOP SECRET (GDS)
October 8, 1974
P
National Security Study Memorandum 211
TO:
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of State
The Director of Central Intelligence
SUBJECT:
U.S. Security Assistance to the Republic of Korea
The President has requested a study of our Security Assistance
Program for the Republic of Korea. The study should define basic
U.S. objectives as regards our security assistance to South Korea,
and should then set forth the policy options that will give effect to
these objectives.
The study should assume no significant changes in the level or missions
of U.S. forces in the Republic of Korea during the period of transition
to new security arrangements following the termination of the United
Nations Command.
The study should include, but not necessarily be limited to, consideration
of the following issues:
-- Should a termination date be set for grant military assistance,
and if so, what should that date be?
-- Should the rate of shift from grant military assistance to
FMS credits, defined in NSDM 227, be accelerated and, if so, what
should the new rate be?
-- What types and numbers of high performance aircraft should
be included in the Korean Force Modernization Program?
-- What modifications, if any, should be made in the five-year
Modernization Program for the Republic of Korea prescribed in
NSDM 129?
TOP SECRET (GDS)
DECLASSIFIED
GREATO FORD LIBRAR
AUTHORITY
nsc memo 1/30/09
BY
DATE 12/7/10
TOP SECRET (GDS)
2
The study should be prepared by the NSC Interdepartmental Group for
East Asia. The study should be submitted no later than November 1,
1974, for review by the NSC Senior Review Group prior to its considera-
tion by the President.
H-7 A. Kissing
Henry A. Kissinger
cc: Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
TOP SECRET (GDS)
3a
4941
MEMORANDUM
ROK
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
ACTION
SECRET
October 18, 1974
MEMORANDUM FOR:
SECRETARY KISSINGER
FROM:
W. R. Smyser 8
SUBJECT:
The President's Trip to Korea
We have now received the State memorandum regarding the President's
trip to Korea (Tab B). The memorandum states objectives for the
trip and outlines a program.
We have recast State's paper as a memorandum from you to the
President.
RECOMMENDATION:
That you sign the attached memorandum to the President (Tab A).
ASSIFIED
03033
guildims
By
We
NAMA, Date 12/9/10
SECRET GDS
4941
3b
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
ACTION
SECRET
MEMORANDUM FOR:
THE PRESIDENT
FROM:
HENRY A. KISSINGER
SUBJECT:
Your Visit to Korea
Your visit to Korea comes in circumstances very different from those
that marked the visits of President Eisenhower in 1952 (as President-
elect) and 1960, and of President Johnson in 1966.
Then we were in the midst of the Cold War and the Vietnam War.
Now we are in a period of detente, improving our relations with
Korea's two large Communist neighbors.
Then North and South Korea were sworn enemies confronting each
other in immutable hostility. Now they have established some contact
and they have made limited gestures toward each other, though they
remain intensely distrustful of each other.
Then we were providing considerable help from what we saw,as
virtually unlimited resources while Korea was struggling to establish
its economy. Now we have to curtail our aid but South Korea is more
able to take care of itself.
Then U.S. public opinion was prepared to accept the blemishes of
our allies. Now it is quicker to insist that allies should be models
of democracy. The Korean opposition knows this. It and the Govern-
ment will both try to gain some advantage from your visit.
While all this has changed, one geographic imperative remains constant:
Korea lies between three great powers, China, the Soviet Union and
Japan. Each would rather have us there than either of the others.
The Republic of Korea remains one of our closest friends, but we are
living in a different time. Our problem is to keep our alliance a
strong and effective deterrent in this different time, making the nec-
essary adjustments without changing the basic relationship and its
contribution to stability, and yet to continue to move toward a lowering
of tensions in Korea and elsewhere.
ASSISIED
SEGRET GDS
E.O.
CEC 3.3
By
Wh
NARA,
Date
12/7/10
SECRET
2
Basic Purposes of Your Visit
In the context of our changing relationship, your visit has the following
basic purposes:
-- To keep North Korea and its allies on notice that our support
for South Korea continues undiminished and that our interest in detente
will not lead to our disengagement from the peninsula.
-- To reaffirm for Seoul our commitment to the Republic of
Korea as well as our readiness to maintain our alliance relationship,
while providing the Korean leadership with a direct appreciation of
our reduced resources.
-- To maintain an equal distance between President Park and his
opposition as regards internal South Korean political affairs.
Means of Achieving these Purposes
We do not expect to conclude any new agreements with the Koreans.
You will, nonetheless, want to have a substantive meeting with
President Park and to meet with other Korean leaders both in the
government and in the opposition.
You will also want to meet with American troops to underline our
continued presence, and you will want to make appropriate public
appearances.
Your Program: Substantive Meetings
You will probably spend much of the afternoon after your arrival in
private discussions with President Park. There should also be time
for a brief wind-up meeting the next morning which will include
issuance of a joint communique. We are doing a NSSM study on
future military assistance levels to help prepare you.
There should also be a visit to the National Assembly and a brief
televised address before that assembly.
Protocol Events
There are a few protocol requirements that the Koreans regard as
essential:
-- Airport arrival and departure ceremonies.
SECRET GDS
SECRET
3
-- Wreath-laying ceremonies at the tombs of Mrs. Park and of
the Unknown Soldier.
-- A reception and a formal dinner hosted by President Park.
-- If your arrival schedule permits it, there may also be a
brief lunch, which could be a formal working lunch with Park or
a somewhat larger formal luncheon.
Your Program: Public Events
To únderscore the American presence in Korea, there are two public
events:
-- A visit to the U.S. Second Infantry Division on the morning
of November 23.
-- A brief meeting with American staff and community
representatives.
We are preparing a separate program for Mrs. Ford, though we
expect that she will join in at least some of your activities.
RECOMMENDATION:
That you authorize us to plan for your visit along the lines outlined
above.
