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{
    "localId": "193676",
    "label": "USSR: Vienna meeting: Background documents, 1953-1961: General",
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    "citationUrl": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/193676"
}

{
    "id": "193676",
    "sourceUrl": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/193676",
    "contentType": "document",
    "title": "USSR: Vienna meeting: Background documents, 1953-1961: General",
    "description": "This file contains materials collected by the office of President John F. Kennedy's secretary, Evelyn Lincoln, concerning the Soviet Union. Materials in this file include newspaper articles, background papers on nuclear science and possible cooperative space exploration projects, a summary of a telephone conversation between President Kennedy and French President General Charles de Gaulle, an itinerary for President Kennedy's trip to Vienna, Austria, and copies of a joint statement issued by the President and Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev concerning nuclear weapons, disarmament, and Germany following discussions in Vienna. The majority of this file consists of telegrams and memoranda to President Kennedy from Cabinet members and advisors regarding suggested strategies for discussing subjects such as nuclear weapons, disarmament, Berlin, and Laos with Premier Khrushchev.",
    "citationUrl": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/193676",
    "identifierLocal": "JFKPOF-126-001",
    "collections": [
        "Papers of John F. Kennedy: Presidential Papers: President's Office Files",
        "Country Files"
    ],
    "subjects": [
        "Soviet Union",
        "Khrushchev, Nikita Sergeevich, 1894-1971",
        "International relations"
    ],
    "iiifBase": "https://s3.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/opastorage/live/76/1936/193676/content/presidential-libraries/kennedy/POF/JFKPOF-126-001/JFKPOF-126-001-p0002.jpg",
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    "naId": 193676,
    "coverageEndDate": {
        "day": 21,
        "logicalDate": "1961-06-21",
        "month": 6,
        "year": 1961
    },
    "coverageStartDate": {
        "day": 13,
        "logicalDate": "1961-04-13",
        "month": 4,
        "year": 1961
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    "seq": 85,
    "pageIndex": 0,
    "type": "photo",
    "url": "https://s3.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/opastorage/live/76/1936/193676/content/presidential-libraries/kennedy/POF/JFKPOF-126-001/JFKPOF-126-001-p0086.jpg",
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    "ocrText": "SECRET LIMIT ISTRIBUTION\n30\n- 3 -\nIt should be pointed out that the entire situation in Germany is\nabnormal, that that of Berlin as a city is abnormal, and that we cannot\naccept use characterization of one part of an abnormal situation as its\nsole abnormality. The situation in Germany has existed since the end\nof the war, and while unsatisfactory to all concerned, any change would\nhave to be an improvement, or at least no worse, from the point of view\nof all concerned -- the Western allies, the people of West Berlin, as\nwell as the Soviet and East German side. In a situation as delicately\nbalanced as the situation in Germany, the side which seeks to change it\nto its advantage and to the detriment of the other side is the one that\nassumes the responsibility for the risks to peace inherent in such a\ncourse of action.\nThe standard Soviet argument concerning the necessity of\ndoing away with the \"vestiges of the war\" is obviously a formalistic state-\nment of the position and cannot be accepted. The real vestige of the war\nto be corrected is the division of Germany, but since this realistically\ndoes not seem to be an immediate possibility, the delicate balance should\nnot be upset. If ways of improving the situation without detriment to any\nof the parties concerned could be found, we would be prepared to consider\nany such suggestion. The proposal for a \"free West Berlin\" does not\nsatisfy these criteria, since it would appear to make very little sense,\neven from a Soviet point of view, unless it brought them certain advantages\nwith corresponding disadvantages to the Western Powers and the people of\nWest Berlin, which would not be tolerable for the reasons given above.\nOne possibility might be to return to the 144 agreement and to\nsee if the statute then outlined for all Berlin could not be reinstituted\nwith certain agreed modifications One other course of action would be,\nif Khrushchev feels he must proceed with a peace treaty with the GDR, to do\nso leaving unchanged the obligations of the Four Powers in regard to West\nBerlin. We would not subscribe to such a peace treaty, but its conclusion\nleaving West Berlin in statu quo might be a possibility.\nb) Disarmament\nIt would be well to focus the disarmament discussion on the\ncurrent test ban negotiations since these are the only actual negotiations\nin progress in this field which, theoretically at least, should offer a\nprospect for agreement. The chief obstacle for agreement at the present\ntime is the retrogression by the Soviet side in introducing the doctrine\nof a Three-Power Committee with individual veto power in place of a single\nadministrator selected for his objectivity as an international civil\nservant.\nKhrushchev should be questioned on this point as to how any\nsuch mechanism could possibly operate, since a veto power would render\nineffective, and indeed ridiculous, the entire concept of an objective\nsystem of international verification and control. He should be pushed\nLIMIT DISTRIBUTION"
}