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5/15/54 - Reel 2, Track 1, Page 1 MR. McGHEE: ...the Iranian situation is that, while they were discussing the supplemental agreement, that they offered 50/50, but I have no evidence of that, and the Iranians would not; and of course it is hardly likely that the Iranians would have accepted the supplemental agreement which provided much less than the true 50/50 if they had in fact been offered the 50/50 Of course, to look at it from the Anglo- Iranian standpoint, they were in this difficulty the 50/50 to them GAN meant their world-wide operation, because frankly the Iranians had a May se ) 20% interest--had to have an interest in their whole world-wide Us operation, not just the part of the operation in Iran. The 50/50 for Aramco referred only to their operation in Iran--I' mean Saudi Arabia- not their whole worldwide operation. That was the basic difficulty Anglo-Iranian faced in offering 50/50 in the first place, which I think we VOICE: I think when they finally offered 50,50, it was on the basis of operations in Iran, not world-wide. MR. McGHEE: That's right. That is correct; but, see, it was merely an offer, as I understand it, in principle and not detailed. So I assume how they were to accomplish this was never spelled out. But Hussein (?), who was Foreign Minister in my time and was Prime Minister when the ? agreement was agreed, explained to me why he turned down the supplemental agreement and (unintelligible) he said he didn't realize at the moment. He said that he was in London and he had called on the--I forget who the British official was, but I think it was the Prime Minister at that time-- and they were discussing this. And he gathered the impression from his discussions that they would probably go a little further, and so when he went back he fixtik refused to ratify this because he thought they could get a little more out of it. He told Razmara that when he came into power.