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the Fuehrer to allow me and my men to join the army of General
Wenk in the battle for the reopening of the encirclement ring or -
if the relief of Berlin should prove impossible - I asked for
the despatch of a "Storch Airoplane, " in order that I might be
able to join the Volkssturm in Berlin and fight this last battle
at his side. The Fuehrer sent me a message, saying that he
appreciated my intention, but as he had already expressed his
opinion on former occasions - he did not want me to take part
in the fights even now One needed me later and I should therefore
go outside the fighting zone and keep myself ready for further
instructions. Such instructions did not come any more, as events
began to precipitate. But I know that the Fuehrer in giving that
order has meant our last conversation for the passing on of which
I should keep myself prepared.
In spite of the diversity of opinion which existed between
the Fuehrer and me on foreign politics as well as on questions of
world perception (Weltauffassung) I have possessed up to the last
the personal confidence of Adolf Hitler. I must attach importance
to confirm this. In case anybody should say anything to the con-
trary it would be false, and there are enough witnesses available
for this.
(2) The German foreign policy was in every phase directed by
the Fuehrer himself. Its execution was my task. After my appoint-
ment to the head of the German Foreign Office I have considered
it my business to help the Fuehrer in attaining the justified
German claims in Europe - as laid down by Hitler - and this by
diplomatic means. But at the same time I have considered it just
as important to help to adjust the dynamics in the national social-
istic doctrine and its principles of world conception (Weltauffassung)
with the necessities and possibilities of foreign politics. My work
was accordingly concentrated on the following or better on the
double aim:
(a) Concentration of the greater part of the Germans in Europe
within the Reich and limitation of the German foreign
policy to the fulfilment of this aim and
(b) Evolution of the principles of world perception (Weltauf-
fassung) of the party in such a way, that the existence
or carrying through of such principles would not endanger
or even make impossible the peaceful living together and
VATIORAL
collaboration of Germany with the other nations. This
had to do especially with the question of toleration or
better adjustment in matters of the churches, in the
jewish question, the question of communism, freemasonry,
etc., for which I have always pleaded in my verbal reports,
memorandums etc. My work to arrive at these two aims was
soon overshadowed by the question of world conception
(Weltauffassung) Events in Germany, about which I am not
informed in detail, because questions of world conception
were always treated separately with the party-authorities
concerned, caused a sharp reaction against all disinteg-
rating tendencies in the interior. When after the agree-
ment with Russia 1939, which was due to my influence and
by which it was possible for me at least to build a bridge
be tween national socialism and communism the communistic
propaganda restarted in Germany, the party took the point
of view, that against the totalitarian claim of radical
communism only a national socialism just as radical could
hold its own. Consequently matters of world perception
(Weltauffassung) gained an ever increasing influence on
the affairs of state and subsequently also a preponderance
to and in questions of foreign policy. In comparison with
the question of the maintenance of the unity of the German
people, all other considerations became gradually of no
more weight. After the outbreak of the war the same
influence/-
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- Type
- photo
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Document data
- ID
- 245256128
- Core
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- document
DTO data
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"ocrText": "-2-\nthe Fuehrer to allow me and my men to join the army of General\nWenk in the battle for the reopening of the encirclement ring or -\nif the relief of Berlin should prove impossible - I asked for\nthe despatch of a \"Storch Airoplane, \" in order that I might be\nable to join the Volkssturm in Berlin and fight this last battle\nat his side. The Fuehrer sent me a message, saying that he\nappreciated my intention, but as he had already expressed his\nopinion on former occasions - he did not want me to take part\nin the fights even now One needed me later and I should therefore\ngo outside the fighting zone and keep myself ready for further\ninstructions. Such instructions did not come any more, as events\nbegan to precipitate. But I know that the Fuehrer in giving that\norder has meant our last conversation for the passing on of which\nI should keep myself prepared.\nIn spite of the diversity of opinion which existed between\nthe Fuehrer and me on foreign politics as well as on questions of\nworld perception (Weltauffassung) I have possessed up to the last\nthe personal confidence of Adolf Hitler. I must attach importance\nto confirm this. In case anybody should say anything to the con-\ntrary it would be false, and there are enough witnesses available\nfor this.\n(2) The German foreign policy was in every phase directed by\nthe Fuehrer himself. Its execution was my task. After my appoint-\nment to the head of the German Foreign Office I have considered\nit my business to help the Fuehrer in attaining the justified\nGerman claims in Europe - as laid down by Hitler - and this by\ndiplomatic means. But at the same time I have considered it just\nas important to help to adjust the dynamics in the national social-\nistic doctrine and its principles of world conception (Weltauffassung)\nwith the necessities and possibilities of foreign politics. My work\nwas accordingly concentrated on the following or better on the\ndouble aim:\n(a) Concentration of the greater part of the Germans in Europe\nwithin the Reich and limitation of the German foreign\npolicy to the fulfilment of this aim and\n(b) Evolution of the principles of world perception (Weltauf-\nfassung) of the party in such a way, that the existence\nor carrying through of such principles would not endanger\nor even make impossible the peaceful living together and\nVATIORAL\ncollaboration of Germany with the other nations. This\nhad to do especially with the question of toleration or\nbetter adjustment in matters of the churches, in the\njewish question, the question of communism, freemasonry,\netc., for which I have always pleaded in my verbal reports,\nmemorandums etc. My work to arrive at these two aims was\nsoon overshadowed by the question of world conception\n(Weltauffassung) Events in Germany, about which I am not\ninformed in detail, because questions of world conception\nwere always treated separately with the party-authorities\nconcerned, caused a sharp reaction against all disinteg-\nrating tendencies in the interior. When after the agree-\nment with Russia 1939, which was due to my influence and\nby which it was possible for me at least to build a bridge\nbe tween national socialism and communism the communistic\npropaganda restarted in Germany, the party took the point\nof view, that against the totalitarian claim of radical\ncommunism only a national socialism just as radical could\nhold its own. Consequently matters of world perception\n(Weltauffassung) gained an ever increasing influence on\nthe affairs of state and subsequently also a preponderance\nto and in questions of foreign policy. In comparison with\nthe question of the maintenance of the unity of the German\npeople, all other considerations became gradually of no\nmore weight. After the outbreak of the war the same\ninfluence/-"
}