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    "ocrText": "J.B.PHISKIPS COPY\n645\nState\nDEPARTMENT OF STATE\nOFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR PUBLIC AFFAIRS\nAttached hereto are the following papers in a plan for a new propaganda approach\nto the Soviet Union:\nSECRET - - - -\"Emergency plan for Psychological Offensive (USSR)\"\nCONFIDENTIAL -\"Psychological Offensive vis-a-vis The USSR - Objective, Tasks and\nThemes\"\nRESTRICTED - -\"An Analysis of the Principal Psychological Vulnerabilities in the USSR\nand of the Principal Assets Available to the U.S. for Their Exploita-\ntion\"\nRecipients should note the difference in classification of these papers and dis-\ntribution must be strictly in accordance with the classifications.\nThe Confidential paper is intended primarily for operators of propaganda media.\nOfficers of the government who are in a position to guide speakers or writers to pro-\nduce material which fulfills these objectives and tasks should be encouraged to base\ntheir guidance on this paper. This, however, should be done on an oral and informal\nbasis without revealing either the existence of such a document or the integrated\nnature of a series of tasks established to attack the USSR by propaganda. We do not\nwant to telegraph our punches to the enemy. (N.B. Themes in this paper are only\nsuggestions and operators should not be limited to them in carrying out the Objectives\nand Tasks.)\nThe Restricted paper is one of several existing studies on Soviet psychological\nvulnerabilities and is given this classification to permit wider use by writers and\nspeakers. Again, to avoid telegraphing our punches, this paper should not be quoted\nfrom. Writers and speakers should be encouraged to attack these vulnerable points\nbut not to describe them.\nCAUTION: Objective II (To establish a reservoir of good will between the peoples\nof the USSR and those of the free world.) requires the most careful handling. This\nobjective was considered necessary to counteract the effect on the Soviet people of\nthe current efforts of the Soviet regime to create an attitude of especial hostility\nto the U.S. within the USSR. Within this context the end result sought is confusion\nand ambivalence in the minds of the Soviet people; actual circumstances do not permit\nthe achievement of ends beyond this. Accordingly, every effort has been made to keep\nthe tasks and themes under this objective as realistic as possible. The word \"good-\nwill\" has been used instead of \"friendship\" as more nearly corresponding to the real-\nistic possibilities.\nThis plan is directed specifically at the Soviet Union. Some of the Objectives,\nTasks and Themes may be useful to operators dealing with other areas, but their use\nshould be guided by local attitudes. They should serve as guidance to other areas,\nhowever, in that output should not contradict or confuse the approach described in\nthese papers.\nEdward W. Barrett\nDECLASSIFIED\n11 April 1951\n11512\nand\n5(D)\nor\n(E)\nE.O.\n£.23.76\nPROJECT NCT 76-6\nDept. of State\n10.20.16\nBy\nRECRET\nEMERGENCY PLAN FOR PSYCHOLOGICAL OFFENSIVE (USSR)\nAttached are the basic papers for a planned psychological offensive against\nthe Soviet regime which have been prepared by an Ad Hoc Working Group formed by\nthe Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs as Director of IFIO. This\nplan is founded on two assumptions:\n1. That the reluctance of the peoples of the USSR to suffer another war\nis a deterrent on the aggressive ambitions of the Bolshevik dictatorship.\n2. That it is within the capabilities of the United States at the present\ntime, and in spite of severe limitations on means of approach to these peoples,\nto increase the force of this deterrent.\nThe plan is within the framework of existing U. S. policy vis-a-vis the\nUSSR. Without waiting for possible future changes in policy, the intention of\nthis plan is to extract the maximum benefit from the existing situation.\nThe plan is intended to sharpen and systematize the entire psychological\napproach to the USSR. Planning has been done in close consultation with the\nVoice of America, the principal agency capable of putting it into overt execution.\nIt is intended that hence forth the Voice of America shall program its output\nto the USSR generally within the framework of the objectives and tasks set forth\nherein. Lists of suggested themes are appended to the appropriate tasks. The\nlists are not exhaustive, and the suggested themes are not designed as text for\nquotation in output; they are designed only as hints for profitable lines of\nthought to be followed in output, on the basis of adequate research and in ap-\npropriate context.\nOccasions will arise when, in its reportorial role, the Voice of America\nwill have to carry program material which does not contribute to the objectives\nand themes specified in the plans. In such cases these extraneous themes should\nbe subordinated to the main effort. It is understood that this will require a\nserious revision in the current working procedure of the Vocie of America.\nSuch a plan as this cannot depend on the efforts of the Voice of America\nalone. Extensive organization of research will be required. In addition, there\nshould be wide distribution within the government of the basic papers in the\nplan so that this approach to the USSR gets into the stream of official and semi-\nofficial public statements and thus facilitates the work of the Voice of America.\nDECLASSIFIED\nE. O, 11612 itc 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)\nDept. of State letter. 7.23.76\nBy NLT- He NARJ Date 10.20.76\nRESTRICTED\nAN ANALYSIS OF THE PRINCIPAL PSYCHOLOGICAL VULNERABILITIES IN THE\nUSSR AND OF THE PRINCIPAL ASSETS AVAILABLE TO THE US FOR THEIR\nEXPLOITATION\nINTRODUCTORY NOTE\nThis analysis is intended to point out areas in which further research may find\nprofitable material for a psychological offensive on the USSR and does not claim that the\nmethods suggested herein will inevitably be of appeal to the Soviet population. While\nAmericans must make the final decisions as to which lines of research to pursue and which\nthemes to stress in a psychological offensive on the USSR, for Americans to debate among\nthemselves whether certain themes would be comprehensible to Soviets without reference\nto the many ex-Soviets available would appear to be a senseless intellectual exercise.\nMuch of the wording of this paper is intended to show the reasons why certain topics may\nbe among those which may be profitably exploited and no effort has been made to restrict\nit to phraseology which would itself be of value in propaganda. This paper is in no way\nan attempt to belittle the undoubtedly great obstacles which face the United States in its\nattempt to communicate effectively with the Soviet population; it is rather an attempt to\nindicate ways in which the United States may be able to communicate effectively with it.\nIt is, in addition, suggested that analyses of emigre propaganda and of the propaganda of\nother governments, in particular the Yugoslav Government, directed toward the USSR\nmight suggest other effective means of approach. Such analyses would in any event warn\nthe United States when it and other governments and groups were working at cross purposes\nin their propaganda to the USSR.\n1. GENERAL\nWhen asked when Communism would be achieved in the USSR, a recent defector\nreplied \"on the day when the people fail to see the discrepance between Soviet propaganda\nand their daily life\". Since the aim of Soviet internal propaganda is to make all Soviet\ncitizens into the willing and enthusiastic tools of the state's policy and since there is\nevidence of widespread, although almost wholly passive discontent, it is apparent that\nthat day has not yet arrived.\nThat many Soviet citizens do see the discrepancy between Soviet propaganda and\nreality implies that they are capable of judging what they see, hear and read by standards\nother than those which the state wishes the \"Soviet man\" to apply, whether this be in the\ncase of an intellectual who concludes that party control is stultifying to science or in the\ncase of a disgruntled kolkhoznik who thinks that his life isn't fit for a pig. In analyzing\nSoviet vulnerabilities the sources of these standards have some relevence since they offer\navenues of approach by which these vulnerabilities may be reached.\nSince the ruling culture of the USSR is basically Russian, Russian culture, having\nmade itself the general culture of the country to an extent almost comparable to that\nwith which Anglo-Saxon culture has formed the basis for U.S. culture, most of this paper\nis devoted to reactions which obtain within Russian culture.\nDECLASSIFIED E.O.N652\nRESTRICTED\nDECLASSIFIED\nSTATE DEPT. LTR 8:23:76\nPROJECT NET 76-6\nBYNLT.NW NARS, Date 10-20-26\n- 1 -\nRESTRICTED\na, Sources of Non-Soviet Standards\nWhile many Russians do not appear to have the same reaction to injustice done to\nothers which an American would have, almost all seem to have a point when injustice is\nbeing done to them which makes them say the equivalent of \"It ain't right\". This implies\nthat despite the teachings of Soviet propaganda most Russians have in their minds at least\nthe remnants of an ethic other than the Bolshevik ethic. The principal source of this seems\nto be the standards which were observed in family life in pre-revoluntionary Russia. De-\nspite the fact that only a minority of the inhabitants of the USSR have any personal know-\nledge of life in pre-revolutionary Russia, the traditional standards which governed re-\nlationships in the Russian family have been handed onto the young by their parents and by\nthe \"grandmothers\" (responsible, even now, for a large part of child care). These\nstandards still provide competition for the strong influence of Soviet propaganda to which\nchildren are subjected in the Soviet schools. That some of the younger generation fairly\nsoon become disgruntled with the regime and cease to work hard for it and that many others\nmake their careers within the system but do so in a cynical way because it is the sole way\nto advancement and privilege indicates that not even this group is Koestler's \"generation\nwithout an umbilical cord.\nA second source of non-Soviet standards is the knowledge of conditions in pre-\nrevolutionary Russia which is also passed on by parents and grandparents to the young.\nRemembered in times of hardship, tales of an easier and better life in Tsarist Russia\nundoubtedly lose nothing in the telling.\nA further source seems to be Soviet education itself, particularly secondary and\nhigher education, which, while it aims at giving most Soviet citizens only enough education\nto do their jobs well, can hardly fail to impart enough perspective to make the recipient\nconscious of the falsity of much Soviet internal propaganda. Not even Pravda can convince\nhim that a hole in the ground is in reality the Palace of the Soviets.\nAn additional source of education and also of non-Soviet standards is pre-revoluntionary\nRussian literature, which is widely read by the literate, perhaps partly because reading\nis a form of escapism and because contemporary Soviet literature is so dull. Since the\nSoviet leaders wish to appropriate to themselves the literature of the revolutionary move-\nment against Tsarism, they have left in circulation the great bulk of nineteenth century\nRussian literature, which, although censored, contains many appeals to values entirely\ncontrary to Soviet values as well as many denunciations of Tsarist tyranny wholly appli-\ncable to the present regime.