Memorandum, State Department Summary of Telegrams

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF STATE the DECLASSIFIED E.O. 12065, Sec. 3-402 WASHINGTON State Dept. Guidelines, March 9-9-85 6, 1982 5 By DEB NLT, Date April 9, 1952 SECRET SECURITY INFORMATION SUMMARY OF TELEGRAMS EGYPT We have informed Embassy Cairo that we find the present trend of Anglo-Egyptian conversations disturbing and see increasing evidence that the Egyptian Government is so unsure of its position that it is taking every opportunity to make negotiations difficult almost to the point of impossibility. We see signs of this in the setting of the election date, the shilly-shallying over the text of an exchange of letters, and in the immediacy of the Government*s reaction to the Sudan draft constitution. We feel that an early agreement with the UK would offer Egypt a better opportunity than now exists to bring its point of view on the Sudan to pre- vail in the Sudan itself, in the UK and elsewhere. Egypt must also come to understand that it has no monopoly either on sentimentalism or public opinion. We have instructed Ambassador Caffery to take every occasion to emphasize to the Prime Minister and the Foreign Minister that we are deeply interested in the Anglo-Egyptian conversations and hope that Egypt will do everything in its power to bring these negotiations to a successful conclusion. Caffery is also to say that we should greatly deplore Egypt's breaking off the talks which have commenced; that we are convinced that the UK is not only sincerely desirous of discussing all outstanding issues with a view to their early solution, but has also made strenuous efforts to meet the Egyptian position; and that Egypt must accept the fact that negotiations are a two-way affair and that their present attitude toward the British is not conducive to a settlement. IRAN The British Foreign Office gave Embassy London the following information yesterday concerning its present attitude toward the Iranian situation. 1) The Foreign Office is more convinced than ever of the improbability of reaching a satisfactory agreement with Mosadeq on the oil question, whether through the International Bank or through direct negotiations, whether on an interim or a long-term basis. 2) The Foreign Office is disposed to sit tight and see whether a change in government takes place in Iran. Meanwhile, in the unlikely event that Mosadeq shows a genuine willingness to be forth-coming, the UK would delve into the matter again. 3) Mr. Garner of the International Bank seems optimistic over a SECRET SECURITY INFORMATION