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NLT/NOVALADE), 435 OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF STATE they 12065, Sec. 3-402 1982 WASHINGTON State DEP Dept. E.O. Guidelines, NLT, Date March 9-11-8) 6, December 2, 1952 By TOP SECRET SECURIT Y INF OR CMATION SUMMARY OF TELEGRAMS KOREA The Indian Ambassador in Tokyo in a conversation with Ambassador Murphy has confirmed the remarks of a member of his staff concerning the Chinese Communist attitude toward the Indian resolution on Korea. The Indian Ambassador said that while the Chinese at Peiping had not in so many words given prior approval to the idea of the Indian proposal, they stated no objection and allowed ground for inference that they favored the idea. The Indian diplomat added that Foreign Minister Vishinsky's intervention set forth in clear relief the extent of Soviet influence in Communist China and is undoubtedly a revelation to many Indians. Meanwhile, our Embassy in Pusan reports that elaborate Government-sponsored preparations for General Eisenhower's visit, plus a Korean press campaign implying that momentous results will follow, indicate the Koreans are being led to expect great things of the visit. Thus, in our Embassy's view, if immediate and dramatic developments do not occur, considerable disappointment may develop and popular resentment directed against the U. S. might follow. IRAN Embassy London reports the Foreign Office expects to request our observations very shortly on a proposed Parliamentary statement on the UK's attitude toward sales of Iranian oil. At the same time, the Foreign Office is somewhat apprehensive that the proposed statement might prejudice Iranian reception of any new proposals to be put forth as a result of forthcoming US - -UK conversations in London. The Foreign Office emphasizes, however, that it will be obliged to make a statement if we do. In view of these facts, Embassy London recommends withholding the US statement pending the London talks, unless there is strong pressure for issuing it at this time. Our Charge in Tehran states relations between Parliament and Prime Minister Mosadeq's Government have deteriorated since the November 25th session in which members of the Cabinet were pressed hard by several deputies. This coincided with information to the effect that some of Mosadeq's lieutenants are growing resentful at his arbitrary actions. Only a small group is reportedly aware of the Prime Minister's decisions before they are announced and our representatives T OP SEGRET SECURITY INF ORMATION