\nAnother source seems to be Soviet law, which, while it is essentially merely another\narm with which the state executes its policy, in judging cases involving the civil relation-\nships between individuals frequently applies the same standards of right and wrong as\nwestern civil law, standards which if applied to the actions of the Politburo would show\nthem to be wholly immoral.\nStill another source of non-Soviet standards is knowledge of the world outside the\nUSSR. Such knowledge, while it is often extremely blurred and fragmentary, exists\n- 2 -\nRESTRICTED\nRESTRICTED\nfairly widely. Perhaps among the many sources from which it has come the most\nimportant are the experience of Soviet troops in Eastern Europe and Germany during\nWorld War II and the foreign language broadcasts of VOA and the BBC.\nb. Other Basic Factors Contributing to the Partial Failure of Soviet Propaganda\nThrough their use of the vocabulary of western liberalism Soviet propagandists\nthemselves have been responsible for popularizing many non-Soviet concepts, such as\nhumanism, free speech, etc., perhaps the best collection of these being in the Soviet\nConstitution. (It may be of more than academic interest to note that Soviet dictionaries\ngive the western definitions for many of the terms used.) While it is probably true that\nby their use of this vocabulary Soviet propagandists have partially blocked the effective-\nness of western propaganda based on these concepts, it seems clear that they have also\nincorporated elements of inconsistency which Per the overall effectiveness of their\npropaganda. In the light of Nazi frankness in their propaganda in which they could say\n\"Come on you German Herrenvolk let's conquer the world,' it is apparent that pro-\npaganda intended to justify and promote Soviet agressiveness in the name of \"peace in\nthe whole world\" is not without elements of weakness.\nSoviet propaganda with its continued emphasis on material progress and its promises\nof \"pie in the sky\" seems also to have increased the dissatisfaction of many Soviet citizens\nat the continuing poer conditions of life in the USSR (See 2 a. (1) ).\nAnother important source of discontent in the Soviet Union is the tough resistance\nwhich some basic cultural patterns have to violent change. This is illustrated by the fact\nthat initial Soviet efforts in the fields of marriage, divorce and the family proved dismal\nfailures and had to be completely reversed. That Soviet defectors condemn the Soviet\nsystem as \"against human nature\" indicates that the Soviet leaders are still trying to put\na good many square pegs into round holes. (See 2 a. (4) ).\nC. Dangers in Piecemeal Psychological Attack\nDespite the many sources of tension and disaffection in the USSR, many Soviet\ncitizens probably remain ultimately loyal to the regime since it claims to have the only\nroad to social justice and material progress, and to be the guardian of Russia and the\nRussian peoples from the hostile and aggressive capitalist powers. Although the social\nstructure of the USSR provides many tempting targets for psychological attack, piecemeal\nattack involves grave dangers. As long as the regime can appeal to Marxism-Leninsim-\nStalinism as the only road to social and material progress and as an infallible system of\ninterpreting history, it can answer any propaganda attack relatively successfully. While\nit can successfully portray itself as the guardian of Russia from aggressive capitalist\nencirclement, attacking individual sore spots in the Soviet social structure without putting\nthe blame squarely on the regime in each case would be likely to seem to prove the\nregime's point about its aggressive enemies and thus solidify the population behind the\nregime. It seems that prerequisite to the successful exploitation of the various sources\nof dissatisfaction in the USSR are the discrediting of Soviet ideology, and the destruction\nof the myth that the regime is the only protector of Great Russian and other Soviet\nnationalistic interests.\n- 3 -\nRESTRICTED\nRESTRICTED\nd. Attacking Soviet Ideology\nWhile it is true that for many people in the USSR Soviet ideology has become a\nritual which is observed in a mechanical way as a necessary sign of conformity and sub-\nmission, in addition it constitutes an important Soviet source of strength since it serves\nas the base for much Soviet propaganda. To any extent that it may be possible, forcing\npeople to think about the real nature and function of Soviet ideology would be valuable since\nit would strip the regime of its self-justification and thus help to direct toward the regime\nthe Soviet population's resentment over the hardships and injustices to which it has been\nsubjected.\nWhile in Soviet propaganda the real nature of Soviet policy is usually masked by\nreferences to capitalist aggressiveness, Stalin has at times been relatively frank as to\nits true implications. It is possible tha epetition of some of Stalin's remarks might be\na good way to expose the profoundly aggressive nature of Soviet ideology and Soviet\npolicy.\nThe following quotations from Stalin are a tentative suggestion of the way in which\nthis might be done:\n\"The revolution will be unable to crush the resistance of the bourgeoisie, to main-\ntain its victory, and to push forward to the final victory of Socialism unless it creates\na special organ in the form of the dictatorship of the proletariat, The dictatorship\nof\nthe\nproletariat cannot arise as the result of the peaceful development of bourgeois society and\nof bourgeois democracy; it can arise only as the result of the smashing of the bourgeois\nstate machine, the bourgeois army, the bourgeois bureaucratic machine, the bourgeois\npolice\nAfter consolidating its power and taking the peasantry in tow, the proletariat of\nthe victorious country can and must build up a Socialist society. But does this mean that\nit will thereby achieve the complete and final victory of Socialism? No it does not.\nFor this the victory of the revolution in at least several countries is needed. Therefore\nthe development and support of the revolution in other countries is an essential task of the\nvictorious revolution. In England and America, too, the preliminary condition for\n'every real people's revolution' is the smashing, the destruction of the 'ready made\nstate machine' In other words, the law of violent proletarian revolution, the law of the\nsmashing of the bourgeois state machine as a preliminary condition for such a revolution,\nis an inevitable law of the revolutionary movement in the imperialist countries of the\nworld\nFor, says Lenin, the free union of nations in Socialism is impossible without a\nmore or less prolonged struggle by the Socialist republics against the backward states\nAfter the October victory, we entered on the third strategic period, the third stage of the\nrevolution, the objective of which is the overthrow of the bourgeoisie throughout the world.\nThe victorious proletariat of one country having expropriated the capitalists and organized\nits own Socialist production, (should) stand up against the rest of the world, attracting to\nits cause the oppressed classes of other countries, raising revolts in those countries\nagainst the capitalists, and in the event of necessity coming out even with armed force\nagainst the exploiting classes and their states.\"\nAn effort should, of course, be made to take from this aggressive program its last\nshred of self-justification by showing that the peoples of the free world, and their\nDECLASSIFIED\n- 4\nE.O. 10501\nBESTR ISTED\nRESTRICTED\ngovernments which depend on the people's consent, are making progress in raising their\nconditions of life while \"the revolutionary will accept a reform in order to use it as an\naid in combining legal work with illegal work, to intensify, under its cover, the illegal\nwork for the revolutionary preparation of the masses for the overthrow of the bourgeois.'\nIt would probably be understandable, even to Soviets, that the disruptive efforts of the\nUSSR the base of the so-called world revolution in the lives of the free nations are re-\nsented by those nations, which are quite competent to manage their own affairs. An early\nexample of this process, which is responsible for any coolness of relations between the\ngovernments of the free world and the government of the USSR, is furnished by the reply\nof the Congress of Soviets on March 15, 1918 to President Wilson's message saying that\nthe U.S. would \"avail itself of every opportunity to secure for Russia once more complete\nsovereignty and independence in her own affairs, and full restoration to her great role\nin the life of Europe and the modern world. \" The tactful Congress in reply expressed its\n\"Firm belief that the happy time is not far distant when the laboring masses of all\ncountries will throw off the yoke of capitalism and will establish a socialistic state of\nsociety which alone is capable of securing just and lasting peace, as well as the culture\nand well-being of all laboring people\nIt might also be possible to point out what the so-called World Peace Campaign's\ncall for \"peace in the whole world\" means in the light of Lenin's statement that there\nwould always be wars as long as capitalist governments existed,\nOne of the regime's important methods of self-justification is based on its claims\nto having \"a scientific method of interpreting history.\" Since each Stalinist policy is\nhearalded as an act of unparalleled wisdom, it is possible that the many flip-flops in\nSoviet policy can be exploited to discredit Stalin's \"wisdom\" and his \"scientific method\".\nWhy, it could be asked, did the Soviet leaders start out with the extreme \"war communism,'\nthen have to reverse their position completely in the NEP, and only then start in five-\nyear plans. Why, incidentally, hasn't anyone been able to write a book on the basic\nprinciples governing the Soviet economy during the period of transition to Communism?\nWhy, if Lenin scorned gold and wanted to build toilets out of it, has Stalin sacrificed\nmillions of lives to mine it? Why was it right to try to do away with the family as the\nbasis of Soviet society, if this policy had to be completely reversed? Why was it right\nfirst to put the army on a fraternal basis and then reintroduce traditional military\ndiscipline? Why was it right to have political commissars in the army one minute and\nwrong the next?\nWhat was so \"scientific\" about the mammoth purge of the officer corps on the eve\nof the war with Nazi Germany, when most of the officers still alive had to be taken out of\nthe concentration camps and sent to the front anyway. What was so wise about the Nazi-\nSoviet Pact which left Hitler free to destroy the second front for which (as Churchill\nsaid) \"The Russian people were to cry so loud and wait in agony so long.'