Approve
Approve as Amended
SECRET - GDS
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
SEAL
4941
3c
Washington, D.C. 20520
SECRET
October 18, 1974
MEMORANDUM FOR LIEUTENANT GENERAL BRENT SCOWCROFT
THE WHITE HOUSE
Subject: Planning for the President's
Visit to Korea
Setting
The President's visit to Korea will be the first
Presidential visit since that of President Johnson
in October 1966. It will occur at a time when the
Korean government is greatly concerned that the long
standing close relationship with the U.S. may be in
for fundamental changes. This concern is motivated
in part by our new relationships with the PRC and
USSR but also by public and congressional criticism
of Korea's recent domestic policies. The visit will
serve to reassure that the basic American attachment to
Korea continues.
In addition to this symbolic aspect, the visit will
provide opportunity for consultation on common issues
at the highest level. These include: the anticipated
dissolution of the United Nations Command; future re-
lationships with North Korea, the USSR and the PRC; our
changing relationship with the ROK and the nature of support
and military assistance (including troop levels) we will
be able to maintain.
The visit to Japan and Korea comes as the two
countries are seeking to restore normal relations which
had been strained almost to the breaking point by events
surrounding the assassination attempt which resulted in
Madam Park's death. The pause in the confrontation
between President Park and his critics occasioned by the
tragic death of his wife has ended. The forecast is that
the visit also will occur at a time of heightened domestic
tension in Korea resulting from the Government's renewed
efforts to stifle political dissent.
SECRET
XDS-3
FORD
DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12358 (as/cinended) SEC 3.3
State Dept Guidelines
TRAND
LIBRAR
By
NARA, Date 12/7/10
SECRET
2
All Koreans welcome the visit. But both sides -- the
government and its critics -- will be seeking to use it
to their own ends: President Park by attempting to portray
the visit as U.S. backing despite criticism of his excesses;
and his critics by attempting to focus world attention on
the need for reform of his authoritarian rule. The latter
will seek to create conditions through protest and demon-
stration prior to the visit, and possibly during it, that
will highlight their position. As a minimum their objective
will be to block Park's attempt to use the visit to demon-
strate U.S. support of his rule, notwithstanding its
authoritarian cast. As a maximum they will wish to use
the visit to force Park to move away from repressive govern-
ment.
In sum, the visit provides a timely opportunity for a
forceful reiteration of the American commitment to the
security and welfare of the Korean people. To demonstrate
these convictions against a background of internal dissention
in Korea and increasing American public concern over Park's
disregard for human rights will not be easy.
Korean Government Objectives
The ROKG wants the visit to:
- reaffirm the continuity of our unique commitment to
Korea, putting to rest public apprehension over what is
feared as an intention to disengage from Asia.
--- assure that we will continue to give priority to
Korea, notwithstanding other demands on our resources. And
in this connection that we will give highest priority to
the completion of the ROK Armed Forces Modernization Program.
Moreover, that we will continue to station forces in Korea
as clear evidence of our intention to defend the South from
aggression.
--- demonstrate to Park's domestic critics that we will
not dissociate ourselves from President Park whatever the
criticism of our press and Congress.
- result in the acceptance of the Korean felt need
for additional F-4 aircraft beyond those mutually projected
in the modernization program.
FURD
SECRET
RALD
LIBRAR
SECRET
3
-- result in recognition of the ROK view that the threat
from North Korea is increasing rather than subsiding and
that we should caution the Japanese whom Koreans see as moving
closer to the North.
Our Objectives
We expect the visit to:
---- reaffirm our commitment to the ROK in a time of
rapidly changing circumstances which prompt Korean anxiety.
At the same time to provide the Korean leadership with an
increased appreciation of our limited resources available.
- to keep Pyongyang and its allies on notice that U.S.
support for the ROK continues undiminished.
--- demonstrate that we are not partisan in our reaction
to on-going Korean/Japan disputes and remind that the
security interests of the two countries are interdependent.
-- assure that the anticipated dissolution of the
United Nations Command will not lessen our cooperation in
mutual security matters.
-- reassure that we have no present plans for sub-
stantial reductions in our force levels.
- encourage the ROK to make more positive efforts
to open a substantive dialogue with the North.
Elements of the Visit
Substantive Meetings
Most of the afternoon of November 22 will be devoted
to private discussions with President Park. These may be
preceded by a small working lunch with Park, depending on
time of arrival, which has not yet been established. There
also will be time for a brief wind-up meeting the next
morning, which will include issuance of a joint communique.
Also planned is a visit to the National Assembly to
call on the Speaker and the leadership of both the govern-
ment and opposition parties. We have under consideration
SECRET
FORD
AIBRARY
SECRET
4
a Korean proposal that the President make a brief address
to the National Assembly.
Social/Protocol Events
The following have been proposed by the ROKG:
--- Airport arrival ceremony at which the President
will make a brief statement. The event will be televised.
- On the way from the airport the President to lay
wreaths at the tombs of Madam Park and the Unknown
Soldier.
- A reception and a formal dinner hosted by President
Park on the evening of November 22.
Other Events
- A visit to the U.S. 2nd Infantry Division the
morning of November 23, which will allow the President
to meet our forces in the field.
--- Brief meeting with American staff and community
representatives.
- Brief departure ceremony to include farewell
remarks by the President.
Recommendation
That we be authorized to proceed with planning and
coordination with the Koreans on the basis of the above
objectives and events.
