Memorandum, State Department Summary of Telegrams

DECLASSIFY 12065, Sec. 3.102 State Dept. E.O. Guidelines, March 6, 1982 OFFICE OF OF STATE By, DED NLT Date WASHINGTON March 24, 1952 SECRET SECURITY INE ORMATHON SUMMARY OF TELEGRAMS IRAN The Shah, in a conversation with Ambassador Henderson, re- - iterated his belief that he had been correct in refusing to yield to the various pressures on him to remove Mosadeq. The Shah stated that 11 Mosadeq and Kashani are safe only because my army is protecting them", and that the change in Mosadeq's popularity was caused by his promising too much and that most of the thinking people in Iran now be- - lieved that he had no constructive program. In reply to a question re- - garding the ability of Mosadeq to surprise his opponents by proposing a program for Iran "1to lieft itself up by its own bootstraps" through a series of drastic measures such as increased taxation, the curtailment of imports and the absorption of labor in public works, the Shah replied that he did not believe that this would be possible as Mosadeq and his advisers were tempermentally andtechnically unable to launch a program of this kind. Furthermore, the Shah believes that an attempt to initiate such a program would further weaken National Front unity which depended primarily on the expectation that Iran would meet its fiscal problems through increased oil revenues. The Shah said that he doubted that Mosadeq could control the new Majlis for a long period in view of the financial situation of the country, and that although Mosadeq would have more supporters than in the previous Majlis the opposition could no longer be cowed and would therefore be in a position to "show where Mosadeq could retire voluntarily or under pressure. 11 The Shah added that he would not intervene unless it should become clear that intervention was necessary for the safety of the country. Regarding the continuance of the United States Military mission, the Shah expressed appreciation of the willingness of the United States Government to permit it to remain with merely antoral extension con- tract" and stressed that the mission could remain for an indefinite period. When Ambassador Henderson said that he did not believe that the United States Government considered the present arrangement other than temporary, the Shah replied that when a new government was formed he hoped that the former agreement could be extended in writing for a definite term. When the Shah expressed his concern regarding the slow delivery of military equipment and supplies, Ambassador Henderson explained the necessity for giving priority to areas in which actual