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OCR Page 1 of 2NLT(Naval Aide)285
the
DECLASSIFIED
OFFICE OF
E. O. 12065, Sec. 3-402
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
State 1/1/1 Depl. Guidelines, March 6, 1982
WASHINGTON
By bes NLT, Date 9-6-85
November 26, 1951
TOP SECREI SECURITY INF ORMATION
SUMMARY OF TELEGRAMS
EGYPT
We have learned from the United Kingdom Embassies
in Cairo and Washington that the British Cabinet has
authorized their military in the Suez Canal Zone to stop fuel oil traffic for
a period of approximately one day each week, allegedly to provide a re-
spite for their harassed soldiers. Stevenson, the British Ambassador in
Cairo, who was overruled by this Cabinet decision, now fears an imminent
Egyptian explosion succeeded by a British reoccupation and ultimately by
the British losing Egypt forever. Our Ambassador in Cairo has emphasized
repeatedly that shutting off the fuel oil supplies again would render all fur -
ther discussions of an Anglo-Egyptian solution useless. As a result of
these events, the Secretary contemplates voicing his concern over the fuel
oil decision at a luncheon meeting with UK Foreign Secretary Eden today.
IRAN
In a conversation with the Secretary, British Foreign
Minister Eden expressed the opinion that the tentative
proposal of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development
looked better to him than anything in the Iranian dispute thus far. Eden
also indicated that the proposal would not be advanced until Mosadeq had
returned to Iran. Meanwhile, although we have encouraged the Bank to
continue conversations, we are not unduly optimistic over their outcome
since the Bank has not yet encountered the particular problems which
blocked our efforts. In addition, we have cautioned the Bank against as- -
suming anything more than a temporary role in the international oil business
and against taking action that might encourage other oncession-holding
countries to look to the Bank as a means of obtaining more favorable con-
cession arrangements.
UNITED NATIONS We have instructed Ambassador Jessup in Paris that,
during the general United Nations debate and informal
discussions, our delegation should avoid a detailed spelling out of the pro-
cesses of disclosure and verification under our disarmament proposals.
We feel that our public elaboration of the disarmament steps should come
only after careful United States Government consideration and that illustrative
TOP SECRET SECURITY INF OR MA TION