Ask the Scholar
Page 13 of 23
I can add historical knowledge about this page.
Page image
OCR
- 9 -
: ARCHIVES NATIONAL AND
entire lecture to this subject, for it is an interesting one and close to
my heart. I do not feel that we in this country always conducted ourselves
in the manner best calculated to reduce the dimensions of the Soviet threat.
I
think we might have done more to win the respect, if not the liking, of
the Russian Communists) and the respect of your enemies -- as we are apt
sometimes to forget - is nothing to be sneezed at. But I know of little
that we could have done to alter basically the political personality of
the Bolshevik leadership or to moderate the violent preconceptions against
Western democracy on which it was reared and with which it came into
power. These things had deep paychological roots, lying in specifically
Russian phenomena. Whether the capitalist democracies of the West had
done things prior to 1917 to deserve this burning hostility on the part
of the political power in Russia, I do not know. But I an sure that,
once developed, it was hardly to be altered by anything the West might do
directly; and the best reaction to it on our part would have been at all
times an attitude of great reserve, consistency, and dignity.
As for Japan, the problem of whether she had also be be ranged
against us in war in the early 1940's was of course primarily our problem --
not that of the French and British. I would wish that we could skip it
entirely for purposes of this discussion; for it is a tremendous subject
in itself, relatively remote from the causes of the war in Eupope, and
not easy to treat in a few words. But the fact of our simultaneous
involvement with Japan and Germany was so important an element in the course
and outcome of the war, that I think one cannot just pass the question by.
To discuss this problem at all adequately would be to discuss
the entire sequence of American-Jepanese relations over the half-century
Page data
- Page
- 13
- Source index
- 0
- Type
- photo
- Media ID
- d0f5f182bf3f8d04
- Size
- unknown
Document data
- ID
- 193223675
- Core
- doc
- Type
- document
DTO data
{
"id": "193223675",
"sourceUrl": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/193223675",
"contentType": "document",
"title": "Letter from George Kennan to Secretary of State Dean Acheson, with Attached Speech",
"citationUrl": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/193223675",
"collections": [
"Dean Acheson Papers",
"Secretary of State Files"
],
"iiifBase": "https://s3.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/lz/presidential-libraries/truman/hst-da/201181/1721929/1721929-28-01.jpg",
"thumbnailUrl": "https://s3.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/lz/presidential-libraries/truman/hst-da/201181/1721929/1721929-28-01.jpg",
"largeImageUrl": "https://s3.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/lz/presidential-libraries/truman/hst-da/201181/1721929/1721929-28-01.jpg",
"imageCount": 23,
"hasImages": true,
"source": "import",
"hasTranscription": false
}
Context sent to Scholar
Document identity
{
"localId": "193223675",
"label": "Letter from George Kennan to Secretary of State Dean Acheson, with Attached Speech",
"core": "doc",
"dtoType": "document",
"citationUrl": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/193223675"
}
Document source metadata
{
"id": "193223675",
"sourceUrl": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/193223675",
"contentType": "document",
"title": "Letter from George Kennan to Secretary of State Dean Acheson, with Attached Speech",
"citationUrl": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/193223675",
"collections": [
"Dean Acheson Papers",
"Secretary of State Files"
],
"iiifBase": "https://s3.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/lz/presidential-libraries/truman/hst-da/201181/1721929/1721929-28-01.jpg",
"thumbnailUrl": "https://s3.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/lz/presidential-libraries/truman/hst-da/201181/1721929/1721929-28-01.jpg",
"largeImageUrl": "https://s3.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/lz/presidential-libraries/truman/hst-da/201181/1721929/1721929-28-01.jpg",
"imageCount": 23,
"hasImages": true,
"source": "import",
"hasTranscription": false
}
Document source extras
{
"url": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/193223675",
"naId": 193223675,
"levelOfDescription": "item",
"productionDates": [
{
"day": 26,
"logicalDate": "1951-05-01",
"month": 5,
"year": 1951
}
],
"recordType": "description",
"ocrSource": "nara-archive"
}
Page context
{
"seq": 13,
"pageIndex": 0,
"type": "photo",
"url": "https://s3.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/lz/presidential-libraries/truman/hst-da/201181/1721929/1721929-28-13.jpg",
"mediaId": "d0f5f182bf3f8d04",
"ocrText": "- 9 -\n: ARCHIVES NATIONAL AND\nentire lecture to this subject, for it is an interesting one and close to\nmy heart. I do not feel that we in this country always conducted ourselves\nin the manner best calculated to reduce the dimensions of the Soviet threat.\nI\nthink we might have done more to win the respect, if not the liking, of\nthe Russian Communists) and the respect of your enemies -- as we are apt\nsometimes to forget - is nothing to be sneezed at. But I know of little\nthat we could have done to alter basically the political personality of\nthe Bolshevik leadership or to moderate the violent preconceptions against\nWestern democracy on which it was reared and with which it came into\npower. These things had deep paychological roots, lying in specifically\nRussian phenomena. Whether the capitalist democracies of the West had\ndone things prior to 1917 to deserve this burning hostility on the part\nof the political power in Russia, I do not know. But I an sure that,\nonce developed, it was hardly to be altered by anything the West might do\ndirectly; and the best reaction to it on our part would have been at all\ntimes an attitude of great reserve, consistency, and dignity.\nAs for Japan, the problem of whether she had also be be ranged\nagainst us in war in the early 1940's was of course primarily our problem --\nnot that of the French and British. I would wish that we could skip it\nentirely for purposes of this discussion; for it is a tremendous subject\nin itself, relatively remote from the causes of the war in Eupope, and\nnot easy to treat in a few words. But the fact of our simultaneous\ninvolvement with Japan and Germany was so important an element in the course\nand outcome of the war, that I think one cannot just pass the question by.\nTo discuss this problem at all adequately would be to discuss\nthe entire sequence of American-Jepanese relations over the half-century"
}