George S. Springsteen
Exeçutive Secretary for
SECRET
FORD LIBRARY
4A
NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet
WITHDRAWAL ID 032801
REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL
ÇNational security restriction
TYPE OF MATERIAL
ÇMemorandum
CREATOR'S NAME
Jeanne W. Davis
RECEIVER'S NAME
Secretary Kissinger
TITLE
Talker for Meeting with Secretary
Schlesinger, October 22
DESCRIPTION
Re US Force Levels in Thailand and
South Korea, and Military Aid for
Vietnam
CREATION DATE
10/21/1974
VOLUME
6 pages
COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID
033700248
COLLECTION TITLE
NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER. NSC EAST
ASIAN AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS STAFF FILES
BOX NUMBER
5
FOLDER TITLE
Korea (7)
DATE WITHDRAWN
03/03/2011
WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST
TMH
4B
NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet
WITHDRAWAL ID 032802
REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL
ÇNational security restriction
TYPE OF MATERIAL
ÇMemorandum
TITLE
Long-Term US Military Force Levels in
Thailand (FY 1976 and Beyond)
CREATION DATE
10/11/1974
VOLUME
5 pages
COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID
033700248
COLLECTION TITLE
NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER. NSC EAST
ASIAN AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS STAFF FILES
BOX NUMBER
5
FOLDER TITLE
Korea (7)
DATE WITHDRAWN
03/03/2011
WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST
TMH
SECRET
4c
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505
July 9, 1974
9 JUL 74 1.9 6z
ILMORANDUM FOR: Rear Admiral Thomas J. Bigley
NMCC-LDX
Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary
for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, ISA
SUBJECT
Comments on DoD Memorandum Entitled "Long-Term
U.S. Military Force Levels in Thailand
(FY 1976 and Beyond)"
As noted in our previous responsé (dated June 25, 1974), the
Central Intelligence Agency believes that the extent of the drawdown
of U.S. military forces in Thailand recommended in Option II may lead
Hanoi to conclude that the U.S. is no longer a restraining factor
against a renewal of major hostilities in South Victnam. Reflecting
this concern, the Central Intelligence Agency does not concur in
recommending Option II. The CIA's position is as follows:
A. The Central Intelligence Agency believes that an
option calling for a gradual reduction of U.S. forces in
Thailand during FY 76 to a level somewhere botween Options I
and II would be less likely to lead Hanoi to conclude that
the U.S. was not intending or able to respond to a major
Communist attack than the recommended Option II. Such a
variation would include the retention of a couple of airfields
on standby, the continued presence of some B-52s at D-Tapao
with the necessary support equipment and personnel, and an
understunding with the Thai government that the U.S. would
rotate units to Thailand from time to time.
B. While granting that the U.S. military presence in
Thailand is not in and of itself the controlling deterrent
ugainst North Vietnumose military action in South Victnam,
a sharp reduction would represent a signal to Hanoi of U.S.
intentions. The Intelligence Community has recently
DECLASSIFIED
NSC. EASPA 5-6-4-2
State Rev. 9/18/03,
4/24/07
HR NLF, DATE 1/6/09
FORD de LIBRARY OFFACO
SECRET
CEDEL
estimated (NIB 53/14.3-1-74, May 23, 1974) that the North
Vietnamese will at some point shift back to major warfare
in an attempt to achieve their objective of gaining control
of South Vietnam. The pace of: the U.S. drawdown in Thailand --
and Hanoi's perception thereof -- could affect the timing of
a North Victnamese decision to launch a major offensive. This
could be particularly important during the 1975-76 dry season
period. With U.S. presidential elections coming up in 1976,
Hanoi might reason -- as it did in 1968 and 1972 -- that
recourse to major military action was especially propitious.
CIA is concerned that the drawdown recommended in Option II
might lead Hanoi to conclude that the U.S. was no longer a
restraining factor on Communist military plans and actions
and that the likelihood of a resurgence in the U.S. presence
in Thailand was exceedingly low or even non-existent.
C. We would not anticipate serious problems with the Thai
government in retaining a U.S. force level in Thailand in
excess of 7,000 during FY 76. From the Thai perspective, the
important matter is showing progress in reducing the U.S.
presence, not in reducing it to any particular level. Indeed,
there is a general acknowledgment within the Thai government,
especially among the military leaders, of the value of the U.S.
presence and it concern that it not be reduced too quickly.
D. The Thai leaders, however, are concerned over what they
can expect to get out of the continued presence of U.S. forces in
Thailand. (This concern applies to any of the options under con-
sideration.) In short, the Thai want to know what the quid pro quo
is for permitting U.S. forces to remain or Thai soil, but its cost
would not necessarily be high. For example, the establishment or
expansion of joint Thai U.S. activities (such as assistance on
highway. and railroad modernization projects, joint intelligence
operations, etc.) would:help to make a continued U.S. presence more
palatable to the Thai.
SColl W. B. Colby
FORD
Director
a
Mr. John B. Dexter, Dept. of State
GERALD
LISA
SECRET
(C)
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506
4d
SECRET- GDS
March 23, 1974
National Security Decision Memorandum 249
TO:
The Secretary of Defense
The Director of Central Intelligence
The Deputy Secretary of State
SUBJECT:
U.S. Deployments in Thailand
The President has reviewed the studies submitted in response to NSSM
171, related studies, and the views of the concerned Departments and
Agencies. He has directed that the following actions be taken:
The Secretary of Defense should:
- - Withdraw unessential non-strike aircraft (EC-121's and
C-130's) by June 1, 1974.
-- Withdraw US combat forces between May 15 and December 31,
1974, to a residual level of nine tactical air squadrons, one
AC-130 gunship squadron and 17 B-52's, as outlined in the plan
presented by the Secretary of Defense. These withdrawals
should be spaced over the period in question, with the precise
timing of the withdrawals to be determined in consultation with
the Thai Government.
-
-- Reduce MACTHAI/JUSMAGTHAI and U.S. Army Support Com-
mand manpower by 30 percent by August 31, 1974, consolidate
headquarters wherever possible and eliminate all unessential
headquarters and support units.
The Deputy Secretary of State should:
-- Immediately initiate consultations with the Royal Thai Govern-
ment on the foregoing withdrawal plans, on means of reducing
the economic dislocation caused by these withdrawals, and on
securing re-entry rights.
DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958 (as amended) SEC 3.3
SECRET GDS
FORD LIBRARY 075830
By NSC Memo, 3/30/06, State Dept. Guidelines ns/memov/30/09
NARA, Date 12/7/10
GDS
a 2 -
The Secretary of Defense, in coordination with the Deputy Secre-
tary of State, should prepare and submit for the President's con-
sideration no later than May 1, 1974, recommendations as to
equipment and facilities associated with US forces in Thailand
that can be made available for turnover to the Thai as US forces
are withdrawn.
The Secretary of Defense should also prepare and submit for the
President's consideration no later than May 1, 1974, alternative
plans and recommendations on the transfer of EC-47 aircraft to
either South Vietnam or Thailand or some combination of the two.
The Secretary of Defense in coordination with the Director of
Central Intelligence and the Deputy Secretary of State should sub-
mit recommendations on alternative long term (FY 76 and beyond)
US military force levels in Thailand and proposed withdrawal plans
to support each of the alternatives. These recommendations should
be submitted not later than June 30, 1974, for consideration by the
NSC Senior Review Group.
