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-2- the Fuehrer to allow me and my men to join the army of General Wenk in the battle for the reopening of the encirclement ring or - if the relief of Berlin should prove impossible - I asked for the despatch of a "Storch Airoplane, " in order that I might be able to join the Volkssturm in Berlin and fight this last battle at his side. The Fuehrer sent me a message, saying that he appreciated my intention, but as he had already expressed his opinion on former occasions - he did not want me to take part in the fights even now One needed me later and I should therefore go outside the fighting zone and keep myself ready for further instructions. Such instructions did not come any more, as events began to precipitate. But I know that the Fuehrer in giving that order has meant our last conversation for the passing on of which I should keep myself prepared. In spite of the diversity of opinion which existed between the Fuehrer and me on foreign politics as well as on questions of world perception (Weltauffassung) I have possessed up to the last the personal confidence of Adolf Hitler. I must attach importance to confirm this. In case anybody should say anything to the con- trary it would be false, and there are enough witnesses available for this. (2) The German foreign policy was in every phase directed by the Fuehrer himself. Its execution was my task. After my appoint- ment to the head of the German Foreign Office I have considered it my business to help the Fuehrer in attaining the justified German claims in Europe - as laid down by Hitler - and this by diplomatic means. But at the same time I have considered it just as important to help to adjust the dynamics in the national social- istic doctrine and its principles of world conception (Weltauffassung) with the necessities and possibilities of foreign politics. My work was accordingly concentrated on the following or better on the double aim: (a) Concentration of the greater part of the Germans in Europe within the Reich and limitation of the German foreign policy to the fulfilment of this aim and (b) Evolution of the principles of world perception (Weltauf- fassung) of the party in such a way, that the existence or carrying through of such principles would not endanger or even make impossible the peaceful living together and VATIORAL collaboration of Germany with the other nations. This had to do especially with the question of toleration or better adjustment in matters of the churches, in the jewish question, the question of communism, freemasonry, etc., for which I have always pleaded in my verbal reports, memorandums etc. My work to arrive at these two aims was soon overshadowed by the question of world conception (Weltauffassung) Events in Germany, about which I am not informed in detail, because questions of world conception were always treated separately with the party-authorities concerned, caused a sharp reaction against all disinteg- rating tendencies in the interior. When after the agree- ment with Russia 1939, which was due to my influence and by which it was possible for me at least to build a bridge be tween national socialism and communism the communistic propaganda restarted in Germany, the party took the point of view, that against the totalitarian claim of radical communism only a national socialism just as radical could hold its own. Consequently matters of world perception (Weltauffassung) gained an ever increasing influence on the affairs of state and subsequently also a preponderance to and in questions of foreign policy. In comparison with the question of the maintenance of the unity of the German people, all other considerations became gradually of no more weight. After the outbreak of the war the same influence/-

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    "ocrText": "-2-\nthe Fuehrer to allow me and my men to join the army of General\nWenk in the battle for the reopening of the encirclement ring or -\nif the relief of Berlin should prove impossible - I asked for\nthe despatch of a \"Storch Airoplane, \" in order that I might be\nable to join the Volkssturm in Berlin and fight this last battle\nat his side. The Fuehrer sent me a message, saying that he\nappreciated my intention, but as he had already expressed his\nopinion on former occasions - he did not want me to take part\nin the fights even now One needed me later and I should therefore\ngo outside the fighting zone and keep myself ready for further\ninstructions. Such instructions did not come any more, as events\nbegan to precipitate. But I know that the Fuehrer in giving that\norder has meant our last conversation for the passing on of which\nI should keep myself prepared.\nIn spite of the diversity of opinion which existed between\nthe Fuehrer and me on foreign politics as well as on questions of\nworld perception (Weltauffassung) I have possessed up to the last\nthe personal confidence of Adolf Hitler. I must attach importance\nto confirm this. In case anybody should say anything to the con-\ntrary it would be false, and there are enough witnesses available\nfor this.\n(2) The German foreign policy was in every phase directed by\nthe Fuehrer himself. Its execution was my task. After my appoint-\nment to the head of the German Foreign Office I have considered\nit my business to help the Fuehrer in attaining the justified\nGerman claims in Europe - as laid down by Hitler - and this by\ndiplomatic means. But at the same time I have considered it just\nas important to help to adjust the dynamics in the national social-\nistic doctrine and its principles of world conception (Weltauffassung)\nwith the necessities and possibilities of foreign politics. My work\nwas accordingly concentrated on the following or better on the\ndouble aim:\n(a) Concentration of the greater part of the Germans in Europe\nwithin the Reich and limitation of the German foreign\npolicy to the fulfilment of this aim and\n(b) Evolution of the principles of world perception (Weltauf-\nfassung) of the party in such a way, that the existence\nor carrying through of such principles would not endanger\nor even make impossible the peaceful living together and\nVATIORAL\ncollaboration of Germany with the other nations. This\nhad to do especially with the question of toleration or\nbetter adjustment in matters of the churches, in the\njewish question, the question of communism, freemasonry,\netc., for which I have always pleaded in my verbal reports,\nmemorandums etc. My work to arrive at these two aims was\nsoon overshadowed by the question of world conception\n(Weltauffassung) Events in Germany, about which I am not\ninformed in detail, because questions of world conception\nwere always treated separately with the party-authorities\nconcerned, caused a sharp reaction against all disinteg-\nrating tendencies in the interior. When after the agree-\nment with Russia 1939, which was due to my influence and\nby which it was possible for me at least to build a bridge\nbe tween national socialism and communism the communistic\npropaganda restarted in Germany, the party took the point\nof view, that against the totalitarian claim of radical\ncommunism only a national socialism just as radical could\nhold its own. Consequently matters of world perception\n(Weltauffassung) gained an ever increasing influence on\nthe affairs of state and subsequently also a preponderance\nto and in questions of foreign policy. In comparison with\nthe question of the maintenance of the unity of the German\npeople, all other considerations became gradually of no\nmore weight. After the outbreak of the war the same\ninfluence/-"
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