\n(In connection with the Pact it might, incidentally be worth noting Stalin's 1927 remark:\n\"and if it is necessary that somebody be stained with blood, we shall exert all our\nefforts to make it some bourgeois country rather than the USSR. \")\n- 5 -\nDECLASSIFIED\nNEW\nE.O. 10501\nRESTRICTED\nIt is possible that Soviet ideology can also be attacked on the basis of the trans-\nformations that it has undergone since the original formulation of Marxism. If the\nideology is to be attacked at all, however, it would seem advisable to avoid implying\nthat it was basically good but had been distorted by Soviet leaders since this would tend\nto confuse the issue and to weaken the impact of our attack. The following is a highly\ntentative suggestion as to one area of change in Soviet ideology which might be exploitable:\nLying at the center of other transformations which Communist ideology has under-\ngone is the reversal under Lenin and Stalin of the Marxian emphasis on materialism. The\nMarxian view was that \"social existence\" (ie. environment) determined a people's\nconsciousness. Although Marx granted the possibility of acts of will on the part of\npeople, he apparently thought that these acts would somehow be brought about by material\nconditions. Marx's application of these principles to the question of revolution was that\ncapitalist society contained within it the seeds of its own destruction and the course of\ndevelopment of capitalist society would inevitably lead to revolution and the establish-\nment of a new social system. Lenin on the other hand, insisted that the downfall of\ncapitalism depended on the existence of a revolutionary party capable of seizing power\nat a time of crisis in the capitalist system and of establishing its dictatorship. He thus\nintroduced into Soviet ideology the idea of the crucial importance of the will, and, in\neffect, reversed the Marxian emphasis on materialism, although the latter continues to\nbe advanced as one of the foundations of the ideology. A recent formulation of the\n\"reconciliation\" of these mutually contradictory concepts is found in an article \"The\nUnity of the Dialectic Method and the Materialist Theory of Marxist-Leninist Philosophy\",\nappearing in the central Soviet press on September 12, 1947, which states: \"For dia-\nlectical materialism it is not enough to recognize the presence of the objective factors\nwhich are prerequisite to the success of practical work. One must also have a correct\nunderstanding of the subjective factors in the historical process. Subjective factors\nplay a decisive role in turning possibility into reality.\nAs to whose will it is that plays such a decisive role in determining the course of\nevents even Soviet theory has stated quite frankly. The position of the Communist Party\nas the initiator and controller of all organizations in the USSR is stated in the Soviet\nConstitution as is the principle of \"democratic centralism\" within the party prescribing\nthat all authority flows from the top.\nThat this concentration of authority goes far beyong the usurpation of all political\npower is made clear by some of the manifestations of Soviet propaganda and ideology\nwhich seem astonishing to most westerners. Nor only are all the inhabitants of the USSR\nmade to conform to the will of the Soviet leaders, this will is presented by Soviet pro-\npaganda as the people's dearest wish. It is even projected beyond the borders of the\nUSSR and is attributed to the overwhelming majority of people in the outside world Will are\nsaid to regard Stalin as \"the leader of all progressive humanity.\" In no field, however\nminor, can anything be permitted to challenge this will as the only basis for thought and\naction. Since Soviet ideology has repudiated God and claims to be able to control the\nforces of nature, even natural laws which restrict the unfettered exercise of the leader's\nwill must be \"attacked\" and \"destroyed.\" Thus Soviet science was forced to repudiate\nthe Mendelian-Morgan theory of genetics since it dared to suggest that the development\nof plant and animal forms was possible only within certain boundaries set by natural law.\n- 6 -\nDECLASSIFIED\nF.O. 10501.\nIt is thus apparent that Soviet ideology's debt to materialism is exceeded by its debt\nto Fichte, Hegel, and others who asserted the complete supremacy of the will. One of the\nSoviet system's more direct ancestors in this line, however, seems to have been the\nnihilist Nechayev, whose \"Revolutionary Catechism\" (1869) is an amazing prescription\nfor the practice of revolution. In this short statement Nechayev outlines the attitudes and\nmethods which are the very foundations of the modern police state. While the nihilist\nstrives to impose his will on world society through destroying it and the totalitarian dic-\ntator attempts to impose this will on it through dominating it completely, it is apparent\nthat nihilism and totalitarianism both involve the complete destruction of all other forms,\norganizations, societies, moralities, etc., and are dangerously close relatives. (See\n\"Zero\" by Robert Payne.) That Nechayev had direct influence in Lenin was acknowledged\nby the latter. It is of interest to note that his \"Revolutionary Catechism\" was also a major\ninfluence on the Nazi system since it was the basis for the Tcheka-forged \"Protocol of the\nWise Men of Zion\" which was one of Hitler's principal points of departure.\nWhile it would probably be tactless to point out to Russians the Russian influence on\nNazism, US propaganda aimed at more literate target groups might be able to get across\nthe dangerous irrationality of the Soviet Leader's attempt to impose their will on the\nworld in disregard of reality. That this concept may not be wholly foreign to some Soviets\nis indicated by Soviet's propaganda continued emphasis on Hitler's insanity and its in-\nsistence that U.S. leaders are mad (eg. \"The Mad Haberdasher\", \"Forestalism\", etc.)\ne, Winning Russian Nationalism\nA second and probably even more important source of Soviet strength is the support\nof Russian nationalism, which was gained by Stalin during the war, largely through the\nstupidities of the Nazis. When in the thirties revolutionary enthusiasm and hopes for a\nbetter future had begun to wane seriously, Stalin began to rule almost wholly by force.\nThis force was applied largely through the fiction of alleged internal enemies, which pro-\ncess created real internal enemies, who in turn had to be suppressed. This self-de-\nstructive technique came dangerously close to getting completely out of control during the\npurges and had only been brought under control when the war broke out. Russia's internal\ndisruption was amply demonstrated by mass desertions to the Germans during the first\nyear of the war. After that, however, German brutality and hostility toward the Russian\npeople began to solidify the people behind the regime and by the end of the war had given\nStalin and the Politburo a graphic demonstration of the strange cohesive character and\namazing force which the amorphous mass which is the Russian people can display in the\nface of Russia's enemies. The advantages of ruling by virtue of this force rather than\nprimarily through the exercise of straight coercion and violence against large parts of\ntheir own population were at once obvious to the Soviet rulers. Stalin's 1946 speech in\nwhich he so soon after the conclusion of World War II raised the question of further\nworld conflicts and called on the USSR to devote much of her effort to building up her\nmilitary strength was the signal that the Soviet leaders had resolved to rule in this way.\nWhether this was done primarily for reasons of internal control or primarily for reasons\nof external advantage, its effectiveness is apparent since despite the dissatisfaction which\nwas widespread in the USSR after the end of the war, purges and internal repressive\nmeasures of the same catastrophic scale employed before the war have not been neces-\nsary. Stalin clearly indicated that the Great Russian people were the key to Russia's\n- 7\nDECLASSIFIED\n10501\nRESTRICTED\nvictory over the Nazis in his toast to them at the end of the war. Continued references to\nthem as \"the elder brother\" show that Soviet leaders have not changed their evaluation of\nthem as the strongest force in the USSR.\nIt is clear that every effort should be made to show that the rule of Stalin and the\nPolitburo is against and not in the best interests of Russia and the Russian people. That\nwhile the free world will resist aggression, it has no animosity toward the Russian people\nand is, in fact, more sympathetic toward their interests than are the Soviet leaders. The\nexploitation of Russian and the Russian people for purposes of international Communist\npropaganda, intrigue, and aggression can be emphasized to gain the first of these ob-\njectives. (In doing this, however, care should be taken not to build up a picture of a\ngenuinely revolutionary international proletariat.) To gain the second, concepts common\nto Russia and to the free world, in particular the U.S., can be established and it can then\nbe shown that they are what lead the free world to resist Communist aggression and are\nalso what make it understand and sympathize with the plight of the Russian people.\nThe inordinate sensitivity of the Russians to criticism of Russia's backwardness\ncoming from foreigners and their suspiciousness of foreigners in general make Russian\nnationalism an extremely difficult force for Americans to handle. In view of this it might\nbe advisable for U.S. propaganda to mix points demonstrating our understanding and\nrespect for the Russians with points that might be construed as critical of them in a\nproportion of at least one to one. In addition, in touching on the sorest spots, it might\nbe wise to imply the final point, so clearly that the Russian cannot fail to draw the de-\nsired conclusion, and to refrain from stating it explicitly. Since the less educated Russian\nlikes to regard himself as khitri (clever-sly-hard to dupe), it might be a useful technique\nin exposing Soviet propaganda lies to imply that we understand that the listener was too\nsmart to have been taken in by the trick.\nf. Interdicting Other Soviet Strengths\nWhile U.S. propaganda has made an effort to show that conditions are improving in\nthe free world, thus implying that there is no need for revolution and that there is no\nworld proletariat waiting for Soviet \"liberation\", there is a further self-justification of\nwhich Soviet leaders should be stripped. The Nazi attack on the USSR is taken to prove\ntheir point about the aggressiveness of the capitalist world and to justify all their\ndraconian measures to build up the military strength of the USSR. Since the war Soviet\npropagandists have, of course, been assiduous in attributing all the evils of the Nazis to\nthe United States. The striking similarity between the Nazi and Soviet systems could be\npointed out or at least implied. It could be emphasized that Nazi Germany was aggressive\nbecause she was totalitarian and not because she was capitalistic. (See Section I (d) \"At-\ntacking Soviet Ideology\"). A further and also important source of Soviet strength is the\nslight but undeniable rise in the standard of living in the USSR during the past two years.\nOne way of neutralizing the psychological effects of this Soviet asset might be to say that\nthe relatively slight proportion of the total Soviet economy that was involved had been\ndevoted to this purpose not out of solicitude for the welfare of the people but so that if\nthe Soviet leaders decide to embark on general war, the blame for the subsequent drop\nin the Soviet standard of living will seemingly fall on the U.S., the alledged aggressors,\nand not on the regime, the actual aggressors.