If
A. Kis
Henry A. Kissinger
CC: Director, Office of Management and Budget
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
SECRET GDS
FORD
CERALD
LOVEDIT
4E
NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet
WITHDRAWAL ID 032803
REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL
ÇNational security restriction
TYPE OF MATERIAL
ÇMemorandum
CREATOR'S NAME
J.R. Schlesinger
CREATOR'S TITLE
Secretary of Defense
RECEIVER'S NAME
Secretaries of the Military Departments
et al
TITLE
FY 74-SO Planning Guidance for
Southeast Asia Force and Activity
Levels
CREATION DATE
01/22/1974
VOLUME
4 pages
COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID
033700248
COLLECTION TITLE
NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER. NSC EAST
ASIAN AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS STAFF FILES
BOX NUMBER
5
FOLDER TITLE
Korea (7)
DATE WITHDRAWN
03/03/2011
WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST
TMH
4F
NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet
WITHDRAWAL ID 032804
REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL
ÇNational security restriction
TYPE OF MATERIAL
ÇMemorandum
CREATOR'S NAME
J.R. Schlesinger
RECEIVER'S TITLE
Assistant to the President for National
Security Affairs
TITLE
U.S. Deployments in Thailand
CREATION DATE
01/22/1974
VOLUME
3 pages
COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID
033700248
COLLECTION TITLE
NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER. NSC EAST
ASIAN AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS STAFF FILES
BOX NUMBER
5
FOLDER TITLE
Korea (7)
DATE WITHDRAWN
03/03/2011
WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST
TMH
4G
NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet
WITHDRAWAL ID 032805
REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL
ÇNational security restriction
TYPE OF MATERIAL
ÇMemorandum
CREATOR'S NAME
J.R. Schlesinger
RECEIVER'S TITLE
Assistant to the President for National
Security Affairs
TITLE
Carrier Alert Posture in Southeast Asia
CREATION DATE
01/1974
VOLUME
1 page
COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID
033700248
COLLECTION TITLE
NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER. NSC EAST
ASIAN AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS STAFF FILES
BOX NUMBER
5
FOLDER TITLE
Korea (7)
DATE WITHDRAWN
03/03/2011
WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST
TMH
4h
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
SECRET
November 21, 1973
MEMORANDUM FOR
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
SUBJECT:
U.S. Deployments in Thailand
After considering Deputy Secretary Clements' memorandum of October 13,
1973, the President has decided that, in light of the threat of a North
Vietnamese offensive, there should be
to 1bc conclusion of the 74 dey acason.
It is requested that the Department of Defense prepare a plan for with-
drawal of forces to the force level goal common to both Options 1 and 2
of the Defense study.
specifing PH.35. The timing
of the withdrawals should take into account projected requirements ior
the FY 75 dry season. This plan should be submitted by January 31, 1974.
and should include recommended sortie surge capabilities and the key
decision points for modification of the withdrawal plan.
It is also requested that a contingency plan be prepared for the possible
withdrawal of some unessential, non-strike capabilities (c.g. g. RB-66,
EC-12], 0-2) during the next few months on relatively short notice.
This 'vould provide some flexibility to withdraw forces should internal
presseres on the RTG make this desirable during the coming dry scason.
This plan should be submitted by December 15, 1973. Neither of these
plans should be discussed with Thai officials.
Directly related to these withdrawals is the question of the equipment
which could be left behind for turnover to the Thais as the units are
withdrawn. In order to determine the exient to which we may respond
to Thai requests, the President has directed a review of the equipment
of all U.S. forces 10 be withdrawn through FY 75. The review should be
submitted by December 15, 1973, and should identify:
oyas.
Equipment which the Thai military would like to acquire.
LIDERA
DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958 (as-amended) SEC 3.3
SECRET
NSC Memo, 3/30/06, State Dept. Guidelines
ASC guiddines 9/17/03
By
in
NARA, Date 12/7/10
Soc nos Cent 11: %-
SGRET
2.
Equipment for which DOD believes Thailand has a valid military
need (particularly as regards counter insurpency operations) and
the capability 1.0 support and maintain, with explanations where
DOD judgment differs from Thai desires.
Equipment required to support U.S. capability for rapid reintroducti
of forces into Thailand.
Significant legal, operational, or budgelary constraints on turning
the identified equipment over to the Thais.
It is also requested that the requirement for the numerous headquarters
and support units in Thailand be examined. Recommended manning levels
and timing of reductions where applicable should be submitted for each
unit. Headquarters and supporting units should be eliminated or con-
solidated where possible. Special attention should be given to reducing
excessive military presence in Bangkok. Recommendations together
with supporting rationale should be submitted by December 15, 1973.
Honry A. Kissinger
FORD
LIBRARY
SECRET
Frache 5
THE WHITE HOUSE
4236
WASHINGTON
R
CONFIDENTIAL - GDS
October 28, 1974
MEMORANDUM FOR:
THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
SUBJECT:
Reduction in Manpower Authorization, Joint
U.S. Military Advisory Group, Korea
The manpower authorization reduction proposed in your memo-
randum of September 19, 1974, has been reviewed and is approved.
However, no action should be taken prior to completion of the
President's trip to Korea.
Kissinger
CONFIDENTIAL - GDS
DECLASSIFIED
(n)
SEC 3.3
By In
NSC Memo,
3/30/20,
Guidelines
NARA, Date Dept 12/7/10
Frache FY!
was Roka
5672
THE WHITE HOUSE
R
WASHINGTON
Date: Nov. 4, 1974
MEMO FOR: JEANNE DAVIS
FROM:
DAXMXKPXXKER
WARREN RUSTAND
The attached is for your appropriate handling.
(Ltr. from Seoul, Korea, with signed
Thank you. petitions re: conditions, welfare,
and development of Korea)
bb
6P
October 1974
Seoul
Koin The
T/D
Honorable Mr. Gerald R. Ford
SCHEDULE ED.
President of The United States
DATE RECEIVED
The White House
Washington, D.C.
