Telegram from Secretary of State Dean Acheson to President Harry S. Truman

NLTCOSF-SUAJ.). 100 INCOMING TELEGRAM Department of State TELEGRAPH BRANCH M-X 384 mon Action Control: 6034 SS Rec'd: September 15, 1950 FROM: New York 1:23 a.m. info DCR TO: Secretary of State DECLASSIFIED NO: SECTO 13, September 15, F.R. OF U.S. 1950 III PACE 1229 BYBLT we NARS, Date 11:22:29 PRIORITY PERSONAL FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM ACHESON. After two days of conferences which had persistently failed in coming to grips with the central problem of the defense of Europe, I asked for and obtained a private conference attended only by mes Bevin, Schuman and our three High Commissioners for The purpose of this talk was to get away from minor difficulties of language and really reach the essence of the problemo This purpose was achieved; and, while the results were immediately discouraging, I think that we may be getting somewhere. I pointed out that you had been able to bring about a complete revolution in American foreign policy, based upon the realities of the international situation. We were prepared to take steps which were absolutely unprecedented in our history, to place substantial forces in Europes to put these forces into an integrated force for the defense of Europe, to agree to a command structure, to agree to a supreme commander, to join in a program for integrating European production, to take far reaching steps in the financial field, but all based upon the expectation that others would do their part, and that the entire scheme would result in the creation of such power that chances of peace would be immeasurably improved; and, if contrary to our hopes and beliefs war should come, we had a first class chance to win it. I went on to say that this involved a defense in Europe as far to the east as possible and that such a defense was not possible with- out facing squarely and deciding wisely the question of German participation. I pointed out that in our discussions the British and French had been prepared to accept what we offered, had been reticent about their contributions and had flatly refused to face in any way the question of German participation. I, therefore wanted to talk about this question with the gloves off and see exactly where we stood. The ensuing discussion brought out very clearly two fundamental facts. The first was that Bevin, who really agreed with mes had been TOP SECRET pop 1229 REPRODUCTION OF THIS MESSAGE IS PROHIBITED