\n- 8\nRESTRICTED\nRESTRIC TED\ng. Questions Regarding Russian Psychology\nThe old Russian village \"mir\", which was supposed to have some mystical quali-\nties and to be greater than the sum total of the individuals making it up, and the Russian\northodox congregation, where the truth was supposed to reside in the congregátion as a\nwhole rather than in any individual member, are evidence that in the basic pattern of\nRussian thought the group is credited with being greater than the sum of its members.\nThis may go part of the way toward explaining the Soviet passion for unanimity, i.e. in\ndemonstrating their strength they have seized on a familiar Russian concept. It is re-\nflected in a good deal of political writing by recent Russian emigres, who rebuke the\nWest for an excess of individualism which, they claim, degenerates into selfishness.\nThere is thus reason to doubt that U.S. propaganda based on appeals to the concepts of\nwestern individualism would be of as much effect as appeals based on concepts more\nfirmly rooted in Russian thought. For example, U.S. propaganda might stress the dif-\nference between the old \"mir\" where unanimity was achieved through custom and respect\nfor the village elders, and the new collectives, where unanimity is achieved through direct\nfear of the police. It may, however, be the concept of the superiority of the group over\nthe individual which leads the two principal Russian emigre parties in Germany in their\nprograms to repudiate the concept of class warfare in the bitterest of terms and to stress\nthe values of national unity. (As with much that is Russian, where one tendency seems to\nbe accompanied by its opposite, it should be remembered that in addition to placing great\nvalue on unity, the Russians have what may easily be the world's greatest talent for\nbitter factionalism.) Despite these comments on Russian collectivism, it should be re-\nmembered that the Soviet collective farms are almost universally hated and that recent\nSoviet defectors indicate many, if not most, Soviet citizens realize clearly Soviet elec-\ntions are a farce. Nor should it be doubted that western concepts have made enough\nheadway in Russia for the concept of \"freedom\" to be a touchstone of great importance\nand the concept of tyranny to be wholly understandable.\nIt cannot be doubted that the Soviet regime's rule by force and its emphasis on\nmaterialism, in addition to denying a decent life to the great majority of its citizens, has\ndone much to break down Russian moral standards and to promote lying, selfishness,\ngraft and theft. Nevertheless, it may be true that the injustices and hardships imposed by\nthe regime have at the same time led many Russians in their inner lives to place great\nimportance on spiritual values by way of compensation. It might thus be wise to set ap-\npeals to the Russians based on purely material considerations, while of undoubted basic\nappeal in themselves, in an acceptable framework of ideas and ideals to avoid offending\nRussian sensibilities.\nThree additional questions regarding the psychology of the Great Russians are\nraised here in the conviction that they are germaine to the problems of a psychological\noffensive on the USSR and in the hopes that someone else will answer them.\nDo the Russians think in visual symbols more than Americans? If so, appeals based\non the contradictions between conflicting verbal concepts may be less effective than they\nwould be with Americans.\nDECLASSIFIED\n9\nMatherity E.O. 10501\nESTR ICTED\nRESTRICTED\nHow does the Russian feeling of guilt differ from the American? Does a Russian\nfeel guilty for thoughts as well as for actions? Does he feel guilty for things done by\nhis group and over which he had no control as well as for things done by him individually?\nIf the hypotheses posed by these latter questions are correct, an additional avenue of\napproach for propaganda exists, but the danger of offending the individual by censuring the\nactions of his group is also increased.\nOn whom or what does the Russian focus hatred? Does he hold the individual re-\npresentative of an institution which is repressing him responsible for the acts of the\ninstitution as a whole or does he feel that someone he knows as a person can never be\nreally guilty and thus focus his hatred on some unknown person or group some degree\nremoved from him? If it is true that in 1917 many Russian peasants went over to the next\nvillage to burn down the landlord's house and barns, there may be support for the latter\nview. Perhaps it is mainly when a Russian has already been galvanized into action\nagainst the unknown group that he hurts the person he knows and then hurts him only as a\nrepresentative of the group he hates. If so, less effect can be gained by trying to focus\nthe hatred of the propaganda recipient on a nearby person than by creating a symbol of\nthe institution or group that is repressing him.\nh. Dangerous Associations\nIn conducting a psychological offensive against the USSR care should be taken to\navoid or nullify the effects of association with certain things which have been standard\nand apparently successful elements in Soviet propaganda, since such association might\nvitiate the effectiveness of the U.S. psychological attack. Such dangerous associations\nobviously include: Tsarist injustice, former landowners, capitalist exploitation, former\nforeign economic concessions, Nazi theories of racial supremacy, and, of course, anti-\nRussianism of all sorts and Austrian-Polish-German efforts to dismember Russia. It\nis suggested that it might be wise to handle the following additional subjects with care for\nthe reasons indicated: Chiang Kai Shek, since Soviet propaganda has apparently success-\nfully made him a symbol of the evils of imperialist and capitalist exploitation; Kerenski\nand the Provisional Government, since recent defectors indicate that many anti-Soviet\nRussians accuse them of spinelessly giving way to the Bolsheviks; Marxist Russian emigres\nemigres since defectors indicate that the desire for private property is making headway\nin the USSR and that another brand of Marxism would have little appeal; the Russian\nOrthodox Church, as distinct from spiritual values and ethics in general, since Soviet\nanti-religious propaganda has apparently had some effect and since defectors indicate\nthat the present church is intensely disliked by some on the grounds that it is thoroughly\ninterpenetrated by the MGB (everything else is too, but this somehow seems revolting);\nthe Vatican and the Catholic Church since these have been used apparently successfully\nby Soviet propaganda as a sinister \"bete noir\"; Churchill for the same reason and\nbecause he has been portrayed as anti-Russian; British imperialism since apparently\nsome traditional anti-British sentiment has successfully been kept alive by Soviet\npropaganda on the grounds of their alleged imperialism and Tito, since disaffected\nSoviets apparently feel he is as bad as Stalin, only less dangerous because less powerful.\n- 10 -\nRESTRICTED\nRESTRICTED\ni. Effects of a Psychological Offensive\nThe point has been raised whether a psychological offensive at the present time\nwould not have the effect of putting a large part of the Soviet population in an untenable\npsychological position by demonstrating the evilness of the regime for which they work\nand the complete futility of their daily lives without offering them any alternative. It\nhas been suggested that putting or attempting to put them in such a position would earn\nus their hostility rather than their friendship and possible future support.\nAt present when Soviet citizens are wholly immersed in the all-pervading atmos-\nphere of the police state and when the United States is not in a position to offer them a\nreal, simple and acceptable alternative of the type that could conceivably be offered in\nwar time, it seems highly doubtful that a U.S. psychological offensive can produce major\nvisible results in the USSR. It does not seem valid, however, to argue that it will do\nmore harm than good from our point of view. The section of the Soviet population which\nis already fully disaffected is now faced with two difficult situations, one in the present\nwhere he is forced to live a life he hates, and one in the future where he fears he will\nfind himself under attack by un-understanding and unsympathetic enemies who will have\nthe mass destruction of the Russian peoples as their objective and thus be forced to fight\nto defend a regime which he despises. Relieving him now of this fear, which is probably\nhis number one horror, would seem to be likely to gain his sympathy more than to make\nhis present life less bearable is, in any event, probably very hard to do since he has\nlearned to live in the Soviet atmospher e and is protected by the \"triple bronze\" which\nprotects us all from the full implications of our daily lives.\nIn addition, the fully disaffected probably constitute only one of three major seg-\nments of the Soviet population and the effects of a psychological offensive on the other two\nmust be considered. It seems reasonable to suppose that the fully disaffected are one\nend of the Soviet spectrum, the other end being formed by the group which because of\ntheir duties or their privileges consider themselves fully committed to the regime, and\nthe middle, probably the largest group, being undecided. It would certainly seem worth-\nwhile to sow doubt and confusion among the group which considers itself fully committed\nto the regime. It might be possible to make some of its members mentally disassociate\nthemselves from the regime by keeping the target group of our offensive as small as\npossible, and, in any event, to increase the tension in the daily lives of the group would\nbe to lower the efficiency of the Soviet Government and thus would represent a net gain\nfrom our point of view.\nIt is the middle and still undecided group which represents the most serious problem\nin considering a psychological offensive. With them, as with the disaffected group, the\nproblems of the future are probably even more important than the problems of the moment.\nTo relieve them of their fears of attack by deadly enemies who wish to destroy all the\npeoples of Russia would certainly be a big step toward winning their sympathy and possible\nfuture support. Because of their distrust of propaganda in general and their uncertainty\nabout the truth about the outside world, it seems improbable that they can be convinced\nthat the outside world is not aggressive without first showing them that the Soviet regime\nis aggressive. This means increasing their tensions about their daily lives, although the\n- 11 -\nDECLASSIFIED\nRESTRICTED\n\"aes triplex\" principle probably operates here too, and replacing their fear of attack by\nall destroying enemies by the fears of the only slightly less horrible prospect of inevitable\nbloodshed caused the outside world's retaliation to Soviet aggression. While it would be\nhelpful to suggest that they will have an acceptable and better alternative than cooperating\nwith the regime in war time, it seems doubtful that associating their fears of war with\ntheir aggressive leaders would result in increased hostility toward the United States. On\nthe contrary, it seems likely that while it would produce no visible results now, in war\ntime it would help to direct at least part of their hostility toward their own regime and to\nmake them more prone to accept an alternative to cooperating with it if one were offered\nto them.