NOV 4 1974
MESSAGE
SPEAKERS BUREAU
OTHER
Dear Mr. President:
ASC
The signers of this letter are all men and APROINTMENT OFFICE
living and serving in the Republic of Korea. Out of our deep
concern for the welfare and development of Korea and its peo-
ple, we wish to bring to your attention the critical situation
now existing in this nation.
We are sure that you are aware of the imprisonment of
scores of students, Christian clergymen, social leaders, law-
yers and common citizens. These men and women have been ar-
rested on false political charges. The military courts that
have tried them have prostituted even military court standards,
let alone standards of normal civil procedures. Sentences of
several years to death have been handed down despite absence
of evidence. Eight men are to die for their part in a so-called
conspiracy which the government has not been able to prove ever
existed.
In addition to these dramatic violations of human rights,
countless citizens are under the ruthless surveillance of the
Korean Central Intelligence Agency; professors at universities
are examined lest they have "disloyal" ideas; businessmen are
under constant police pressure to make political "contribu-
tions"; workers have had their rights to collective bargain-
ing and collective action taken away; and ordinary citizens
in the markets, tea rooms and other public places must care-
fully guard their speech lest they be overheard to offend the
government in some manner.
These crimes against human rights and civil liberties
are, however, only the by-product of a more fundamental pro-
blem; that being the "Yushin" Constitution ("Revitalizing
Reforms"). This constitution, forcefully pressed upon the
Korean people under a decree of martial law in October of
1972, eliminated democratic legislative government in Korea;
made one man, Park Chung Hee, virtual dictator for life; and
allowed Mr. Park and his C.I.A. to suspend any person or group
of their civil liberties at any time. The tragic events of
1974 are a. consequence of this Yushin constitution. Therefore
large numbers of the Korean people are demanding that the Yu-
shin constitution be withdrawn and the democratic constitution
which existed up to 1972 be reinstated. This is a just demand
LIBRARY
which must be recognized if Korea is to return to the path
of democracy and development.
Some rationalize that the Yushin constitution and the
suppression practiced by Park and his C.I.A. are necessary
in order to defend the country against a threatened invasion
from North Korea. In fact, however, the observable results
are the exact opposite. South Korea is so filled with mis-
trust and fear arising from Park's constitution and the re-
sultant policies, that the social unity needed to defend
against the North has certainly been weakened. Moderniza-
tion of Korea's military cannot restore the confidence of
the citizens in their government. Park's government has
undermined its own military forces as well as those of the
United States which just recently have again been pledged
to defend the Republic of Korea.
How will the rest of the world react to America's con-
tinuing support of Park's dictatorial policies? The recent
Congressional Hearings have clearly pointed out not only a
shift in U.S. public opinion, but also the grave disadvan-
tages of the U.S. continuing its unconditional support of
the Park regime. We too are of the strong opinion that it
would be in the best interest of both Korea and the U.S.--
diplomatically, economically, and militarily to convey strong
disapproval of the trend of events in this country over the
last few years. We feel that your visit, if it does not in-
clude this expression of disapproval, will only prove to mil-
lions of observers that the U.S. government does, in fact, ful-
ly support the oppressive policies of the present Korean gov-
ernment.
Mr. President, we are writing this letter out of love
and commitment to the people of Korea. We wish you to be fully
informed of these facts when you make your visit here in Nov-
ember. Already Korean newspapers have said that the government
is likely to release some political prisoners before your visit.
Of course, if this occurs, we, along with the people of Korea,
will rejoice at such a move. However, at the same time we must
recognize this act for what it is: only a gesture to impress
the world and particularly the United States. We would mourn
the fact that it was done with such motivation rather than as
a genuine attempt to restore the integrity of this nation.
In light of these facts we ask that you strongly urge the
leaders of the Republic of Korea to release all the political
prisoners apprehended since October, 1972; to rescind the re-
maining Emergency Measures; and to abolish the Yushin Consti-
tution, reinstating in its place the democratic. constitution
which existed up to October, 1972. We also strongly suggest
that you meet with opposition religious, social, and political
leaders.
FORD
LIBRAR
We, the signers, representing various churches, agencies,
and organizations, will be glad to meet with you or any of
your accompanying party to discuss these matters directly.
We pray that your visit will have some influence in healing
the present tragic situation.
Sincerely yours,
The Undersigned
R.
FORD
Gerry Lignature agle Seoul Nutronallno. Methodist Professor, Mission
Position
Organization
State
Pa.
Harritt P. Mom Social Worker U.S. Army
Conn.
Martin I howery, m.m. Parish advisor Priest
Maryfull Fathers mission
Illinois
Suzanne B. Rice Coirls welfare association United Presbyterian hew you
Consultant
Very Rev. J.P. Sinnort Vicar General
alfred V. Keane m.m. Regimal Corrdination
Manyhroll Hatters
Ma you
Juichon Discese New York
Louise on. Durat Teacher
methodist mission Jenn
age Matthew Student Worker
Methodist Mission Iowa
John Corzoran Regional Virictor
Maryhmoll Missions R.J.
DD Missionary Missimary
Baptest Missin N.C.
Methodistmission Colo.
Basil m. Price
Chifessor
Robert J. Killy
Missionary Professor
Society offeres
Society / Jean Wisconson Calif.
willa Bernen missionary
Joanne Fisher Secretary - n.e.c. Korea
United " Church % Canada " B.C. Sask.
Dorothy Ogle
Nurse
Methodist Mission Illinois
Signature
Position
Organization
State
Sr. ann Hayden
Professional Name Maryknoll Sisters Kentucky
Sr. Signid Christine Ortis Social morker maryboll sister newyork
Jr. Dolores Congdon Public Health hurse many Rnoll Sistus how your
Sr, Mary Hock
Pedietric Murse MaryKnok Sister Pa,
An. Rice Donnin
R.n.
Marykuser Acaters Thash.
& Patricia Aathyik Secretary
maryknoll Sista mass.
Sr Jean maloney
Vice-President
Korean Sisters Association
manypoll Sicter n.y.
