Memorandum, State Department Summary of Telegrams

NLT (Naval Aidc) 103 OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF STATE WASHiNGTON DECLASSIFIED E.O. 12065, Sec. 3-402 October 25, 1950 State Dept. Guidelines, March 6, 1982 By DEB NLT, Date 6-10-85 ToPSRE SUMMARY OF TELEGRAMS GERMANY High Commissioner McCloy has replied to our request for a further explanation of his estimate of the time required to fully implement a decision for the inclusion of German units in the European defense force. He stated that the initial estimate of one year was based upon a composite of individual German views and included the time necessary to obtain agreement in principle in the North Atlantic Treaty discussions and between the occupying powers and the Germans of the conditions of a German contribution, the necessary psychological preparation of the German people and the steps by the German Government to permit their con- tribution. He pointed out that he had always considered that this estimate was pessimistic and could be reduced and that if a decision in principle is reached by January 1, volunteer training could probably begin by March 1. In his opinion the time estimate in no way affects the need for pressing for an immediate decision for a German con- tribution, particularly with the French, since no preparations can be made by the German Government until this has taken place. McCloy feels that, while much depends upon the type of proposal and its man- ner of presentation, it would be feasible to have effective German units in being by the end of next year if a decision in principle is taken in the reasonably near future. INDOCHINA Minister Heath in Saigon has conveyed to Bao Dai in a personal interview the substance of our message on the necessity for Bao Dai to assume personally the reins of govern- ment and to lead his people into aggressive opposition to the Communist forces of Ho Chi-minh. In the course of the discussion Bao Dai informed Heath that: 1) he had personally assigned himself the mission of taking into his hands the formation of a Vietnamese national army; 2) he intended to take over the reins of government "with his collabora- - tors"; and 3) he intended to proceed immediately to Tonkin and also to make public appearances in Saigon. Heath commented that throughout the discussion Bao Dai expressed himself with every appearance of sincerity his appreciation of American help and intentions and expressed full understanding of the necessity for the greatest government activity during the crisis confronting his country. Bao Dai insisted that he had no feelings against the French and that he saw advantages for Vietnam TO-PSECRE