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THE JAMES E. WEBB ARCHIVES RECORDS AMD SERVICO° March 5, 1950 Mr. President: In line with our conversation, here is the situation as I see it: 1. Negotiation of Accommodation There are a number of inherent strengths in our situation which could be so m anaged as to make either negotiation or accommodation attrac- tive to the USSR. Before undertaking any negotiation, we must have an alternative position to fall back on, and this must be something better than "preventive war. If we can create conditions under which our great strength is daily becoming more manageable, and more subject to control for cold or hot war purposes, then we can fall back on the position of continuing to build our strength if negotiations fail or drag out unreasonably. In fact, a beginning at the task of building our strength is a prerequisite to entering negotiations with a chance of success and the f act that ve have made the beginning will keep the pressure on the USSR to join in seeking a mutually acceptable result and not let things drag out. 2. Activation of Cold War Headquarters The NSRB could be used, under your close personal direction, to coordinate the effort to build more strength and make more manageable the already great strength which we have. This has the advantage of being a part of your 'Executive Office" and would thus become a symbol of your personal leadership. It is also very flexible. 3. Streng thening of Cold War Team Certain existing vacancies in such places as the AEC and NSRB could be filled with men the country and the world would immediately recognize as adding strength to your team. Certain changes in some key spots, such as CIA, could also be made in a manner to show the strength of your determination and desire to build strength.