Memorandum, State Department Summary of Telegrams

R DECLASSIFIED OFFICE OF 12065, Sec. 3-402 THE SECRETARY OF STATE 1982 State Dept. DEB E.O. Guidelines, NLT, Date March 9-10-85 6, WASHINGTON October 1, 1952 By SECRET SEGURITY INEORMATION SUMMARY OF TELEGRAMS SPAIN Assistant Secretary Perkins after conferring in Paris with Ambassador MacVeagh and other officials concerned with the Spanish negotiations reports that subject to minor changes the draft agreement seems acceptable and urges that formal instructions be issued from Washington as soon as possible for delivery of the memorandum to the Spanish Government. In a lengthy discussion as to what should be said to the Spanish on the subject of assurances of US military assistance, Mr. Perkins stressed that while Spain was eligible for such aid we could not give any kind of commitment on deliveries now or in the foreseeable future. While equipment for training valued at about $37 million probably could be made available, we would have to know Spain's requirements before informing them whether the items were available. The Department official suggested this point be illustrated by pointing out the importance to Western defense and to Spain of the German contribution and that until equipment had been provided in this and other categories there would be little to spare. AFGHANISTAN In evaluating the underlying significance of recent Soviet attempts to force Afghanistan to shelve its plans to develop the country's vital northern area our Embassy in Kabul stresses the belief the problem of Afghanistan cannot be viewed in isolation or in terms of past historical policies and the buffer state concept. When the time seems ripe the Kremlin may be expected to follow a more active policy. In addition, the Embassy regards Afghanistan's fate as closely bound up with the position of Iran and Turkey. It reports that the Afghan Government is showing unmistakable signs of weakening to the Soviet pressure on the oil exploration issue. The apparent Pakistan plan to view the development of Afghan-Soviet tension complacently in the hope that Afghanistan will be forced to come to terms on the Pushtoonistan issue is equally fatal. Meanwhile, we have informed our Embassy in Kabul that we believe the Soviet note does not pose any substantially new political problem for the Afghan Government, Although the seriousness of the over-all problem of economic development and the internal administration of the northern provinces in the context of Afghan-USSR relation is fully appreciated, we think the Soviet stand need not discourage con- tinuation of economic developments in that area and may have a salutary effect on Afghan-Pakistan relations. Aside from a desire for friendly SECRET SECURITY INFORMATION