Memorandum to President Carter from Zbigniew Brzezinski Regarding Memorandum from Turner on Hostage Negotiations
This document is a December 2, 1980 White House memorandum from Zbigniew Brzezinski to President Carter regarding a memorandum from Stan Turn to President Carter on hostage negotiations.
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OCR Page 1 of 3SECRET
1: MORANDI M
THE WHITE not SE
4
WASHINGTON
SECRET
,
December 2, 1980
MEMORANDUM FOR:
THE PRESIDENT
FROM:
255.
,
ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI
SUBJECT:
Memorandum from Turner on Hostage
Negotiations
I enclose a memorandum from Stan Turner, recommending a reconsider-
ation of our negotiating tactics.
I know that you feel deep personal responsibility for getting the
hostages out before your term ends, and I share it. The latest
U.S. response is an imaginative effort to square our own legal
and moral responsibilities with Iranian political needs as we
understand them. Clearly, we have gone the second mile in keeping
the negotiations alive. If this latest proposal succeeds in
breaking the logjam, you will have performed an invaluable service
to the American people and the incoming Administration by resolving
the issue. However, if the Iranians maintain their position of
inflexibility, any further effort on our part to sustain this
effort could only be at the expense of whittling away at our own
position. Not only is that unlikely to achieve release of the
hostages, but it also invites public attack by the next Administra-
tion.
If the hostages are not out by January 20, Reagan will have the
choice either to accept the continuation of a complex and uncertain
negotiating process or to wipe the slate clean and take a fresh
start. He will be in a position to argue that we have so weakened
the U.S. case that he either (a) has to toughen it up and hold fast;
or (b) that we have made it impossible for him to obtain an honor-
able solution. Even if the hostages were released prior to
January 20, on the basis of a new set of U.S. concessions, we
could expect to be charged later with having agreed to a settlement
which in effect indemnifies Iran rather than the U.S. victims.
In light of these considerations, if Christopher's mission does
not precipitate a solution, I believe it might be tactically more
effective to tell the Iranians quite explicitly that no further
SECRET
Rvw. on December 2, 1986
DECLASSIFIED
Per; Rac Project
SECRET
ESON; NLC-15-77-8-3-0
BY B NARA.DATE 5/19/2015