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OCR Page 1 of 3NLT/NAVAL AIDE)434
OFFICE OF
DECLASSIFIED
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
E.O. 12065, Sec. 3-402
WASHINGTON
State Dept. Guidelines, March 6, 1982
By DEB NLT, Date 9-10-8
November 28, 1952
TOP SECRET SECURITY INFORMATION
SUMMARY OF TELEGRAMS
IRAQ
We have asked our Embassies in Baghdad and
London for clarification of reports that the
British believe the present crisis in Iraq might lead to a situation
in which their forces would have to intervene to protect British
and other friendly foreigners and British interests in Iraq, par- -
ticularly the oil installations at Kirkuk. At the same time, Embassy
London states the UK Foreign Office is not particularly concerned
over the possibility of nationalization of the Iraq oil industry. The
Foreign Office thinks that on the whole, intelligent Iraqis are con-
scious of the benefits derived from the oil concessions and aware
of the dangers of nationalization which have shown themselves in
the Iranian situation.
Our Ambassador in Baghdad has discussed the
damage to the US Information Service building which occurred during
the recent rioting. The tone of the Acting Foreign Minister and
the Foreign Office Under Secretary was one of sincere regret and
the Iraqi officials agreed that it was important to resume our in-
formation operations as soon as possible to combat Communist
propaganda. Our Embassy in analyzing recent developments notes
there is a very slender margin between stability and instability
in Iraq. The rioting demonstrated what a small, localized but
vocal and determined group can do against superior forces. Pre-
vious reports that social discontent and Communist strength in
Iraq are increasing have now been confirmed. A fundamental
weakness was the unwillingness of the authorizied to use sufficient
force to maintain control. The Embassy believes the total effect
has been to point up the hazardous position of the West and to in-
dicate the basis upon which we can influence Iraq is narrowing.
The Government's policy toward making open commitments to
the West is now likely to be more cautious than heretofore. Our
representatives further note that although the new Prime Minister,
General Nureddin Mahmoud, has promised direct elections, this
alone will not change the basic character of the regime and that
the gap between the Government and the middle and lower classes
remains.
TOP SEGRET SECURITY INFORMATION