Memorandum, State Department Summary of Telegrams

NLT(Naval Aide)285 the DECLASSIFIED OFFICE OF E. O. 12065, Sec. 3-402 THE SECRETARY OF STATE State 1/1/1 Depl. Guidelines, March 6, 1982 WASHINGTON By bes NLT, Date 9-6-85 November 26, 1951 TOP SECREI SECURITY INF ORMATION SUMMARY OF TELEGRAMS EGYPT We have learned from the United Kingdom Embassies in Cairo and Washington that the British Cabinet has authorized their military in the Suez Canal Zone to stop fuel oil traffic for a period of approximately one day each week, allegedly to provide a re- spite for their harassed soldiers. Stevenson, the British Ambassador in Cairo, who was overruled by this Cabinet decision, now fears an imminent Egyptian explosion succeeded by a British reoccupation and ultimately by the British losing Egypt forever. Our Ambassador in Cairo has emphasized repeatedly that shutting off the fuel oil supplies again would render all fur - ther discussions of an Anglo-Egyptian solution useless. As a result of these events, the Secretary contemplates voicing his concern over the fuel oil decision at a luncheon meeting with UK Foreign Secretary Eden today. IRAN In a conversation with the Secretary, British Foreign Minister Eden expressed the opinion that the tentative proposal of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development looked better to him than anything in the Iranian dispute thus far. Eden also indicated that the proposal would not be advanced until Mosadeq had returned to Iran. Meanwhile, although we have encouraged the Bank to continue conversations, we are not unduly optimistic over their outcome since the Bank has not yet encountered the particular problems which blocked our efforts. In addition, we have cautioned the Bank against as- - suming anything more than a temporary role in the international oil business and against taking action that might encourage other oncession-holding countries to look to the Bank as a means of obtaining more favorable con- cession arrangements. UNITED NATIONS We have instructed Ambassador Jessup in Paris that, during the general United Nations debate and informal discussions, our delegation should avoid a detailed spelling out of the pro- cesses of disclosure and verification under our disarmament proposals. We feel that our public elaboration of the disarmament steps should come only after careful United States Government consideration and that illustrative TOP SECRET SECURITY INF OR MA TION