& Madeline Minds Referremed Turoe Nw York
Nurse
International catholic BELGION
auxiliaries
Sr. Anne Marie Cunin
Pediatrician
Franciscon inster FRENCH
SR. Minim
L. Dolnes Deni
University teacher
marybonall Authors
New york
Dr. Esther M. Kelly
Phumacist
Merghnoll Sisters Pa.
f Jugs Junn
hurse
Mire had Sisters New York
Christine Groppe
Prof your mets.
youse's Unio calif,
a
FORD
VERALA
LIBRARY
Signature
Position
Organization
State
Donald g. Gulet ,MM Pastor
Marybroll Fathers Maine
Charles Robak M.M. Missionary
Manykwoel Fathers Mass.
Benedict Zweler mm. Missionary
Manyboll Fathers Minin
apprew E. Eichmann M.M. Missionary
Mangurall Fathers New York
Gera missioner
James J. Missioner
marykoll Fathers new Yoek
Rechard Missionsn
Maryknoll Pathers new york
Fns. Mich.
Linda Huffman Jones,M.Ph. Researcher
Johnson Professor/Missionary
Yonsei University Illinois
Edwarder Pitras Professor
Youse: University South Dakote
Lerop Professor
Methodist Heol Seminy Mass.
United Mission Pre bytorsis mich
Elva D. Harper Missionery
Bd of Olobal Ministries
Unitedy Methods Lchunh
Board of Glabal Ministries
Illinois
Charlatt Harper Professor, Makaum methodist College
united Methodist hurch Ellinois
FORD is LISMAR 0703
Signature
Position
Organization
State
Nancy nelson Teacher- Preslugterian Missin Illenois
Dirk Nelson Visiting Prottessor Presby. mission Illinois
a.h. Stanley
Teacher
Presby. Mission Virginia
Am Burton
Betty Urgelars
Professor
Presby. Mission Ill
Missionary
Presby. Mission Wis.
W:R. RansemRice Jr
Missionary
Prealy Mission New YORK
David Jones Urban Researcher Presly. Mission Illinois
FORD is LIBRARY
Signature
Position
Organization
State
John Goulde s).
High School Teacher
Society of Jtsus
WISCONSIN
my 20 anits
administration
drug of your
Wis
S
Rishand McCashin S1. missinary Puferson
Society 7 Jenns
nebraska
Laugual Killersh of professor
John D. mace 50., professor
Society I Jus Nebraska Iowa
Society of Jenes
Wilter Hums
Robertk. s/- Catholic Professor priest
Society of Jesas
Wisconsin
Sogary University Florida
Edward & Farren, sg Priest-Professor
Sogang University
Pennsylvania
SEALD FORD LIBRA
Signature
Position
Organization
State
Deneey. Portran
Professn at Ewha University United Methodect Church Massachusetts
spid girsberg
Lecturer at Sogang University I.C.A.
W. Germany
Colette Nov
decturer at Kozyo University Juter Culture Association French
GERALD R. FORD
Freebe +YI 7a h
MEMORANDUM
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
ACTION
C Generbally 5254 & har w/ eld
CONFIDENTIAL
November 5, 1974
Nicholand. Basic
MEMORANDUM FOR:
GENERAL SCOWCROFT
correspond) dence
FROM:
JOHN A. FROEBE, JR. 120b
SUBJECT:
Request by Eight Congressmen to Call
on the President Prior to his Visit to
South Korea
And lson
by
Eight Congressmen have written the President (Tab A) asking to meet
11/14/74 248
with him prior to his visit to South Korea in order to discuss their
concerns about President Park's handling of his internal political
situation. Mr. Timmons has given the Congressmen an interim reply
(also at Tab A), saying that the President's heavy schedule for the
near future makes a call unlikely but that he would refer the matter to
the Appointments Secretary.
I recommend strongly against the President's seeing the eight Congressmen
before his Japan-Korea trip. The Congressmen include some of those
who have been the most strident critics of the Park Government and who
have been at the forefront of Congressional efforts to pressure the Park
Government through reduced military Indeed in this letter
they go even farther, suggesting that the President tell Park that "unless
human rights are restored to the Korean people, the U.S. will begin to
disengage from South Korea. " It seems to me that for the President to
meet with the Congressmen before his trip could complicate tactically
our handling of this problem both with the Congress and with the Park
Government.
I recommend that, instead, you suggest to Mr. Rustand that he inform
the Congressmen that the President's schedule regretfully does not in
fact allow him to see them before his trip to Korea, but that the President
will be writing the Congressmen about this question in the very near
future. I would intend to forward a draft Presidential reply to you within
the next few days as soon as we are clearer on the scheduling possibilities
for the President to address the South Korean National Assembly and to
meet with non-governmental leaders in Seoul.
DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958 (as amended) SEC 3.3
CONFIDENTIAL
By
NSC Memo, has 3/30/06, State Dept. Guidelines
NARA, Date 12/7/10
888817 BENALD FORD
GONFIDENTIAL
2
RECOMMENDATION:
That you call Mr. Rustand suggesting that he inform the eight Congressmen
as suggested above.
APPROVE
DISAPPROVE
Concurrence:
Mr. Janka H
CONFIDENTIAL
52.54
ab
ACTION
T/D
October 30, 1974
SCHFDULE DD.
DATE RECEIVED
NOV 1 1974
MESSAGE
Dear Tips
SPEAKERS BUREAU
OTHER
: would like to acknowledge and thank you for your
October 24 letter to the President in which WASHINTMENT OFFICE
and caven of your colleagues request a measing with
his before his experience for South Zorea.
The President's schedule in extremely heavy et this
time and will continue to be for the asse coveral
weeks. nowever, I shall call your letter to ALS
early attention as well 20 to the Appointments
Secretary, and I 50 sare that every emapideration
will be vivea to your request for & vesting. Also,
2 shall units your CONCORNA known to the President's
foreign policy advisors.
Bith best wishes,
Sincerely,
William S. Timmons
Assistant to the President
NAT. KOREAN Assumply
The Nonorable Theras 2. o'weill
Rouse of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515
MET:EF:frw
bee w/inc to Warren Rustand for further action
bee w/inc to Ceneral Scowcroft - PYI
bee w/inc to Shirley Hays - FYI
Same ach sent to all signees
FORD
STRALD
LIBRAGE
1C
Congress of the United States
house of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515
October 24, 1974
The President
The White House
1600 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D. C.