\n2. Soviet Psychological Vulnerabilities\nA. General\n(1) Soviet reliance on \"pie in the sky\" thirty-three years after promising\nSoviet citizens a good life\nThe Soviet regime's continued failure to produce the good life that it has promised\nand its continued reliance on promises of \"pie in the sky\" are things of which most\nSoviet citizens are probably already acutely aware and can be capitalized on to the regime's\ndiscomfiture. The Soviet population could be reminded of the promises which the regime\nhas made regarding the standard of living and of the contrast between these promises and\nreality. In doing this, U.S. propaganda operators should make maximum use of concrete\nexamples and hard facts. The effects of the slight rise in the standard of living during\nthe past two years must be neutralized, however, before full profit can be obtained in\nthis field. If it can be shown that the regime has itself created most all (i.e. except Nazi\nGermany) of the enemies on which it has always placed the blame for not delivering the\n\"pie\", and must create such enemies in order to govern, it can be shown that reality\nwill always remain grim and the \"pie\" will remain in the sky.\n(2) Demonstrable falsity of much Soviet internal propaganda re the USSR\nThe relative degree of objectivity which nearly all Soviet Citizens possess is suf-\nficient to make them see the obvious falsity of much Soviet internal propaganda regarding\nconditions in the USSR. It may be possible to use this fact to discredit Soviet propaganda\nregarding the free world by continually coupling obvious Soviet lies concerning the USSR\nwith Soviet lies about the outside world.\n(3) Reversible Soviet propaganda regarding the free world\nSince much of the Soviet regime's propaganda concerning the free world is not a\npicture of the free world but only a mirror held up to its own horrible face, it may be\npossible to discredit it by pointing out its obvious similarity to conditions within the USSR\nwith which the Soviet citizen is familiar.\n- 12 -\nDECLASSIFIED\n10501\nRESTRICTED\n(4) Resistance of some cultural patterns to violent change\nSoviet attempts to displace the family as the basis of Russian society, to place the\narmy on a fraternal basis, to institute the continuous work week, etc., failed dismally\nand had to be completely reversed. Such reversals could be capitalized on by emphasizing\nthat they show that the Marxist-Leninist system is foreign to the fundamental basis of\nRussian society. In addition a study of the basic Russian culture would probably reveal\nother areas in which the regime is trying to go counter to the cultural pattern and is there-\nby creating tensions which could be successfully exploited in propaganda. The universality\nsality with which Soviet defectors condemn what the regime is trying to do as being\n\"against human nature\" reveals that this is one of its principal points of weakness. (See\n2 b. (4). A study of the cultures of the national minorities in the USSR might reveal\nsimilar material for exploitation in splinter language propaganda.\n(5) Rewritten Soviet history\nThe Soviet citizen's memory can be made to work toward discrediting the regime's\npresent propaganda if the U.S. makes use of the various rewritings of Soviet history. It\nhas been suggested that a careful review of the changes made in the various editions of\nthe large Soviet encyclopedia alone would furnish a wealth of material for this purpose.\n(6) Soviet refusal to let the ordinary citizen travel abroad\nIn attacking Soviet propaganda the regime's refusal to let the ordinary citizen travel\nabroad can be tied onto many lies we wish to discredit. Samples: Why should a Soviet\ncitizen believe that life is better in the USSR than in the free world if his government won't\nlet him see the free world? If life was worse there than in the USSR, he would come\nback. Why should he believe that the USSR is helping the \"peoples democracies\" to\nimprove their standards of living if his government keeps him from seeing these coun-\ntries. That it won't let him see them shows that the standard of living in most of these\nareas is still higher than in the USSR. Why should the workers and peasants, in these\ncountries willingly adopt a system which produces a standard of living lower than the\none they had before Soviet \"liberation\"?\nb. Specific\n(1) The fear of war\nThe fear of war is at present one of the strongest emotions among the Soviet popu-\nlation but can only be safely exploited by U.S. propaganda if it is successfully demon-\nstrated that the entire danger of war has been created by the Soviet leaders. If this has\nnot been done, raising the intensity of the already existing fear of war on the part of the\nSoviet population may backfire and contribute to the Soviet propaganda picture of an ag-\ngressive U.S.\n- 13 -\nDECLASSIFIED\nRESTRICTED\nE.O. 10501\nRESTRICTED\n(2) The forced labor system\nWhile all labor in the Soviet Union is in effect forced since \"the happy workers\"\ncannot leave the country and must work, the concentration camp system as such probably\nconstitutes the Soviet Union's principal psychological vulnerability since it runs entirely\ncounter to Russian ideals of solidarity and fraternity and since it is the living proof of the\nevils inherent in trying to force an unworkable system to work.\nThe regime's justification of their concentration camps on the grounds that those\ndetained at \"corrective labor\" have committed crimes against the state can be attacked\nby showing what most of these crimes really were: i.e., \"anti-Soviet conversation\"\nmeans speaking the truth, \"anti-Soviet sentiments\" means thinking the truth, \"kulakism\"\nmeans wanting the land for which the Russians fought the revolution, etc., even stealing\nis largely the regime's fault since it spends so much of Russia's natural and human\nresources supporting the upper Party and its efforts to conquer the world that the ordinary\nman cannot obtain the necessities of life without cheating.\nThat the forced labor system has grown to such proportions that it cannot now be\ndispensed with by the Soviet economy can be shown by the fact that the \"National Labor\nReserves\" are in fact an addition to the slave labor system, the regime having been\nforced to feed the machine it has created with wholly innocent, underprivileged youth\nunder the guise of \"education.\"\nAll Russians, with the possible exception of the young, are so acutely aware of the\ninjustices of the forced labor system, and at the present it is such an integral part of\nRussia that it is possible that some restraint should be used by U.S. propaganda in\ntreating the subject. Full treatment might seem to the Russians like rebuking them for\ntheir character.\n(3) The Police State\nThe whole gigantic mechanism of coercion which the Soviet State has created and\nwhich has as its function cowing or breaking the will of all Soviet citizens who do not\nblindly follow the state's instructions constitute's another Soviet vulnerability of the\nfirst importance. To make its system even partially work the regime has been forced\nto set a large part of its population against the rest. This runs entirely counter to\nRussian ideas of unity and is clear disproof of the Soviet leaders' claim that they are\nacting in the direction of the aspirations of the masses.\nSince fear of the secret police forces most Soviet citizens to live a daily lie and\nto lie daily, the police state system comes in conflict with the Russian concepts of truth\nand conscience as does the regime's continual demands for indications of submission\n(ovations, telegrams to Stalin, confessions, renunciations, etc.). The fantastic plots\nhatched up by the police as charges can hardly be credible to the more intelligent, and\nthe cynicism and brutality displayed by the secret police must run counter to Russian\nideas of humanity.\n- 14\nASSIRED\nRESTRICTED\nName\nE.O.\n10501\nRESTRICTED\n(4) The Collective Farm System\nThere seems little reason to doubt that the Russian peasant's traditional desire to\nown his own land is one of the most tenacious parts of the basic Russian culture of which\nthe efforts of the regime are running afoul and that there is almost universal dislike for\nand disgust with the collective farm system on the part of ordinary collective farm workers.\nThat the concessions to individualism on the kolkhozes which were necessary to raise the\nproductivity of agriculture on the eve of the war with Germany have recently been re-\nversed by the regime and that Party control is being strengthened seem to indicate that\ndiscontent on the collective farms is due for a sharp upswing in the immediate future.\nSince many collective farms workers do not feel that they are provided with a\nsufficient return on their labor by the state and are convinced that kolkhoz chairmen and\nwarehouse superintendents are profiteering in grain, etc., at their expense, they have\nbecome almost completely indifferent toward their work and a significant number have\ntaken to theft of collective farm property which they resell through middlemen. To\nillustrate the latter process: A collective farm worker, who wants to buy a pair of shoes\nfor his son, steals the distributor off the tractor which the kolkhoz needs to plow its\nfields and sells it to someone who resells it to the manager of a Machine Tractor Station,\nwho knows where it came from but has to fulfill his plan for the repairing of tractors,\nand who puts it on a tractor from another collective farm the distributor of which has\nbeen stolen by someone who wants to buy a pair of shoes for his daughter.\nOther sources of collective farm discontent are: Party men in key positions who\nhave little real understanding of agriculture, the scant consumers goods which reach\ncollective farms and which make the kolkhozniki realize that they are being exploited for\nthe benefit of the communist bureaucracy in the cities, slipshod plowing done by Machine\nTractor Station operators who are pushed by the Stakhanovite system and continually\nrising norms, the fact that collective farm workers face real hardships in times of crop\nfailure when they will get no help from the state, etc., etc.\n(5) Minorities Nationalism\nWhile discontent among the national minorities in the USSR is probably stronger\nthan among the Great Russian people and arises, at least in part, from feelings of\nnationalism (especially in the Baltic States and among the peoples of the Caucasus) which\nlead them to resent both the regime and the Great Russian people, care must be exercised\nin exploiting this force if the Great Russians, always extremely sensitive about foreign\nattempts to dismember Russia, are not to be driven into the arms of the regime. The\nstrength of separatist feeling on the part of the Ukrainians.is a highly controyersial\nsubject, but all Russian defector and emigre sources indicate that because of the fact\nthat Russia's enemies have traditionally tried to sever the Ukraine from Russia indica-\ntions that the U.S. had arbitrarily decided to try to set up the Ukraine as an independent\nstate would be a fatal blow to U.S. attempts to win Great Russian sympathies. In this\nconnection, however, it may be noted that both SBONR's and NTS's programs (organiza-\ntions which are almost as Great Russian as you can get) propose some form of plebiscite\nas a solution for the nationalities question in the event that the regime is overthrown.\n- 15 -\nDECL ASSIFIED\nASSIRED\nO. Sec. 3(E) and I(D) or (B)\nRESTRICTED\nD.p., State Aug. an\nE.O.