Report, Central Intelligence Agency, Advance Copy of Special Estimate Number 20, The Probably Consequences of Certain Possible United States Courses of Action with Respect to Communist China and Korea
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OCR Page 1 of 953817-m
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NLT(PSF-SUBT): 366
SECURITY INFORMATION
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
oin china
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.
15 December 1951
CONFIDENTIAL-
DECLASSIFIED
RAC 10/5/2010
ADVANCE COPY
Authority ML-PSF-36-18-2
By. SOB
NARA, Dak/5/13
SPECIAL ESTIMATE # 20
THE PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES OF CERTAIN POSSIBLE US COURSES OF
ACTION WITH RESPECT TO COMMUNIST CHINA AND KOREA
THE PROBLEM
To estimate (a) the effect on Communist China of certain
possible US courses of action, and (b) the Communist reaction
to these courses of action.
NARA
ESTIMATE
1. Expansion of the Korean War by Imposition of a UN Embargo
on Shipping and Exports to Communist China
a. A UN embargo on shipping and exports to Communist
China, if effective, could reduce Communist Chinese seaborne
The intelligence organizations of the Departments of State,
cipated with the Central Intelligence Agency in the preparation
the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and the Joint Staff parti-
of this estimate. All members of the Intelligence Advisory
Committee concurred in this estimate on 15 December 1951
CONFIDENTIAL
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