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RESTRICTED victory over the Nazis in his toast to them at the end of the war. Continued references to them as "the elder brother" show that Soviet leaders have not changed their evaluation of them as the strongest force in the USSR. It is clear that every effort should be made to show that the rule of Stalin and the Politburo is against and not in the best interests of Russia and the Russian people. That while the free world will resist aggression, it has no animosity toward the Russian people and is, in fact, more sympathetic toward their interests than are the Soviet leaders. The exploitation of Russian and the Russian people for purposes of international Communist propaganda, intrigue, and aggression can be emphasized to gain the first of these ob- jectives. (In doing this, however, care should be taken not to build up a picture of a genuinely revolutionary international proletariat.) To gain the second, concepts common to Russia and to the free world, in particular the U.S., can be established and it can then be shown that they are what lead the free world to resist Communist aggression and are also what make it understand and sympathize with the plight of the Russian people. The inordinate sensitivity of the Russians to criticism of Russia's backwardness coming from foreigners and their suspiciousness of foreigners in general make Russian nationalism an extremely difficult force for Americans to handle. In view of this it might be advisable for U.S. propaganda to mix points demonstrating our understanding and respect for the Russians with points that might be construed as critical of them in a proportion of at least one to one. In addition, in touching on the sorest spots, it might be wise to imply the final point, so clearly that the Russian cannot fail to draw the de- sired conclusion, and to refrain from stating it explicitly. Since the less educated Russian likes to regard himself as khitri (clever-sly-hard to dupe), it might be a useful technique in exposing Soviet propaganda lies to imply that we understand that the listener was too smart to have been taken in by the trick. f. Interdicting Other Soviet Strengths While U.S. propaganda has made an effort to show that conditions are improving in the free world, thus implying that there is no need for revolution and that there is no world proletariat waiting for Soviet "liberation", there is a further self-justification of which Soviet leaders should be stripped. The Nazi attack on the USSR is taken to prove their point about the aggressiveness of the capitalist world and to justify all their draconian measures to build up the military strength of the USSR. Since the war Soviet propagandists have, of course, been assiduous in attributing all the evils of the Nazis to the United States. The striking similarity between the Nazi and Soviet systems could be pointed out or at least implied. It could be emphasized that Nazi Germany was aggressive because she was totalitarian and not because she was capitalistic. (See Section I (d) "At- tacking Soviet Ideology"). A further and also important source of Soviet strength is the slight but undeniable rise in the standard of living in the USSR during the past two years. One way of neutralizing the psychological effects of this Soviet asset might be to say that the relatively slight proportion of the total Soviet economy that was involved had been devoted to this purpose not out of solicitude for the welfare of the people but so that if the Soviet leaders decide to embark on general war, the blame for the subsequent drop in the Soviet standard of living will seemingly fall on the U.S., the alledged aggressors, and not on the regime, the actual aggressors. - 8 - RESTRICTED

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    "ocrText": "RESTRICTED\nvictory over the Nazis in his toast to them at the end of the war. Continued references to\nthem as \"the elder brother\" show that Soviet leaders have not changed their evaluation of\nthem as the strongest force in the USSR.\nIt is clear that every effort should be made to show that the rule of Stalin and the\nPolitburo is against and not in the best interests of Russia and the Russian people. That\nwhile the free world will resist aggression, it has no animosity toward the Russian people\nand is, in fact, more sympathetic toward their interests than are the Soviet leaders. The\nexploitation of Russian and the Russian people for purposes of international Communist\npropaganda, intrigue, and aggression can be emphasized to gain the first of these ob-\njectives. (In doing this, however, care should be taken not to build up a picture of a\ngenuinely revolutionary international proletariat.) To gain the second, concepts common\nto Russia and to the free world, in particular the U.S., can be established and it can then\nbe shown that they are what lead the free world to resist Communist aggression and are\nalso what make it understand and sympathize with the plight of the Russian people.\nThe inordinate sensitivity of the Russians to criticism of Russia's backwardness\ncoming from foreigners and their suspiciousness of foreigners in general make Russian\nnationalism an extremely difficult force for Americans to handle. In view of this it might\nbe advisable for U.S. propaganda to mix points demonstrating our understanding and\nrespect for the Russians with points that might be construed as critical of them in a\nproportion of at least one to one. In addition, in touching on the sorest spots, it might\nbe wise to imply the final point, so clearly that the Russian cannot fail to draw the de-\nsired conclusion, and to refrain from stating it explicitly. Since the less educated Russian\nlikes to regard himself as khitri (clever-sly-hard to dupe), it might be a useful technique\nin exposing Soviet propaganda lies to imply that we understand that the listener was too\nsmart to have been taken in by the trick.\nf. Interdicting Other Soviet Strengths\nWhile U.S. propaganda has made an effort to show that conditions are improving in\nthe free world, thus implying that there is no need for revolution and that there is no\nworld proletariat waiting for Soviet \"liberation\", there is a further self-justification\nof\nwhich Soviet leaders should be stripped. The Nazi attack on the USSR is taken to prove\ntheir point about the aggressiveness of the capitalist world and to justify all their\ndraconian measures to build up the military strength of the USSR. Since the war Soviet\npropagandists have, of course, been assiduous in attributing all the evils of the Nazis to\nthe United States. The striking similarity between the Nazi and Soviet systems could be\npointed out or at least implied. It could be emphasized that Nazi Germany was aggressive\nbecause she was totalitarian and not because she was capitalistic. (See Section I (d) \"At-\ntacking Soviet Ideology\"). A further and also important source of Soviet strength is the\nslight but undeniable rise in the standard of living in the USSR during the past two years.\nOne way of neutralizing the psychological effects of this Soviet asset might be to say that\nthe relatively slight proportion of the total Soviet economy that was involved had been\ndevoted to this purpose not out of solicitude for the welfare of the people but so that if\nthe Soviet leaders decide to embark on general war, the blame for the subsequent drop\nin the Soviet standard of living will seemingly fall on the U.S., the alledged aggressors,\nand not on the regime, the actual aggressors.\n- 8 -\nRESTRICTED"
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