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NLT (Naval Aide) 179 OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF STATE WASHINGTON DECLASSIFIED March 8, 1951 E.O. 12065, Sec. 3-402 State Dept. Guidelines, March 6, 1982.0 P SECRET By D.B NLT, Date 9-4-85 SUMMARY OF TELEGRAMS F OUR - POWER At the third session of the Paris talks on EXPLORATORY TALKS March 7 the Soviets indicated that they were willing to include the Austrian Peace Treaty on the agenda but only if the western powers were willing to dis- - cuss the "fulfillment of the peace treaty with Italy in the part concerning Trieste" as part of it. The western delegates refused to discuss the two matters together, maintaining that there is no connection between the two issues. Ambassador Jessup feels that the obvious answer to such a maneuver is to insist that the question of satellites' violation of military and human rights clauses would also have to be dis- - cussed in connection with the Austrian treaty. He feels that if we push this angle hard, it might possibly lead to a compromise which would elimi- nate reference to the Italian treaty as well as the satellite treaties. YUGOSLAVIA The French Government has proposed through its Embassy here that, in view of the real possibility of an attack on Yugoslavia this spring or summer, the US, UK and French deputies now in Paris for the four power talks should exchange views among themselves on the following points: 1) Should the Western Powers convey a diplomatic warning to the satellite governments of the serious consequences to themselves of aggression against Yugoslavia? ; 2) Might not such a warning logically accompany the forthcoming protests against the violation of the military clauses of the peace treaties ?; and 3) If the attack takes place, what should be the Western reaction? We have informed Ambassador Jessup that we believe the action suggested in point 1) would be premature at the present because of the lack of indication of any imminent attack upon Yugoslavia. We agree, however, that all possible diplomatic and other preparations should take place to enable the West to react vigorously to such a situation, and we would welcome the opportunity to pursue the subject through frequent exchanges on a diplomatic level as the situation develops, with a view to