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OCR Page 1 of 2NLT(Naval Aide)384
OFFICE OF
Declassisies
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
E. 0. 12065, Sec.3-402
WASHINGTON
State Dept. Gundetines, Mara 6,1982
By DEB NLT, Date 9-10-85
August 25, 1952
TOP SECRET SECURITY INE ORMA TION
SUMMARY OF TELEGRAMS
Baltic Maneuvers Mr. Churchill, in his capacity as acting head of the
Foreign Office, sent Mr. Selwyn-Lloyd to see
Ambassador Gifford yesterday morning concerning the Bornholm phase
of Operation Main Brace. Churchill is extremely concerned over this
phase of the maneuvers. He feels strongly, and hopes we will agree
with him, that it is dangerously provocative in view of the obvious stra-
tegic importance of this Danish island to the USSR, a fact which is
further emphasized by the reluctance with which the Soviets evacuated
it after the war. Churchill suggests that the subject be treated with
great secrecy, perhaps not even giving prior notice to the Danes, and
that absolutely no further publicity be given, but that the commander of
the operation, acting ostensibly on his own authority, should simply fail
to carry out the Bornholm exercise and in practice regard the 14 degree
line as the eastern limit of Main Brace. Churchill assumes that this
would have to be considered by the Standing Group, but he would like to
know whether we would go along with him before instructing the British
member.
Meanwhile, Ambassador Kennan in Moscow has also
expressed misgivings about NATO's Baltic maneuvers. Commenting on
a Danish suggestion that the NATO should issue some sort of collective
warning to the Soviets about Bornholm Island, Kennan says he thinks this
would be unjustified and dangerous. He says that the Soviets have done
nothing so far but warn the Danes, in their curious and irritating way,
that they withdrew from the island on the understanding that it would not
be developed for military purposes against the Soviets, that their willing- -
ness to disinterest themselves in the island was conditional on the obser -
vance of this principle, and that they would regard the stationing of
non-Danish, particularly American forces, on the island as a violation
of the principle. Kennan suggests that it might be emphasized a bit more
than heretofore, but onlyyinformally through "leaks", answers to press
queries, etc. that US forces will not participate in the Baltic phase of the
maneuvers, and that in reality we should make sure that US personnel is
kept off the island, not even allowing small numbers of personnel to go
there for purposes we would consider relatively inoffensive.
TOP SECRET SECURITY INFORMA TION