\n10501\nBy NLT\nNAME Date\nRESTRICTED\n(6) The low standard of living in urban communities\nSince the revolution was in large part fought to raise the standard of living of the\nproletariat and since the regime has continually justified itsactions in those terms, the\nfacts that the standard of living in Soviet cities remains approximately at pre-revolutionary\nlevel and housing continues to be grossly overcrowded, this is a fruitful field for\npsychological exploitation. (See 2 a (1), \"Pie in the Sky\".) Perhaps one of the best ways\nto avoid offending Russian sensitiveness to criticism of Russian backwardness in exploiting\nthis field and to associate blame for the situation with the regime would be to emphasize\nthat most of the country's economy is being used by the Politburo to support international\nCommunist aggressive war (i.e. Korea), Soviet propaganda and intrigue, preparations\nfor Soviet aggressive war, etc. The low standard of living of the proletariat certainly\nalso provides grounds for resentment of the dachas, good clothes, good food and other\nluxuries enjoyed by the Party-Burocracy, which rules in the name of the proletariat.\n(7) The exploitation of \"free Labor\"\nWages are so low that many workers have to work two shifts to make enough to\nlive on, piece work, the Stkhanovite speed-up, continually rising production norms, the\nforced \"voluntary buying of government bonds, draconian labor legislation, etc. make\nmany of the workers in Soviet industry dissatisfied with their lot in \"The Worker's\nParadise\". (See (6) above.)\n(8) The position of women\nLow wages and high prices have forced the tremendous majority of women in the\nUSSR to work. Most of them simultaneously try to raise a family (which defectors\nindicate they still consider as their primary interest in life). In fact this group is\nexploited in a way which makes a farce out of the so-called \"equality of women\". In\naddition, unskilled and semi-skilled female labor is used on back-breaking jobs extremely\ninjurious to health. If without suggesting that the women's place is in the home, the\npresent exploitation of Soviet women can be associated with the regime, much capital can\nbe made out of this field. It could, for example, be implied that wages are deliberately\nkept low in proportion to prices so that most women will have to work.\nSince the majority of women are primarily interested in family relationships\nand since men are already scarce in Soviet Russia, Soviet women might easily provide a\ngood target for anti-aggressive-war propaganda.\n(9) Popular resentment of the Party-Bureaucracy\nThere is certainly popular resentment of the privileges enjoyed by the new upper\nclasses in \"The Classless Society\" and of the nepotism, advancement by connection,\nbeaurocratic disregard for the individual, etc. practised by the Party-Burocracy. Care,\nhowever, should be used in exploiting this field since it might result in unnecessarily\nsolidifying all the privileged classes behind the regime.\nRESTRICTED\nDECLASSIRED\nBatherity E0. 10501\n16 -\nRESTRICTED\n(10) Friction within the Party-Bureaucracy\nThere is every indication that within the Soviet Party-Burocracy there is jealousy\nof the position and privileges of superiors, resentment of toadies and bootlickers who\ngain undeserved advancement, resentment of others for their unwillingness to take res-\nponsibility, a sense of insecurity owing to the necessity of finding a scapegoat for\neverything that goes wrong, frustration at the continual lying that one is forced to do, a\nsense of shame at the hypocracy necessary to disassociate oneself from a person on the\nway out, and continual fear of intra-office spying, compromising oneself, making a\nmistake, and of the \"slow way down\" courtesy of the party or the fast way out courtesy of\nthe MGB.\nIt would appear, however, that attacks against the group as a whole should be\navoided and individual members encouraged d'disassociate themselves from the regime\nso that the entire group will not feel that its only salvation lies with the regime. The\nquestion of the size of the target group for US propaganda is a vital one and it is here\nsuggested that it might prove best to make it no bigger than the Politburo, attributing\nall evils to it or to the system, so that the door would seem open to all others. In\ninsurrection, the Russian people might choose to shut in on many of the groups but they\nwould be in a better position to select the guilty ones than we.\n(11) Discontent on the Part of the factory manager group\nThis group probably contains many of the ablest and most energetic people in the\nUSSR and must certainly compare its situation unfavorably to its counterpart in US in-\ndustry where opportunities are almost unlimited for able executives. Since it seems\nto be one of the most logical places in which to look for future anti-Soviet leadership, care\nshould be taken to avoid driving the group into the arms of the regime.\n(12) Discontent on the part of the Intelligentsia\nStrict party control and the severe post-war purges probably indicate that there is\nwidespread discontent among the Intelligentsia. The group probably feels its isolation\nfrom the west more acutely than any other Soviet group.\n(13) Frustration and confusion on the part of Soviet engineers\nSoviet engineers must feel the control, and not the always understanding control,\nof the Party in much the same way as does the group of factory managers. In addition,\nsince many of them spend their time pouring over western technical journals, largely\nAmerican, they are probably particularly susceptible to doubts about the true value of\nthe Soviet system.\n(14) Resentment of the Politburo by Soviet Marshals\nZhukov and several of the other great Soviet Army leaders during the last war must\nresent the way that they have been put in the shade by the Politburo, especially since they\nread of the great post-war roles that Marshall, Eisenhower, Montgomery, are playing.\n- 17 - -\nDECLASSIRED\nRESTRICTED\nAdherity E.O. 10501\nRESTRICTED\n3. Possible Methods of Approach to Other Major Target Groups\na. The Soviet Armed Forces\nSpecial slanting of propaganda directed toward the Soviet Army could take into\naccount the troops' practical confinement to barracks and the higher standard of living in\nEastern Germany, etc. than in the USSR. Emphasis could also be placed on the fact that\nthe Russian Army has traditionally been an instrument of Russian national policy and has\nalmost exclusively been used for the defense of Russia, while it is now being readied for\noffensive use in aggression against the west in the interests of international communist\nexpansion and not in the interests of the Russian people. The great respect which Soviet\nwartime leaders such as Zhukov enjoyed, and still enjoy, among Soviet troops could be\nexploited by showing how they have largely been relegated to minor jobs by the Politburo\nwhich feared their prestige. Zhukov's role in the Soviet film, \"The Fall of Berlin\"\nprovides a handy example of this process.\nb. Soviet Youth\nSoviet youth, which is too young to know at first hand what collectivization and the\npurges meant or to have seen Eastern Europe or Germany during the war, undoubtedly\nconstitutes one of the regime's principal sources of strength and at the same time\nprobably the most difficult group for US propaganda to appeal to. Exposing the real\nmeaning of Marxism-Stalinism and giving some pointed lessons on the real history of the\nUSSR might be among the best ways of neutralizing the effects of this Soviet source of\nstrength. The fact that the regime is able to offer good jobs to only part of the group\nwhile others have to be drained off into the forced labor system under the guise of the\n\"National Labor Reserves\" might be a point illustrating the nature of the Soviet system\nand close enough to home to be understandable.\n4. Exploitable US Assets\na. Conceptions and Interests Common to the US and Russia\nEvery effort should be made to ascertain the basic Russian concepts which can be\nused to build up a picture of what the United States is trying to do in terms which are\nunderstandable to the Russians and to establish, insofar as possible, a community of\ninterest between the US and the Russian people.\nb. Exploitable Quotations from Russian Classical and Marxist Literature\nResearch groups and the US universities could be allotted the task of collecting\nuseful quotations which could be prepared for use on IBM machines available to US pro-\npaganda operators.\nc. Strength of the free world\nStressing the strength of the free world is undoubtedly of great importance and\nis already one of the major themes on VOA broadcasts beamed to the USSR.\n18 -\nDECLASSIFIED\nRESTRICTED\nSubmity E.O. 10501\nRESTRICTED\nd. Non-aggressive character of free world\nSee \"Interdicting other Soviet strengths\" and \"Effects of a psychological offensive\".\n- 19 -\nDECLASSIRED\nAuthority E.O. 10501\nRESTRICTED\nPSYCHOLOGICAL OFFENSIVE VIS-A-VIS THE USSR\nOBJECTIVE, TASKS AND THEMES\nU.S. psychological approaches to the USSR should be directed, in general, toward the crea-\ntion of future beneficial relations between the two nations. The present situation, however,\ncalls for emergency efforts to stimulate all psychological factors within the USSR which may\nact as a deterrent upon the aggressive policies of its rulers. For this purpose, therefore, all\nappropriate psychological pressure shall be exerted to deter further aggression on the part of\nthe Soviet Union by:\nI. Emphasizing to Soviet rulers and peoples the reckless nature of Soviet policy and its\nconsequences.\nП. Establishing a reservoir of good will between the peoples of the USSR and those of\nthe free world.\nIII. Widening the schism which exists between the Soviet peoples and their rulers.\nIN SUPPORT OF OBJECTIVE I: Emphasizing to Soviet rulers and peoples the reckless\nnature of Soviet policy and its consequences.\nTasks 1. and 2.\n1. To establish the vast potential strength of the free world, moral as well as\nmaterial, in the minds of the people of the USSR.\n2. To make clear free world strength is based on the determination and association\nof free men to defend their homes and way of life against aggressors.\nSuggested Themes:\n(a) The peoples of the free world regard Soviet aggression as an attempt to enslave\nthem and will resist such aggression by force of arms.\n(b) The attempts of all tyrants to conquer the world have always failed; future attempts\nwill also inevitably fail.\n(c) The free world has spiritual, human and industrial, natural, economic, and techno-\nlogical resources as well as the military potential necessary to defeat any attempt at world\nconquest and experience and skills in their use.\nNecessarily implicit throughout these objectives, tasks and themes is the suggestion to the\nSoviet peoples that an alternative to the present regime can exist. It is not the policy of the\nU.S. to advocate specific alternatives. Consequently no such suggestion should be made on\nany specific issue (collectivization, democratic elections, etc.) without special policy guidance.\nIn all our output however, it should be implicit that the eventual solution lies in a reassertion\nof the human values which are the heritage of the Russian people, and which Stalinism has\nrepudiated.\n(d) The tremendous\n- 1 -\nDECLASSIFIED\nO. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)\nCONFIDENTIAL\nDept. of State letter, 8.23.76\nNLT 76.6\nBy NLT. NARS Date 10-20-76\nCONFIDENTIAL\n(d) The tremendous potential of the United States which supplied weapons to all nations,\nexpecially the USSR, who fought against aggression in World War II is again being marshaled\nto prevent further aggression.