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OCR Page 1 of 3THE
JAMES E. WEBB
ARCHIVES RECORDS AMD
SERVICO°
March 5, 1950
Mr. President:
In line with our conversation, here is the
situation as I see it:
1. Negotiation of Accommodation
There are a number of inherent strengths in
our situation which could be so m anaged as to
make either negotiation or accommodation attrac-
tive to the USSR. Before undertaking any
negotiation, we must have an alternative position
to fall back on, and this must be something
better than "preventive war. If we can create
conditions under which our great strength is
daily becoming more manageable, and more subject
to control for cold or hot war purposes, then we
can fall back on the position of continuing to
build our strength if negotiations fail or drag
out unreasonably. In fact, a beginning at the
task of building our strength is a prerequisite
to entering negotiations with a chance of success
and the f act that ve have made the beginning will
keep the pressure on the USSR to join in seeking
a mutually acceptable result and not let things
drag out.
2. Activation of Cold War Headquarters
The NSRB could be used, under your close personal
direction, to coordinate the effort to build more
strength and make more manageable the already
great strength which we have. This has the
advantage of being a part of your 'Executive Office"
and would thus become a symbol of your personal
leadership. It is also very flexible.
3. Streng thening of Cold War Team
Certain existing vacancies in such places as the
AEC and NSRB could be filled with men the country
and the world would immediately recognize as
adding strength to your team. Certain changes
in some key spots, such as CIA, could also be made
in a manner to show the strength of your determination
and desire to build strength.
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