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{
    "localId": "23914366",
    "label": "Memorandum to President Carter from Zbigniew Brzezinski Regarding Memorandum from Turner on Hostage Negotiations",
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    "id": "23914366",
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    "contentType": "document",
    "title": "Memorandum to President Carter from Zbigniew Brzezinski Regarding Memorandum from Turner on Hostage Negotiations",
    "description": "This document is a December 2, 1980 White House memorandum from Zbigniew Brzezinski to President Carter regarding a memorandum from Stan Turn to President Carter on hostage negotiations.",
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    "collections": [
        "Records of the Office of the National Security Advisor (Carter Administration)",
        "Zbigniew Brzezinski's Office Files"
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            "logicalDate": "1980-12-02",
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    "seq": 3,
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    "type": "document",
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    "ocrText": "SECRET\nVE MORANDUM\nTHE WHITE HOU SE\n4\nWASHINGTON\nSECRET\nDecember 2, 1980\nMEMORANDUM FOR:\nTHE PRESIDENT\n25.\nFROM:\nZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI\nSUBJECT:\nMemorandum from Turner on Hostage\nNegotiations\nI enclose a memorandum from Stan Turner, recommending a reconsider-\nation of our negotiating tactics.\nI know that you feel deep personal responsibility for getting the\nhostages out before your term ends, and I share it. The latest\nU.S. response is an imaginative effort to square our own legal\nand moral responsibilities with Iranian political needs as we\nunderstand them. Clearly, we have gone the second mile in keeping\nthe negotiations alive. If this latest proposal succeeds in\nbreaking the logjam, you will have performed an invaluable service\nto the American people and the incoming Administration by resolving\nthe issue. However, if the Iranians maintain their position of\ninflexibility, any further effort on our part to sustain this\neffort could only be at the expense of whittling away at our own\nposition. Not only is that unlikely to achieve release of the\nhostages, but it also invites public attack by the next Administra-\ntion.\nIf the hostages are not out by January 20, Reagan will have the\nchoice either to accept the continuation of a complex and uncertain\nnegotiating process or to wipe the slate clean and take a fresh\nstart. He will be in a position to argue that we have SO weakened\nthe U.S. case that he either (a) has to toughen it up and hold fast;\nor (b) that we have made it impossible for him to obtain an honor-\nable solution. Even if the hostages were released prior to\nJanuary 20, on the basis of a new set of U.S. concessions, we\ncould expect to be charged later with having agreed to a settlement\nwhich in effect indemnifies Iran rather than the U.S. victims.\nIn light of these considerations, if Christopher's mission does\nnot precipitate a solution, I believe it might be tactically more\neffective to tell the Iranians quite explicitly that no further\nSECRET\nRvw. on December 2, 1986\nASSIFIED\nPer; Rac Project\nSECRET\nESDN; NLC-\n15-77-8-3-0\nBY\nB\nNARA DATE\n5/19/2015\nSECRET\nSECRET\n-2-\nadjustments in the U.S. position are possible, that Iran has to\nbe prepared to suffer some financial loss just as the U.S. side\nhas suffered a great deal of human cost, and that any further\nnegotiations will have to be conducted with the next Administra-\ntion. In his talks with the Algerians, Christopher has done a\ngood job of putting to rest any thoughts that a Reagan Adminis-\ntration will be more forthcoming. We could add to that pressure\na bit by hinting indirectly that the U.S. may become more\nsympathetic to the Iraqi side in the conflict.\nNothing is certain in this process, but it is not impossible\nthat the prospect of dealing with a new Administration, together\nwith concern that the United States may be drawing closer to\nIraq, might give the Iranians the necessary incentive to make\nsome of the difficult political decisions which they are\npresently evading.\nSECRET\nSECRET"
}