\n(e) The myth that the USSR won World War II without significant military, economic\nand industrial help from the West should be destroyed.\nTask 3.\n3. To make clear that such strength is not being created for aggression.\nSuggested Themes.\n(a) There were no annexations of territory by the free world as a result of World War\nII. On the contrary, many nations have won their independence (India, Philippines, etc.)\nthrough peaceful development and political negotiations. (Caution: Do not confuse annexation\nwith the trusteeships and temporary occupations which have followed World War П.)\n(b) The U.S. has no desire to possess nor control any Russian (or Soviet) lands whatever.\n(c) In contrast to the Soviet Union, armies were disbanded in the free world at the end\nof World War П. The free world has started to rearm only as a result of the repeated demon-\nstrations of hostile intent and aggressive design on the part of the Soviet government.\n(d) The free world desires only peaceful and friendly relations with all nations and will\ngo to war only to protect its people, territory, and way of life from aggression.\nTask 4.\n4. To establish the reckless and aggressive nature of Soviet policy and to establish\nthe inevitable disaster for the people of the USSR inherent in their rulers' quest for\nworld domination.\nSuggested Themes:\n(a) Soviet ideology as taught by Stalin calls for an aggressive struggle by the USSR\nagainst the so-called bourgeois states using armed force if necessary.\n(b) Any quest for world dominion leads to war.\n(c) Stalin's speech of 1946 and \"The History of CPSU(b)\" and Stalin's \"Problems of\nLeninism\" all portray a philosophy which permits of no compromise and calls for the destruc-\ntion of all other systems of government, even though they may have been created by and are\ndefended by the people governed.\n(d) Statements of possibility of peaceful co-existence have been made only for the purpose\nof deceiving Soviet and other peoples and for tactical advantage as taught by basic communist\ndoctrine. Emphasize that they have never appeared as a basic communist tenet.\n(e) The free world recognizes the communist \"peace\" campaign as a travesty when\nsponsored by a regime which aids and abets aggression openly. It is intended to exploit the\npeople's desire for peace in the selfish interests of the Stalin clique.\n(f) This \"peace\"\n- 2 -\nDECLASSIFIED\nE.O. 11652. Sec. 3(E) and 8:33:21 5(D) or (E)\nCONFIDENTIAL\nof\nState\nletter\nBy. Dept. NLT. HV NARS Date 10.20.76\nCONFIDENTIAL\n(f) This \"peace\" campaign is specifically designed to distort the motives of nations\nresisting communist aggression; it is a device to immobilize the free world's resistance to\nSoviet aggression, direct or indirect.\nIN SUPPORT OF OBJECTIVE II: Establishing a reservoir of good will between the peoples\nof the USSR and those of the free world.\nTask 1.\n1. To uncover and develop the spiritual values and the moral and ethical concepts\nof the Soviet peoples especially of Russia and to establish the identity of these values\nwith those of the free world.\nSuggested Themes:\n(a) Truth, mercy, pity, charity, love of family, hospitality, are some of the basic values\nwhich have always been dear to the Soviet peoples and which are derived from their spiritual\nlife. They are held in common with the people of the free world, but in contempt by the Soviet\nrulers.\n(b) Historically the contribution of the Russian people to the free world in the various\nfields of creative thought - i.e., ethics, arts and the sciences - has always been recognized\nand respected.\n(c) A review of classical Russian literature and political and ethical philosophy shows\nthat Russia shared and was influenced by the creative social and cultural forces that have\nshaped the West. The political and ethical ideals of the Russian peoples are at bottom similar\nto those of the West, since they spring from common spiritual roots; they are thwarted in the\ncommunist state, but they are not dead.*\n(d) The Russian family is founded on love, trust, mutual assistance, and respect for the\nrights of others. These values are held in common with the free world.\n(e) The things for which the Soviet peoples believed the revolution was fought: peace,\nfreedom, and a decent life for all, are basic concepts held in common with the free world.\nThese concepts motivate and are being advanced in the progressive daily and political life of\nthe free world.\n(f) To assure the Russian people that the free world has no designs against them nor\ntheir country and that it seeks only their freedom and prosperity in a friendly, cooperative\nworld.\nTask 2.\n2. To establish specifically the good-will of the government and people of the United\nStates toward Soviet peoples.\n* Treatment note: We should avoid talking of Western influence overmuch, and avoid any sug-\ngestion of being patronizing.\nSuggested Themes:\n- 3 -\nDECLASSIFIED\nE. O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)\nDept. of State letter 8-23-76\nCONFIDENTIAL\nBy NLT. He NARS Date 10-20-70\nSuggested Themes:\n(a) The U.S. is peace-loving and honors the sovereignty and integrity of peoples and\nnations.\n(b) Americans distinguish between the Soviet peoples and their government.\n(c) The United States never has been at war with Russia.\n(d) The U.S. helped the Soviet peoples in World War II even before the U.S. was at war\nwith Germany.\n(e) The U.S. continued to help the peoples of the USSR even after the end of hostilities\nof World War II. (Helped also after the Revolution: Hoover Commission)\n(f) Americans have contributed their knowledge and experience to the building of industry\nthere.\n(g) The love of technology and gadgetry, science and mechanics applied to daily life, is\nshared by the peoples of the USSR and the U.S.\n(h) Our countries are big and we share a tendency to plan big.\n(i) We share the spirit of pioneers.\n(j) There are many thousands of persons of Russian or Ukranian descent in the United\nStates who have had an important influence on the development of American life.\n(k) Russian and Ukranian folk music and the music of their composers (including the\nSoviet) are very frequently performed in the U. S.* Many of our outstanding performing\nartists are of Russian extraction.\n(1) The novels and stories of Russian authors are very popular in the United States (the\nfree world). Courses in Russian literature figure in the curricula of all our major univer-\nsities.*\n(m) The people of the U.S. and the free world are well aware of the courage, energy\nand aspirations of the Soviet peoples; many Americans have publicly praised these qualities.\n(n) The U.S. helps all peoples when it can, whether or not they agree with American\nforeign policy. (Witness the case of India, Yugoslavia, and other neutrals.) It does not seek\nto punish peoples for the acts of their governments. (Witness the contributions from the\nU.S. to UNRRA and UNICEF, which have helped the peoples of America's former allies and\nenemies alike.)\n* The tours of the Don Cossack Chorus and of the Ballet Russe should be reported from time\nto time.\n* New biographies of Russian writers and studies of Russian literature should be reviewed,\neven if they appear to have no political content.\nDECLASSIFIED\n- 4 -\nE. O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and S(D) or (E)\nDept. of State letter. 23.26\nBz. NLT. He NARS Date 10-20-76\n(o) Theatrical aspirants in America still study the Stanislawsky method and no attempt\nis made to disguise its Russian origin.\n(p) The U.S. government and many private institutions and individuals have sought to\nestablish cultural, scientific, and technical exchange with the Soviet Union. (The U.S. even\nsought, albeit unsuccessfully, to have the Red Army chorus tour the United States.)\n(q) Evidence of nature of America (the free world) and of the basic drives and ideals we\nhold in common with the peoples of the USSR is provided in the American and other Western\nliterature still available in the Soviet Union: Steinbeck, Upton Sinclair, Mark Twain, Jack\nLondon, Dickens, etc. Although some of the works are \"social protest\" literature, they dem-\nonstrate the operation of the democratic faith in social process; the very fact that they are\nprotests and critical of the social system and government indicates that the society as a whole\nis strong and progressive.\nTask 3.\n3. To reduce the credibility of Soviet internal propaganda by:\na. Exposing false statements made by Soviet propaganda on internal matters to\npersons inside the USSR.\nb. Discrediting false statements made by Soviet internal propaganda regarding\nthe free world, e.g., by:\ni. Associating them with past statements by the Soviet Government regard-\ning the internal situation which has proven false;\nii. Proving that the Soviet internal propaganda with respect to the free world\nis but a reflection of the Soviet system - not a picture of the free world.\nSuggested Theme (to support 3a):\n(1) The demonstrable falsity of Soviet internal propaganda is proof of the especial disdain\nof the leaders for the people.\n(2) Years of massive propaganda effort has not killed the instinctive ability of the people\nto distinguish between true and false; by attempting to debase truth, the regime has really\nenhanced its value.\nSuggested Themes (to support 3b):\n(1) \"A small clique of scheming rulers who oppress and exploit the majority of the popula-\ntion.\" The United States, where people can and do change governments through free elections,\nor the USSR?\n(2) \"Inhuman exploitation of the working class.\" The United States, where workers live\nwell - are free to strike for higher wages, have free labor unions to represent their interests.-\ncan change jobs at will - or the USSR?\n- 5 -\nDECLASSIFIED\nE. O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)\nDept. of State letter, 2-23-76\nBy NLT- HC, NARS Date 10.20.76\nCONFIDENTIAL\n(3) \"Suppression of the truth and monopoly control of the press.\" The United States,\nwhere all are free to criticize the government and anybody can print anything, or the USSR?\n(4) The classical counter-argument of Wall Street control of the U.S. Press should be\nanswered by emphasizing the multiplicity and vanity of opinions of U.S. newspapers, mag-\nazines, etc.\nTask 4.\n4. To break down the feelings of isolation and abandonment on the part of persons\nnon-sympathetic to the regime.\nNOTE: All tasks under Objective II are directed at breaking down the feeling of isolation\nof the Soviet peoples. Task 4. has a special application to those who may be af-\nfected by news from defectors, news of the organization of \"Free Russia\"emigre\ngroups, and reports from the emigre press. Defectors should be handled strictly\nin accordance with special guidances on the subject. Other emigre subjects also\nmust be handled with care by USIS operators owing to intricate policy questions\ninvolved. When in doubt about the validity or invalidity of news of this kind, ask\nfor guidance. Do not go beyond news treatment without special guidance.7\nIN SUPPORT OF OBJECTIVE III: Widening the schism which exists between the Soviet\npeoples and their rulers.\nTask 1.\n1. To stimulate conscious thought regarding the basis of Soviet rule in arbitrary\npolice power and intimidation, and to stimulate a realization that by the values of self-\nrespecting men the physical, spiritual and moral conditions under which Soviet citizens\nare forced to live are unjust and unnecessary.