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NLT(Naval Aide)384 OFFICE OF Declassisies THE SECRETARY OF STATE E. 0. 12065, Sec.3-402 WASHINGTON State Dept. Gundetines, Mara 6,1982 By DEB NLT, Date 9-10-85 August 25, 1952 TOP SECRET SECURITY INE ORMA TION SUMMARY OF TELEGRAMS Baltic Maneuvers Mr. Churchill, in his capacity as acting head of the Foreign Office, sent Mr. Selwyn-Lloyd to see Ambassador Gifford yesterday morning concerning the Bornholm phase of Operation Main Brace. Churchill is extremely concerned over this phase of the maneuvers. He feels strongly, and hopes we will agree with him, that it is dangerously provocative in view of the obvious stra- tegic importance of this Danish island to the USSR, a fact which is further emphasized by the reluctance with which the Soviets evacuated it after the war. Churchill suggests that the subject be treated with great secrecy, perhaps not even giving prior notice to the Danes, and that absolutely no further publicity be given, but that the commander of the operation, acting ostensibly on his own authority, should simply fail to carry out the Bornholm exercise and in practice regard the 14 degree line as the eastern limit of Main Brace. Churchill assumes that this would have to be considered by the Standing Group, but he would like to know whether we would go along with him before instructing the British member. Meanwhile, Ambassador Kennan in Moscow has also expressed misgivings about NATO's Baltic maneuvers. Commenting on a Danish suggestion that the NATO should issue some sort of collective warning to the Soviets about Bornholm Island, Kennan says he thinks this would be unjustified and dangerous. He says that the Soviets have done nothing so far but warn the Danes, in their curious and irritating way, that they withdrew from the island on the understanding that it would not be developed for military purposes against the Soviets, that their willing- - ness to disinterest themselves in the island was conditional on the obser - vance of this principle, and that they would regard the stationing of non-Danish, particularly American forces, on the island as a violation of the principle. Kennan suggests that it might be emphasized a bit more than heretofore, but onlyyinformally through "leaks", answers to press queries, etc. that US forces will not participate in the Baltic phase of the maneuvers, and that in reality we should make sure that US personnel is kept off the island, not even allowing small numbers of personnel to go there for purposes we would consider relatively inoffensive. TOP SECRET SECURITY INFORMA TION