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562 to 325-a November 21, 1950 At a meeting last night in the Secretary's office, he discussed in some detail the current situation in Korea and analyzed the problem along the following lines. He said there were four parts of this analysis: (1) We should see whether General MacArthur has been told very clearly what to do and whether this is within his capabilities. (2) We should examine the effect of various courses on the probability of bringing on general hostilities and war. (3) What is the area of political adjustment and what are the pluses and minuses with regard to them. (4) What is the effect of the general military posture of the United States and does this require change in policies. With regard to (1) above, the Secretary said there was a possibility of some confusion in General MacArthur's mind because he has a straight military directive from the Joint Chiefs of Staff and also has general orders sent from the United Nations. On a straight military basis, he was told to pursue the enemy forces north of the 38th and destroy them as a military force. If the Chinese appeared, he was to continue the mission until it was evident he could not succeed. The Secretary felt that no one should change this part of the directive until General MacArthur had had a chance to "probe" the situation. The Secretary said that the civil affairs directive may have affected General MacArthur's interpretation of the military directive. He referred particularly to that portion on occupation. He said that the civil affairs directive does confuse and does not take into consideration the contingency of the Chinese communists coming in, as does the military directive. The Secretary said we must talk to the Joint Chiefs of Staff about this and clear up any misunderstanding, if one exists. We must point out that we are not interested in "real estate" but in an army. DECLASSIFTED E. O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) DE TOP SLUND 3-22-2777 Depr. of State letter, PROJECT NO NARS 76-17 Date 3-24-77 By NLT He