\nCAUTION: This is the task most easily implemented. Do not overdo it. The purpose\nis to stimulate a consciousness of tyranny among those who might become inured to it\nor not know what goes on beyond their own personal horizon.\nSuggested Themes:\n(a) One of the oldest crimes against the people of the Soviet Union has been the slave\nlabor system, but it never before operated with such vast inhumanity. Stress should be\nplaced on the wide range of offenses for which people are sent to prison camps, rather than\non the mere fact that they exist. Without including such offenses, USSR would not have the\nnecessary prison manpower nor would it be an effective tool of terrorism. (N.B, Because\nof American legal aspects involved, make extra effort to keep abreast of special guidances\non this subject.)\n(b) Allegedly an idealistic blueprint of reeducating the wrongdoer, the Soviet penal\nsystem is, in fact, a cruel instrument for economic exploitation of the populace and of dis-\nposition of embarrassing elements.\n(c) Every family in Russia has felt the burden of this instrument, which is as brutally\ndesigned to keep the population in a state of terror as it is to inflict physical enslavement.\nE. O. DECLASSIFIED 11652. Sec. 3(E) and S(D) or (E)\n- 6 -\nDept. of State letter 8-23-76\nBy NARS Date 102076\nGONFIDENTIAL\nCONFIDENTIAL\n(d) The resentment created by Soviet rule makes necessary for its own protection and\nthe exploitation of its subject people the largest oppressive police mechanism in history,\nmany times larger and more complex than the largest police force of the Tsars.\n(e) Labor camps are only the final stage in a system, the whole purpose of which is to\nenslave the peoples of the Soviet Union in the interests of their masters.\n(f) First freedom of speech was lost, now freedom of silence:\ni. The MVD blackout of the mind is so complete that the Russian is not permitted\nto see, hear, learn, or even think anything which is not approved by the Kremlin.\nii. In an MVD-operated world, not even silence is golden nor safe unless a Russian\nvoices his approval of the regime he is likely to run afoul of the police. (The citizen is\ncondemned to a lifetime of enthusiasms.)\niii. The MVD blinders seek to prevent the Russians from even seeing what actually\ngoes on in their own country as well as in the free world.\niv. The Soviet citizen has no right of arriving at conclusions through objective\ndiscussion.\nV. All thought is cast in dictated channels and no deviation may be made for fear of\narrest and retaliation.\nvi. Intellectual integrity is impossible for anyone who wants to get along in the USSR.\nvii. Brute force has replaced intellectual persuasion in establishing convictions.\nviii. The Politburo is insisting on dragging the cultural level of the Soviet peoples\ndown to its own level; i.e., Stalin's influence on music, Zhdanov on the \"Leningrad writers.\"\nix. The Kremlin is attempting to prevent the Soviet peoples from reaching that stage\nof educational and intellectual development which would enable them to understand,\nintellectually oppose, and defend themselves against the Kremlin's tactics.\nTasks 2. and 3.\n2. To destroy the Soviet-fostered myth of Stalin as an all-wise semi-deity and point up\nthe fact that he, in conjunction with the Politburo, is responsible for the intolerable conditions\nunder which the population of the USSR live.\n3. Avoiding any pointless character attacks, to establish Stalin's responsibility for the\nunprincipled exploitation of the Russian peoples; to establish his use of a false philosophy alien\nto those peoples to mislead them.\nCAUTION: These tasks must be used with restraint.\nSuggested Themes:\n(a) Lenin's testament is a shrewd and accurate appraisal of Stalin as a ruthless power\nseeker.\n- 7 -\nDECLASSIFIED\nB.O. 11652, Sec. 3(11) and (ii)\nDept. of State lieur. 23.76\nCONFIDENTIAL\nBy NLT. HE NARS Date 10.20-76\nCONFIDENTIAL\n(b) Stalin has used his position as means to build his arbitrary and selfish power.\n(c) Stalin has ruthlessly eliminated all rivals.\n(d) Stalin's purge of officer corps on eve of war eliminated thousands of patriotic\nRussians whose absence cost the Soviet people dearly in untold, unnecessary casualties in\nWorld War II.\n(e) Stalin's pact with Hitler was a costly blunder for the Soviet peoples, giving Nazis\nsignal to open war, concentrate against and destroy the original allied front on the continent -\na front for whose re-creation Stalin later pleaded.\n(f) Military leaders and the people - not Stalin - organized victorious Russian offensives\nagainst Nazis. In both war and peace Stalin is unscrupulously prodigal with the lives of the\nSoviet people.\n(g) Just as Stalin's propaganda organs claim credit for all alleged improvements in\nstandard of living of Russian people since 1917, so must actual hardships and sufferings of\nthe people be laid at his door.\n(h) After World War II, Stalin and his clique deliberately threw away the respect and\nfriendship in the free world for the USSR, which the peoples had earned for the Kremlin by\ntheir sacrifices and heroism in the war.\n(i) If Marxism-Leninism is a scientific theory, why hasn't anyone been able to describe\nthe \"basic principles\" governing the Soviet economy?\nWhy did the USSR start out the extreme \"militant communism,\" reverse its field com-\npletely in the NEP, and only then start five-year plans?\nWhy did Soviet leaders first try to replace the family as the basis of Soviet society and\nthen have to reinstate it?\nWhy did they first try to put the army on a fraternal basis, and then have to reintroduce\ntraditional military discipline?\nWhy was it right to have political commissars in the army at one moment, and wrong\nthe next?\nTask 4.\n4. To demonstrate the consistently illusory nature of Soviet promises of improved\nmaterial conditions of life in Russia and the falsity of claims to having created living\nconditions better than those in the free world.\nCAUTION: Handle with care. Living standards have improved relatively at certain\nperiods, but only at the whim of the regime.\nE. DECLASSIFIED 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)\nDept. O. of State letter, Aug.\n- 8 - -\nBy NLT- HC NARS Date/D-20-76\nCONT IDENTIAL\nCONFIDENTIAL\nSuggested Themes:\n(a) Are conditions in the USSR better now - food, clothing, homes, freedom - really a\nfulfillment of the promises that have been held out ever since the Revolution? Ask the parents\nwho sacrificed because they believed their children would be better off.*\n(b) Do the working classes and peasants of the USSR live better than did the working\nclasses of Eastern Europe and Germany? Ask the soldiers who saw_those areas during\nWorld War II.\n(c) What is the real value of a day's work in the Soviet Union in terms of what a worker\ncan buy with his pay compared to the worker in the free nations?\n(d) If the working classes and peasants of the USSR live better than their counterparts\nin Germany and Austria, why are Soviet occupation troops confined to barracks? Why are\nordinary Soviet citizens not allowed to visit those areas?\n(e) If the working classes and peasants of the USSR live better than their counterparts\nin the free world, why are they not permitted to visit those areas freely?\n(f) How many more generations will be sacrificed on the false altar of a better life in\nthe future? When will the individual be permitted to work toward a better life for himself\nand his family right now?\nTask 5.\n5. To demonstrate that the Soviet people, the Soviet army, and the natural wealth\nof the USSR are being ruthlessly exploited by Stalin and the Politburo in the interest of\nincreasing and extending their power in the name of World Communism and against the\ninterest of the country and the people.\nSuggested Themes:\n(a) The workers and peasants of the USSR are deprived of the fruit of their labor and\ntheir productivity is reduced in a rich land because:\ni. Their leaders are unscrupulous and too thirsty for power to delegate authority;\nthey have eńmeshed the nation in a blundering bureaucracy.\nii. The wealth of their factories goes into armaments for extension of the power\nof the regime.\niii. The produce of their fields is sold to support this aggression.\niv. Millions of their young men are held in military service, not to defend Russia,\nbut to serve as unwilling tools of the aggressors.\n*\nSuch social improvements as they have are less than those obtained by peoples of the West\nand are bumbling, bureaucratic and unworkable in real practice.\nDECLASSIFIED\n- 9 -\nE.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)\nDept. of State letter, 8.23.76\nCONFIDENTIAL\nBy NLT. HC NARS Date 10.20.76\nCONFIDENTIAL\nV. Inefficient and corrupt administration of the national economy and the hostility\nof workers and peasants prevents development of countries' potentialities.\n(b) \"One with the plough - seven with the spoon.\" Weapons for aggression in Korea,\nmoney for the comintern, thousands of bureaucrats - millions of police all on the backs of the\nRussian people.\n(c) The patriotism and devotion of the Russian and his countrymen of other races are\nprostituted for purposes of aggression in ways and places foreign to those peoples and not in\ntheir interest.\n(d) The Army, traditionally a weapon of defense of the Russian peoples, has been and will\nbe, ruthlessly sacrificed by Stalin and his cohorts in the name of international communist\naggression.\nTask 6.\n6. To exploit the widespread dislike of rural populations for the obligatory col-\nlective farm system and focus rural resentment on the Soviet regime which imposes\ncollectivization as an instrument of political control.\nSuggested Themes:\n(a) Lenin's promises to the peasant of land and freedom - peace, land, and bread - - have\nnot been kept.\n(b) The peasant has always been a special object of Stalin's cruelty and exploitation.\n(c) The onerous state taxes in kind and other levies deprive the peasant of the fruit of\nhis labor.\n(d) The bureaucracy deprives the peasant of proper medical care, education, and\nconsumer goods.\n(More to come)\nTask 7.\n7. To exploit among Soviet women woman's traditional fear and dislike of war,\ntheir resentment at their special exploitation by the regime and the failure to give them\nthe promised equality with men; to associate their fears and resentment with regime's\naggressive intentions.\nSuggested Themes:\n(a) There is a shortage of marriageable men in the USSR now; aggressive war will\nneedlessly cost the lives of millions more.\n(b) Marriage and home life, already difficult, will become impossible.\nDECLASSIFIED\n10 -\nE. O. 11632. Sec. 3(E) and 8-23-76 5(D) of (E)\nD.pr. of State letter. Aug-9,1973\nBy NLT- He NARS Date 810.20.76\nCONFIDENTIAL\n(c) The dual burden on women will be intensified - child bearer, with no time to raise\nchildren - factory or field worker without time for proper rest, much less to get real enjoy-\nment out of one's life on this earth.\n(d) Woman's equality under the Soviet regime means being forced to work for deliberately\nlow wages and high prices.\n* The systematized attack on Stalinism - Leninism - Marxism is omitted from this paper\nas it is a task which has been assigned to a special unit.\nDECLASSIFIED\nE.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and S(D) or (E)\nDept. of State letter,\n- 11 -\nBy NLT. HC , NARS\nCONFIDENTIAL"
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