Dear Mr. President:
Your decision to visit South Korea in November carries
some grave risks for U.S. foreign policy. The situation with
respect to human rights in South Korea has received extensive consider-
ation both by the Foreign Affairs Committee during the hearings and
mark-up of the foreign aid bill, as well as during joint hearings
by the Subcommittees on International Organizations and Movements
and on Asian and Pacific Affairs. We would greatly appreciate having
the opportunity to meet with you to discuss the Korean trip and how
it can best reflect the common aspirations of the Korean and American
people for the attainment of human rights and fundamental freedoms.
As you are aware, President Park Chung Hee has in recent years
placed severe restrictions on the exercise of fundamental civil rights
and liberties. At the present time, approximately 200 people are in
prison for violating decrees which made it a crime to propose revisions
in the Constitution or for students to engage in political activity.
Those imprisoned include Protestant and Catholic clergyman, university
professors, and political leaders. A former President of South Korea
received a suspended sentence and the opposition candidate for the
Presidency in 1971 (who received about 46% of the vote) was kidnapped
from Japan and is under house arrest.
We are sure you would not want your visit to South Korea to be
interpreted as approving or even condoning the unwarranted excesses
of governmental power exercised by President Park. On the contrary,
we hope that you will use this opportunity to convey to President Park
the growing concern Americans have about the destruction of democracy
in Korea. President Park should be informed that unless human rights
are restored to the Korean people, the United States will begin to
disengage from South Korea. The House Foreign Affairs Committee and
the Senate Foreign Relations Committee have placed restrictions on
military assistance to South Korea because of the oppression in that
country.
The President
The White House
Page 2
As you may be aware, members of the opposition political
parties, as well as church and university officials, are advocating
a revision of the Constitution to restore political freedoms. A
debate has commenced in the National Assembly. Although President
Park has lifted two emergency decrees he has not shown any sign of
responding positively to these demands. If, during your visit, you
should meet only with leaders in the government, the Korean people
would interpret this behavior as indicating approval for continuing
the present authoritarian government. We therefore strongly urge
you to address the National Assembly and meet privately with opposition
political party leaders, as well as church and university officials.
We sincerely hope that you will be able to meet with us before
making your trip to South Korea.
Sincerely yours,
mr.
Jonathan B. Bingham Bigh
mr,
Aea
Lloyd Meeds
Near
Thrmas Oninf
Donald M. Fraser
3
I
Thomas P. O'Neill
RUHHIL
Day
Lee H. Hamilton
M
mo
Morris K. Udall
Dear
Patry T. mink
Pear
mondall
Patsy T. Mink
Dear www.
Charles W. Whalen
Dear churter
DMF gw
CC: Hon. Henry Kissinger - Secretary of State
Chuck Whalen
Hon. Philip C. Habib - Assistant Secretary of State
for East Asian and Pacific Affairs
Mr. Donald L. Ranard - Director Korea Office, Department of State
FORD
GP
8a
MEMORANDUM
5315
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
TOR SECRET
ACTION
November 6, 1974
MEMORANDUM FOR:
GENERAL SCOWCROFT
FROM:
JOHN A. FROEBE, JR.
SUBJECT:
Preparation for the President's
Japan and South Korean Visits
At Tab I is a draft memorandum from you to the President attaching
background reading materials for his visits to Japan and Korea as he
has requested. J. have also included in the memorandum a brief
resume of other aspects of the preparations for his visit to Japan
and Korea which will involve him next week.
DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958 (as amended) SEC 3.3
FORD
By NSC in Memo, M 3/30/06, State Dept. Guidelines
NARA, Date 12/9/10
DORALD
TOP 00 CRET
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8B
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CREATOR'S NAME
Brent Scowcroft
RECEIVER'S TITLE
The President
TITLE
Preperation for Your Japan and South
Korean Visits
CREATION DATE
11/1974
VOLUME
2 pages
COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID
033700248
COLLECTION TITLE
NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER. NSC EAST
ASIAN AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS STAFF FILES
BOX NUMBER
5
FOLDER TITLE
Korea (7)
DATE WITHDRAWN
03/03/2011
WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST
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9
ROK
MEMORANDUM
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
SECRET
INFORMATION
November 15, 1974
MEMORANDUM FOR:
GENERAL SCOWCROFT
FROM:
JOHN A. FROEBE,
JR
JOR-
SUBJECT:
Briefing Materials for Counsellors
Hartmann and Rumsfeld
You have asked me to assemble State Department briefing materials
on Korea and Japan that would be appropriate for Counsellors Hartmann
and Rumsfeld.
Les Janka informs me that State is putting together a comprehensive
fact book for all persons accompanying the President on the trip. I
believe this should meet Messrs. Hartmann and Rumsfeld's needs
as I understand them. To provide more would get into the substantive
briefing materials, which you said you did not think it necessary to
provide.
FORD
ED S.S
NSC ivemo,
Guidelines
;
By
NARA Date 12/1/10
SECRET
1
10a
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CREATOR'S NAME
David Elliott
RECEIVER'S NAME
General Scowcroft
TITLE
Sale of Canadian Nuclear Reactor to
South Korea
CREATION DATE
11/18/1974
VOLUME
2 pages
COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID
033700248
COLLECTION TITLE
NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER. NSC EAST
ASIAN AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS STAFF FILES
BOX NUMBER
5
FOLDER TITLE
Korea (7)
DATE WITHDRAWN
03/03/2011
WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST
TMH
10B
NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet
WITHDRAWAL ID 032807
REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL
ÇNational security restriction
TYPE OF MATERIAL
ÇIntelligence Report
DESCRIPTION
Re Canada and South Korea
CREATION DATE
11/16/1974
VOLUME
1 page
COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID
033700248
COLLECTION TITLE
NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER. NSC EAST
ASIAN AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS STAFF FILES
BOX NUMBER
5
FOLDER TITLE
Korea (7)
DATE WITHDRAWN
03/03/2011
WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST
TMH
Fraebe
a
MEMORANDUM
5478
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
ACTION
November 25, 1974
R
MEMORANDUM FOR:
R. ELLIOTT
FROM:
JEANNE W. DAVIS
your
SUBJECT:
Suggested Reply to Mr. LeRoy Brown
Concerning His Recommendation that
Dr. Kyo R. Jhin Accompany the
President to South Korea
Attached at Tab A is a draft reply from you to Mr. LeRoy Brown,
who wrote the President recommending that Dr. Kyo R. Jhin accompany
the President on his visit to South Korea.
