Memorandum to President Carter from Zbigniew Brzezinski Regarding Memorandum from Turner on Hostage Negotiations

This document is a December 2, 1980 White House memorandum from Zbigniew Brzezinski to President Carter regarding a memorandum from Stan Turn to President Carter on hostage negotiations.

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SECRET 1: MORANDI M THE WHITE not SE 4 WASHINGTON SECRET , December 2, 1980 MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT FROM: 255. , ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI SUBJECT: Memorandum from Turner on Hostage Negotiations I enclose a memorandum from Stan Turner, recommending a reconsider- ation of our negotiating tactics. I know that you feel deep personal responsibility for getting the hostages out before your term ends, and I share it. The latest U.S. response is an imaginative effort to square our own legal and moral responsibilities with Iranian political needs as we understand them. Clearly, we have gone the second mile in keeping the negotiations alive. If this latest proposal succeeds in breaking the logjam, you will have performed an invaluable service to the American people and the incoming Administration by resolving the issue. However, if the Iranians maintain their position of inflexibility, any further effort on our part to sustain this effort could only be at the expense of whittling away at our own position. Not only is that unlikely to achieve release of the hostages, but it also invites public attack by the next Administra- tion. If the hostages are not out by January 20, Reagan will have the choice either to accept the continuation of a complex and uncertain negotiating process or to wipe the slate clean and take a fresh start. He will be in a position to argue that we have so weakened the U.S. case that he either (a) has to toughen it up and hold fast; or (b) that we have made it impossible for him to obtain an honor- able solution. Even if the hostages were released prior to January 20, on the basis of a new set of U.S. concessions, we could expect to be charged later with having agreed to a settlement which in effect indemnifies Iran rather than the U.S. victims. In light of these considerations, if Christopher's mission does not precipitate a solution, I believe it might be tactically more effective to tell the Iranians quite explicitly that no further SECRET Rvw. on December 2, 1986 DECLASSIFIED Per; Rac Project SECRET ESON; NLC-15-77-8-3-0 BY B NARA.DATE 5/19/2015