Ask the Scholar

{
    "localId": "193676",
    "label": "USSR: Vienna meeting: Background documents, 1953-1961: General",
    "core": "doc",
    "dtoType": "document",
    "citationUrl": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/193676"
}

{
    "id": "193676",
    "sourceUrl": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/193676",
    "contentType": "document",
    "title": "USSR: Vienna meeting: Background documents, 1953-1961: General",
    "description": "This file contains materials collected by the office of President John F. Kennedy's secretary, Evelyn Lincoln, concerning the Soviet Union. Materials in this file include newspaper articles, background papers on nuclear science and possible cooperative space exploration projects, a summary of a telephone conversation between President Kennedy and French President General Charles de Gaulle, an itinerary for President Kennedy's trip to Vienna, Austria, and copies of a joint statement issued by the President and Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev concerning nuclear weapons, disarmament, and Germany following discussions in Vienna. The majority of this file consists of telegrams and memoranda to President Kennedy from Cabinet members and advisors regarding suggested strategies for discussing subjects such as nuclear weapons, disarmament, Berlin, and Laos with Premier Khrushchev.",
    "citationUrl": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/193676",
    "identifierLocal": "JFKPOF-126-001",
    "collections": [
        "Papers of John F. Kennedy: Presidential Papers: President's Office Files",
        "Country Files"
    ],
    "subjects": [
        "Soviet Union",
        "Khrushchev, Nikita Sergeevich, 1894-1971",
        "International relations"
    ],
    "iiifBase": "https://s3.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/opastorage/live/76/1936/193676/content/presidential-libraries/kennedy/POF/JFKPOF-126-001/JFKPOF-126-001-p0002.jpg",
    "thumbnailUrl": "https://s3.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/opastorage/live/76/1936/193676/content/presidential-libraries/kennedy/POF/JFKPOF-126-001/JFKPOF-126-001-p0002.jpg",
    "largeImageUrl": "https://s3.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/opastorage/live/76/1936/193676/content/presidential-libraries/kennedy/POF/JFKPOF-126-001/JFKPOF-126-001-p0002.jpg",
    "imageCount": 129,
    "hasImages": true,
    "source": "import",
    "hasTranscription": false
}

{
    "url": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/193676",
    "naId": 193676,
    "coverageEndDate": {
        "day": 21,
        "logicalDate": "1961-06-21",
        "month": 6,
        "year": 1961
    },
    "coverageStartDate": {
        "day": 13,
        "logicalDate": "1961-04-13",
        "month": 4,
        "year": 1961
    },
    "itemCount": 22,
    "levelOfDescription": "fileUnit",
    "recordType": "description",
    "ocrSource": "nara-archive"
}

{
    "seq": 84,
    "pageIndex": 0,
    "type": "photo",
    "url": "https://s3.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/opastorage/live/76/1936/193676/content/presidential-libraries/kennedy/POF/JFKPOF-126-001/JFKPOF-126-001-p0085.jpg",
    "mediaId": "fad6afa272b85f1a",
    "ocrText": "LIMIT\nDISTRIBUTION\n30\n- 2\nspreading, and thereby moving from one category to another. . Support by\nthe Soviet Union of \"wars of national liberalization\" -- an extremely\nflexible definition at best - is entirely incompatible with the professed\nSoviet desire for peaceful co-existence.\nWhile Khrushchev will probably not be too receptive to any-\nthing to do with the United Nations, nonetheless the only ground rules for\nco-existence which exist in a jointly agreed document are in the Charter\nitself, which specifically binds its signatories to refrain in their inter-\nnational relations from the threat or use of force, except in individual or\ncollective self-defense, and to settle their international disputes by peace-\nful means. It should be pointed out that the attempt to advance the communist\ncause by small internal wars, i.e. wars of national liberation,\nis a\ncertain path towards world war if consistently followed, in the state of the\nworld today. This is the logic of any such Soviet position and no amount\nof tactical skill or self-deception could obscure this reality.\nThe United States is a great power, and the Soviet Union is a\ngreat power. The United States is very cognizant of this fact and does not\nand will not seek to confront a great power, i.e. the Soviet Union, with a\nseries of intolerable choices which would involve either the acceptance of\ninternational political defeat, or the recourse to war as a means of averting\nit. The Soviet Union, for its part, should recognize the same reality in\nregard to the United States. Quite apart from the subjective will of its\nleaders, it is not realistic to believe that a great power can accept a\nsuccession of attempted or actual political defeats without at some point\nin the process having recourse to its great power.\nWhile concentrating on the responsibilities and interests\nof the Soviet Union as a great power, at some point in the discussion the\nduality of Soviet operations in the foreign field should be brought out, but\nonly, as indicated above, as the function of or in relation to its national\npolicy. Reference should be made, in this connection, to the incompatibility\nbetween the public utterances of Khrushchev as the leader of the Soviet\nState and the positions taken and the views expressed in his January sixth\nspeech as head of the dominant party in the world communist movement, with\nparticular reference in the latter document to the violent and distorted\nstatements of hostility towards the United States as a country. On\nspecific issues, the following line of approach is suggested:\na) Germany and Berlin\nStemming from the general considerations outlined above, it\ncould be said to Khrushchev that he should not expect that the United States\nand its allies would accept the political defeat involved in the loss or\nweakening of their existing position in Berlin. We have firm obligations\nand solemn commitments in this matter and to give them up or to permit\nthem to be eroded would constitute a political defeat in Europe, which would\nbe quite intolerable and unacceptable to a great power, no matter what\nthe consequences\nLIMIT\nDISTRIBUTION"
}