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OCR Page 1 of 2NLT (Naval Aide) 179
OFFICE OF
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON
DECLASSIFIED
March 8, 1951
E.O. 12065, Sec. 3-402
State Dept. Guidelines, March 6, 1982.0 P SECRET
By
D.B
NLT, Date 9-4-85
SUMMARY OF TELEGRAMS
F OUR - POWER
At the third session of the Paris talks on
EXPLORATORY TALKS
March 7 the Soviets indicated that they
were willing to include the Austrian Peace
Treaty on the agenda but only if the western powers were willing to dis- -
cuss the "fulfillment of the peace treaty with Italy in the part concerning
Trieste" as part of it. The western delegates refused to discuss the two
matters together, maintaining that there is no connection between the two
issues.
Ambassador Jessup feels that the obvious
answer to such a maneuver is to insist that the question of satellites'
violation of military and human rights clauses would also have to be dis- -
cussed in connection with the Austrian treaty. He feels that if we push
this angle hard, it might possibly lead to a compromise which would elimi-
nate reference to the Italian treaty as well as the satellite treaties.
YUGOSLAVIA
The French Government has proposed
through its Embassy here that, in view of
the real possibility of an attack on Yugoslavia this spring or summer, the
US, UK and French deputies now in Paris for the four power talks should
exchange views among themselves on the following points: 1) Should the
Western Powers convey a diplomatic warning to the satellite governments
of the serious consequences to themselves of aggression against Yugoslavia?
;
2) Might not such a warning logically accompany the forthcoming protests
against the violation of the military clauses of the peace treaties ?; and
3) If the attack takes place, what should be the Western reaction?
We have informed Ambassador Jessup that
we believe the action suggested in point 1) would be premature at the present
because of the lack of indication of any imminent attack upon Yugoslavia.
We agree, however, that all possible diplomatic and other preparations
should take place to enable the West to react vigorously to such a situation,
and we would welcome the opportunity to pursue the subject through frequent
exchanges on a diplomatic level as the situation develops, with a view to