Memorandum from Rear Admiral R. H. Hillenkoetter to President Harry S. Truman

CIA 22992 TOP SECRET NLT(PSF-Intell.) 25 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY WASHINGTON 25, D. C. WDI 10 December 1948 MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRES IDENT The recent action of the USSR in recognizing an east Berlin government is representative of the shift which has taken place in the Kremlin's estimate concerning its capabilities in the Berlin dispute. Originally, it appeared that the Soviet blockade of Berlin was designed primarily to gain western power concessions regarding western Germany and secondarily to force the US, the UK, and France to evacuate Berlin. The refusal of the western powers to negotiate under duress has apparently convinced the Kremlin that its chance of gaining the primary objective is remote, Soviet strategy is now concentrating upon the se condary objective, with a view to forcing the West either to evacuate the city or to negotiate on terms which will make the western position in Berlin inef- fective and eventually untenable. Stringent blockade In pursuit of this objective, the USSR (RUMAN may now impose a more stringent blockade 5. of the western sectors of Berlin. The USSR can cite the recent "illegal" elections in the western sectors, or the possible RECURDS SERVICE No EX introduction of the western mark as the sole legal currency GOVER in the western sectors, as an excuse to throw a cordon around the western area and thus enforce a blockade much more effective than the present one. The successful sealing-off of the western sectors of the city, combined with the establishment of the east Berlin government, would seriously damage both the political and the econômic position of the western powers in Berlin. Political effects In the political realm, the effect of this double action would be to: (1) destroy all pretense that Berlin is a unified city, thereby making UN agreements on overall Berlin affairs all but impossible to implement; (2) hamper the administration of Berlin's western sectors by cutting off the operation of public utilities and services on a city-wide basis; (3) dispirit pro-western ele- ments in both the east and west sectors; (4) diminish Berlin's accessibility as a political sanctuary for anti-Communist Ger- mans and Soviet deserters; and (5) reduce the capabilities of the western powers for supporting anti-Communist factions in the Soviet Zone. ISD