Dear Mr. Brown:
I have been asked to respond to your letter of November 11, 1974,
to the President recommending that he include Dr. Kyo R. Jhin in
his party for his visit to the Republic of Korea.
I can assure you that we gave careful consideration to your
recommendation, and that we appreciated Dr. Jhin's qualifications.
Regretfully, however, it was not possible to bring Dr. Jhin into
the preparations for the visit.
May I express our appreciation for your taking the time to bring
Dr. Jhin's talents to our attention.
Sincerely,
Roland L. Elliott
Mr. LeRoy Brown
State Superintendent of Education
Department of Education
State Office Building
Montgomery, Alabama 36104
NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet
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CREATOR'S NAME
J.A. Froebe
RECEIVER'S NAME
W.R. Smyser
TITLE
North Korean Tunneling
CREATION DATE
11/29/1974
VOLUME
1 page
COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID
033700248
COLLECTION TITLE
NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER. NSC EAST
ASIAN AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS STAFF FILES
BOX NUMBER
5
FOLDER TITLE
Korea (7)
DATE WITHDRAWN
03/03/2011
WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST
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11/29/74
SECRET
kolz
TALKING POINTS FOR THE PRESIDENT ON HIS VISIT TO KOREA
My Korean visit was marked by a genuine welcome of the
kind we do not see much any more. There must have been 2 million
people lining the streets between the airport and the hotel.
I think it was very important for me to have gone to Korea.
If I had not gone, the North Koreans might have underestimated our
determination to support our friends as well as our commitment to
stability in the area.
What the Koreans have done economically is just astonishing.
Seoul looks like a modern American city, with skyscrapers, cars,
and an obviously thriving economy.
-- I was also very impressed by our troops in Korea. From all
that I could see, their moral and their training are very high. I am
glad I visited them so that they do not think that we have forgotten
them.
-- It is clear that President Park believes he is directly menaced
by North Korean aggression. He spoke of the tunnel that was recently
discovered as evidence of this. I think we have to recognize that he is
going to want all the military aid that we can give him. More importantly,
he regards the sustained level of our forces as vital, at least for the
near term. He wants us to complete our program of assistance to the
Modernization Plan for South Korean forces as soon as possible. I
reaffirmed our support for the Plan, and said we hoped to speed up our
military assistance in support of the Plan.
I told President Park that he can count on us to keep our forces
in Korea at present levels and that he can count on our continued military
and economic assistance subject to Congressional funding limitations.
-- I also pointed out that we maintain our commitments in an era
of detente and that we will not take actions that affect their interests
without consulting them.
-- I did not dwell on President Park's internal policies and
problems. I merely pointed out to him the possible impact of such
problems on our ability to continue to support him.
SECRET
Guidelines
NSC
By
NARA, Date
12/7/10
reparcere
5822
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a
MEMORANDUM
Rot
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
ACTION
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE
November 29, 1974
MEMORANDUM FOR:
SECRETARY KISSINGER
FROM:
W. R. Smyser N RS as/tnc
SUBJECT:
My Meeting with American Missionaries
in Korea
I met in Seoul on November 23 with the American missionaries opposed
to the Park regime, as you instructed.
Attached (at Tab A) is the requested report for the President on the
meeting.
RECOMMENDATION:
That you sign the attached memorandum for the President (Tab A).
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MEMORANDUM
5822
14b
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
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MEMORANDUM FOR:
THE PRESIDENT
FROM:
Henry A. Kissinger
SUBJECT:
Meeting of the American Missionaries
in Korea with a Member of the NSC
Staff
One of the members of the NSC Staff met with a group of American
missionaries in Korea after our departure. He met with them at their
request to hear their views opposing the policies of President Park.
The missionaries, who belong to various Christian denominations,
made the following principal points:
-- The Korean people feel alienated from the Park Government.
But they are not against the Government. They just favor things that
the Government opposes, like certain democratic liberties.
-- The opposition does not want to overthrow the Government
but to change its nature. It offers no alternative regime.
-- The principal opposition demand is to eliminate the new consti-
tution (which permits Park to rule beyond his original two terms).
-- President Park believes that all his opposition is linked to the
communists, and he labels it as such. This is not correct.
-- The United States shares responsibility for events in Korea
because we lost nearly 40,000 men and because we have been there
since the armistice in 1953.
-- The Korean Government regards your visit and the communique
with great satisfaction, but other Koreans are deeply disappointed.
-- President Park may become even tougher with the opposition
now that he has been bolstered by the visit of the American President.
This would be seen by Koreans as a direct insult to the United States,
and the United States should speak out.
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2
The NSC staff member said that he would report the views of the
American missionaries, as he ba been commissioned to do.
FORD
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15.00
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
VIA LDX
WASHINGTON, D.C. 2050G
r
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE
November 29, 1974
ATTACHMENT
MEMORANDUM FOR:
Mr. George S. Springsteen
Executive Secretary
Department of State
SUBJECT:
Presidential Message to President Park
Will you please transmit the attached cable to Embassy Seoul
for delivery to President Park.
Jeanne Staff am Secreta Davis
Attachment
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156
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TO:
AMEMI VESI SEOUL
Please pass the following message for President Ford to President
Park:
Be gin text
Dear President Park:
Please let me express my appreciation for the cordial hospitality that
you and the people of the Republic of Korea extended to me during my visit.
The warmth of the welcome by so many of the Korean people was truly
overwhelming.
I appreciated the opportunity to exchange views with you during our
meetings and to greet other Korean leaders at the reception and dinner
that you kindly gave for me.
I believe that the United States and Korea will remain firm friends in
the future as they have been in the past. I was pleased to reaffirm the
depth of our friendship and of our r commitment during this visit.
With best wishes,
a
Gerald Ford
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FORD