Possible Responses to Iranian Decision to Put the Hostages on Trial
This document is an undated (circa January 4, 1980) draft memorandum from U.S. Secretary of State Edmund S. Muskie to President Carter regarding possible responses to Iranian decision to put the hostages on trial.
Images (8)
Document
| id |
id
23914406
|
|---|---|
| contentType |
contentType
document
|
| identifierLocal |
identifierLocal
14A
|
| source |
source
import
|
Source image fields (6)
Extracted text
OCR Page 1 of 8SECRET
DRAFT
Revised .14
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON
14A
SECRET/SENSITIVE
SECRET-
TO:
The President
FROM :
Edmund S. Muskie
SUBJECT:
Possible Responses to Iranian Decision
to Put the Hostages on Trial
Our strategy in trying to stave off trials has combined
two elements: (1) Each time there has been increased talk of
trials in Tehran, we have mounted a campaign of approaches by
a number of governments to Iranian authorities to show the dis-
approval of the world community. (2) We have on one occasion
sent a private message threatening further U.S. action.
Our approach has been to react quickly as soon as talk of
trials begins in an effort to move the Iranians off that course
before they are locked into it. In the present situation, we
have already sent two cables to 46 capitals urging a new round
of public statements and approaches. Other governments are
also limited in their ability to influence the revolutionary
leadership in Iran, but one group of ambassadors--with the
European Community as the nucleus-plans a meeting with Rajai
on January 5. We have particularly communicated our concern
to Ambassador Lang.
The transition in Washington, of course, injects a new
element into the situation. In addition to the desire for
the hostages' sake to keep all options open for the new
Administration, some of the threats or actions mentioned
below would require the explicit support of the Reagan Ad-
ministration to assure that they would be followed through.
We assume our highest priority is to keep a negotiating
track open as long as that is realistic and possible, but
this paper addresses the contingency that negotiations are
fading and trials seem imminent.
-SECRET/SENSITIVE
DECLASSIRIED
Per; Rac Project
ESDN; NLC-6-31-9-5-6
SECRET
BY. P NARA, DATE 7/21/15